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ABSTRACT	  THE	  ECONOMY	  EFFECT	  SEPTEMBER	  2015	  JEREMY	  WOLF,	  B.A.,	  SIMON’S	  ROCK	  COLLEGE	  OF	  BARD	  Ph.D.,	  UNIVERSITY	  OF	  MASSACHUSETTS	  AMHERST	  Directed	  by:	  Professor	  Barbara	  R.	  Cruikshank	  This	  dissertation	  focuses	  on	  the	  production	  of	  “the	  economy”	  as	  a	  structural	  effect.	  Following	  the	  work	  of	  Timothy	  Mitchell,	  JK	  Gibson-­‐Graham,	  Michel	  Foucault,	  and	  others	  who	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  relatively	  recent	  innovation,	  this	  dissertation	  traces	  its	  development,	  and	  examines	  some	  of	  the	  implications	  that	  such	  a	  claim	  might	  have	  for	  contemporary	  politics.	  The	  dissertation	  begins	  by	  identifying	  a	  set	  of	  six	  characteristics	  that	  characterize	  the	  contemporary	  economy.	  Chapter	  1	  reviews	  relevant	  literature	  regarding	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  theorize	  objects	  that	  are	  produced	  and	  contingent,	  but	  nevertheless	  real,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  concepts	  of	  “structural	  effect”	  and	  “materialization.”	  Chapter	  2	  is	  an	  etymology	  of	  the	  economy,	  which	  substantiates	  the	  claim	  that	  “the	  economy”	  is	  much	  newer	  than	  we	  tend	  to	  assume	  and	  provides	  some	  detail	  about	  the	  process	  by	  which	  we	  came	  to	  understand	  it	  as	  a	  given.	  Chapter	  3	  examines	  the	  practice	  of	  “reading	  back”	  our	  contemporary	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy	  on	  thinkers	  whose	  work	  precedes	  it,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  Adam	  Smith.	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5	  are	  analyses	  of	  the	  “green”	  and	  “sharing”	  economies	  respectively,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  (and	  reasons	  for	  which)	  efforts	  to	  modify	  the	  economy	  might	  succeed	  or	  fail.	  These	  chapters	  also	  contain	  a	  review	  of	  the	  relevant	  literature	  on	  conceptual	  innovation,	  along	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  might	  think	  of	  efforts	  to	  alter	  the	  structural	  effect	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  attempts	  to	  innovate	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  economy.	  This	  approach	  opens	  possibilities	  for	  change	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy	  and	  other	  structural	  effects,	  but	  can	  also	  make	  us	  aware	  of	  some	  of	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  such	  attempts,	  including	  the	  possibility	  that	  they	  will	  result	  not	  in	  conceptual	  innovation,	  but	  instead	  simply	  in	  a	  broadening	  of	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  economy	  effect.	  The	  dissertation	  concludes	  with	  some	  thoughts	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  might	  resist	  this	  tendency	  toward	  cooptation	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  real	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy.	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  1	  
INTRODUCTION	  	  	   This	  project,	  like	  so	  many,	  seeks	  to	  serve	  multiple	  purposes	  at	  once.	  On	  one	  level	  (and	  this	  is	  the	  level	  at	  which	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  text	  will	  operate)	  it	  seeks	  to	  intervene	  (or	  perhaps,	  more	  accurately,	  through	  it	  I	  seek	  to	  intervene)	  in	  the	  ongoing	  process	  of	  producing,	  reproducing,	  and	  maintaining	  the	  economy	  as	  structural	  effect	  that	  serves	  to	  constrain	  the	  possibilities	  for	  political	  action	  by	  functioning	  as	  an	  absolute	  limit	  beyond	  which	  politics	  cannot	  reach.	  In	  this	  effort	  I	  will	  start	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  we	  may	  [view]	  language	  as	  an	  arsenal	  of	  discursive	  assets	  out	  of	  which	  are	  fabricated	  structures	  of	  intelligibility	  that	  shape	  our	  valuations	  and	  limit,	  but	  also	  constrain	  and	  determine,	  what	  is	  comprehensible	  and	  what	  is	  obscure,	  what	  is	  familiar	  and	  what	  is	  strange.	  (Schoolman,	  x)	  	  Following	  this	  assumption,	  I	  will	  seek	  to	  trace	  the	  history	  of	  this	  particular	  fabricated	  structure,	  with	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  has	  served	  to	  constrain	  and	  determine	  the	  appearance	  of	  reasonableness	  for	  political	  projects	  ranging	  from	  the	  interpretation	  of	  historical	  texts	  to	  efforts	  to	  reconfigure	  the	  logic	  and	  structure	  of	  economic	  activity.	  The	  project	  will	  be,	  as	  it	  must	  be,	  a	  scholarly	  inquiry	  rooted	  in	  research	  and	  analysis,	  a	  block	  in	  the	  much	  larger	  structure	  of	  the	  edifice	  of	  political	  theory	  and	  economic	  and	  conceptual	  history.	  	   Any	  such	  project,	  however,	  must	  start	  from	  a	  spark	  in	  the	  author’s	  mind,	  a	  wish	  to	  know	  that	  is	  so	  profound	  that,	  while	  it	  may	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  goals	  enumerated	  above	  (and	  indeed,	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  should	  be)	  must	  also	  be	  something	  more.	  Each	  of	  us	  have	  questions	  that	  gnaw	  at	  us,	  attributes	  of	  the	  world	  around	  us	  that	  just	  don’t	  make	  sense,	  mysteries	  that	  we	  must	  at	  least	  attempt	  to	  solve	  if	  we	  have	  any	  hope	  of	  feeling	  at	  home	  in	  the	  world.	  Such	  a	  question,	  such	  a	  desire,	  lies	  at	  
	  2	  
the	  heart	  of	  this	  project.	  	   I	  was	  twenty	  years	  old	  when	  I	  graduated	  from	  a	  miniscule	  liberal	  arts	  college	  in	  Western	  Massachusetts	  and	  moved	  to	  New	  York	  City.	  Like	  so	  many	  recent	  graduates,	  I	  felt	  sure	  that	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  world’s	  problems	  was	  clear	  and	  unproblematic,	  and	  that	  all	  it	  might	  require	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  the	  (to	  my	  mind)	  obvious	  solution(s)	  was	  a	  clear,	  consistent,	  and	  patient	  effort	  to	  explain	  my	  insights	  to	  others	  who	  did	  not	  (yet)	  share	  them.	  Of	  course,	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  this	  is	  not	  actually	  the	  case	  are	  not	  the	  mystery	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  project.	  The	  folly	  of	  youth,	  in	  this	  regard,	  is	  well	  chronicled.	  As	  I	  worked	  my	  way	  through	  a	  number	  of	  jobs	  that	  I	  hoped	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  opportunity	  I	  sought	  to	  communicate	  my	  unique	  insight	  to	  the	  world,	  however,	  the	  real	  mystery	  began	  to	  take	  a	  vague	  shape	  in	  my	  psyche.	  	   Chief	  among	  the	  experiences	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  this	  mystery	  was	  my	  work	  as	  a	  labor	  organizer.	  I	  worked	  in	  the	  research	  department	  of	  a	  major	  textile	  union	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  and	  then	  for	  several	  years	  as	  an	  organizer	  for	  a	  health	  care	  union	  in	  Southern	  New	  England.	  When	  I	  decided	  to	  return	  to	  school,	  I	  chose	  an	  institution	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  strength	  in	  my	  field	  of	  study,	  offered	  an	  opportunity	  to	  continue	  my	  work	  as	  an	  organizer	  through	  involvement	  with	  the	  union	  that	  represented	  graduate	  employees.	  I	  ran	  into	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  conundrums	  in	  each	  of	  these	  jobs,	  but	  I	  think	  it	  might	  be	  best	  summarized	  through	  relating	  one	  particular	  experience	  I	  had	  while	  I	  was	  working	  as	  an	  organizer	  for	  the	  graduate	  employee’s	  organization.	  	  	   I	  sat	  across	  the	  table	  from	  the	  director	  of	  Health	  Services	  at	  a	  large,	  public	  university,	  discussing	  a	  set	  of	  changes	  to	  the	  student	  health	  insurance	  plan.	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The	  plan	  had	  been	  changed	  so	  that	  students,	  who	  in	  the	  past	  had	  not	  been	  responsible	  for	  any	  payments	  other	  than	  their	  premiums	  as	  long	  as	  they	  received	  care	  “in	  network,”	  were	  now	  responsible	  for	  15%	  of	  their	  own	  health	  care	  costs,	  after	  premiums,	  up	  to	  a	  plan	  year	  maximum	  of	  $5,000.	  This	  was	  a	  substantial	  change	  that	  many	  of	  those	  affected	  believed	  really	  amounted	  to	  an	  elimination	  of	  insurance	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  payment	  assistance	  model.	  For	  students	  with	  a	  $15,000	  annual	  income,	  there	  was	  essentially	  no	  way	  to	  budget	  for	  the	  potential	  $5,000	  in	  annual	  medical	  expenses.	  	  	   This	  change	  was	  particularly	  perplexing	  as	  it	  was	  apparent	  from	  documents	  the	  university	  had	  shared	  with	  the	  student	  organization	  I	  was	  representing	  that	  Health	  Services	  was	  already	  profitable	  prior	  to	  these	  plan	  changes.	  Moreover,	  our	  premiums	  weren’t	  going	  down	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  changes;	  in	  fact,	  they	  were	  going	  up,	  though	  not	  as	  much	  as	  the	  university	  wished	  us	  to	  believe	  they	  would	  have	  without	  the	  changes.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  meeting,	  it	  began	  to	  become	  clear	  that	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  change	  was	  that	  it	  altered	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  school	  and	  the	  insurance	  company	  that	  underwrites	  the	  policy	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  allow	  Health	  Services	  to	  “capture”	  an	  additional	  few	  million	  dollars	  per	  year	  in	  revenue.	  	  	   Why,	  we	  asked,	  was	  it	  necessary	  for	  Health	  Services	  at	  a	  public	  university	  to	  increase	  its	  revenue	  when	  it	  was	  already	  achieving	  its	  mission	  of	  providing	  health	  care	  to	  the	  campus	  community	  while	  doing	  better	  than	  breaking	  even?	  The	  answer,	  we	  were	  told,	  was	  that	  the	  building	  housing	  Health	  Services	  was	  more	  than	  50	  years	  old,	  and	  those	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  organization,	  which	  is	  required	  to	  be	  “revenue	  neutral”	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  larger	  university,	  believed	  that	  the	  additional	  revenue	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“captured”	  by	  this	  change	  would	  be	  necessary	  in	  the	  future	  for	  the	  repair	  or	  replacement	  of	  the	  structure.	  They	  suggested	  that,	  “in	  this	  economy,”	  there	  was	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  state	  or	  the	  University	  would	  come	  through	  with	  the	  funds	  necessary	  to	  build	  a	  new	  building,	  and	  so	  they	  had	  decided	  to	  fund	  the	  project	  themselves	  by	  following	  the	  growing	  trend	  in	  health	  insurance	  toward	  “cost-­‐shifting.”	  	   This	  language	  of	  “the	  economy”,	  I	  realized	  as	  I	  thought	  back	  on	  this	  a	  moment	  later,	  set	  off	  a	  sort	  of	  logical	  chain	  reaction	  in	  my	  thoughts	  (and,	  it	  seemed,	  the	  thoughts	  of	  my	  co-­‐negotiators)	  that	  was	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  short	  circuit	  or	  counteract.	  If	  “the	  economy”	  dictated	  that	  Health	  Services	  was	  unlikely	  to	  get	  outside	  funding	  for	  a	  new	  building,	  and	  if	  a	  new	  building	  was	  required,	  then	  there	  was	  really	  very	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  find	  another	  way	  to	  fund	  the	  building.	  There	  was	  still	  room	  left,	  of	  course,	  to	  fight	  over	  who	  should	  bear	  the	  cost	  of	  this	  building,	  but	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  “the	  economy”	  made	  it	  unlikely	  that	  funding	  would	  come	  from	  any	  source	  other	  than	  those	  who	  pay	  to	  use	  Health	  Services.	  Had	  management	  told	  us	  instead	  that	  it	  was	  the	  “political	  climate”	  that	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  secure	  outside	  funding,	  we	  would	  have	  suggested	  that	  a	  joint	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  students,	  workers,	  and	  management	  might	  have	  been	  able	  to	  alter	  that	  climate	  through	  careful	  planning.	  However,	  such	  a	  claim	  with	  respect	  to	  “the	  economy”	  seemed	  absurd;	  how	  could	  we	  hope	  to	  alter	  this	  seemingly	  inexorable	  force	  through	  coordinated	  activity?	  I	  realized	  that,	  in	  this	  context,	  suggesting	  that	  we	  might	  alter	  “the	  economy”	  would	  have	  sounded	  as	  absurd	  as	  a	  suggestion	  that	  we	  might	  alter	  the	  weather.	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   This	  argument	  put	  the	  group	  I	  was	  representing	  in	  a	  difficult	  spot.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  no	  one	  wants	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  Health	  Services	  building	  shouldn’t	  be	  repaired	  or	  replaced	  if	  such	  action	  is	  necessary.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  had	  the	  strong	  feeling	  that	  if	  such	  a	  project	  was	  necessary,	  it	  shouldn’t	  be	  financed	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  our	  secure	  access	  to	  health	  care	  in	  the	  present.	  One	  thing	  that	  made	  the	  situation	  really	  difficult	  from	  a	  tactical	  perspective	  was	  that	  we	  didn’t	  have	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  combat	  Health	  Services’	  argument	  that	  “the	  economy”	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  rely	  on	  historically	  available	  sources	  of	  funding	  for	  things	  like	  health	  care	  and	  building	  maintenance.	  We	  could	  show	  that	  they	  had	  lied	  to	  us,	  that	  they	  had	  misrepresented	  their	  reasons	  for	  changing	  our	  plan	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  and	  that	  they	  did	  not	  seem	  particularly	  concerned	  that	  the	  new	  plan	  would	  severely	  limit	  our	  access	  to	  health	  care,	  but	  we	  knew	  that	  even	  with	  all	  of	  this	  evidence,	  we	  would	  still	  run	  up	  against	  those	  “realists”	  who	  would	  scoff	  at	  our	  complaints	  and	  brush	  them	  all	  away	  with	  the	  same	  line	  about	  how	  “the	  economy”	  makes	  such	  changes	  necessary	  and	  inevitable.	  	   This	  interaction	  itself	  was	  in	  no	  way	  novel,	  which	  is	  part	  of	  why	  the	  feeling	  of	  powerlessness	  that	  I	  experienced	  as	  a	  result	  has	  had	  such	  a	  profound	  and	  long-­‐lasting	  effect	  on	  me.	  Thinking	  back,	  for	  example,	  to	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  tax	  reform	  plan	  Bill	  Clinton	  proposed	  early	  in	  his	  first	  term	  as	  President,	  one	  could	  find	  a	  similar	  logic	  at	  work.	  The	  (ostensibly)	  left-­‐leaning	  Center	  on	  Budget	  and	  Policy	  Priorities	  (CBPP),	  for	  example,	  issued	  a	  report	  on	  tax	  proposals	  in	  July	  of	  1997	  that	  contrasted	  the	  House	  and	  Senate	  plans	  with	  the	  one	  proposed	  by	  the	  President.	  Both	  the	  House	  and	  Senate	  plans,	  according	  the	  CBPP,	  assumed	  a	  rate	  of	  growth	  that	  was	  “more	  than	  double	  the	  projected	  rate	  of	  growth	  in	  the	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product,	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the	  basic	  measure	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  U.S.	  economy.”	  In	  contrast,	  the	  President’s	  plan	  was	  deemed	  superior	  because	  it	  did	  “not	  grow	  in	  cost	  in	  future	  years	  at	  rates	  that	  exceed[ed]	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  economy	  …	  [was]	  expanding”	  (Greenstein	  and	  Lav,	  1997).	  The	  authors	  of	  this	  report	  assumed	  (probably	  correctly)	  that	  their	  readers	  would	  understand	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  given,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  immutable	  parameters	  with	  which	  a	  realistic	  tax	  plan	  must	  be	  expected	  to	  operate.	  	  This	  view	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  entirely	  uncomplicated.	  Consider	  the	  following	  lines	  from	  a	  Washington	  Post	  article	  in	  1999	  detailing	  Clinton’s	  veto	  of	  a	  tax	  cut	  proposed	  by	  Republican	  Congressional	  leaders:	  Unable	  to	  override	  the	  veto,	  Congress’s	  GOP	  leaders	  face	  an	  uneasy	  choice.	  They	  can	  bargain	  with	  Clinton	  for	  a	  smaller	  tax	  cut	  package	  –	  totaling	  perhaps	  $300	  billion	  –	  which	  they	  have	  called	  too	  stingy.	  Or	  they	  can	  risk	  being	  labeled	  a	  “do-­‐nothing”	  Congress	  and	  try	  to	  convince	  voters	  next	  year	  that	  the	  president	  and	  his	  fellow	  Democrats	  unwisely	  blocked	  major	  tax	  cuts	  when	  the	  economy	  was	  booming.	  Many	  economists	  and	  budget	  experts,	  meanwhile,	  say	  the	  impasse	  would	  benefit	  the	  economy	  by	  making	  it	  easier	  to	  pay	  down	  the	  federal	  debt,	  while	  giving	  policymakers	  more	  time	  for	  a	  full-­‐throttle	  debate	  on	  the	  best	  uses	  of	  future	  surpluses.	  (Pianin	  and	  Babbington,	  1999)	  	  Here	  we	  can	  see	  two	  related,	  but	  distinct,	  discourses	  of	  the	  economy	  at	  work	  in	  the	  same	  discussion.	  The	  first	  mention	  of	  “the	  economy”	  treats	  it	  is	  a	  factor	  that	  is	  external	  to	  political	  activity,	  but	  that	  should	  be	  expected	  to	  influence.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  the	  failure	  to	  cut	  taxes	  during	  a	  period	  in	  which	  “the	  economy	  was	  booming”	  might	  be	  analogous	  to	  the	  failure	  to	  plant	  additional	  crops	  during	  a	  period	  in	  which	  the	  weather	  was	  unusually	  well	  suited	  to	  growing	  crops.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  very	  next	  sentence	  the	  authors	  suggest	  a	  competing	  (or	  at	  least	  different)	  viewpoint.	  Experts,	  they	  tell	  us,	  think	  the	  failure	  to	  cut	  taxes	  could	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“benefit	  the	  economy”	  by	  allowing	  policy	  makers	  to	  reduce	  the	  debt	  and	  engage	  in	  further	  planning.	  The	  implication	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  external	  force,	  but	  rather	  something	  over	  which	  at	  least	  some	  (powerful)	  people	  have	  some	  modicum	  of	  control.	  Even	  from	  this	  perspective,	  however,	  “the	  economy”	  appears	  as	  an	  object	  to	  be	  managed	  through	  a	  process	  that	  is	  simultaneously	  imbued	  with	  the	  utmost	  political	  significance	  and	  fraught	  with	  uncertainty,	  even	  on	  the	  part	  of	  experts.	  This	  becomes	  even	  clearer	  in	  the	  final	  mention	  of	  “the	  economy”	  in	  this	  piece:	  “Many	  experts	  say	  policymakers	  have	  failed	  to	  address	  several	  important	  questions,	  such	  as	  whether	  the	  long-­‐term	  surplus	  forecasts	  will	  hold	  up	  and	  whether	  a	  major	  tax	  cut	  could	  overheat	  the	  economy”	  (ibid).	  The	  economy	  must	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  object	  with	  which	  a	  given	  policy	  will	  interact,	  and	  our	  understanding	  of	  its	  contours	  and	  dynamics	  directly	  influences	  the	  types	  of	  policy	  proposals	  that	  we	  understand	  as	  realistic	  and	  productive.	  	  These	  discourses	  directly	  contributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  members	  of	  my	  organization	  had	  been	  lied	  to	  about	  the	  reasons	  for	  a	  change	  that	  would	  have	  a	  substantial	  material	  effect	  on	  their	  own	  well-­‐being,	  from	  the	  moment	  “the	  economy”	  was	  brought	  into	  play	  as	  an	  unavoidable	  reason	  for	  the	  change,	  I	  could	  be	  confident	  that	  any	  effort	  to	  combat	  this	  change	  would	  be	  met	  by	  resistance	  not	  only	  from	  outside	  the	  organization,	  but	  also	  from	  within.	  Such	  resistance	  could	  not	  be	  chalked	  up	  to	  ignorance	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  situation,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  double-­‐edged	  swords	  of	  a	  union	  of	  graduate	  students	  is	  that	  they	  have	  the	  capacity,	  the	  will,	  and	  the	  time	  to	  analyze	  and	  research	  every	  issue	  that	  comes	  before	  them	  ad	  nauseum.	  Nor	  could	  it	  be	  attributed	  to	  apathy,	  as	  we	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were	  regularly	  successful	  in	  mobilizing	  large	  numbers	  of	  members	  to	  resist	  policies	  that	  had	  much	  less	  impact	  on	  their	  lives,	  but	  which	  were	  not	  so	  securely	  linked	  to	  the	  language	  and	  logic	  of	  the	  economy.	  It	  was	  clear	  to	  me,	  on	  a	  visceral	  level,	  that	  there	  was	  something	  going	  on	  with	  “the	  economy”	  that	  required	  further	  investigation.	  	   So,	  here	  we	  reach	  the	  fundamental	  mystery	  that,	  for	  me,	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  project.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  exposure	  to	  convincing	  and	  thoughtful	  post-­‐structuralist	  critiques	  of	  Marx	  and	  his	  contemporaries,	  I	  reject	  the	  idea	  of	  “false	  consciousness”	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  presupposes	  not	  only	  a	  real,	  objective	  truth	  underlying	  reality,	  which	  each	  individual	  either	  correctly	  or	  incorrectly	  accesses,	  but	  also	  the	  existence	  of	  some	  individual	  or	  individuals	  who	  can	  tell	  the	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  kinds	  of	  people.	  Because	  of	  my	  rejection	  of	  this	  idea,	  I	  also	  don’t	  have	  much	  sympathy	  for	  political	  questions	  that	  take	  the	  form	  of	  “why	  does	  this	  person	  or	  group	  of	  people	  do	  (or	  fail	  to	  do)	  X	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  doing	  (or	  not	  doing)	  X	  is	  clearly	  against	  their	  own	  objective	  self-­‐interest?”	  If	  we	  reject	  the	  idea	  of	  objective	  (that	  is,	  clearly	  legible	  from	  the	  outside)	  self-­‐interest,	  such	  a	  question	  becomes	  nonsensical.	  Instead,	  however,	  we	  might	  ask,	  “What	  kind	  of	  understanding	  of	  the	  world,	  what	  kind	  of	  subjective	  experience	  of	  possibility	  and	  constraint,	  is	  necessary	  for	  such	  a	  course	  of	  action	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  an	  individual’s	  perception	  of	  their	  own	  self-­‐interest?”	  To	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  and	  to	  focus	  more	  closely	  on	  the	  question	  at	  hand,	  what	  work	  must	  the	  economy	  do,	  what	  effect	  must	  it	  have,	  in	  order	  to	  structure	  the	  calculation	  of	  constraint	  and	  possibility	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  individuals	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  determine	  that	  a	  course	  of	  action	  that	  decreases	  their	  subjective	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well-­‐being	  (such	  as	  the	  changes	  to	  health	  benefits	  described	  above)	  constitutes	  a	  best-­‐case	  scenario,	  and	  is	  thus	  not	  worth	  resisting?	  	   Such	  a	  shift	  has	  some	  important	  implications.	  First,	  by	  getting	  rid	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  “objective	  self-­‐interest,”	  we	  also	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  idea,	  noted	  above,	  that	  all	  we	  need	  to	  do	  in	  order	  to	  effect	  political	  change	  is	  to	  clearly	  explain	  to	  others	  why	  we	  have	  perfect	  access	  to	  the	  truth	  about	  their	  objective	  self-­‐interest.	  Political	  change,	  in	  this	  view,	  is	  not	  the	  result	  of	  demonstrating	  to	  others	  the	  error	  of	  their	  ways	  (at	  least,	  not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  argument).	  Equally	  importantly,	  this	  shift	  requires	  that	  we	  each	  relinquish	  the	  potential	  moral	  high	  ground	  of	  a	  belief	  that	  we	  are	  warriors	  on	  the	  side	  of	  truth,	  seeking	  to	  express	  to	  others	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  flaws	  in	  their	  understanding.	  Instead,	  we	  are	  each	  left	  in	  the	  more	  vulnerable,	  but	  also	  more	  flexible,	  position	  of	  fighting	  not	  for	  Truth	  and	  Justice	  in	  some	  objective	  sense,	  but	  instead	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  world	  that	  we	  prefer.	  	  Bruno	  Latour	  makes	  the	  argument	  that	  critical	  theory	  has,	  historically,	  done	  a	  poor	  job	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  distinction	  between	  “facts”	  and	  “concerns”	  (as	  he	  terms	  them)	  because	  critical	  theorists	  tend	  to:	  …debunk	  objects	  they	  don’t	  believe	  in	  by	  showing	  the	  productive	  and	  projective	  forces	  of	  people;	  then,	  without	  ever	  making	  the	  connection,	  they	  use	  objects	  they	  do	  believe	  in	  to	  resort	  to	  the	  causalist	  or	  mechanist	  explanation	  and	  debunk	  conscious	  capacities	  of	  those	  	  whose	  behavior	  they	  don’t	  approve	  of.	  (2004,	  240-­‐241)	  	  	  That	  is,	  for	  Latour,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  critical	  theory	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  destabilizing	  those	  “facts”	  to	  which	  it	  objects	  (in	  his	  example,	  religion	  or	  hegemony)	  while	  simultaneously	  (and	  apparently	  without	  consciousness	  of	  the	  contradiction)	  defending	  and	  depending	  upon	  the	  objectivity	  of	  those	  facts	  that	  it	  wishes	  to	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support	  (e.g.	  the	  science	  of	  climate	  change).	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  failing	  into	  such	  a	  trap,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  the	  economy	  not	  as	  a	  lie	  that	  has	  been	  perpetrated	  against	  the	  masses,	  but	  neither	  as	  an	  inevitable	  truth.	  Instead,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  a	  thing	  that	  is	  real,	  but	  that	  is	  real	  because	  it	  is	  produced	  and	  maintained	  by	  the	  activities	  of	  real	  people	  performing	  real	  actions.	  To	  make	  this	  claim	  about	  the	  economy	  is	  not,	  therefore,	  to	  banish	  or	  unmask	  it,	  but	  instead	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  part	  of	  a	  class	  of	  constructed	  objects	  (or	  as	  I	  will	  suggest	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  structural	  effects)	  that	  are	  at	  once	  “much	  too	  strong	  to	  be	  treated	  [merely]	  as	  fetishes	  and	  much	  too	  weak	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  indisputable	  causal	  explanations	  of	  some	  unconscious	  action”	  (242).	  	  	  	   We	  might	  say,	  then,	  that	  each	  of	  us	  is	  engaged	  every	  day	  in	  the	  process	  by	  which	  we	  collectively	  generate	  the	  context	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  have	  some	  shared	  conception	  of	  the	  possibilities	  for	  political	  action	  that	  are	  available	  to	  us,	  and	  of	  the	  constraints	  within	  which	  the	  possibilities	  must	  be	  seen	  to	  operate.	  	  This	  context	  includes	  those	  constructed	  objects	  (or,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  “effects”)	  that	  serve	  to	  establish	  both	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for,	  and	  the	  limits	  of,	  our	  perception	  of	  political	  possibility,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  within	  such	  a	  context	  that	  calculations	  of	  self-­‐interest	  can	  even	  begin	  to	  become	  intelligible	  and	  predicable.	  To	  return	  to	  our	  initial	  example,	  no	  one	  would	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  individuals	  benefit	  from	  acceding	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  their	  healthcare	  costs	  that	  comes	  with	  no	  corresponding	  improvement	  in	  service.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  possible,	  but	  probable,	  that	  when	  faced	  with	  the	  choice	  of	  acceding	  to	  such	  a	  demand	  or	  doing	  battle	  with	  the	  apparently	  inexorable	  forces	  of	  the	  economy	  (which	  set	  constraints	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on	  what	  we	  understand	  to	  be	  realistic	  political	  goals),	  many	  will	  decide	  that	  there	  is	  no	  way	  they	  can	  win,	  and	  that	  they	  may	  as	  well	  save	  their	  effort	  for	  fights	  in	  which	  they	  have	  a	  chance.	  	  	   The	  mystery,	  then,	  is	  how	  the	  economy	  came	  to	  be	  such	  a	  powerful,	  and	  (nearly)	  universally	  shared,	  component	  of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  we	  establish	  such	  constraints.	  That	  is,	  how	  did	  the	  economy	  come	  to	  be	  as	  an	  object	  that	  has	  the	  real	  effect	  of	  transforming	  otherwise	  desirable	  political	  goals	  into	  unrealistic	  aspirations.	  Additionally,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  I	  will	  address	  the	  question	  of	  how	  such	  an	  object	  might	  be	  altered	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  for,	  or	  even	  perhaps	  encourage,	  the	  kinds	  of	  changes	  that	  political	  actors	  who	  oppose	  the	  status	  quo	  seek	  to	  make.	  This	  project	  will	  take	  up	  these	  questions	  as	  they	  pertain	  to	  the	  production	  of	  “the	  economy”	  in	  Britain	  and	  the	  United	  States.1	  While	  I	  hope	  that	  this	  discussion	  will	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  political	  scientists,	  economists,	  and	  economic	  and	  conceptual	  historians,	  it	  is	  not	  written	  for	  them;	  instead	  it	  is	  written	  for	  those	  students	  and	  activists	  in	  search	  of	  a	  frame	  through	  which	  to	  think	  about	  the	  power	  of	  “the	  economy”	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  power	  might	  be	  resisted	  or	  repurposed	  in	  order	  to	  move	  toward	  goals	  that	  advance	  the	  causes	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  justice.	  I	  hope	  that	  this	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  union	  and	  community	  organizers	  who	  are	  frustrated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  examination	  is	  limited	  to	  these	  two	  countries	  because	  of	  the	  intimate	  relationship	  between	  questions	  regarding	  the	  emergence	  and	  function	  of	  concepts,	  and	  questions	  regarding	  the	  emergence	  and	  function	  of	  language	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Williams,	  1985;	  Austin,	  1975;	  Koselleck,	  2002;	  or	  Skinner,	  1999).	  While	  it	  may	  well	  be	  the	  case	  (and	  indeed,	  I	  suspect	  that	  it	  is)	  that	  similar	  dynamics	  are	  at	  play	  in	  other	  places,	  to	  substantiate	  such	  a	  claim	  would	  require	  a	  parallel	  analysis	  in	  languages	  other	  than	  English	  that	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  current	  project.	  By	  limiting	  the	  scope	  of	  analysis	  to	  the	  US	  and	  Britain,	  I	  can	  ensure	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  discourses	  concerning	  the	  production,	  maintenance,	  reproduction,	  and	  function	  of	  the	  economy,	  both	  dominant	  and	  oppositional,	  share	  at	  least	  a	  common	  basis	  in	  language.	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by	  the	  difficulty	  of	  organizing	  for	  political	  action	  around	  issues	  that	  are	  commonly	  understood	  to	  be	  economic	  in	  character,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  those	  who	  have	  become	  jaded	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  effective	  political	  action	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  inevitable	  influence	  of	  “the	  economy”	  on	  political	  outcomes.	  I	  also	  hope	  that	  it	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  those	  teachers,	  particularly	  in	  classes	  that	  seek	  to	  introduce	  students	  to	  concepts	  like	  “the	  economy”	  and	  “the	  political”,	  who	  are	  looking	  for	  ways	  to	  help	  their	  students	  think	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  power	  operates	  in	  reference	  to	  these	  and	  other	  produced	  or	  inscribed	  objects.	  Perhaps,	  I	  will	  suggest,	  if	  we	  can	  see	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  highly	  contingent	  history	  of	  “the	  economy”	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  the	  possibilities	  for	  political	  action	  has	  come	  to	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  inevitable,	  we	  might	  also	  begin	  to	  perceive	  the	  future	  as	  open	  to	  our	  influence	  in	  ways	  that	  previously	  seemed	  closed.	  While	  I	  will	  not	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  understanding	  the	  economy	  as	  contingent	  and	  constructed	  makes	  its	  effects	  any	  less	  real,	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  such	  an	  understanding	  allows	  us	  to	  think	  critically	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  operates	  to	  constrain	  political	  action,	  and	  that	  such	  a	  critical	  examination	  is	  vital	  for	  any	  effort	  to	  resist	  the	  tendency	  for	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  economy	  to	  absorb	  and	  neutralize	  proposed	  alternatives.	  If	  we	  wish	  to	  destroy,	  to	  escape,	  or	  to	  alter	  the	  constraints	  posed	  by	  the	  economy,	  we	  must	  first	  understand	  what	  they	  are	  and	  how	  they	  operate.	  It	  is	  only	  by	  starting	  with	  such	  an	  understanding	  that	  we	  might	  undertake	  an	  active	  campaign	  to	  engage	  in	  (and	  promote)	  practices	  that	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  result	  in	  conceptual	  change	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy	  (see	  Chapter	  4).	  Again,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  wiping	  away	  false	  consciousness2;	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  simply	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  It’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  an	  argument	  against	  positions	  that	  assume	  false	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to	  unmask	  the	  economy.	  The	  analysis	  below	  will	  not,	  on	  its	  own,	  change	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  any	  way.	  Instead,	  I	  hope	  this	  analysis	  will	  prove	  useful	  to	  those	  who	  already	  wish	  to	  challenge	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  political	  possibility	  by	  suggesting	  some	  strategies	  for	  participating	  in	  its	  construction	  and	  maintenance	  in	  a	  deliberate,	  goal-­‐oriented	  manner.	  Understanding	  the	  economy	  as	  constructed,	  in	  short,	  doesn’t	  make	  it	  disappear,	  but	  it	  does	  make	  it	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  malleable	  than	  we	  might	  otherwise	  assume.	  	  Additionally,	  I	  intend	  this	  investigation	  to	  be	  useful	  to	  those	  who	  are	  more	  broadly	  interested	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  ideas	  and	  practices	  can	  come	  together	  to	  form	  things	  that,	  while	  neither	  natural	  nor	  inevitable,	  are	  nonetheless	  real.	  The	  story	  of	  how,	  in	  a	  scant	  250	  years,	  “economy”	  could	  have	  gone	  from	  a	  rarely	  used	  term	  denoting	  thrift	  to	  the	  name	  of	  a	  concept	  considered	  to	  be	  so	  important	  that	  one	  would	  have	  to	  be	  stupid	  in	  order	  to	  fail	  to	  understand	  its	  supreme	  importance	  in	  national	  elections	  is,	  to	  my	  mind,	  a	  fascinating	  one,	  and	  I	  hope	  the	  reader	  will	  agree.	  I	  want	  to	  make	  an	  argument	  here,	  to	  be	  sure,	  because	  I	  believe	  the	  stakes	  to	  be	  quite	  high	  indeed	  and	  I	  want	  to	  advance	  my	  position,	  but	  I	  also	  want	  to	  tell	  a	  story,	  for	  three	  reasons.	  First,	  no	  author	  wants	  to	  write	  something	  that	  no	  one	  will	  ever	  read,	  and	  I	  am	  not	  immune	  to	  this	  feeling.	  Second,	  and	  more	  important,	  there	  is	  a	  way	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  consciousness	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  require	  us	  to	  jettison	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  might	  be	  truths	  out	  there	  for	  the	  uncovering;	  instead	  it	  requires	  us	  to	  jettison	  the	  idea	  that	  these	  truths	  might	  be	  related	  to	  the	  actual	  interests	  of	  individuals.	  So,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  project	  at	  hand,	  one	  needn’t	  rely	  on	  false	  consciousness	  to	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  revelation	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  something	  other	  than	  natural	  and	  inevitable	  can	  have	  real	  political	  effects	  (particularly	  for	  those	  who	  are	  already	  seeking	  to	  resist	  its	  demands).	  One	  would,	  however,	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  false	  consciousness	  to	  make	  the	  claim	  that,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  such	  a	  revelation,	  people	  will	  immediately	  change	  their	  courses	  of	  action	  because	  they	  will	  realize	  they	  have	  been	  deluded.	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which	  narrative	  can	  be	  powerful	  that	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  emulate	  in	  strictly	  analytical	  prose.	  A	  story	  can	  draw	  the	  reader	  in,	  showing	  her	  what	  analytical	  prose	  alone	  could	  only	  tell	  her.	  Third,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  important	  of	  all,	  the	  story	  of	  the	  economy	  is	  in	  some	  ways	  itself	  about	  narrative.	  The	  kind	  of	  reality	  that	  the	  economy	  has	  achieved	  would	  have	  been	  impossible	  without	  the	  stories	  we	  tell	  ourselves	  about	  it	  all	  the	  time,	  whether	  they	  be	  part	  of	  the	  history	  of	  ideas,	  the	  evening	  news,	  the	  economics	  curriculum	  at	  the	  local	  college,	  a	  debate	  over	  taxes,	  or	  the	  conflict	  between	  workers	  and	  employers	  at	  the	  bargaining	  table.	  By	  telling	  a	  story	  about	  how	  we	  came	  to	  tell	  these	  stories	  in	  this	  way,	  and	  about	  how	  we	  might	  tell	  them	  differently,	  I	  hope	  that	  I	  can	  enter	  into	  the	  fray	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  my	  argument	  as	  accessible	  as	  possible	  to	  as	  many	  readers	  as	  possible.	  	  	   To	  this	  end,	  I	  will	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  five	  chapters.	  In	  the	  first	  chapter	  I	  will	  look	  at	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  other	  theorists	  have	  sought	  to	  understand	  objects	  that	  are	  at	  once	  real	  and	  constructed,	  and	  I	  will	  make	  a	  case	  that	  we	  should	  think	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  object	  (a	  materialization)	  that	  is	  produced	  through	  a	  “structural	  effect.”	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  will	  investigate	  the	  etymology	  of	  “the	  economy,”	  showing	  that	  it	  did	  not	  come	  into	  common	  usage	  until	  well	  into	  the	  20th	  Century,	  through	  a	  process	  linked	  to	  processes	  as	  diverse	  as	  the	  development	  of	  the	  discipline	  of	  economics,	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  British	  East	  India	  Company.	  Chapter	  3	  will	  provide	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  read	  the	  economy	  back	  onto	  authors	  whose	  work	  precedes	  its	  production,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Adam	  Smith.	  Finally,	  in	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5	  I	  will	  examine	  some	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SORTING	  OUT	  WORDS	  AND	  THINGS	  
A.	  Introduction	  	   In	  order	  to	  undertake	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  serves	  to	  constrain	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  possibility	  for	  political	  action,	  we	  must	  first	  attempt	  to	  sort	  out	  exactly	  what	  sort	  of	  thing	  the	  economy	  is.	  We	  can	  begin	  this	  project	  by	  looking	  at	  one	  example	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  talk	  about	  “the	  economy.”	  In	  late	  2008,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Programme	  launched	  the	  Green	  Economy	  Initiative,	  which	  “consists	  of	  several	  components	  whose	  collective	  overall	  objective	  is	  to	  provide	  the	  analysis	  and	  policy	  support	  for	  investing	  in	  green	  sectors	  and	  in	  greening	  environmentally	  unfriendly	  sectors”	  (UNEP).	  At	  the	  top	  of	  the	  Initiative’s	  cleanly	  designed	  and	  polished	  homepage	  can	  be	  found	  a	  link	  entitled	  “What	  is	  Green	  Economy?”	  Upon	  clicking	  this	  link,	  I	  found	  myself	  reading	  a	  series	  of	  definitions	  and	  explanations	  that	  were	  striking	  not	  so	  much	  for	  their	  contents	  as	  for	  their	  omissions.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  following	  definition	  of	  “green	  economy,”	  the	  central	  concept	  around	  which	  this	  initiative	  was	  formed:	  …UNEP	  has	  developed	  a	  working	  definition	  of	  a	  green	  economy	  as	  one	  that	  results	  in	  improved	  human	  well-­‐being	  and	  social	  equity,	  
while	  significantly	  reducing	  environmental	  risks	  and	  ecological	  
scarcities.	  In	  its	  simplest	  expression,	  a	  green	  economy	  can	  be	  though	  of	  as	  one	  which	  low	  carbon,	  resource	  efficient	  and	  socially	  
inclusive.	  (emphasis	  in	  original)	  	  The	  fascinating	  thing	  about	  this	  definition	  is	  not	  the	  claims	  the	  GEI	  makes	  about	  the	  potentially	  transformative	  effects	  of	  green	  economies,	  but	  rather	  the	  repeated	  definition	  of	  a	  green	  economy	  as	  “one	  that…”	  does	  particular	  things	  or	  has	  given	  attributes.	  This	  is	  a	  definition	  that	  assumes	  we	  all	  already	  know	  what	  an	  economy	  is,	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and	  only	  need	  be	  told	  how	  a	  “green”	  one	  differs	  from	  an	  uncolored	  one	  (that	  is,	  an	  economy	  that	  does	  not	  take	  the	  “green”	  critique	  into	  account).3	  	  	   In	  many	  contexts,	  such	  a	  definition	  would	  be	  unexceptional.	  One	  need	  not,	  for	  example,	  define	  an	  automobile	  in	  order	  to	  point	  out	  what	  makes	  a	  hybrid	  car	  a	  hybrid.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  “the	  economy,”	  however,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  such	  a	  treatment	  contributes	  to	  a	  false	  sense	  of	  solidity,	  beneath	  which	  we	  will	  find	  considerable	  slippage	  and	  contestation	  regarding	  precisely	  what	  we	  mean	  when	  we	  use	  this	  term.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  not	  real,	  or	  that	  it	  is	  illusory,	  but	  rather	  to	  say	  that	  it	  may	  not	  be	  as	  settled	  as	  UNEP’s	  definition	  suggests.	  	   An	  examination	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  setting	  the	  limits	  of	  reasonableness	  for	  political	  action	  requires	  a	  history	  of	  the	  concept.	  We	  cannot	  hope	  to	  find	  a	  way	  out	  of,	  through,	  or	  around	  such	  limits	  if	  we	  don’t	  have	  some	  idea	  of	  what	  they	  are,	  where	  they	  came	  from,	  and	  how	  they	  came	  to	  be.	  In	  short,	  before	  we	  can	  ask	  how	  we	  might	  escape	  the	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  the	  economy,	  we	  must	  first	  ask	  “Do	  we	  really	  know	  what	  an	  economy	  is?”	  	  One	  obvious	  place	  to	  begin	  such	  a	  work	  of	  conceptual	  history	  is	  with	  the	  work	  of	  Quentin	  Skinner,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prolific	  and	  important	  historians	  of	  concepts	  working	  today.	  In	  Liberty	  Before	  Liberalism,	  Skinner	  asks	  “What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  agent	  at	  all?”	  in	  order	  to	  begin	  to	  bring	  to	  light	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  talk	  about	  the	  state	  as	  though	  we	  know	  what	  it	  is,	  despite	  significant	  slippage	  and	  confusion	  in	  our	  uses	  of	  the	  term.	  (109)	  Such	  an	  inquiry,	  he	  suggests,	  has	  value	  because:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  This	  project	  will	  examine	  several	  modifications	  of	  the	  term	  “economy”	  in	  much	  greater	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  4.	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“[a]s	  we	  analyse	  and	  reflect	  on	  our	  normative	  concepts,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  become	  bewitched	  into	  believing	  that	  the	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  them	  bequeathed	  to	  us	  by	  the	  mainstream	  of	  our	  intellectual	  traditions	  must	  be	  the	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  them…	  The	  history	  of	  philosophy,	  and	  perhaps	  especially	  of	  moral,	  social	  and	  political	  philosophy,	  is	  there	  to	  prevent	  us	  from	  becoming	  too	  readily	  bewitched.”	  (116).	  	  	  	  	  By	  tracing	  the	  history	  of	  a	  concept	  such	  as	  liberty,	  for	  example,	  through	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  evolving	  state,	  Skinner	  suggests	  that	  we	  might	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  dominant	  contemporary	  understandings	  of	  such	  concepts	  are	  the	  result	  not	  of	  inevitable	  meaning,	  nor	  of	  a	  steady	  march	  toward	  truth,	  but	  rather	  of	  particular	  choices	  made	  by	  individual	  actors	  in	  distinct	  historical	  contexts.	  Such	  an	  understanding,	  he	  argues,	  can	  “help	  to	  liberate	  us	  from	  the	  grip	  of	  any	  one	  hegemonal	  account	  of	  those	  values	  and	  how	  they	  should	  be	  interpreted	  and	  understood”	  (117).	  That	  is,	  while	  an	  account	  such	  as	  Skinner’s	  cannot	  (nor	  should	  it	  hope	  to)	  displace	  the	  dominant	  contemporary	  understanding	  of	  a	  given	  concept,	  it	  can	  serve	  to	  destabilize	  it	  by	  making	  other	  possible	  understandings	  evident,	  and	  by	  highlighting	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  our	  preference	  for	  one	  understanding	  over	  another	  is	  the	  result	  of	  contingent	  historical	  processes.	  	  Following	  Skinner,	  we	  might	  ask,	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  constraint	  at	  all?	  What	  exactly	  is	  it	  that	  goes	  without	  saying	  when	  we	  speak	  about	  the	  economy,	  and	  how	  do	  these	  assumptions	  constrain	  our	  possibilities	  for	  action?	  For	  Skinner,	  the	  problem	  with	  speaking	  about	  the	  state	  as	  an	  agent	  is	  that	  “we	  have	  inherited	  a	  theory	  which	  we	  continue	  to	  apply,	  but	  which	  we	  do	  not	  really	  understand.”	  The	  problem	  I	  am	  raising	  with	  the	  economy	  is,	  I	  believe,	  slightly	  different.	  Perhaps	  one	  might	  say	  that	  we	  have	  produced	  (or,	  even,	  are	  producing)	  a	  theory	  that	  we	  do	  not	  understand.	  This	  distinction	  is	  important	  because,	  for	  Skinner,	  
	  19	  
the	  solution	  is	  “to	  go	  back	  to	  the	  historical	  juncture	  at	  which	  this	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  politics	  was	  first	  articulated	  and	  developed,”	  in	  order	  to	  “[improve]	  our	  understanding”	  (109).	  	  While	  I	  agree	  that	  reference	  to	  evidence	  produced	  in	  the	  era	  in	  which	  an	  idea	  originated	  is	  important	  to	  any	  history	  of	  a	  concept,	  I	  quibble	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  what	  we	  should	  try	  to	  do	  with,	  for	  example,	  “the	  economy”	  is	  simply	  to	  improve	  our	  understanding	  of	  what	  earlier	  theorists	  were	  doing	  when	  they	  wrote	  it.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  step,	  but	  it	  is	  necessary	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  helps	  us	  get	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  we	  do	  when	  we	  say	  or	  write	  the	  same	  words,	  and	  how	  we	  might	  have	  gotten	  here	  from	  there.	  “The	  economy”	  to	  which	  we	  refer	  today	  may	  not	  be,	  in	  any	  important	  sense,	  the	  same	  as	  the	  economy	  to	  which	  19th	  century	  historicist	  economists	  referred,	  as	  the	  constant	  contestation	  and	  mobilization	  of	  this	  concept	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  repeatedly	  reconstituting	  it.	  While	  Skinner	  might	  not	  disagree	  with	  such	  an	  assertion,	  his	  focus	  is	  on	  re-­‐contextualizing	  the	  historical	  uses	  of	  important	  terms	  and	  concepts,	  while	  my	  focus	  is	  not	  simply	  to	  “understand”	  what	  early	  theorists	  of	  the	  economy	  did	  with	  the	  term,	  but	  to	  examine	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  has	  been	  used	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  concrete	  political	  problems	  by	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  actors,	  resulting	  over	  time	  in	  the	  production	  of	  “the	  economy”	  as	  an	  object	  that	  we	  all	  use,	  but	  which	  is	  quite	  difficult	  to	  look	  at	  directly,	  and	  which	  might	  be	  more	  accurately	  understood	  as	  a	  locus	  of	  multiple,	  conflicted	  meanings	  than	  as	  a	  single,	  settled	  concept.	  We’ll	  return	  shortly	  to	  the	  question	  of	  Skinner’s	  historical	  method,	  but	  first	  I	  think	  a	  little	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  deal	  with	  the	  production	  and	  existence	  of	  such	  an	  object	  would	  be	  helpful.	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B.	  The	  Economy	  Effect	  Timothy	  Mitchell	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  example	  of	  how	  one	  might	  wrestle	  with	  such	  a	  slippery	  object	  in	  his	  treatment	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  “effect”	  (Mitchell,	  1991).	  	  The	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  state	  as	  an	  effect,	  Mitchell	  suggests,	  is	  in	  addressing	  it	  neither	  as	  a	  free-­‐standing	  entity,	  nor	  as	  a	  mere	  phenomenon	  of	  decision	  making,	  but	  instead	  as:	  …an	  effect	  of	  detailed	  processes	  of	  spatial	  organization,	  temporal	  arrangement,	  functional	  specification,	  and	  supervision	  and	  surveillance,	  which	  create	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  world	  fundamentally	  divided	  into	  state	  and	  society.	  The	  essence	  of	  modern	  politics	  is	  not	  policies	  formed	  on	  one	  side	  of	  this	  division	  being	  applied	  to	  or	  shaped	  by	  the	  other,	  but	  the	  producing	  and	  reproducing	  of	  this	  line	  of	  difference.	  (95)	  	  The	  economy,	  I	  will	  suggest,	  is	  in	  some	  ways	  even	  more	  well-­‐suited	  to	  an	  examination	  as	  an	  effect	  than	  the	  state.	  Like	  Mitchell’s	  state,	  the	  economy	  is	  neither	  a	  free-­‐standing	  entity	  nor	  merely	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  decision	  making.	  Also,	  mirroring	  Mitchell’s	  construction,	  we	  might	  very	  reasonably	  suggest	  that	  the	  essence	  of	  modern	  economics	  is	  not	  policies	  formed	  (or	  decisions	  made)	  on	  one	  side	  of	  the	  division	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  rest	  of	  the	  totality	  of	  existence	  being	  applied	  to	  or	  shaped	  by	  the	  other,	  but	  the	  producing	  and	  reproducing	  of	  this	  line	  of	  difference.4	  	  However,	  Mitchell’s	  argument,	  while	  extremely	  useful,	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  constraints	  of	  time	  and	  space	  inherent	  in	  a	  journal	  article.	  He	  suggests	  a	  project	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  state,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  embark	  on	  the	  project	  itself	  (that	  is,	  the	  reexamination	  of	  his	  object	  as	  an	  effect).	  Moreover,	  while	  he	  certainly	  alludes	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  such	  a	  project	  might	  involve	  an	  inquiry	  into	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Mitchell’s	  argument	  about	  the	  state	  effect	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  below.	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effect	  changes	  over	  time	  in	  response	  to	  the	  particular	  needs	  of	  those	  who	  participate	  in	  its	  (re)production,	  he	  does	  not	  even	  begin	  to	  conduct	  such	  an	  inquiry.	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  effect,	  with	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  the	  dividing	  line	  constrains	  the	  possibilities	  for	  political	  action,	  and	  with	  an	  eye	  toward	  the	  process	  by	  which	  such	  production	  (and	  the	  constraints	  that	  go	  along	  with	  it)	  change	  over	  time	  (both	  as	  a	  result	  of	  intentional	  resistance	  and	  as	  the	  unintended	  consequence	  of	  attempts	  to	  resolve	  particular	  political	  problems).	  	  This	  is	  not	  the	  first	  work	  to	  question	  the	  process	  by	  which	  we	  came	  to	  talk	  about	  “the	  economy”	  as	  though	  it	  were	  a	  natural	  thing	  with	  which	  anybody	  engaged	  in	  politics	  would	  necessarily	  need	  to	  reckon,	  or	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  reexamination	  of	  this	  assumption	  might	  open	  new	  political	  possibilities.	  Mitchell,	  for	  example,	  makes	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  invention,	  coming	  into	  common	  usage	  in	  the	  post	  WWII	  era	  (Mitchell,	  1998).	  Raymond	  Williams	  notes	  that	  the	  economy,	  along	  with	  society	  and	  culture,	  is	  a	  “relatively	  recent	  historical	  formulation”	  (1977).	  J.K.	  Gibson-­‐Graham	  suggests	  that:	  	  [The]	  economy	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  ideological	  concept	  susceptible	  to	  intellectual	  debunking,	  but	  a	  materialization	  that	  participates	  in	  organizing	  the	  practices	  and	  processes	  that	  surround	  it,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  being	  organized	  and	  maintained	  by	  them.	  (2006,	  xi)	  	  	  	  That	  is,	  Gibson-­‐Graham	  claims,	  the	  economy	  is	  more	  than	  an	  idea,	  but	  less	  than	  an	  irreducible	  reality;	  instead,	  it	  is	  a	  made	  thing	  that	  also	  has	  a	  role	  in	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  the	  other	  made	  things	  that	  make	  up	  the	  social	  world	  are	  formed	  and	  sustained.	  The	  economy,	  in	  this	  understanding,	  is	  both	  formed	  by	  and	  formative	  of	  the	  practices	  in	  which	  people	  engage	  when	  they	  participate	  in	  political	  activity,	  for	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example,	  or	  social	  activity,	  or	  any	  of	  the	  other	  myriad	  divisions	  and	  sectionings	  by	  which	  we	  codify	  human	  activity.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  by	  looking	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  borders	  and	  contours	  of	  this	  materialization	  are	  drawn,	  defended,	  and	  contested,	  we	  might	  gain	  the	  ability	  to	  ask	  what	  political	  possibilities	  could	  be	  opened	  by	  an	  effort	  to	  redraw	  (or	  even	  undrawn)	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  is	  made	  and	  re-­‐made.	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  conception	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  materialization	  is	  consistent	  with	  our	  discussion	  of	  the	  “economy	  effect.”	  	  As	  I	  noted	  above,	  Mitchell	  suggests	  that	  rather	  than	  attempting	  to	  understand	  the	  state	  as	  a	  discrete	  entity,	  separate	  from	  society,	  we	  instead	  think	  of	  it	  as	  an	  effect.	  The	  appearance	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  discrete	  entity,	  according	  to	  Mitchell’s	  account,	  is	  related	  to	  Foucault’s	  concept	  of	  disciplinary	  power,	  but	  hinges	  on	  an	  aspect	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  that	  Foucault	  did	  not	  explore.	  	  	   Foucault	  describes	  “disciplines”	  as	  consisting	  of	  a	  set	  of	  techniques	  and	  practices	  that	  differ	  from	  previous	  modes	  of	  imposing	  “constraints,	  prohibitions,	  or	  obligations”	  on	  the	  body	  in	  several	  important	  ways	  (Foucault	  1977,	  136).	  First,	  discipline	  operates	  not	  at	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  masses,	  but	  instead	  at	  “retail”	  scale,	  as	  Foucault	  puts	  it;	  discipline	  acts	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual.	  Second,	  discipline	  focuses	  not	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  individual,	  but	  on	  their	  precise	  processes	  and	  exact	  functions;	  “constraint	  bears	  upon	  the	  forces	  rather	  than	  upon	  the	  signs”	  (1977,	  137).	  Finally,	  discipline	  depends	  upon	  “uninterrupted,	  constant	  coercion,	  supervising	  the	  processes	  of	  the	  activity	  rather	  than	  its	  result	  and	  it	  exercised	  according	  to	  a	  codification	  that	  partitions	  as	  closely	  as	  possible	  time,	  space,	  and	  movement”	  (137).	  Mitchell	  sums	  up	  the	  concept	  of	  disciplinary	  power	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nicely,	  noting	  that	  it	  “works	  not	  from	  outside	  but	  from	  within,	  not	  at	  the	  level	  of	  an	  entire	  society,	  but	  at	  the	  level	  of	  detail,	  and	  not	  by	  constraining	  individuals	  and	  their	  actions	  but	  by	  producing	  them”	  (1991,	  93).	  	   The	  result	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  disciplinary	  power	  on	  which	  Foucault	  focuses,	  according	  to	  Mitchell,	  is	  the	  production	  of	  both	  the	  military,	  educational,	  and	  economic	  organizations	  that	  are	  characterized	  by	  “organized	  power”	  and	  the	  individuals	  who	  make	  such	  organizations	  and	  institutions	  possible.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  discipline,	  power	  does	  not	  operate	  from	  above,	  “as	  a	  set	  of	  external	  orders	  or	  prohibitions”	  (1991,	  93).	  Instead,	  the	  individual	  is	  always	  already	  part	  of	  a	  complex	  web	  of	  power	  relations,	  and	  his	  or	  her	  individuality	  is	  inextricably	  wrapped	  up	  in	  the	  relation	  and	  the	  institutions	  that	  create	  and	  are	  created	  by	  them.	  	  	   Mitchell	  argues,	  however,	  that	  disciplinary	  power	  has	  another	  important	  consequence:	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  power	  relations	  become	  internal…	  and	  by	  the	  same	  methods,	  they	  now	  appear	  to	  take	  the	  novel	  form	  of	  external	  structures…	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  the	  modern	  state,	  appearing	  as	  an	  apparatus	  that	  stands	  apart	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  social	  world,	  must	  be	  sought	  in	  this	  novel	  structural	  effect.	  (93)	  	  Using	  the	  same	  example	  that	  Foucault	  uses	  in	  his	  initial	  description	  of	  disciplinary	  power,	  Mitchell	  illustrates	  this	  claim	  by	  reference	  to	  a	  military	  unit.	  Foucault	  makes	  much	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  disciplinary	  techniques	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  produced	  the	  trained,	  disciplined	  soldier.	  The	  same	  set	  of	  practices	  and	  operations	  also	  produced	  “the	  novel	  effect	  of	  the	  armed	  unit	  as	  an	  artificial	  machine”	  (Mitchell	  1991,	  93).	  This	  machine,	  of	  course,	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  any	  literal	  sense	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  soldiers	  of	  whom	  it	  was	  composed;	  its	  appearance	  was	  instead	  “an	  effect	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produced	  by	  the	  organized	  partitioning	  of	  space,	  the	  regular	  distribution	  of	  bodies,	  exact	  timing,	  the	  coordination	  of	  movement,	  the	  combining	  of	  elements,	  and	  endless	  repetition,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  particular	  practices”	  (93).	  This	  is	  the	  same	  process	  that,	  according	  to	  Mitchell,	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  state	  effect.	  To	  say,	  then	  that	  the	  state	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  structural	  effect	  is	  to	  say	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  its	  appearance	  as	  a	  distinct	  apparatus,	  separate	  from	  the	  individuals	  who	  make	  it	  up	  or	  occupy	  its	  positions,	  as	  “the	  powerful,	  metaphysical	  effect	  of	  practices	  that	  make	  such	  structures	  appear	  to	  exist”	  (94).	  	  If,	  taking	  Mitchell’s	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  effect	  into	  account,	  we	  attempt	  to	  think	  about	  the	  economy	  as	  being	  made	  apparent	  by	  such	  a	  structural	  effect5,	  we	  must	  investigate	  the	  specific	  “processes	  of	  spatial	  organization,	  temporal	  arrangement,	  functional	  specification,	  and	  supervision	  and	  surveillance	  which	  create	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  world	  fundamentally	  divided	  into”	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  extra-­‐economic.	  Such	  processes	  might	  include	  the	  maintenance	  of	  national	  accounts,	  the	  judicial	  imposition	  of	  fiduciary	  responsibility,	  the	  incentivization	  of	  individual	  retirement	  investment,	  and	  the	  construction	  and	  enforcement	  of	  the	  tax	  code,	  just	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  	  One	  might	  at	  this	  point	  reasonably	  wonder	  where	  Gibson-­‐Graham’s	  materialization	  comes	  into	  this	  picture.	  While	  the	  materialization	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  structural	  effect	  Mitchell	  describes,	  I	  don’t	  think	  they’re	  exactly	  the	  same	  thing,	  and	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  our	  discussion.	  The	  structural	  effect	  gives	  us	  a	  language	  through	  which	  to	  explain	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  In	  fact,	  Mitchell	  himself	  has	  recently	  made	  a	  similar	  argument.	  See	  Mitchell,	  2014.	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economy	  as	  a	  distinct	  realm	  of	  human	  activity,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  do	  much	  to	  theorize	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  thing	  that	  appears.	  As	  Mitchell	  puts	  it:	  These	  processes	  create	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  state	  not	  only	  as	  an	  entity	  set	  apart	  from	  society,	  but	  as	  a	  distinct	  dimension	  of	  structure,	  framework,	  codification,	  planning,	  and	  intentionality.	  The	  state	  appears	  as	  an	  abstraction	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  concreteness	  of	  the	  social,	  and	  as	  a	  subjective	  ideality	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  objectness	  of	  the	  material	  world.	  The	  distinctions	  between	  abstract	  and	  concrete,	  ideal	  and	  material,	  and	  subjective	  and	  objective,	  which	  most	  political	  theorizing	  is	  built	  upon,	  are	  themselves	  partly	  constructed	  in	  those	  mundane	  social	  processes	  we	  recognize	  and	  name	  as	  the	  state.	  (95)	  	  If	  the	  result	  of	  the	  structural	  effect	  Mitchell	  describes	  is	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  an	  object	  that	  it	  as	  once	  abstract	  and	  concrete,	  ideal	  and	  material,	  subjective	  and	  objective,	  and	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  contributes	  to	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  not	  only	  of	  its	  own	  distinct	  character,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  categories	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  such	  a	  distinction	  may	  be	  made,	  how	  should	  we	  talk	  about	  this	  object?	  We	  might,	  I	  suggest,	  think	  about	  Gibson-­‐Graham’s	  materialization	  as	  the	  object	  given	  appearance	  by	  Mitchell’s	  structural	  effect.	  	  	   However,	  Gibson-­‐Graham	  leave	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  that	  are	  important	  to	  the	  project	  at	  hand	  unaddressed	  in	  their	  articulation	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  materialization.	  They	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  largely	  a	  representative	  or	  linguistic	  object.	  For	  example,	  they	  note	  that:	  	  A	  project	  of	  instituting	  a	  different	  economy	  must…	  produce	  a	  “dislocation,”	  enabling	  a	  recognition	  that	  “other	  economies	  are	  possible.”	  Something	  outside	  the	  given	  configuration	  of	  being	  must	  offer	  itself	  as	  an	  element	  or	  ingredient	  for	  a	  new	  political	  project	  of	  configuring.	  For	  us,	  this	  dislocating	  element	  has	  been	  an	  economic	  language	  that	  cannot	  be	  subsumed	  to	  existing	  ways	  of	  thinking	  economy,	  and	  instead	  signals	  the	  ever-­‐present	  possibility	  of	  remaking	  economy	  in	  alternative	  terms.	  (2006,	  xi)	  	  Gibson-­‐Graham	  go	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  their	  intervention	  has	  been	  “to	  propose	  a	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language	  of	  the	  diverse	  economy”	  (xii).	  Their	  main	  goal	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  presumed	  capitalist	  hegemony	  over	  the	  economy	  might	  be	  questioned	  or	  conceived	  differently.	  To	  this	  end,	  they	  enumerate	  and	  describe	  a	  number	  of	  non-­‐capitalist	  class	  processes	  that	  are	  present	  within	  what	  we	  typically	  call	  a	  capitalist	  economic	  framework.	  While	  such	  an	  undertaking	  might	  be	  an	  excellent	  element	  of	  a	  strategy	  to	  “disarm	  and	  dislocate	  the	  naturalized	  dominance	  of	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  and	  make	  a	  space	  for	  new	  economic	  beginnings”	  (xii),	  it	  does	  little	  to	  aid	  the	  analysis	  of	  those	  who	  might	  wish	  to	  destabilize	  or	  alter	  the	  materialization	  of	  the	  economy	  itself.	  That	  is,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  begin	  their	  discussion	  of	  the	  materialization	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  economy	  in	  general,	  Gibson-­‐Graham	  very	  quickly	  refine	  their	  focus	  to	  the	  capitalist	  content	  of	  the	  materialization,	  devoting	  the	  bulk	  of	  their	  attention	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  this	  capitalist	  content	  may	  be	  demonstrated	  to	  be	  less	  omnipresent	  than	  is	  often	  assumed,	  and	  that	  it	  may	  be	  replaced	  or	  reconfigured	  to	  create	  different	  types	  of	  economies	  (most	  notably,	  “community	  economies”).	  This	  makes	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  sense,	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  project.	  Gibson-­‐Graham’s	  main	  concern,	  it	  seems,	  is	  to	  bring	  our	  attention	  to	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  already	  underway:	  the	  presence	  and	  expansion	  of	  diverse	  class	  processes	  and	  their	  occlusion	  by	  the	  idea	  of	  hegemonic	  capitalism.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  such	  an	  aim,	  it	  is	  not	  immediately	  necessary	  to	  effect	  any	  substantial	  change	  in	  the	  practices	  and	  institutions	  that	  support	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  materialization;	  instead,	  what	  is	  required	  is	  a	  different	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  view	  such	  practices,	  and	  the	  language	  of	  the	  diverse	  economy	  is	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  such	  a	  lens.	  	  	   This	  strategy,	  however,	  has	  a	  shortcoming	  for	  my	  purposes;	  it	  does	  little	  to	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make	  visible	  the	  produced	  and	  contingent	  nature	  of	  the	  economy	  itself.	  Instead,	  despite	  their	  discussion	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  materialization,	  Gibson-­‐Graham	  tend	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  given,	  or	  even	  natural,	  container	  or	  category.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  existence	  or	  even	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  container	  that	  is	  under	  discussion	  for	  Gibson-­‐Graham;	  instead,	  it	  is	  only	  the	  contents.	  To	  put	  this	  in	  more	  specific	  terms,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  economy,	  nor	  its	  nature	  as	  a	  distinct	  sphere	  of	  human	  activity,	  that	  Gibson-­‐Graham	  seek	  to	  challenge,	  but	  rather	  the	  identity	  of	  this	  sphere	  as	  unproblematically	  capitalist.	  	  	   As	  such,	  in	  their	  discussion	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  materialization,	  their	  emphasis	  tends	  to	  fall	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  understanding	  it	  in	  this	  way	  allows	  us	  to	  imagine	  substituting	  different	  economies	  for	  the	  one	  we	  currently	  confront.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  call	  our	  attention	  to	  a	  different	  set	  of	  possibilities	  arising	  from	  this	  discussion.	  	  If	  we	  think	  of	  a	  materialization	  as	  the	  real	  (actually	  existing)	  result	  of	  the	  collective	  labor	  of	  developing	  and	  maintaining	  a	  structural	  effect,	  we	  may	  begin	  to	  answer	  some	  of	  our	  questions	  about	  how	  we	  might	  describe	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  abstract.	  It	  is,	  however,	  necessary	  to	  clarify	  our	  terminology	  a	  bit	  first.	  One	  might	  very	  legitimately	  wonder	  why	  I	  might	  wish	  to	  describe	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  abstract	  if	  I	  am	  arguing	  that	  it	  is	  fundamentally	  historical	  and	  contingent.	  While	  this	  is	  a	  reasonable	  question,	  it	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  “abstract”	  and	  “ahistorical”	  may	  be	  treated	  as	  synonyms	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  discussion.	  Instead,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  economy	  (or,	  in	  fact,	  any	  materialization)	  must	  always	  be	  understood	  as	  both	  historical	  and	  contingent,	  it	  must	  nevertheless	  also	  be	  constrained	  by	  certain	  rules	  that	  can	  be	  described	  in	  the	  abstract.	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   In	  order	  for	  any	  word	  to	  have	  meaning	  (even	  if	  such	  meaning	  is	  historically	  contingent,	  as	  I	  would	  suggest	  all	  meaning	  is),	  it	  must	  be	  possible	  to	  use	  the	  word	  correctly	  or	  incorrectly.	  So,	  while	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  pin	  down	  exactly	  the	  point	  at	  which	  a	  given	  practice	  or	  institution	  becomes	  sufficiently	  closely	  related	  to	  other	  practices	  or	  institutions	  that	  we	  understand	  to	  make	  up	  the	  economy	  that	  it	  may	  itself	  be	  appropriately	  referred	  to	  as	  part	  of	  the	  economy,	  it	  must	  be	  possible	  to	  make	  a	  suggestion	  regarding	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  given	  practice	  or	  institution	  that	  is	  patently	  wrong.	  For	  example,	  there	  may	  be	  debate	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  practices	  of	  illegal	  file	  sharing	  should	  be	  included	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy,	  but	  anyone	  who	  suggested	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  sunbathing	  in	  one’s	  back	  yard	  should	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  economy	  would	  be	  (reasonably)	  accused	  of	  misunderstanding	  the	  term	  “economy.”	  Similarly,	  if	  someone	  claims	  that	  the	  individual	  share	  of	  health	  insurance	  costs	  must	  rise	  (as	  in	  the	  example	  in	  the	  Introduction)	  due	  to	  “the	  economy,”	  this	  is	  not	  a	  prima	  facie	  ridiculous	  claim.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  the	  same	  person	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  cure	  for	  cancer	  is	  impossible	  due	  to	  “the	  economy,”	  such	  a	  claim	  would	  appear	  absurd	  without	  some	  significant	  (and	  likely	  complex)	  line	  of	  reasoning	  to	  support	  it.	  In	  fact,	  Peter	  Winch	  makes	  two	  claims	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  practices	  and	  the	  terms	  we	  use	  to	  describe	  them	  that	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  us	  here.	  First,	  he	  suggests:	  	  A	  person	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  performing	  a	  specific	  social	  activity	  on	  a	  given	  occasion	  only	  if	  he	  belongs	  to	  a	  society	  in	  which	  the	  performance	  of	  at	  least	  the	  general	  kind	  of	  activity,	  e.g.	  playing	  games,	  religious	  worship,	  the	  use	  of	  money,	  is	  an	  established	  institution,	  and	  if	  his	  behaviour	  shows	  that	  he	  understands	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  doing	  that	  kind	  of	  thing.	  In	  one	  society	  a	  set	  of	  actions	  performed	  by	  a	  group	  of	  people	  might	  constitute	  a	  game	  of	  hide	  and	  seek;	  in	  another	  society	  a	  superficially	  identical	  set	  of	  actions	  might	  constitute	  a	  religious	  rite;	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and	  in	  a	  society	  where	  it	  did	  not	  fall	  under	  any	  concept	  recognized	  in	  that	  society	  it	  would	  be	  completely	  aimless	  behaviour.	  (1956,	  19)	  	  In	  order,	  then,	  for	  us	  to	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  individuals	  are	  involved	  in	  practices	  that	  support	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  structural	  effect	  (and,	  hence,	  as	  a	  materialization),	  we	  must	  assume	  the	  shared	  category	  of	  economic	  activity,	  and	  we	  must	  expect	  such	  activity	  to	  be	  undertaken	  in	  particular	  ways.	  Without	  such	  a	  shared	  concept,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  way	  for	  us	  to	  organize	  all	  of	  this	  disparate,	  otherwise	  aimless	  activity	  into	  the	  category	  of	  “activity	  related	  to	  producing	  and	  maintaining	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  structural	  effect.”	  Second:	  The	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “concept”	  in	  this	  connection	  suggests,	  what	  is	  true,	  that	  linguistic	  behaviour	  enters	  into	  the	  more	  refined	  forms	  of	  social	  activity.	  You	  cannot	  play	  bridge	  without	  understanding	  and	  being	  able	  to	  use	  words	  such	  as	  “revoke”	  and	  “trump”;	  you	  cannot	  pay	  bills	  without	  understanding	  the	  use	  of	  arithmetical	  symbols;	  you	  cannot	  make	  future	  arrangements	  and	  reminisce	  without	  understanding	  the	  use	  of	  the	  future	  and	  past	  tense	  of	  verbs;	  you	  cannot	  be	  a	  Christian	  without	  understanding	  the	  use	  of	  such	  words	  as	  “God”,	  “sin”,	  “salvation”	  –	  and	  so	  one	  might	  go	  on.	  (19)	  	  If	  we	  follow	  Winch’s	  cue,	  in	  fact,	  one	  can	  understand	  my	  claim	  that	  you	  cannot	  engage	  in	  politics,	  or	  in	  business,	  or	  in	  the	  practices	  of	  social	  science	  without	  being	  able	  to	  use	  and	  understand	  phrases	  like	  “the	  economy”	  which	  sets	  a	  limit	  on	  what	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  say	  and	  do.	  We	  must	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  what	  kind	  of	  thing	  it	  is,	  and	  what	  its	  components	  parts	  are,	  in	  order	  to	  think	  about	  how	  it	  might	  be	  made	  differently,	  or	  not	  at	  all.	  To	  claim	  that	  the	  economy	  may	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  abstract,	  then,	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  immutable	  or	  natural;	  it	  is	  simply	  to	  suggest	  that,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  specific	  practices	  and	  institutions	  which	  produce	  and	  maintain	  the	  structural	  effect	  are	  constantly	  changing	  and	  evolving	  through	  processes	  of	  innovation	  and	  contestation,	  there	  is	  some	  common	  thread	  that	  allows	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us	  to	  understand	  the	  result	  of	  these	  changing	  practices	  and	  institutions	  as	  a	  continuous	  effect.	  There	  must	  be,	  that	  is,	  some	  criteria	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  the	  materialization	  that	  is	  product	  of	  the	  structural	  effect	  in	  question	  is	  (and	  continues	  to	  be)	  intelligible	  as	  “the	  economy”	  as	  opposed	  to	  some	  other	  thing.	  One	  result	  of	  an	  attempt	  to	  think	  about	  the	  economy	  in	  this	  way	  is	  that	  it	  begins	  to	  appear	  to	  have	  multiple	  senses	  that	  do	  not	  coexist	  without	  difficulty.	  	  When	  one	  says	  that	  one	  studies	  the	  economy,	  for	  example,	  they	  address	  the	  materialization	  as	  an	  object	  –	  the	  developed,	  aggregate	  understanding	  itself.	  When	  one	  says,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  that	  the	  economy	  created	  jobs	  last	  month,	  they	  address	  it	  as	  an	  agent,	  or	  rather	  as	  the	  product	  of	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  agential	  activities.	  Like	  the	  state	  effect	  that	  Mitchell	  describes,	  it	  is	  not	  satisfying	  to	  think	  of	  the	  economy	  either	  as	  exclusively	  a	  distinct,	  continuous	  object	  or	  as	  merely	  the	  product	  of	  a	  collection	  of	  individual	  actions.	  The	  language	  of	  the	  structural	  effect	  allows	  us	  to	  ease	  this	  tension	  some,	  in	  that	  it	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  understand	  the	  economy	  as	  simultaneously	  both	  a	  continuous	  object	  (the	  materialization	  produced	  by	  the	  structural	  effect)	  and	  the	  result	  of	  a	  collection	  of	  individual	  action	  (the	  discrete	  practices	  and	  institutions	  that	  produce	  and	  maintain	  the	  structural	  effect).	  One	  significant	  contribution	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  develop	  this	  idea	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  effect.	   In	  elaborating	  on	  this	  effect,	  I	  will	  suggest	  six	  criteria	  of	  the	  economy.	  I	  have	  arrived	  at	  these	  criteria	  through	  a	  careful	  consideration	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  term	  “the	  economy”	  is	  used	  in	  actual	  contemporary	  discourses,	  including	  every	  day	  conversation,	  academic	  texts,	  and	  media	  sources.	  By	  examining	  these	  ordinary	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language	  uses,	  I	  have	  discerned	  patterns	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  speakers	  and	  writers	  tend	  to	  employ	  the	  term,	  and	  I	  have	  detailed	  those	  patterns	  below.	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  vital	  to	  remember	  that	  while	  “the	  economy”	  may	  be	  used	  in	  these	  senses	  by	  many	  of	  the	  discourses	  and	  practices	  whose	  interactions	  and	  collisions	  constitute	  it,	  discourses	  are	  always	  plural,	  and	  thus	  there	  will	  always	  be	  exceptions	  and	  counter-­‐truths.	  Nonetheless,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  by	  considering	  “the	  economy,”	  generally	  speaking,	  to	  have	  the	  following	  six	  traits,	  we	  might	  advance	  our	  strategic	  position.	  First,	  as	  a	  realm	  distinct	  from	  both	  social	  life	  and	  political	  life,	  the	  economy	  may	  be	  seen	  to	  function	  according	  to	  laws	  of	  its	  own.	  It	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  influence	  by	  human	  activity,	  but	  like	  “the	  environment,”	  for	  example,	  it	  exists	  prior	  to	  all	  such	  activity,	  and	  may	  be	  influenced	  but	  not	  determined.	  The	  economy	  is	  independent	  and	  unique.	  Second,	  and	  following	  from	  this,	  activities	  that	  take	  place	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  economy	  are	  not	  only	  subject	  to	  distinct	  laws,	  but	  also	  to	  a	  distinct	  (or	  sometimes	  entirely	  absent)	  moral	  code.	  The	  economy	  is	  impersonal.	  	  Third,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  liberal	  capitalism,	  the	  logical	  and	  moral	  separation	  of	  the	  economy	  from	  the	  political	  and	  the	  social,	  coupled	  with	  the	  real	  interaction	  between	  these	  “realms”	  allows	  for	  the	  naturalization	  of	  certain	  inequalities	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  material,	  political,	  and	  social	  resources	  without	  implicating	  the	  political	  and	  social	  equality	  that	  are	  necessary	  for	  the	  continued	  functioning	  of	  liberal	  democracy6	  (Dahl,	  1989).	  The	  economy	  is	  a	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  politics,	  society,	  and	  the	  economy	  is	  not	  a	  contentious	  one,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  contentions	  tend	  to	  arise	  over	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Fourth,	  as	  Timothy	  Mitchell	  points	  out,	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  distinct	  space	  creates	  an	  outlet	  for	  capitalism	  that	  can	  “be	  imagined	  to	  grow	  –	  without	  altering	  its	  physical	  limits”	  (Mitchell,	  1998,	  90),	  making	  the	  kind	  of	  unending	  growth	  that	  capitalism	  requires	  possible	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  frontier.	  	  The	  economy	  is	  potentially	  infinite.	  Fifth,	  this	  conception	  of	  the	  economy	  tends	  toward	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  functions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  set	  of	  mechanical,	  inexorable	  laws,	  the	  determination	  of	  which	  is	  the	  end	  goal	  of	  economic	  science.7	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  needs	  and	  dictates	  of	  the	  economy	  are	  able	  to	  override	  mere	  human	  concerns,	  insofar	  as	  human	  wants	  represent	  only	  wishes	  or	  desires,	  while	  economic	  laws	  represent	  the	  way	  things	  must	  be.	  The	  economy	  is	  natural	  and	  inevitable.	  	   Sixth,	  and	  finally,	  the	  economy	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  engage	  in	  activities	  such	  as	  creating	  and	  destroying	  jobs,	  or	  demanding	  reductions	  in	  spending	  on	  particular	  activities.	  The	  economy	  is	  an	  agent.	  	  	   While	  some	  of	  these	  criteria	  (related	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  potentially	  infinite,	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality)	  are	  unique	  to	  the	  specific	  nature	  of	  the	  economy	  effect,	  and	  others	  (independence,	  impersonality,	  agency)	  are	  shared	  by	  the	  economy	  effect	  and	  the	  state	  effect,	  the	  presumption	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  natural	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  appropriate	  arrangement	  of	  these	  spheres,	  rather	  than	  over	  the	  appropriateness	  or	  necessity	  of	  the	  designations	  themselves.	  7	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  “scientism”	  in	  social	  sciences	  has	  taken	  the	  specific	  character	  of	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  economic.	  Economics	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  most	  scientific	  of	  the	  social	  sciences	  because	  its	  object,	  unlike	  those	  of	  political	  science,	  anthropology,	  sociology,	  or	  even	  psychology,	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  abstract,	  general,	  unchangeable	  laws	  as	  those	  that	  govern	  the	  physical	  world.	  What	  happens	  to	  this	  conception,	  one	  wonders,	  when	  we	  consider	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  constructed	  object,	  a	  set	  of	  arbitrary	  distinctions?	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and	  inevitable	  serves	  to	  distinguish	  it	  (at	  least	  to	  some	  degree)	  from	  the	  state	  (as	  treated	  by	  Mitchell).	  With	  respect	  to	  naturalness,	  we	  might	  find	  a	  better	  analogy	  in	  Judith	  Butler’s	  (1990)	  treatment	  of	  gender,	  though	  Tully’s	  (1995)	  work	  on	  culture	  and	  indigeneity	  or	  Chakrabarty’s	  (2002)	  work	  on	  modernity	  also	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  topic.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  the	  project	  at	  hand,	  as	  the	  presumption	  of	  naturalness	  is	  a	  significant	  obstacle	  to	  conceptual	  innovation.	  	  	   In	  the	  introduction	  to	  Gender	  Trouble,	  Butler	  asks	  “What	  happens	  to	  the	  subject	  and	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  gender	  categories	  when	  the	  epistemic	  regime	  of	  compulsory	  heterosexuality	  is	  unmasked	  as	  that	  which	  produces	  and	  reifies	  these	  ostensible	  categories	  of	  ontology?”	  (vii).	  The	  answer,	  as	  disappointing	  as	  it	  may	  be,	  is	  that	  nothing,	  or	  very	  little,	  happens	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  unmasking	  alone.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  one	  must	  simply	  illuminate	  the	  contingent	  nature	  of	  the	  apparently	  natural	  effect	  in	  order	  to	  alter,	  transform,	  or	  negate	  it.	  Instead,	  Butler	  suggests:	  …the	  “being”	  of	  gender	  is	  an	  effect,	  an	  object	  of	  a	  genealogical	  investigation	  that	  maps	  out	  the	  political	  parameters	  of	  its	  construction	  in	  the	  mode	  of	  ontology.	  To	  claim	  that	  gender	  is	  constructed	  is	  not	  to	  assert	  its	  illusoriness	  or	  artificiality,	  where	  those	  terms	  are	  understood	  to	  reside	  within	  a	  binary	  that	  counterposes	  the	  “real”	  and	  the	  “authentic”	  as	  oppositional.	  As	  a	  genealogy	  of	  gender	  ontology,	  this	  inquiry	  seeks	  to	  understand	  the	  discursive	  production	  of	  the	  plausibility	  of	  that	  binary	  relation	  and	  to	  suggest	  that	  certain	  cultural	  configurations	  of	  gender	  take	  the	  place	  of	  “the	  real”	  and	  consolidate	  and	  augment	  their	  hegemony	  through	  that	  felicitous	  self-­‐naturalization…	  To	  expose	  the	  contingent	  acts	  that	  create	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  naturalistic	  necessity,	  a	  move	  which	  has	  been	  a	  part	  of	  cultural	  critique	  at	  least	  since	  Marx,	  is	  a	  task	  that	  now	  takes	  on	  the	  added	  burden	  of	  showing	  how	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  the	  subject,	  intelligible	  only	  through	  its	  appearance	  as	  gendered,	  admits	  of	  possibilities	  that	  have	  been	  forcibly	  foreclosed	  by	  the	  various	  reifications	  of	  gender	  that	  have	  constituted	  its	  contingent	  ontologies.	  (32-­‐33)	  	  If	  we	  understand	  gender	  as	  an	  effect,	  we	  must	  understand	  it	  (like	  the	  economy)	  as	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both	  constructed	  and	  real.	  As	  such,	  simply	  providing	  evidence	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  constructed	  (and	  contingent)	  does	  little	  to	  affect	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  still	  real.	  Instead,	  we	  must	  look	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  those	  aspects	  of	  (constructed)	  reality	  made	  intelligible	  through	  gender	  also	  make	  intelligible	  possibilities	  that	  are	  foreclosed	  by	  reified	  gender.	  	  	   This	  subject	  (“the	  I”)	  is	  brought	  into	  being,	  for	  Butler,	  through	  practices	  of	  signification.	  	  Identity	  is	  treated	  as	  though	  it	  is	  “substantive,”	  in	  that	  it	  appears	  as	  fixed	  and	  inert	  –	  one	  is,	  for	  example,	  a	  woman	  or	  a	  man	  simply	  because	  that	  is	  what	  one	  is.	  “However	  the	  substantive	  ‘I’	  only	  appears	  as	  such	  through	  a	  signifying	  practice	  that	  seeks	  to	  conceal	  its	  own	  workings	  and	  to	  naturalize	  its	  effects”	  (144).	  Importantly,	  she	  goes	  on	  to	  note	  that	  “to	  qualify	  as	  a	  substantive	  identity	  is	  an	  arduous	  task,	  for	  such	  appearances	  are	  rule-­‐generated	  identities,	  ones	  which	  rely	  on	  the	  consistent	  and	  repeated	  invocation	  of	  rules	  that	  condition	  and	  restrict	  culturally	  intelligible	  practices	  of	  identity”	  (144-­‐145).	  Identity	  is	  given	  the	  appearance	  of	  substantiveness	  through	  signifying	  practices,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  have	  this	  effect	  these	  signifying	  practices	  must	  conform	  to	  the	  rules	  that	  will	  make	  them	  intelligible	  as	  signifying	  practices	  within	  a	  given	  context.	  	   This	  rule-­‐governed	  nature	  of	  the	  appearance	  of	  identity,	  Butler	  suggests,	  can	  be	  exploited	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  challenging	  (or	  troubling)	  existing,	  reified	  categories	  of	  identity.	  	  Indeed,	  when	  the	  subject	  is	  said	  to	  be	  constituted,	  that	  means	  simply	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  certain	  rule-­‐governed	  discourses	  that	  govern	  the	  intelligible	  invocation	  of	  identity.	  The	  subject	  is	  not	  determined	  by	  the	  rules	  through	  which	  it	  is	  generated	  because	  signification	  is	  not	  a	  founding	  act,	  but	  rather	  a	  regulated	  process	  of	  repetition	  that	  both	  conceals	  itself	  and	  enforces	  its	  rules	  precisely	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through	  the	  production	  of	  substantializing	  effects.	  In	  a	  sense,	  all	  signification	  takes	  place	  within	  the	  orbit	  of	  the	  compulsion	  to	  repeat;	  “agency,”	  then,	  is	  to	  be	  located	  within	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  variation	  on	  that	  repetition.	  If	  the	  rules	  governing	  signification	  not	  only	  restrict,	  but	  enable	  the	  assertion	  of	  alternative	  domains	  of	  cultural	  intelligibility,	  i.e.,	  new	  possibilities	  for	  gender	  that	  contest	  the	  rigid	  codes	  of	  hierarchical	  binarisms,	  then	  it	  is	  only	  within	  the	  practices	  of	  repetitive	  signifying	  that	  a	  subversion	  of	  identity	  becomes	  possible.	  (145)	  	  The	  trick,	  it	  seems,	  is	  to	  find	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  repeated	  practices	  of	  signification	  can	  be	  varied	  such	  that	  they	  are	  at	  once	  intelligible	  as	  practices	  related	  to	  the	  signification	  of	  gender	  and	  irreconcilable	  with	  the	  “rigid	  codes	  of	  hierarchical	  binarisms”	  to	  which	  Butler	  refers.	  	   This	  argument	  about	  the	  subversion	  of	  identity	  may	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  subvert	  the	  economy.	  Parallel	  to	  Butler’s	  reasoning	  about	  gender,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  effect,	  simultaneously	  constructed	  and	  real.	  Like	  the	  subject,	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  economy,	  insofar	  as	  it	  appears	  as	  an	  object	  conforming	  to	  the	  six	  criteria	  I	  have	  elaborated	  above,	  only	  “appears	  as	  such	  through	  a	  [set	  of]	  signifying	  practice[s]	  that	  seeks	  to	  conceal…	  [their]	  own	  workings	  and	  to	  naturalize…	  [their]	  effects.”	  As	  such,	  if	  we	  follow	  Butler’s	  argument,	  one	  strategy	  for	  subverting	  the	  economy	  is	  to	  look	  for	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  repeated	  practices	  of	  signification	  may	  be	  varied	  such	  that	  they	  are	  simultaneously	  intelligible	  as	  practices	  related	  to	  the	  economy	  and	  also	  irreconcilable	  with	  the	  rules	  we	  understand	  to	  govern	  the	  economy.	  	  	   Such	  a	  project	  of	  subversion	  would	  require	  an	  understanding	  both	  of	  the	  practices	  of	  signification	  required	  to	  maintain	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  of	  the	  rules	  governing	  intelligibility	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy.	  To	  return	  to	  our	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bicycle	  example,	  we	  must	  explore	  the	  question	  of	  how	  far	  we	  may	  stretch	  the	  practices	  of	  signification	  associated	  with	  the	  economy	  without	  breaking	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  these	  practices	  and	  the	  economy.	  This	  is	  one	  way	  in	  which	  we	  might	  think	  about	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy.	  It	  is	  clear	  (for	  reasons	  discussed	  above)	  that	  no	  simple	  unmasking	  of	  the	  economy’s	  contingency,	  its	  basis	  in	  a	  structural	  effect,	  or	  its	  status	  as	  a	  materialization	  is	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  any	  substantial	  change	  in	  its	  operations	  or	  effect,	  because	  to	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  constructed	  is	  not	  (to	  risk	  beating	  a	  dead	  horse)	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  not	  real.	  	   However,	  the	  twin	  claims	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  both	  real	  and	  constructed	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  may	  be	  constructed	  differently.	  In	  order	  to	  effect	  such	  a	  change,	  we	  must	  seek	  out	  practices	  which	  are	  at	  once	  intelligible	  as	  part	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  incompatible	  with	  the	  rules	  by	  which	  we	  understand	  the	  economy	  to	  operate.	  Additionally,	  assuming	  that	  our	  goal	  in	  seeking	  to	  alter	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  economy	  is	  not	  merely	  random	  change,	  but	  rather	  change	  directed	  toward	  some	  particular	  political	  end	  (such	  as	  increased	  egalitarianism,	  reduced	  alienation,	  limitation	  of	  negative	  environmental	  impact,	  or	  even	  an	  elimination	  of	  the	  economy’s	  appearance	  of	  naturalness),	  we	  must	  seek	  out	  practices	  that	  link	  these	  ends	  with	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  structural	  effect.	  The	  practices	  suggested	  by	  Gibson-­‐Graham	  above,	  for	  example,	  are	  well	  suited	  to	  the	  task	  of	  challenging	  the	  hegemony	  of	  capitalism	  within	  the	  economy,	  but	  poorly	  suited	  to	  the	  task	  of	  challenging	  the	  maintenance	  and	  production	  of	  the	  structural	  effect	  itself.	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C.	  Thinking	  About	  the	  Effect	  Historically	  	  If	  the	  economy	  may	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  structural	  effect,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  above,	  many	  questions	  remain	  regarding	  how	  this	  effect	  might	  have	  come	  to	  be,	  and	  how	  it	  has	  changed	  over	  time.	  In	  trying	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  such	  questions	  might	  be	  answered,	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  distinct,	  but	  in	  some	  respects	  complimentary,	  methods	  of	  Skinner	  and	  Michel	  Foucault	  may	  be	  useful.	  As	  Ryan	  Walter	  argues,	  Skinner	  and	  Foucault	  share	  a	  “…general	  political	  purpose	  of	  using	  the	  past	  to	  make	  change	  in	  the	  present	  appear	  more	  possible”	  (Walter,	  108).	  While	  their	  views	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  should	  be	  done	  are	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  opposed	  to	  one	  another,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  our	  investigation,	  they	  may	  usefully	  be	  understood	  as	  complimentary,	  within	  certain	  limits.	  	  	   Skinner	  argues	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  what	  he	  calls	  “appraisive	  terms”	  are	  applied,	  we	  must	  be	  conscious	  of	  at	  least	  three	  dimensions	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  term	  and	  the	  concept	  it	  describes.	  First,	  we	  need	  to	  know	  “the	  nature	  and	  range	  of	  the	  criteria	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  the	  word	  or	  expression	  is	  standardly	  employed”	  (Skinner	  1989,	  9).	  Using	  as	  an	  example	  the	  term	  “courageous,”	  he	  notes	  that	  were	  we	  to	  ask	  someone	  to	  describe	  what	  the	  word	  meant,	  they	  would	  need	  to	  list	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  its	  appropriate	  use.	  Among	  these	  conditions,	  he	  suggests,	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  find	  at	  least	  the	  following:	  ...that	  the	  word	  can	  only	  be	  used	  in	  the	  context	  of	  voluntary	  actions;	  that	  the	  actor	  involved	  must	  have	  faced	  some	  danger;	  that	  he	  must	  have	  faced	  it	  with	  some	  consciousness	  of	  its	  nature;	  and	  he	  must	  have	  faced	  it	  heedfully,	  with	  some	  sense	  of	  the	  probably	  consequences	  of	  the	  action	  involved.	  (9)	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  range	  of	  conditions,	  Skinner	  continues,	  we	  must	  also	  account	  for	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the	  term’s	  “range	  of	  reference,”	  which	  he	  describes	  as	  “a	  consequence	  of	  understanding	  the	  criteria	  for	  applying	  it	  directly”	  (10).	  That	  is,	  he	  points	  out,	  to	  continue	  the	  example	  of	  the	  word	  courageous,	  once	  we	  understand	  the	  conditions	  involved	  in	  its	  application,	  we	  may	  debate	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  given	  situation	  may	  be	  appropriately	  described	  by	  use	  of	  the	  term	  without	  debating	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  itself.	  One	  might	  argue	  that	  one	  who	  “faced	  a	  painful	  death	  with	  cheerfulness”	  should	  or	  should	  not	  be	  described	  as	  doing	  so	  courageously	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  was	  real	  danger	  involved.	  	   Finally,	  for	  Skinner,	  we	  must	  take	  into	  account	  “the	  range	  of	  attitudes	  the	  term	  can	  standardly	  be	  used	  to	  express.”	  That	  is,	  “no	  one	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  grasped	  the	  correct	  application	  of	  the	  adjective	  courageous	  if	  they	  remain	  unaware	  that	  it	  is	  standardly	  used	  to	  commend,	  to	  express	  approval,	  and	  especially	  to	  express	  (and	  solicit)	  admiration	  for	  any	  action	  it	  is	  used	  to	  describe”	  (10).	  We	  must	  know	  not	  only	  what	  the	  word	  means,	  but	  also	  what	  it	  does.	  	   A	  case	  can	  be	  made,	  I	  think,	  that	  while	  it	  might	  not	  immediately	  appear	  to	  function	  as	  an	  appraisive	  term,	  the	  economy	  effect	  does	  have	  a	  sort	  of	  uniquely	  appraisive	  character.	  That	  is,	  by	  claiming	  that	  some	  action	  or	  phenomenon	  is	  part	  of	  the	  economy,	  we	  often	  free	  it	  from	  what	  might	  otherwise	  be	  a	  negative	  appraisal	  of	  its	  moral	  content.	  As	  such,	  the	  term	  itself	  carries	  a	  certain	  appraisive	  value.	  	  Certainly,	  as	  we’ll	  examine	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Adam	  Smith,	  economy	  functioned	  as	  an	  appraisive	  term	  in	  the	  18th	  century.	  Its	  range	  of	  necessary	  conditions	  would	  have	  included	  that	  the	  word	  can	  only	  be	  used	  in	  a	  context	  wherein	  an	  actor	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  disposition	  of	  some	  resources,	  material	  or	  otherwise;	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that	  the	  actor	  must	  have	  multiple	  choices	  about	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  such	  disposition	  will	  occur;	  that	  given	  this	  range	  of	  choices,	  the	  actor	  chooses	  that	  which	  makes	  most	  efficient	  use	  of	  the	  resources	  in	  question;	  and	  that	  the	  actor	  does	  so	  with	  knowledge	  that	  the	  chosen	  course	  of	  action	  is	  preferable	  at	  least	  in	  part	  due	  to	  this	  superior	  efficiency.	  A	  complete	  understanding	  of	  these	  conditions	  would	  allow	  for	  debate	  over	  whether	  a	  given	  action	  could	  suitably	  be	  described	  as	  an	  exercise	  of	  economy	  –	  was	  the	  outcome	  really	  efficient,	  etc?	  And	  economy	  was	  typically	  used	  to	  describe	  actions	  or	  dispositions	  that	  were	  praiseworthy	  for	  their	  efficiency	  (though	  it	  was	  occasionally	  used	  as	  backhanded	  compliment	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  “frugality”	  might	  be	  used	  today).	  One	  of	  aims	  of	  this	  dissertation	  will	  be	  to	  examine	  and	  explain	  some	  of	  the	  dynamics	  by	  which	  such	  changes	  have	  occurred,	  and	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	   I	  think	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  apply	  a	  similar	  analysis	  to	  “the	  economy”	  in	  its	  more	  contemporary	  usage.	  While	  it	  is	  not,	  at	  first	  glance,	  appraisive	  (in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  tend	  to	  think	  of	  the	  categorization	  of	  given	  phenomenon	  or	  course	  of	  action	  as	  dictated	  by	  the	  economy	  as	  morally	  and	  ethically	  neutral),	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  in	  fact	  shares	  many	  features	  with	  the	  appraisive	  terms	  Skinner	  described.	  We	  can	  certainly	  begin	  by	  listing	  a	  set	  of	  criteria	  for	  its	  use,	  as	  we	  have	  done	  above.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  criteria,	  we	  may	  debate	  whether	  a	  given	  aspect	  of	  human	  activity	  should	  or	  should	  not	  be	  treated	  as	  part	  of	  “the	  economy.”	  Moreover,	  while	  “the	  economy”	  may	  not	  have	  as	  clear	  an	  attitudinal	  inflection	  as	  “economy”	  in	  the	  older	  sense,	  or	  as	  Skinner’s	  example	  of	  “courageous,”	  it	  may	  be	  understood	  (as	  noted	  in	  the	  criteria)	  to	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  emptying	  other	  terms	  and	  concepts	  of	  the	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attitudinal	  inflections	  they	  might	  otherwise	  carry.	  The	  moral/ethical	  distinction	  between	  actions	  based	  on	  greed	  and	  those	  based	  upon	  a	  levelheaded	  response	  to	  the	  demands	  and	  necessities	  of	  the	  economy	  hinges	  on	  such	  an	  attitudinal	  inflection.	  	  	   Such	  an	  analysis	  on	  its	  own	  won’t	  get	  us	  very	  far	  in	  our	  efforts	  to	  understand	  the	  formation	  and	  evolution	  of	  “the	  economy.”	  However,	  as	  Skinner	  points	  out,	  once	  we	  have	  established	  these	  dimensions	  through	  which	  to	  examine	  the	  terms	  in	  question,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  break	  down	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  terms	  might	  change	  over	  time,	  and	  the	  kinds	  of	  political	  changes	  that	  might	  be	  both	  embodied	  and	  enacted	  in	  such	  changes.	  He	  takes	  as	  an	  example	  of	  one	  way	  in	  which	  such	  conflict	  might	  occur	  the	  debate	  over	  whether	  Marcel	  Duchamp’s	  “readymade”	  series	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  works	  of	  art.	  On	  one	  level,	  he	  points	  out,	  such	  a	  debate	  is	  simply	  a	  linguistic	  debate	  over	  the	  question	  of	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  that	  should	  be	  satisfied	  in	  order	  to	  apply	  the	  term	  “work	  of	  art.”	  On	  another	  level,	  however,	  we	  must:	  	  …recognize	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  term	  such	  as	  art	  gains	  its	  meaning	  from	  the	  place	  it	  occupies	  within	  an	  entire	  conceptual	  scheme.	  To	  change	  the	  criteria	  for	  applying	  it	  will	  thus	  be	  to	  change	  a	  vast	  deal	  else	  besides…	  we	  must	  be	  prepared	  to	  focus	  not	  on	  the	  “internal	  structure”	  of	  particular	  words,	  but	  rather	  on	  their	  role	  in	  upholding	  complete	  social	  philosophies.	  (13)	  	  If	  we	  apply	  this	  insight	  to	  our	  study	  of	  “the	  economy,”	  we	  might	  inquire	  as	  to	  whether,	  aside	  from	  the	  linguistic	  shift	  we’ve	  noted	  in	  the	  term’s	  usage,	  there	  is	  some	  reorganization	  of	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  (which	  is,	  itself,	  constructed	  in	  much	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  the	  economy)	  implicit	  in	  this	  change.	  What,	  we	  might	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ask,	  is	  the	  role	  of	  “the	  economy”	  in	  upholding	  a	  complete	  social	  philosophy?8	  Moreover,	  what	  new	  function	  is	  accomplished	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  object?9	  	  	   Similarly,	  Skinner	  suggests	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  the	  application	  of	  a	  term	  should	  be,	  we	  might	  also	  experience	  conflicts	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  given	  concrete	  phenomenon	  does	  or	  does	  not	  match	  up	  with	  those	  conditions.	  He	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  exploitation,	  suggesting	  that	  even	  if	  we	  agree	  about	  the	  conditions	  governing	  its	  usage,	  we	  might	  disagree	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  term	  could	  be	  appropriately	  applied	  to	  situation	  of	  “wives	  in	  ordinary	  middle-­‐class	  families	  at	  the	  present	  time”	  (14).	  In	  order	  for	  such	  conflict	  to	  occur,	  there	  must	  be	  some	  agreement	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  in	  the	  first	  sense.	  That	  is,	  a	  disagreement	  over	  the	  question	  of	  exploitation	  raised	  above	  that	  centered	  around	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  itself	  would	  open	  up	  the	  term	  to	  examination,	  but	  would	  leave	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  question	  largely	  unexplored.	  However,	  if	  the	  conflict	  is	  not	  over	  the	  conditions	  implicit	  in	  the	  term	  itself,	  but	  instead	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  those	  conditions	  are	  met	  in	  a	  particular	  case,	  our	  attention	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  case	  in	  question,	  with	  potentially	  radical	  results.	  In	  Skinner’s	  example,	  if	  we	  disagree	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  exploitation,	  then	  our	  conversation	  will	  do	  little	  to	  affect	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  “wives”	  in	  question.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  agree	  about	  the	  meaning	  (that	  is,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  We’ll	  ask	  this	  question,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  version	  of	  this	  question,	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  when	  we	  look	  at	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  use	  this	  relatively	  recent	  concept	  to	  understand	  the	  texts	  of	  a	  past	  the	  precedes	  it.	  9	  This	  question	  will	  be	  approached	  twice,	  and	  in	  two	  different	  ways.	  First,	  in	  Chapter	  2	  we’ll	  look	  at	  the	  process	  by	  which	  “the	  economy”	  was	  initially	  produced,	  and	  at	  the	  functions	  its	  introduction	  accomplished.	  In	  Chapter	  4,	  we’ll	  examine	  the	  various	  functions	  that	  the	  “the	  economy”	  has	  taken	  on	  in	  contemporary	  life.	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necessary	  conditions)	  of	  exploitation,	  but	  disagree	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  “wives”	  Skinner	  mentions	  satisfy	  those	  conditions,	  our	  shared	  understanding	  of	  these	  conditions	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  lever	  that	  makes	  possible	  a	  powerful	  social	  critique	  of	  the	  institutions	  and	  power	  relations	  underlying	  the	  traditional	  family.	  The	  advantage	  of	  such	  a	  move	  is	  that,	  if	  those	  with	  whom	  we	  engage	  in	  such	  a	  debate	  are	  unwilling	  (or	  unable)	  to	  alter	  or	  abandon	  these	  conditions,	  it	  may	  actually	  be	  possible	  to	  support	  a	  fundamentally	  normative	  argument	  (housewives	  are	  being	  exploited)	  with	  fact-­‐based	  evidence	  (housewives	  satisfy	  conditions	  x,	  y,	  and	  z,	  which	  we	  have	  already	  agreed	  constitute	  expoloitation).	  	  	   Following	  this	  idea,	  if	  we	  can,	  in	  the	  foregoing	  analysis,	  pin	  down	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  associated	  with	  the	  use	  of	  “the	  economy,”	  we	  might	  then	  open	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  debate	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  given	  phenomenon	  or	  set	  of	  phenomena	  satisfy	  those	  conditions.	  Should	  we,	  for	  example,	  treat	  an	  extremely	  unequal	  division	  of	  wealth	  as	  a	  problem	  to	  be	  solved	  by	  appropriate	  management	  of	  the	  economy,	  or	  as	  a	  political	  problem	  to	  be	  solved	  directly	  through	  statutory	  and	  other	  means?	  To	  return	  to	  an	  example	  from	  the	  introduction,	  should	  we	  treat	  the	  difficulty	  of	  securing	  funding	  for	  a	  new	  Student	  Health	  Center	  as	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  background	  condition	  of	  the	  economy,	  and	  thus	  only	  susceptible	  to	  solutions	  that	  either	  rely	  on	  a	  change	  in	  this	  background	  condition	  or	  accept	  it	  as	  is?	  Or,	  might	  we	  instead	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  of	  the	  economy	  at	  all,	  but	  instead	  a	  problem	  of	  political	  will,	  to	  be	  solved	  not	  by	  hoping	  for	  change	  or	  accepting	  the	  status	  quo,	  but	  instead	  by	  making	  demands	  and	  applying	  leverage	  through	  the	  political	  process?	  If	  we	  can	  first	  agree	  on	  conditions	  by	  which	  to	  judge	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these	  types	  of	  questions	  in	  the	  abstract,	  then	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  productive	  debate	  over	  the	  application	  of	  these	  conditions	  to	  the	  case	  at	  hand.	  Alternatively,	  and	  I	  think	  more	  realistically,	  the	  impossibility	  of	  an	  attempt	  to	  develop	  a	  consistent	  set	  of	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  such	  a	  distinction	  might	  serve	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  distinction	  is	  based	  not	  on	  a	  coherent	  set	  of	  distinct	  requirements,	  but	  rather	  on	  a	  historically	  contingent	  set	  of	  judgments	  that	  cannot	  maintain	  their	  coherence	  without	  direct	  reference	  to	  the	  concept	  they	  seek	  to	  describe	  and	  bound.	  That	  is,	  to	  return	  to	  Mitchell’s	  language,	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  cannot	  establish	  a	  consistent	  set	  of	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  totality	  might	  help	  to	  highlight	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  operates	  as	  an	  effect.	  Such	  a	  debate	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  make	  visible	  the	  contradictions	  of	  the	  current	  (implicit)	  arrangement	  of	  such	  issues	  in	  a	  way	  that	  first-­‐level	  debates	  over	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  themselves	  are	  unlikely	  to	  accomplish.	  	  	   Finally,	  Skinner	  points	  out,	  even	  if	  we	  have	  agreement	  on	  both	  the	  conditions	  associated	  with	  the	  use	  of	  a	  term,	  and	  on	  the	  application	  of	  these	  conditions	  to	  a	  specific	  case,	  there	  is	  still	  the	  potential	  for	  conflict	  over	  the	  “direction	  of	  the	  term’s	  evaluative	  force”	  (17).	  This	  is	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  possibility	  for	  debates	  and	  discussions	  regarding	  “the	  economy,”	  as	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  one	  of	  the	  principle	  functions	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  upholding	  a	  “complete	  social	  philosophy”	  is	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  sphere	  of	  human	  activity	  that	  is	  by	  and	  large	  free	  of	  moral	  valuation	  (which	  is	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  as	  blanket	  moral	  approval).	  If	  “the	  economy”	  could	  be	  produced	  as	  a	  site	  of	  conflict	  over	  the	  “direction	  of	  the	  term’s	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evaluative	  force”	  it	  might	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  economy’s	  ability	  to	  perform	  this	  function.	  One	  need	  not	  stretch	  too	  hard	  to	  imagine	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  shift	  in	  evaluative	  meaning	  such	  that	  to	  say	  “X	  did	  Y	  because	  the	  economy	  required	  it”	  sounds	  less	  like	  “X	  did	  Y	  because	  he	  would	  have	  died	  if	  he	  did	  not”	  and	  more	  like	  “X	  did	  Y	  because	  the	  demands	  of	  his	  ego	  required	  it.”	  The	  two	  statements	  may,	  in	  many	  cases,	  be	  equivalent	  on	  a	  purely	  factual	  basis,	  but	  they	  undeniably	  carry	  different	  evaluative	  messages.	  To	  shift	  the	  evaluative	  direction	  of	  the	  economy	  away	  from	  tacit	  approval	  could	  have	  profound	  effects	  upon	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  term	  when	  deployed	  in	  political	  debates	  and	  conflicts.	  	   While	  such	  an	  analysis	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  our	  endeavor,	  it	  is	  also	  (necessarily)	  limited	  in	  certain	  respects.	  There	  is,	  unfortunately,	  a	  common	  trend	  of	  thought	  that	  suggests	  that	  when	  we	  do	  a	  historical	  analysis	  of	  discourse,	  we	  must	  choose	  between	  the	  methods	  employed	  by	  Skinner	  and	  Foucault.	  For	  example,	  Vucina,	  et	  al	  make	  the	  following	  comparison	  between	  Skinner’s	  treatment	  of	  freedom	  and	  Fuocault’s:	  Skinner’s	  attempt	  at	  unsettling	  contemporary	  limits	  to	  freedom	  seems	  to	  hinge	  on	  providing	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  past	  political	  ideas	  and	  texts,	  better	  than	  that	  provided	  by	  existing	  historical	  analyses.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  potential	  of	  Foucault’s	  analyses	  rests	  not	  on	  providing	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  past	  but	  on	  estranging	  us	  from	  contemporary	  ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  acting.	  Foucault	  seeks	  to	  produce	  this	  estrangement	  by	  demonstrating	  how	  current	  ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  acting	  on	  a	  particular	  problem	  differ	  from	  the	  past	  as	  well	  as	  by	  showing	  the	  mundane	  and	  contingent	  formation	  of	  current	  ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  acting.	  (emphasis	  in	  original)	  (128)	  	  While	  they	  raise	  some	  important	  questions,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  Vucina	  et	  al	  miss	  on	  a	  couple	  of	  levels.	  First,	  their	  analysis	  undersells	  Foucault’s	  project	  to	  some	  extent	  (while	  estrangement	  from	  contemporary	  ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  acting	  may	  be	  an	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effect	  of	  his	  work,	  it	  seems	  a	  stretch	  to	  label	  it	  his	  goal).	  Second,	  while	  there	  is	  almost	  certainly	  a	  useful	  distinction	  here,	  I	  don’t	  think	  they	  get	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  distinction	  quite	  right.	  It’s	  not	  fair	  to	  Skinner,	  for	  example,	  to	  say	  that	  he’s	  not	  interested	  in	  demonstrating	  the	  strange,	  contingent	  nature	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  liberty.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  following	  passage	  from	  the	  Introduction	  to	  Visions	  of	  
Politics:	  We	  are	  of	  course	  embedded	  in	  practices	  and	  constrained	  by	  them.	  But	  those	  practices	  owe	  their	  dominance	  in	  part	  to	  the	  power	  of	  our	  normative	  language	  to	  hold	  them	  in	  place,	  and	  it	  is	  always	  open	  to	  us	  to	  employ	  the	  resources	  of	  our	  language	  to	  undermine	  as	  well	  as	  to	  underpin	  those	  practices.	  We	  may	  be	  freer	  than	  we	  sometimes	  suppose.	  (Skinner	  2002,	  7)	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  obvious	  paraphrasing	  of	  Foucault’s	  famous	  claim	  that	  we	  are	  freer	  than	  we	  think	  we	  are,	  this	  passage	  provides	  ample	  evidence	  that	  Skinner	  shares	  Foucault’s	  concern	  with	  demonstrating	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  liberty	  is	  not	  only	  constructed	  but	  also	  contingent,	  and	  therefore	  subject	  to	  change.	  To	  my	  mind,	  the	  important	  distinction	  between	  Skinner	  and	  Foucault	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  kinds	  of	  evidence	  they	  consider,	  and	  with	  the	  kinds	  of	  arguments	  that	  result	  from	  consideration	  of	  this	  evidence.	  Skinner’s	  focus	  is	  on	  understanding	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  given	  concept	  fits	  into	  a	  larger	  whole	  (his	  “complete	  social	  philosophy”),	  and	  how	  this	  fit	  (along	  with	  the	  concept	  itself)	  may	  be	  seen	  to	  change	  over	  time;	  as	  such,	  he	  focuses	  largely	  on	  the	  history	  of	  political	  theory.	  Foucault,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  power/knowledge	  nexus	  produces	  regimes	  of	  truth	  within	  which	  a	  given	  claim	  (for	  instance,	  “The	  economy	  is	  a	  distinct	  realm	  of	  human	  activity”)	  might	  be	  recognized	  as	  “true.”	  Foucault’s	  project,	  to	  be	  sure,	  may	  result	  in	  some	  estrangement	  from	  “contemporary	  ways	  of	  thinking	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and	  acting,”	  but	  it	  also	  has	  the	  (in	  my	  view,	  more	  important)	  potential	  to	  highlight	  the	  process	  by	  which	  an	  effect	  like	  the	  economy	  might	  come	  to	  be,	  not	  as	  a	  historical	  inevitability,	  but	  rather	  as	  the	  contingent	  (or,	  as	  Trouillot	  would	  say,	  “made”)	  result	  of	  particular	  political	  actions	  to	  solve	  concrete	  political	  problems.	  	  	  While	  Skinner	  focuses	  on	  the	  history	  of	  political	  theory,	  then,	  Foucault	  focuses	  instead	  on	  what	  is	  said	  in	  (everyday)	  discourse,	  on	  how	  particular	  problems	  (and	  their	  solutions)	  are	  framed,	  and	  on	  the	  regimes	  of	  veridiction	  that	  are	  required	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  successes	  and	  failures	  of	  these	  truth	  claims.	  	  While	  there	  are	  certainly	  complexities	  and	  complications	  involved	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  align	  these	  two	  projects	  within	  a	  single	  examination	  of	  the	  history	  of	  a	  concept,	  I’m	  not	  sure	  that	  they	  are	  sufficiently	  extreme	  to	  warrant	  the	  authors’	  assertion	  that	  “…	  [a]ny	  attempt	  to	  establish	  an	  analytical	  synthesis	  would…	  not	  only	  be	  a	  sign	  of	  disrespect	  but	  also	  very	  likely	  result	  in	  throwing	  out	  the	  sharp	  and	  valuable	  analytical	  edges	  of	  the	  two	  approaches”	  (139).	  Moreover,	  one	  need	  not	  necessarily	  synthesize	  the	  two	  approaches	  in	  order	  to	  suggest	  that	  they	  may	  yield	  insights	  that	  are	  complimentary	  to	  one	  another.	  While	  Skinner’s	  method	  is	  useful	  for	  illustrating	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  might	  improve	  our	  understanding	  of	  historical	  texts	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  context	  of	  their	  production	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  concepts	  they	  employ	  over	  time10,	  it	  pays	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  production	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  subjects	  who	  produce	  and	  interpret	  such	  texts,	  and	  to	  the	  array	  of	  power	  within	  which	  both	  the	  subjects	  and	  the	  discourses	  in	  question	  operate.	  In	  fact,	  as	  Vucina	  et	  al	  go	  on	  to	  note,	  “Foucault’s	  analyses	  of	  subjugated	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  For	  this	  reason,	  Skinner’s	  method	  informed	  much	  of	  the	  work	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  where	  I	  seek	  to	  examine	  the	  process	  by	  which	  we	  read	  the	  economy	  back	  onto	  Adam	  Smith.	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may	  support	  Skinner’s	  analyses	  of	  political	  language	  by	  paying	  attention	  to	  [both]	  discourses	  that	  were	  hegemonic	  (and	  achieved	  the	  status	  of	  classics)	  and	  those	  that	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons	  never	  obtained	  that	  status”	  (139).	  Discourse	  is	  always	  plural,	  both	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  always	  includes	  resistance	  to	  the	  dominant	  discourse,	  and	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  encompasses	  many	  different	  regimes	  of	  veridiction	  (economics,	  policy,	  finance,	  etc)	  that	  play	  off	  one	  another.11	  Additionally,	  as	  James	  Tully	  points	  out,	  Skinner	  and	  Foucault	  are	  both	  part	  of	  a	  tradition	  of	  thought	  that	  understands	  speech	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  action.	  This	  shared	  tradition	  can,	  according	  to	  Tully,	  be	  outlined	  as	  follows:	  Speaking	  and	  writing	  are	  viewed	  pragmatically	  and	  intersubjectively	  as	  linguistic	  activities	  performed	  by	  speakers	  and	  writers	  as	  participants	  in	  language	  games.	  Actors	  in	  practices	  of	  governance	  and	  theorists	  who	  present	  rival	  solutions	  to	  a	  shared	  political	  problem	  are	  approached	  as	  engaged	  in	  the	  intersubjective	  activities	  of	  exchanging	  reasons	  and	  justifications	  over	  the	  contested	  uses	  of	  the	  descriptive	  and	  normative	  concepts	  by	  which	  the	  problematic	  practice	  and	  its	  forms	  of	  subjectivity	  are	  47rivilege47zed	  and	  disputed.	  The	  exchange	  of	  reasons	  in	  this	  broad	  sense	  of	  practices	  of	  argumentation	  is	  both	  communicative	  and	  strategic,	  involving	  reason	  and	  rhetoric,	  conviction	  and	  persuasion.	  Participants	  exchange	  practical	  reasons	  over	  the	  contested	  criteria	  for	  the	  application	  of	  concepts	  in	  question	  (sense),	  including	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘reason’	  and	  ‘reasonable’,	  the	  circumstances	  that	  warrant	  the	  application	  of	  the	  criteria,	  the	  range	  of	  reference	  of	  the	  concepts,	  and	  their	  evaluative	  force,	  to	  argue	  for	  their	  solutions	  and	  against	  others.	  (2002,	  542)	  	  As	  such,	  while	  there	  may	  be	  significant	  differences	  in	  their	  focuses,	  there	  also	  exist	  broad	  consistencies	  in	  their	  epistemological	  and	  methodological	  outlooks	  that	  should	  allow	  us	  to	  use	  their	  techniques	  in	  a	  complimentary	  fashion.	  One	  way	  in	  which	  we	  might	  take	  advantage	  of	  Foucault’s	  consistent	  attention	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  It	  is	  to	  this	  plurality	  of	  discourse,	  and	  to	  the	  successes	  and	  failures	  to	  challenge	  a	  regime	  of	  veridiction,	  that	  I	  will	  turn	  my	  attention	  in	  Chapters	  2,	  4	  and	  5.	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to	  difference	  and	  to	  “subjugated	  forms	  of	  knowledge”	  is	  to	  allow	  his	  insight	  to	  prevent	  us	  from	  making	  the	  claim	  that	  “the	  economy”	  is	  a	  unitary	  object,	  perhaps	  subject	  to	  continued	  contestation	  and	  negotiation,	  but	  still	  always	  carrying	  some	  particular	  meaning	  (and	  hence,	  not	  others).	  Instead,	  we	  might	  heed	  Foucault’s	  claim	  that:	   Politics	  and	  the	  economy	  are	  not	  things	  that	  exist,	  or	  errors,	  or	  illusions,	  or	  ideologies.	  They	  are	  things	  that	  do	  not	  exist	  and	  yet	  which	  are	  inscribed	  in	  reality	  and	  fall	  under	  a	  regime	  of	  truth	  dividing	  the	  true	  and	  the	  false.	  (2008,	  20)	  	  To	  put	  this	  another	  way,	  when	  we	  use	  the	  term	  “the	  economy”	  we	  participate	  in	  the	  construction	  and	  maintenance	  of	  a	  particular	  regime	  of	  truth	  within	  which	  the	  existence	  “the	  economy”	  has	  the	  status	  of	  truth	  (as	  opposed	  to	  falsehood).	  Far	  from	  being	  fixed,	  this	  term	  is	  constantly	  being	  reinterpreted,	  reified,	  and	  (superficially?)	  modified	  by	  our	  continuous	  claims	  about	  what	  it	  is,	  what	  it	  is	  not,	  and	  what	  it	  is	  different	  from.	  Such	  a	  claim	  is,	  of	  course,	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  our	  attempt	  to	  view	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  effect,	  but	  the	  addition	  of	  Foucault’s	  framework	  provides	  some	  guidance	  about	  how	  we	  might	  go	  about	  extending	  Mitchell’s	  critique	  into	  a	  positive	  analysis	  of	  the	  process	  by	  which	  such	  an	  effect	  is	  created	  and	  maintained.	  	  	   Given	  Foucault’s	  insights	  regarding	  the	  operation	  of	  power/knowledge,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  we	  can	  hope	  for	  from	  such	  an	  analysis	  (and	  it	  might	  be	  something	  worth	  hoping	  for)	  is	  that	  it	  helps	  us	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  a	  regime	  of	  truth	  with	  an	  eye	  toward	  the	  nature	  of	  its	  construction	  and	  an	  aspiration	  to	  re-­‐construct	  it	  in	  ways	  that	  suit	  our	  preferences	  and	  demands.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Our	  discussion	  of	  conceptual	  change	  in	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5	  will	  take	  up	  this	  question	  in	  detail.	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In	  her	  examination	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  “patriotism,”	  for	  example,	  Mary	  Dietz	  demonstrates	  not	  only	  that	  patriotism	  is	  itself	  a	  relatively	  new	  word,	  but	  also	  that	  over	  its	  short	  life	  it	  has	  gone	  through	  significant	  transformations	  in	  both	  its	  meaning	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  other	  related	  concepts	  (177-­‐193).	  She	  points	  out	  that	  when	  the	  term	  “patriot”	  first	  came	  into	  use	  in	  English	  in	  the	  sixteenth	  century,	  it	  simply	  meant	  “countryman”.	  However,	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  next	  half-­‐millennium,	  it	  has	  gone	  through	  a	  number	  of	  meanings,	  including	  Whig	  partisan	  (with	  a	  connotation	  of	  political	  martyrdom),	  Tory	  partisan	  (with	  a	  connotation	  of	  faithfulness	  to	  King	  and	  country),	  defender	  of	  liberty	  and	  property	  against	  tyranny,	  socialist	  or	  working-­‐class	  partisan	  (as	  against	  the	  increasingly	  class	  power	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie),	  and	  finally	  nationalist	  partisan	  of	  the	  “my	  country	  right	  or	  wrong”	  school.	  In	  tracing	  these	  developments,	  she	  notes	  that	  several	  of	  these	  shifts	  hinged	  on	  what	  Skinner	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  term’s	  evaluative	  force.	  “Patriot”	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  term	  of	  praise	  or	  condemnation,	  depending	  upon	  the	  context	  of	  its	  use	  and	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  speaker	  and	  the	  subject.	  What’s	  perhaps	  most	  striking	  about	  Dietz’s	  history	  of	  this	  concept,	  however,	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  shifts	  she	  identifies	  depend	  both	  upon	  the	  willful	  and	  intentional	  speech	  acts	  of	  elites	  (as	  when	  she	  details	  the	  efforts	  of	  17th	  century	  poets	  to	  appropriate	  the	  term	  to	  the	  Tory	  cause)	  (184),	  and	  on	  the	  larger	  context	  in	  which	  the	  term	  must	  operate,	  as	  when	  she	  notes	  that:	  By	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  a	  transformation	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  forces	  and	  the	  related	  rise	  of	  more	  potent	  “statist”	  symbols	  significantly	  diminished	  the	  meaning	  of	  patriotism	  in	  the	  special	  sense	  of	  constitutional	  reform	  and…	  economic	  egalitarianism.	  (189)	  	  Dietz	  treats	  this	  change	  as	  an	  unexplained	  background	  phenomenon	  against	  which	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we	  might	  better	  understand	  the	  changes	  she	  details	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  patriotism.	  The	  change	  in	  context	  seems	  to	  be	  viewed	  entirely	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  the	  change	  in	  concept,	  with	  no	  attention	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  causal	  relationship	  in	  the	  reverse	  direction.	  However,	  if	  we	  attempt	  to	  understand	  this	  story	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Foucault’s	  claim	  that	  politics	  and	  the	  economy	  are	  “inscribed	  in	  reality	  and	  fall	  under	  a	  regime	  of	  truth,”	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  trace	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  particular	  individuals,	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  solve	  specific,	  concrete	  problems	  with	  which	  they	  were	  faced,	  participated	  in	  the	  production	  and	  alteration	  of	  regimes	  of	  truth	  under	  which	  claims	  that	  political	  and	  economic	  forces	  had	  changed	  could	  be	  endowed	  with	  the	  status	  of	  truth.	  	  That	  is,	  Dietz’s	  story	  about	  patriotism,	  which	  is	  excellent	  in	  it’s	  own	  right,	  and	  which	  depends	  largely	  on	  a	  Skinnerian	  conceptual	  history,	  could	  be	  enriched	  considerably	  by	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  Foucaultian	  examination	  of	  the	  power/knowledge	  operations	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  both	  a	  state	  effect	  (the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  state	  and	  external	  totality)	  and	  an	  economy	  effect	  that	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  recognize	  her	  claim	  regarding	  “a	  transformation	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  forces”	  as	  true.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  general	  value	  of	  enriching	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  concept,	  such	  an	  approach	  has	  a	  distinct	  advantage	  for	  those	  of	  who	  are	  interested	  not	  merely	  in	  describing	  politics,	  but	  in	  participating	  in	  it.	  If	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  patriotism	  depended,	  in	  large	  part,	  on	  changes	  in	  the	  “political	  and	  economic	  forces,”	  then	  accepting	  them	  as	  background	  effect	  (as	  Dietz	  seems	  to)	  suggests	  that	  we	  must	  simply	  wait	  for	  a	  change	  in	  conditions	  if	  we	  seek	  to	  innovate	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  concept.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  follow	  Foucault	  in	  understanding	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such	  shifts	  as	  the	  result	  of	  distinct	  actions	  and	  choices	  on	  the	  part	  of	  particular	  individuals,	  then	  we	  might	  ask	  ourselves	  what	  actions	  we	  might	  take,	  what	  choices	  we	  might	  make,	  that	  could	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  opening	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  concept	  in	  question.	  	   Such	  a	  perspective	  allows	  us	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  Skinner’s	  insights	  regarding	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  language	  choices	  by	  elites	  can	  have	  significant	  effects	  on	  the	  meaning	  and	  inflection	  of	  terms,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  on	  the	  concepts	  represented	  by	  those	  terms,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  keeping	  sight	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  whole	  universe	  of	  concepts	  rests	  on	  particular	  regimes	  of	  truth	  that	  are	  themselves	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  contestation	  and	  change,	  and	  that	  rely	  upon	  particular	  manifestations	  of	  power/knowledge.	  Moreover,	  while	  Skinner’s	  method	  will	  tend	  to	  emphasize	  the	  continuity	  of	  these	  concepts,	  as	  they	  go	  through	  a	  process	  of	  shifting	  inflection	  and	  meaning,	  Foucault’s	  method	  will	  tend	  to	  emphasize	  disjuncture	  and	  discontinuity.	  This	  can	  be	  useful	  in	  at	  least	  two	  ways:	  first,	  it	  helps	  to	  create	  a	  strong	  sense	  that	  things	  not	  only	  were	  otherwise	  in	  the	  past,	  but	  could	  have	  been	  otherwise	  in	  the	  present,	  and	  therefore	  could	  be	  otherwise	  in	  the	  future;	  and	  second,	  a	  consciousness	  of	  these	  disjunctures	  and	  discontinuities	  helps	  to	  highlight	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  operation	  of	  power	  relationships	  contributes	  to	  (or	  resists)	  the	  process	  of	  conceptual	  innovation.	  	  	   This	  second	  point	  perhaps	  requires	  some	  additional	  clarification.	  While	  Skinner	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  terms	  and	  their	  concepts	  are	  deployed	  by	  speakers	  and	  authors	  who	  are	  today	  recognized	  as	  having	  formed	  important	  parts	  of	  a	  conceptual	  conversation	  that	  spans	  from	  the	  past	  to	  the	  present,	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Foucault’s	  focus	  is	  less	  on	  who	  is	  speaking	  (or	  the	  intentions	  of	  actors)	  and	  more	  on	  what	  is	  said	  and	  its	  effects.	  There	  are	  (almost)	  always,	  of	  course	  multiple	  kinds	  of	  things	  being	  said	  (and	  written)	  about	  any	  given	  subject	  and	  any	  given	  point	  in	  time;	  there	  are	  (almost)	  always	  competing	  discourses,	  and	  discourse	  is	  always	  plural.	  However,	  some	  of	  these	  things	  will	  be	  recognized	  as	  having	  the	  status	  of	  “truth”	  while	  others	  will	  not,	  and	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  think	  about	  why	  this	  might	  be	  the	  case	  without	  bringing	  power	  into	  the	  conversation.	  In	  “The	  Subject	  and	  Power,”	  Foucault	  suggests	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Frankfurt	  school’s	  focus	  on	  understanding	  Enlightenment	  rationalism,	  there	  is:	  …another	  way	  to	  go	  further	  toward	  a	  new	  economy	  of	  power	  relations,	  a	  way	  that	  is	  more	  empirical,	  more	  directly	  related	  to	  our	  present	  situation,	  and	  one	  that	  implies	  more	  relations	  between	  theory	  and	  practice.	  It	  consists	  in	  taking	  the	  forms	  of	  resistance	  against	  different	  forms	  of	  power	  as	  a	  starting	  point…	  Rather	  than	  analyzing	  power	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  its	  internal	  rationality,	  it	  consists	  of	  analyzing	  power	  relations	  through	  the	  antagonism	  of	  strategies.	  For	  example,	  to	  find	  out	  what	  our	  society	  means	  by	  “sanity,”	  perhaps	  we	  should	  investigate	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  the	  field	  of	  insanity.	  And	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  “legality”	  in	  the	  field	  of	  illegality.	  And,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  what	  power	  relations	  are	  about,	  perhaps	  we	  should	  investigate	  the	  forms	  of	  resistance	  and	  attempts	  made	  to	  dissociate	  these	  relations.	  (2003,	  128-­‐129)	  	  Such	  a	  strategy	  leaves	  us	  with	  some	  important	  questions	  about	  initiatives	  like	  the	  GEI	  that	  seek	  to	  modify	  “the	  economy”	  in	  particular	  ways.	  For	  instance,	  what	  is	  the	  economy	  that	  we	  understand	  as	  available	  for	  modification	  by	  the	  term	  “green”	  (or	  any	  of	  a	  host	  of	  other	  adjectives	  like	  “alternative”	  or	  “social”)?13	  To	  what	  type	  of	  economy	  does	  the	  “green	  economy”	  stand	  in	  opposition?	  In	  this	  respect,	  perhaps,	  a	  “green	  economy”	  may	  be	  like	  a	  “person	  of	  color;”	  implicit	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  each	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  In	  its	  recent	  ruling	  on	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  of	  2010,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  even	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  refer	  to	  “healthcare	  economies.”	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these	  concepts	  is	  an	  understanding	  that	  some	  other	  form	  of	  the	  thing	  they	  denote	  is	  more	  given	  than	  the	  form	  in	  question.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  what	  is	  the	  economic	  equivalent	  of	  “whiteness?”	  And	  finally,	  does	  the	  “green	  economy,”	  along	  with	  other	  modified	  economies	  like	  it,	  constitute	  a	  site	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  resistance	  that	  Foucault	  describes?	  If	  so,	  what	  we	  can	  determine	  about	  the	  power	  relations	  that	  inhere	  in	  the	  economy	  by	  examining	  such	  sites	  of	  resistance?	  We’ll	  return	  to	  these	  questions,	  and	  examine	  them	  in	  detail,	  in	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5.	  	   First,	  though,	  it’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  these	  questions	  become	  particularly	  perplexing	  when	  one	  begins	  to	  enumerate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  “the	  economy”	  can	  be	  brought	  into	  play.	  	  Leaving	  off,	  for	  the	  moment,	  the	  various	  modifiers	  to	  which	  the	  term	  may	  be	  attached,	  the	  economy	  can	  be	  an	  actor	  (“the	  economy	  created	  10,000	  jobs	  last	  month”)	  or	  an	  area	  for	  action	  (“President	  Obama	  today	  unveiled	  his	  new	  plan	  for	  the	  economy”).	  	  It	  can	  be	  national,	  or	  global,	  or	  even	  local	  (or	  micro).	  It	  can	  be	  singular	  (“the	  economy”)	  or	  plural	  (“local	  economies”).	  	  If	  we	  drop	  the	  indefinite	  article,	  economy	  can	  be	  a	  noun	  adjunct	  (as	  in	  the	  classical	  “political	  economy”);	  a	  noun	  denoting	  thrift,	  a	  complex	  system,	  or	  a	  particular	  sphere	  of	  human	  activity	  devoted	  to	  production,	  distribution,	  and	  consumption;	  or	  an	  adjective	  describing	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  human	  activity	  (and	  it’s	  corresponding	  social	  science).	  How	  is	  it	  that,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  so	  much	  uncertainty,	  so	  many	  slippages,	  so	  many	  conflicting	  and	  colliding	  discourses	  swirling	  around	  “the	  economy,”	  there	  could	  be	  any	  meaning	  at	  all	  to	  a	  standard	  (as	  opposed	  to	  alternative),	  colorless	  (as	  opposed	  to	  green),	  or	  free-­‐standing	  (as	  opposed	  to	  social)	  economy?	  How	  do	  such	  a	  term,	  and	  its	  corresponding	  constellation(s)	  of	  meaning,	  serve	  as	  a	  limit	  to	  the	  possibilities	  for	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political	  action?	  What	  kinds	  of	  conceptual	  innovation	  might	  the	  recognition	  of	  this	  particular	  locus	  of	  power/knowledge	  enable?	  What	  are	  the	  possibilities	  and	  limits	  imposed	  upon	  us	  by	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  “the	  economy?”	  That	  is,	  clearly	  the	  modifications	  of	  “the	  economy”	  noted	  above	  (green,	  social,	  alternative)	  are	  understood	  by	  their	  advocates	  to	  resist	  the	  hegemony	  of	  “the	  economy,”	  but	  as	  simple	  modifications,	  they	  are	  still	  subject	  to	  the	  limitations	  places	  on	  the	  imagination	  by	  the	  conceptual	  apparatus	  of	  “the	  economy”	  itself.	  As	  particular	  kinds	  of	  economies,	  they	  must	  still	  be	  economies.	  Is	  this	  simply	  a	  structure	  from	  which	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  break	  free,	  or	  are	  there	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  might	  conceive	  of	  the	  complex	  web	  of	  human	  interaction	  that	  includes	  processes	  of	  production,	  consumption,	  and	  distribution	  but	  does	  away	  with	  the	  category	  of	  “economy”	  entirely?	  	  	   Another	  set	  of	  intriguing	  questions	  is	  added	  when	  one	  considers	  that,	  as	  recently	  as	  150	  years	  ago,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  unintelligible	  to	  say	  “the	  economy.”	  The	  indefinite	  article	  was	  absent,	  and	  only	  its	  noun	  adjunct	  and	  adjectival	  forms	  were	  intelligible.	  Some	  small	  number	  of	  trained	  economists	  or	  political	  economists	  were	  beginning	  to	  talk	  about	  national	  economies	  as	  early	  as	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  but	  the	  term	  didn’t	  have	  anywhere	  near	  the	  kind	  of	  real	  existence	  and	  unconscious	  acceptance	  it	  enjoys	  today.	  So,	  to	  the	  list	  of	  questions	  above,	  we	  might	  add,	  how	  did	  “the	  economy”	  come	  to	  be	  inscribed	  in	  the	  regime	  of	  truth	  in	  such	  a	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	  time?	  And,	  for	  that	  matter,	  how	  did	  we	  come	  to	  talk	  about	  it	  as	  though	  it	  has	  always	  been	  there,	  and	  as	  though	  others	  have	  always	  been	  talking	  about	  it?	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   It	  is	  to	  these	  questions	  that	  I	  will	  turn	  my	  attention	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  It	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  destabilize	  “the	  economy”	  as	  an	  effect,	  though	  I	  certainly	  wouldn’t	  mind	  if	  that	  happened.	  Instead,	  my	  goal	  is	  more	  modest:	  I	  seek	  to	  map	  some	  of	  the	  discursive	  trends	  that	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  emergence	  and	  historical	  becoming	  of	  “the	  economy,”	  as	  well	  as	  to	  its	  durability,	  and	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  within	  which	  to	  think	  about	  strategies	  for	  combatting	  the	  economy	  effect	  that	  may	  be	  open	  to	  those	  of	  us	  who	  wish	  to	  resist	  or	  reconfigure	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  “the	  economy”	  as	  it	  exists	  today,	  rather	  than	  merely	  offering	  a	  modification	  to	  the	  “standard”	  version	  such	  as	  a	  “green	  economy.”	  In	  this	  attempt,	  I	  will	  seek	  to	  take	  advantage	  both	  of	  Skinner’s	  insights	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  appraisive	  terms	  and	  their	  role	  in	  conceptual	  change,	  and	  of	  Foucault’s	  suggestions	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  truth	  and	  power,	  while	  all	  the	  while	  seeking	  to	  expand	  on	  Mitchell’s	  idea	  of	  “an	  effect”	  as	  it	  might	  relate	  to	  the	  economy.	  I	  hope	  that,	  to	  return	  to	  the	  example	  of	  my	  experience	  with	  Health	  Services,	  labor	  organizers	  might	  be	  able	  to	  use	  this	  frame	  of	  resistance	  to,	  and	  reconfiguration	  of,	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  economy	  to	  help	  them	  steer	  the	  debate	  when	  an	  employer	  tells	  them	  that	  health	  care	  costs	  for	  their	  members	  must	  rise	  because	  of	  “the	  economy.”	  Instead	  of	  being	  left	  with	  the	  twin	  losing	  options	  of	  admitting	  defeat	  or	  attempting	  to	  show	  the	  employer	  that	  savings	  can	  be	  found	  elsewhere	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  existing	  healthcare	  costs,14	  an	  organizer	  who	  understands	  the	  economy	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Unions	  seem	  forever	  to	  be	  caught	  up,	  for	  example,	  in	  debates	  over	  executive	  pay.	  While	  the	  unfairness	  of	  high	  wages	  for	  executives	  coupled	  with	  low	  wages	  for	  workers	  is	  clear,	  the	  math	  is	  typically	  such	  that,	  were	  executive	  pay	  reduced	  to	  some	  reasonable	  multiple	  of	  average	  worker	  pay,	  and	  the	  resulting	  surplus	  distributed	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an	  effect	  that	  is	  dependent	  both	  on	  its	  perceived	  appraisive	  value	  and	  on	  its	  position	  within	  a	  given	  regime	  of	  truth	  might	  respond	  by	  attempting	  to	  engage	  in	  practices	  of	  negotiating	  that	  are	  at	  once	  intelligible	  as	  practices	  related	  to	  the	  economy	  and	  incompatible	  with	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  they	  are	  commonly	  understood.	  One	  might	  suggest,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  dictates	  of	  the	  economy	  require	  that	  we	  shift	  our	  attention	  from	  buildings	  to	  workers,	  as	  there	  can	  be	  no	  economic	  activity	  at	  all	  without	  healthy	  workers.	  Perhaps,	  a	  bold	  negotiator	  might	  even	  argue,	  the	  economy	  demands	  that	  the	  workers	  discontinue	  their	  labor	  unless	  the	  minimum	  needs	  of	  wages,	  healthcare,	  job	  stability,	  and	  decent	  working	  conditions	  are	  met.	  	  	   Clearly,	  active	  and	  conscious	  engagement	  in	  such	  a	  strategy	  of	  resistance	  cannot	  eliminate	  the	  very	  real	  power	  relationship	  that	  obtains	  between	  workers	  and	  employers.	  No	  amount	  of	  rhetorical	  maneuvering	  can	  change,	  for	  example,	  the	  availability	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  of	  replacement	  workers.	  However,	  different	  moves	  in	  this	  game	  can	  highlight	  some	  truths	  while	  diminishing	  the	  appearance	  of	  others.	  The	  move	  to	  contrast	  a	  “green	  economy”	  to	  “the	  economy,”	  for	  instance,	  serves	  to	  highlight	  truths	  about	  the	  environmental	  cost	  of	  business	  as	  usual	  and	  the	  job	  creation	  potential	  of	  wholesale	  change	  in	  our	  structure	  of	  production	  while	  diminishing	  the	  appearance	  of	  truths	  about	  profit	  per	  unit	  or	  lowest	  feasible	  short	  term	  cost.	  A	  succession	  of	  such	  moves	  might	  even	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  causing	  sufficient	  slippage	  in	  the	  (always	  contested)	  meaning(s)	  of	  “the	  economy”	  that	  it	  could	  cease	  to	  be	  meaningful	  to	  contrast	  the	  two	  at	  all.	  As	  we	  are	  beginning	  to	  see	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  “green”	  products,	  such	  a	  series	  of	  moves	  can	  also	  have	  the	  effect	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  among	  the	  workers,	  each	  of	  these	  workers	  would	  receive	  a	  pittance.	  	  Thus,	  this	  is	  almost	  always	  a	  losing	  gambit.	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of	  increasing	  profit	  per	  unit	  through	  increasing	  demand.	  People	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	  more	  for	  products	  they	  understand	  as	  green;	  as	  such,	  a	  representation	  of	  “the	  environment”	  which	  was	  initially	  deployed	  in	  opposition	  to	  “the	  economy”	  may	  in	  fact	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  increasing	  profits	  as	  they	  are	  conventionally	  understood.15	  This	  is	  not	  an	  inherently	  good	  or	  bad	  phenomenon	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  environment	  (because,	  of	  course,	  its	  goodness	  or	  badness	  depends	  upon	  the	  real	  environmental	  impact	  of	  increased	  consumption	  of	  those	  products	  labeled	  “green”),	  but	  it	  does	  show	  one	  way	  in	  which	  a	  conscious	  strategy	  of	  resistance	  can	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  altering	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  economy.16	  	  	   In	  fact,	  one	  might	  view	  the	  whole	  history	  of	  “the	  economy”	  as	  a	  continuous	  process	  of	  the	  incorporation	  of	  particular	  (again,	  always	  contested)	  modifiers	  resulting	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  appearance	  of	  naturalness.	  In	  such	  a	  story,	  the	  modifier	  “free-­‐market”	  might	  have	  been	  one	  of	  the	  first	  modifiers	  to	  be	  so	  incorporated,	  so	  that	  today	  one	  need	  not	  specify	  that	  “the	  economy”	  we	  are	  discussing	  is	  based	  upon	  markets	  rather	  than	  planning.	  Other	  incorporated	  modifiers	  might	  include	  “national”	  and	  “global”	  (as	  the	  economy	  seems	  generally	  assumed	  to	  be	  both	  at	  once),	  “information”17	  and	  “service,”	  or	  even	  “neoliberal”	  and	  “neoclassical.”	  	  	   Such	  a	  perspective	  may	  prove	  enormously	  valuable	  to	  those	  of	  us	  who	  wish	  to	  intervene	  (or	  participate	  actively)	  in	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  This	  relationship	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  because,	  in	  many	  respects,	  the	  environment	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  effect	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  economy	  or	  the	  state.	  	  16	  We’ll	  take	  up	  the	  question	  of	  the	  efficacy	  of	  such	  a	  strategy	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  17	  The	  idea	  that	  information	  was	  an	  economic	  good	  may	  once	  have	  been	  novel,	  but	  it	  certainly	  is	  not	  so	  today.	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AN	  ETYMOLOGY	  OF	  THE	  ECONOMY	  
	  
A.	  Introduction	  
	  	   In	  a	  study	  of	  any	  concept,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  start	  with	  a	  history,	  or	  etymology,	  of	  the	  term	  itself.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  term	  “economy”	  wasn’t	  used	  in	  anything	  resembling	  the	  contemporary	  sense	  until	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  at	  the	  earliest,	  and	  that	  a	  history	  of	  the	  multiple	  uses	  to	  which	  the	  term	  (and	  it’s	  accompanying	  conceptual	  apparatuses)	  has	  been	  put	  will	  help	  to	  put	  both	  the	  specific	  nature	  and	  the	  contingency	  of	  the	  current	  arrangement	  in	  context.	  	   It	  is	  common	  practice	  to	  begin	  any	  etymological	  analysis	  of	  “economy”	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  Greek	  roots	  oikos	  and	  nomos,	  meaning	  household	  management	  (e.g.	  Weber,	  1978).	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  History	  of	  Economic	  Analysis,	  Schumpeter	  suggests	  that	  we	  should	  distinguish	  between	  “Economic	  Thought,”	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  “the	  opinions	  on	  economic	  matters	  that	  prevail	  at	  any	  given	  time	  in	  any	  given	  society	  and	  belong	  to	  the	  province	  of	  economic	  history	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  province	  of	  the	  history	  of	  economics,”	  and	  “Economic	  Analysis,”	  which	  must	  be	  the	  result	  of	  self	  consciously	  scientific	  investigation	  of	  economic	  phenomena.	  While	  Economic	  Thought,	  he	  suggests,	  is	  nearly	  as	  old	  as	  organized	  human	  society,	  Economic	  Analysis	  begins	  with	  the	  Greeks	  (Pt.	  II,	  Ch.	  1.1).	  	  In	  making	  this	  claim,	  Schumpeter	  does	  our	  project	  a	  service	  by	  highlighting	  the	  examples	  of	  Economic	  Thought	  that	  precede	  the	  Greeks	  but	  do	  not	  meet	  his	  bar	  for	  status	  as	  Analysis.	  Assyrians	  and	  Babylonians,	  for	  example,	  had	  credit	  and	  banking,	  but	  not	  Economic	  Analysis.	  Curiously,	  according	  to	  Schumpeter,	  “The	  sacred	  books	  of	  Israel,	  especially	  the	  legislative	  portions	  of	  them,	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reveal	  perfect	  grasp	  of	  the	  practical	  economic	  problems	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Hebrew	  state.	  But	  there	  is	  no	  trace	  of	  analytic	  effort”	  (ibid).	  	  	   Schumpeter	  points	  out	  that	  the	  Greek	  discipline	  of	  Oeconomicus	  “meant	  only	  the	  practical	  wisdom	  of	  household	  management”	  (Pt.	  II,	  Ch.	  1.2).	  It	  is	  instead	  to	  the	  Aristotelian	  concept	  of	  Chrematistics	  (the	  science	  or	  study	  of	  possessions	  or	  wealth)	  that	  Schumpeter	  points	  as	  the	  first	  example	  of	  Economic	  Analysis	  proper.	  Interestingly	  for	  our	  purposes,	  he	  complains	  of	  Greek	  economic	  thought	  in	  general	  that	  “they	  merged	  their	  pieces	  of	  economic	  reasoning	  with	  their	  general	  philosophy	  of	  state	  and	  society	  and	  rarely	  dealt	  with	  an	  economic	  topic	  for	  its	  own	  sake”	  (ibid).	  What	  Schumpeter	  sees	  as	  a	  failure	  to	  recognize	  economics	  as	  a	  distinct	  field	  might	  instead	  be	  interpreted	  as	  evidence	  that	  the	  seemingly	  natural	  distinctions	  between	  the	  economy,	  the	  state,	  and	  society	  did	  not	  exist	  for	  the	  Greek	  thinkers	  in	  question.	  They	  had	  neither	  the	  words	  nor	  the	  concepts	  for	  disaggregating	  or	  demarcating	  human	  activity	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  we	  now	  take	  for	  granted.	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  despite	  the	  strong	  linguistic	  link	  between	  the	  Greek	  oikos	  and	  the	  contemporary	  economy,	  the	  term	  itself	  has	  gone	  through	  a	  number	  of	  permutations	  that	  are	  not	  directly	  related	  either	  to	  household	  management	  or,	  in	  fact,	  to	  the	  direct	  distribution	  of	  material	  goods.	  For	  example,	  in	  1651	  Hobbes	  wrote	  that:	  	  …in	  old	  time	  there	  was	  a	  manner	  of	  living,	  and	  as	  it	  were	  a	  certain	  economy…	  living	  by	  rapine;	  which	  was	  neither	  against	  the	  law	  of	  nature	  (things	  then	  so	  standing),	  nor	  void	  of	  glory	  to	  those	  who	  exercised	  it	  with	  valor,	  not	  with	  cruelty.	  (Hobbes,	  64)	  	  	  Here	  he	  uses	  “economy”	  to	  mean	  a	  “manner	  of	  living;”	  this	  may	  foreshadow	  the	  term’s	  transformation	  to	  mean	  “[t]he	  organization,	  internal	  constitution,	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apportionment	  of	  functions,	  of	  any	  complex	  unity”	  (OED).This	  understanding	  of	  economy	  as	  the	  unity	  (or	  order)	  of	  a	  complex	  system	  came	  into	  popular	  usage	  during	  the	  17th	  and	  18th	  centuries	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  nature	  (OED).	  In	  	  1749,	  Isaac	  Biberg	  penned	  a	  tract	  entitled	  “The	  Oeconomy	  of	  Nature”	  in	  which	  he	  noted	  that	  “[b]y	  the	  Oeconomy	  of	  Nature	  we	  understand	  the	  all-­‐wise	  disposition	  of	  the	  Creator	  in	  relation	  to	  natural	  things,	  by	  which	  they	  are	  fitted	  to	  produce	  general	  ends,	  and	  reciprocal	  uses”	  (39).	  Similarly,	  in	  his	  1785	  work	  The	  Task,	  poet	  William	  Cowper	  discusses	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  killing	  insects	  and	  other	  vermin.	  If	  they	  come	  into	  one’s	  home,	  or	  other	  protected	  spaces,	  it’s	  acceptable	  to	  kill	  them.	  However:	  Not	  so	  when,	  held	  within	  their	  proper	  bounds,	  And	  guiltless	  of	  offence,	  they	  range	  the	  air,	  Or	  take	  their	  pastime	  in	  the	  spacious	  field:	  There	  they	  are	  61rivilege’d;	  and	  he	  that	  hunts	  Or	  harms	  them	  there	  is	  guilty	  of	  a	  wrong;	  Disturbs	  the	  economy	  of	  Nature’s	  realm,	  Who,	  when	  she	  form’d,	  design’d	  them	  an	  abode.	  (139)	  	  Other	  uses	  included	  “the	  proper	  management	  of	  the	  body”	  (from	  1632),	  “the	  method	  of	  divine	  government	  of	  the	  world”	  (from	  1577),	  and	  “the	  structure,	  arrangement,	  or	  layout	  of	  something	  made	  or	  created	  by	  human	  design”	  (from	  1637).	  (OED)	  	   Additionally,	  and	  of	  significant	  importance	  for	  the	  project	  at	  hand,	  economy	  has	  been	  used	  to	  denote	  thrift	  or	  the	  careful	  stewardship	  of	  limited	  resources	  since	  at	  least	  the	  late	  17th	  century.	  In	  his	  1670	  translation	  (or	  “Englishing”)	  of	  Guillaume	  Girard’s	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Life	  of	  the	  Duke	  of	  Espernon:	  The	  Great	  Favourite	  of	  France,	  Charles	  Cotton	  writes	  thusly	  of	  the	  Duke’s	  renowned	  stinginess	  (or	  thrift,	  depending	  upon	  one’s	  perspective):	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Many	  have	  since	  been	  very	  liberal	  in	  their	  censure	  of	  the	  Duke’s	  Oeconomy,	  and	  which	  many	  unjust	  to	  his	  Honour,	  and	  not	  very	  kind	  to	  him,	  have	  blemish’d	  with	  the	  name	  of	  Avarice:	  I	  cannot	  deny	  that	  but	  that	  the	  Oeconomy	  of	  his	  House	  was	  great;	  neither	  do	  I	  see	  why	  that	  should	  not	  have	  its	  due	  Honour	  amongst	  his	  other	  Vertues;	  he	  being	  in	  this	  as	  much	  a	  Steward	  for	  the	  publick,	  as	  for	  his	  own	  private	  Interests…	  (62)	  	  By	  the	  late	  18th	  century,	  Thomas	  Jefferson	  was	  using	  the	  term	  to	  refer	  not	  to	  thrift	  in	  general,	  but	  instead	  to	  a	  particular	  concrete	  instance	  of	  thrift	  (“The	  suppression	  of	  the	  packets	  is	  one	  of	  the	  economies	  under	  consideration.”	  (OED)),	  and	  by	  the	  very	  early	  19th	  century	  he	  was	  also	  using	  it	  to	  refer	  to	  efficiency	  in	  the	  disposition	  of	  non-­‐material	  resources:	  …I	  have	  begun	  a	  sketch,	  which	  those	  who	  come	  after	  me	  will	  successively	  correct	  and	  fill	  up,	  till	  a	  code	  of	  rules	  shall	  be	  formed	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Senate,	  the	  effects	  of	  which	  may	  be	  accuracy	  in	  business,	  economy	  of	  time,	  order,	  uniformity,	  and	  impartiality.	  (4)	  	  It	  is	  not,	  however,	  until	  1892	  that	  the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  points	  to	  the	  first	  use	  of	  economy	  to	  mean	  “The	  organization	  or	  condition	  of	  a	  community	  or	  nation	  with	  respect	  to	  economic	  factors,”	  in	  the	  following	  phrase	  from	  the	  Journal	  of	  
Political	  Economy:	  “Taxes	  are	  still	  the	  main	  support	  of	  the	  State’s	  economy.”	  (OED)	  	   A	  number	  of	  important	  transitions,	  each	  occurring	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  19th	  and	  20th	  centuries,	  and	  each	  the	  product	  of	  an	  individual	  or	  group’s	  efforts	  to	  solve	  concrete	  political	  problems,	  contributed	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  as	  an	  effect.	  One	  of	  these	  transitions	  was	  the	  emergence	  of	  academic	  economics	  as	  a	  discipline	  in	  need	  of	  an	  object.	  The	  object,	  the	  economy,	  thus	  came	  into	  being	  not	  by	  an	  accident	  of	  language	  or	  by	  a	  slow	  emergence	  of	  inevitable	  processes,	  but	  rather	  as	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  series	  of	  efforts	  to	  distinguish	  the	  study	  of	  “economic”	  activity	  from	  that	  of	  politics	  or	  of	  society.	  In	  particular,	  the	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development	  of	  the	  economy	  served	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  problems	  faced	  first	  by	  newly	  professionalizing	  economists	  seeking	  to	  distinguish	  their	  field	  of	  study	  from	  established	  fields	  such	  as	  politics	  and	  sociology,	  and	  then	  by	  a	  subset	  of	  newly	  professionalized	  economists	  seeking	  to	  bolster	  their	  methodological	  perspective	  against	  challenges	  from	  competing	  schools	  of	  thought.	  Throughout	  this	  story,	  the	  usage	  and	  inflection	  of	  the	  term	  “the	  economy”	  will	  continue	  to	  shift,	  as	  different	  actors	  seek	  to	  deploy	  it	  in	  novel	  ways.	  	  While	  there	  is	  significant	  shifting	  in	  the	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  over	  time,	  one	  thing	  we	  can	  observe	  from	  the	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  word	  provided	  above	  is	  that	  each	  subsequent	  usage	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  history	  of	  prior	  usages.	  In	  the	  transition	  from	  economy	  as	  complex	  system	  to	  economy	  as	  management	  of	  a	  complex	  system,	  intelligibility	  is	  maintained	  because	  the	  term	  does	  not	  come	  to	  mean	  management	  of	  any	  system	  whatever,	  but	  only	  those	  systems	  that	  are	  sufficiently	  complex,	  like	  the	  body	  or	  government.	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  later	  shift	  to	  “careful	  stewardship	  of	  limited	  resources,”	  intelligibility	  is	  maintained	  insofar	  as	  this	  is	  really	  simply	  a	  further	  restriction	  of	  “management	  of	  complex	  systems.”	  In	  some	  respects,	  we	  see	  the	  usage	  diverge	  away	  from	  this	  focus	  on	  complexity	  (as	  in	  the	  example	  of	  Jefferson	  using	  it	  to	  denote	  specific	  instances	  of	  thrift),	  but	  such	  divergences	  cement	  the	  relationship	  between	  “economy”	  and	  the	  disposition	  of	  material	  goods,	  such	  that	  the	  move	  by	  the	  economists	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  to	  revise	  the	  term	  once	  again	  to	  denote	  “the	  organization	  or	  condition	  of	  a	  community	  or	  nation	  with	  respect	  to	  economic	  factors,”	  is	  intelligible	  with	  respect	  both	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  economy	  as	  a	  complex	  system	  and	  to	  the	  alternate	  conception	  of	  economy	  as	  related	  to	  thrift	  (or	  efficiency).	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Each	  of	  these	  shifts	  requires	  some	  conceptual	  innovation,	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  such	  innovation	  must	  occur	  within	  a	  context	  that	  allows	  the	  term	  to	  maintain	  at	  least	  the	  appearance	  of	  continuity.	  
B.	  Marx	  and	  the	  Economy	  If,	  as	  I	  have	  suggested	  here,	  the	  term	  “the	  economy”	  doesn’t	  come	  into	  usage	  in	  the	  contemporary	  sense	  until	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  and	  if,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  even	  the	  conceptual	  apparatus	  was	  not	  available	  to	  those	  who	  are	  commonly	  looked	  at	  as	  its	  inventors,	  where	  shall	  we	  begin	  to	  look	  for	  the	  genesis	  of	  this	  conceptual	  apparatus?	  One	  obvious	  place	  to	  start	  in	  our	  search	  for	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Karl	  Marx.	  His	  system	  of	  thought	  clearly	  assumes	  that	  economic	  activity	  is	  subject	  to	  discoverable	  laws,	  and	  is	  to	  some	  degree	  independent	  of	  other	  human	  activity.	  However,	  while	  there	  are	  some	  important	  similarities	  between	  the	  economic	  base	  as	  articulated	  by	  Marx	  and	  the	  contemporary	  economy,	  there	  are	  also	  sufficient	  differences	  to	  say	  that	  the	  two	  are	  related,	  but	  distinct	  from	  one	  another.	  As	  Hodgson	  (2001)	  points	  out,	  however,	  Marx	  appears	  to	  be	  interested	  not	  in	  some	  grand	  general	  idea	  of	  the	  economy,	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  specific	  economic	  formations	  that	  correspond	  to	  particular	  “modes	  of	  production.”	  For	  this	  reason,	  Hodgson	  argues,	  we	  might	  understand	  Marx	  as	  an	  important	  precursor	  of	  the	  German	  historical	  school,	  which	  we’ll	  discuss	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  One	  aspect	  of	  Marx’s	  thought	  that	  is	  important	  for	  our	  story	  is	  that	  instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  general	  questions	  about	  how	  “the	  economy”	  works,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  his	  work	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  specific	  question	  of	  how	  capitalism	  functions	  as	  a	  historically	  specific	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formation.	  This	  focus	  would	  be	  echoed	  by	  the	  historical	  school’s	  insistence	  that	  all	  economic	  reality	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  specific	  time	  and	  place	  in	  which	  it	  is	  found.	  	  Hodgson	  and	  others	  (e.g.	  Resnick	  and	  Wolff	  1989,	  or	  Gibson	  Graham	  2006)	  have	  noted,	  however,	  that	  Marx’s	  theoretical	  position	  is	  not	  at	  all	  devoid	  of	  general	  or	  totalizing	  principles.	  Instead,	  such	  principles	  are	  applied	  not	  directly	  to	  questions	  of	  specific	  economic	  relations,	  but	  to	  the	  overall	  field	  within	  which	  such	  economic	  relations	  are	  constituted	  and	  contested.	  That	  is,	  capitalism	  may	  be	  a	  historically	  specific	  formation,	  governed	  by	  its	  own	  historically	  specific	  laws,	  but	  the	  logic	  by	  which	  primitive	  accumulation	  flows	  into	  feudalism,	  and	  feudalism	  into	  capitalism,	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  a	  general,	  ahistorical	  principle.	  Hodgson’s	  distinction	  between	  those	  early	  economists	  who	  were	  looking	  for	  universal,	  transhistorical	  principles,	  and	  those	  who	  were	  interested	  in	  the	  historically	  specific	  nature	  of	  economic	  problems	  may	  be	  useful	  in	  our	  attempt	  to	  find	  the	  roots	  of	  “the	  economy.”	  If,	  as	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  is	  typically	  imbued	  with	  traits	  of	  independence,	  uniqueness,	  impersonality,	  protection	  of	  inequality,	  potential	  for	  infinite	  growth,	  naturalness,	  inevitability,	  and	  agency,	  the	  presence	  of	  these	  traits	  seems	  to	  be	  rooted	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  trans-­‐historical	  given.	  Certainly	  the	  ideas	  that	  a	  society	  could	  not	  function	  without	  an	  economy,	  and	  that	  the	  economy	  has	  always	  been	  an	  object	  available	  for	  discovery	  seem	  to	  support	  the	  position	  that	  one	  might	  find	  a	  set	  of	  general	  laws	  that	  apply	  to	  all	  economies	  in	  all	  situations.	  Similarly,	  the	  other	  criteria	  I	  have	  suggested	  for	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  may	  be	  easily	  related	  to	  an	  ahistorical	  formulation	  of	  a	  set	  of	  abstract	  rules	  and	  laws.	  As	  such,	  while	  Hodgson’s	  distinction	  between	  the	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historicist	  economists	  and	  those	  who	  are	  convinced	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  general	  theory	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	  distinction	  for	  which	  we	  are	  searching	  (that	  is,	  one	  between	  those	  economists	  who	  did	  not	  conceive	  of	  	  “the	  economy”	  in	  the	  contemporary	  sense	  (or	  senses)	  and	  those	  who	  did/do),	  his	  categorization	  may	  be	  a	  useful	  precursor	  to	  ours;	  it	  might	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  contemporary	  sense(s)	  without	  first	  siding	  with	  the	  generalizers	  over	  the	  historicists,	  as	  only	  the	  generalizers	  understand	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  object	  (though	  we	  would,	  of	  course,	  say	  “effect”)	  that	  conforms	  to	  a	  given	  set	  of	  criteria	  at	  all	  times	  in	  all	  places,	  and	  it	  is	  such	  an	  understanding	  that	  undergirds	  the	  economy’s	  appearance	  as	  natural	  and	  inevitable.	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  one	  might	  quite	  reasonably	  wonder	  where	  Marx	  fits	  into	  this	  cosmology.	  Is	  he	  a	  theorist	  of	  the	  historical	  specificity	  of	  capitalism,	  or	  of	  the	  general	  dynamics	  of	  change	  in	  economic	  systems	  (formations	  of	  the	  economy)?	  He	  is,	  I	  think,	  much	  closer	  to	  the	  latter	  than	  the	  former,	  despite	  his	  clear	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  capitalist	  form	  and	  the	  minutiae	  of	  its	  operation.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  following	  broad	  statement	  of	  principles	  penned	  in	  1859:	  The	  general	  conclusion	  at	  which	  I	  arrived	  and	  which,	  once	  reached,	  became	  the	  guiding	  principle	  of	  my	  studies	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  social	  production	  of	  their	  existence,	  men	  inevitably	  enter	  Into	  [sic]	  definite	  relations,	  which	  are	  independent	  of	  their	  will,	  namely	  relations	  of	  production	  appropriate	  to	  a	  given	  stage	  in	  the	  development	  of	  their	  material	  forces	  of	  production.	  The	  totality	  of	  these	  relations	  of	  production	  constitutes	  the	  economic	  structure	  [German:	  ökonomische	  Struktur]	  of	  society,	  the	  real	  foundation,	  on	  which	  arises	  a	  legal	  and	  political	  superstructure	  and	  to	  which	  correspond	  definite	  forms	  of	  social	  consciousness.	  (1977)	  	  If	  the	  relations	  into	  which	  men	  enter	  in	  the	  context	  of	  economic	  activity	  are	  both	  “inevitable”	  and	  “independent	  of	  their	  will,”	  one	  might	  reasonably	  infer	  that	  Marx	  is	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making	  a	  claim	  not	  simply	  about	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  capitalist	  mode	  of	  production,	  but	  about	  the	  generality	  of	  human	  existence	  and	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  economy.	  While	  the	  particular	  form	  of	  these	  relations	  might	  not	  always	  conform	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  capitalism,	  it	  certainly	  seems	  as	  though	  Marx	  is	  making	  a	  universal	  claim	  when	  he	  suggests	  that	  these	  relations,	  in	  the	  aggregate,	  “[constitute]	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  society,	  the	  real	  foundation…”	  Where	  there	  is	  society,	  there	  is	  an	  economic	  foundation,	  and	  this	  foundation	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  “totality”	  of	  individual	  relations	  of	  production.	  	  	   As	  such,	  Marx’s	  work	  at	  least	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  universal	  thinking	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  contemplate	  the	  economy	  in	  its	  contemporary	  sense.	  In	  fact,	  from	  the	  foregoing	  discussion,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  ask	  whether	  we	  might	  have	  found	  in	  Marx	  an	  early	  articulator	  of	  “the	  economy”	  in	  all	  but	  name.	  While	  there	  are	  certainly	  some	  compelling	  similarities,	  there	  are	  also	  some	  important	  differences	  between	  “the	  economy”	  and	  Marx’s	  trans-­‐historical	  connection	  between	  relations	  and	  forces	  of	  production.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  obvious	  is	  that,	  for	  Marx,	  the	  mode	  of	  production	  is	  not	  in	  any	  way	  exempt	  from	  moral	  or	  ethical	  concerns.	  In	  fact,	  the	  relations	  of	  production	  are	  in	  many	  ways	  responsible	  for	  the	  production	  of	  those	  moral	  and	  ethical	  concerns	  that	  are	  specific	  to	  a	  given	  mode	  of	  production.	  “The	  ideas	  of	  the	  ruling	  class,”	  as	  Marx	  says,	  “are	  in	  every	  epoch	  the	  ruling	  ideas”	  (1978,	  72),	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  ruling	  ideas	  will	  always	  be	  determined,	  to	  some	  extent,	  precisely	  by	  the	  structure	  composed	  of	  the	  relations	  and	  forces	  of	  production.	  This	  structure,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  is	  not	  simply	  given,	  but	  is	  rather	  produced	  by	  the	  activities	  of	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individuals	  operating	  within	  certain	  constraints.	  “The	  social	  relations,	  and	  therefore	  the	  social	  position	  of	  the	  agents	  of	  production	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other,	  i.e.	  the	  
relations	  of	  production,	  are	  themselves	  produced:	  they	  are	  also	  the	  constantly	  renewed	  result	  of	  the	  process”	  (1991,	  1065).	  So,	  for	  example,	  the	  moral	  sanctity	  of	  private	  property	  and	  individual	  rights	  are	  themselves	  products	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  forces	  and	  relations	  of	  production.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  Marx’s	  entire	  teleological	  schema	  rests	  upon	  the	  premise	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  trans-­‐historical	  ethical	  principles	  that	  supersede	  the	  merely	  superficial	  ruling	  ideas	  of	  a	  given	  ruling	  class.	  How	  else	  might	  we	  explain	  the	  inevitability	  of	  the	  uprising	  of	  the	  proletariat	  in	  the	  face	  of	  exploitation	  by	  the	  bourgeoisie?	  Certainly,	  though	  Marx	  would	  like	  to	  present	  his	  work	  as	  the	  result	  of	  purely	  scientific	  inquiry	  into	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  capitalism,	  there	  is	  a	  normative	  claim	  at	  work	  in	  the	  assertion	  that	  all	  profit	  by	  capitalists	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  process	  known	  as	  “exploitation.”	  Marx’s	  effort	  to	  define	  exploitation	  in	  purely	  descriptive	  terms,	  rather	  than	  moral	  ones,	  is	  unconvincing	  at	  best.	  One	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  daily	  sustenance	  of	  labour-­‐power	  costs	  only	  half	  a	  day’s	  labour,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  very	  same	  labour-­‐power	  can	  remain	  effective,	  can	  work,	  during	  a	  whole	  day,	  and	  consequently	  the	  value	  which	  its	  use	  during	  one	  day	  creates	  is	  double	  what	  the	  capitalist	  pays	  for	  that	  use;	  this	  circumstance	  is	  a	  piece	  of	  good	  luck	  for	  the	  buyer,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  an	  injustice	  towards	  the	  seller.	  (1991,	  301)	  	  Despite	  his	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  no	  injustice	  in	  the	  situation	  described,	  he	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  worker	  in	  such	  a	  situation	  is	  having	  the	  wool	  pulled	  over	  his	  eyes	  by	  the	  capitalist	  (300)	  and	  that	  the	  capitalist	  himself	  views	  the	  whole	  situation	  and	  responds	  “with	  a	  hearty	  laugh”	  (300).	  While	  there	  may	  be	  no	  injustice	  on	  the	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superficial	  level	  of	  bourgeois	  ethics,	  Marx	  clearly	  sees	  some	  broader	  set	  of	  ethical	  concerns	  as	  relevant	  to	  his	  story	  of	  economic	  change.	  	  	   This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  next	  distinction,	  which	  is	  that	  for	  Marx,	  those	  processes	  and	  practices	  that	  he	  describes	  are	  far	  from	  natural,	  and	  do	  not	  effectively	  perform	  the	  function	  of	  rendering	  invisible	  the	  political	  and	  social	  inequalities	  that	  result	  from	  them.	  The	  moral	  component	  of	  Marx’s	  theory	  makes	  it	  impossible	  for	  him	  to	  understand	  the	  inequalities	  of	  capitalism	  (for	  example)	  as	  natural,	  because	  he	  is	  so	  focused	  on	  the	  potential	  for	  history	  to	  overcome	  these	  inequalities.	  It	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  inequality	  that	  is	  natural	  for	  Marx,	  a	  situation	  that	  is	  not	  without	  its	  own	  problems,	  but	  which	  clearly	  distinguished	  his	  view	  from	  what	  is	  evoked	  today	  by	  “the	  economy.”	  	   Finally,	  while	  Marx’s	  focus	  on	  the	  transhistorical	  forces	  dictating	  economic	  change	  might	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  universalist	  thinking	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  contemplate	  the	  contemporary	  economy,	  his	  universalism	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  that	  embodied	  in	  “the	  economy.”	  For	  Marx,	  the	  universal	  is	  embodied	  in	  history	  itself,	  and	  it	  is	  articulated	  as	  a	  universal	  movement	  toward	  an	  end	  point.	  Unlike	  the	  contemporary	  economy,	  which	  is	  a	  domain	  subject	  to	  inexorable	  rules	  and	  laws	  that	  will,	  in	  theory,	  be	  the	  same	  in	  any	  time	  and	  place,	  but	  will	  never	  achieve	  any	  kind	  of	  lasting	  equilibrium	  (in	  part,	  because	  of	  the	  necessity	  for	  constant	  growth),	  Marx’s	  history	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  set	  of	  inexorable	  laws	  and	  rules	  that	  will	  lead	  it	  to	  a	  particular	  end	  point	  and	  stop.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  an	  agent	  or	  historical	  actor	  may	  have	  its	  roots	  in	  Marx,	  there	  are	  important	  differences	  between	  Marx’s	  ideas	  and	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  effect.	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C.	  The	  Historicists,	  the	  Marginalists,	  and	  the	  Struggle	  	  
for	  Control	  of	  the	  Discipline19	  While	  Marx’s	  work	  was	  certainly	  important	  to	  the	  development	  of	  “the	  economy,”	  it	  was	  two	  of	  his	  contemporaries,	  Wilhelm	  Roscher	  and	  Friedrich	  List,	  whose	  work	  was	  most	  influential	  in	  the	  development	  of	  what	  would	  become	  known	  as	  the	  German	  historical	  school,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  schools	  of	  economic	  thought	  to	  begin	  referring	  to	  the	  “the	  economy”	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  be	  intelligible	  to	  the	  contemporary	  reader.	  Though	  they	  are	  completely	  absent	  from	  Paul	  Samuelson’s	  hugely	  influential	  Economics	  textbook	  (first	  published	  in	  1948),20	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  German	  historical	  school	  positioned	  themselves	  in	  opposition	  both	  to	  the	  Classical	  school	  of	  economics	  (dominant	  through	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century	  in	  British	  economic	  thought)	  and	  the	  Marxist	  school	  (which	  was	  becoming	  an	  important	  force	  in	  German	  economic	  thought	  during	  this	  period).	  A	  vocal	  minority	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Historical	  school	  to	  modern	  mainstream	  economics	  has	  been	  underestimated	  by	  many	  economic	  historians	  (e.g.	  Balabkins,	  1993).	  	  	  In	  1827,	  Friedrich	  List	  made	  the	  argument	  that	  classical	  political	  economy	  had	  gotten	  it	  wrong	  by	  thinking	  of	  wealth	  as	  a	  literal	  physical	  stockpile	  of	  goods	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  There	  were,	  according	  to	  List,	  three	  main	  components	  of	  capital:	  natural,	  material,	  and	  mental	  (Levi-­‐Faur,	  1997).	  This	  was	  important	  because	  it	  suggested	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  It	  is	  not	  my	  goal,	  in	  this	  section,	  to	  trace	  the	  history	  of	  the	  development	  of	  economics	  as	  a	  professional	  discipline,	  as	  this	  work	  has	  already	  been	  completed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  accomplished	  scholars	  (e.g.	  Ross,	  1991;	  or	  Fourcade,	  2009).	  Instead,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  production	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  object	  for	  study	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  this	  process	  of	  professionalization.	  20	  See	  below	  for	  a	  slightly	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  text	  and	  its	  importance	  to	  the	  story	  at	  hand.	  	  
	  71	  
that	  policy	  directed	  merely	  at	  increasing	  material	  wealth	  might	  not	  actually	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  increasing	  a	  nation’s	  wealth	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  Levi-­‐Faur	  uses	  an	  interesting	  example	  of	  List’s	  reasoning	  based	  upon	  an	  example	  of	  two	  farmers.	  Each	  of	  the	  farmers	  has	  five	  sons	  and	  the	  two	  farmers	  have	  equivalent	  plots	  of	  land.	  One	  of	  the	  farmers	  employs	  all	  five	  sons	  as	  laborers	  on	  his	  farm,	  maximizing	  the	  present	  yield	  of	  the	  land,	  while	  the	  other	  farmer	  employs	  two	  of	  his	  sons	  in	  this	  way	  (while	  also	  ensuring	  that	  they	  are	  educated	  in	  the	  latest	  techniques	  of	  agriculture),	  and	  sends	  the	  other	  three	  away	  to	  learn	  trades.	  After	  the	  two	  farmers’	  deaths,	  the	  first	  farm	  is	  cast	  into	  disarray,	  as	  it	  must	  be	  divided	  five	  ways,	  and	  none	  of	  the	  resulting	  farms	  will	  be	  sufficient	  to	  raise	  a	  family.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  second	  farm	  must	  be	  divided	  only	  two	  ways,	  and	  each	  resulting	  farm	  will	  be	  sufficiently	  productive	  as	  its	  proprietor	  will	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  bring	  modern	  knowledge	  to	  bear.	  The	  three	  remaining	  sons	  of	  the	  second	  farmer	  will	  be,	  by	  this	  time,	  comfortably	  ensconced	  in	  their	  new	  professions	  (1997	  [List	  made	  the	  original	  argument	  in	  1827]).	  The	  point	  of	  such	  a	  parable,	  for	  List,	  is	  that	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  mental	  capital	  (knowledge)	  can	  render	  an	  otherwise	  equal	  situation	  profoundly	  unequal.	  For	  this	  reason,	  a	  state	  that	  regulates	  only	  the	  movement	  and	  production	  of	  material	  goods	  has	  no	  hope	  of	  achieving	  complex	  economic	  ends.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  good	  economic	  policy,	  a	  state	  must	  consider	  every	  aspect	  of	  society,	  and	  especially	  education,	  as	  existing	  in	  complex	  interaction	  with	  the	  material	  production	  of	  wealth.	  	  	  Following	  List’s	  lead	  in	  his	  critique	  of	  classical	  political	  economy	  in	  his	  
Principles	  of	  Political	  Economy,	  Volume	  I	  (published	  in	  German	  in	  1854,	  translated	  to	  English	  in	  1878),	  Roscher	  makes	  numerous	  mentions	  of	  the	  national	  economy:	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If,	  by	  the	  public	  economy	  of	  a	  nation,	  we	  understand	  economic	  legislation	  and	  the	  governmental	  guidance	  or	  direction	  of	  the	  economy	  of	  private	  persons,	  the	  science	  of	  public	  economy	  becomes,	  so	  far	  as	  its	  form	  is	  concerned,	  a	  branch	  of	  political	  science,	  while	  as	  to	  its	  matter,	  its	  subject	  is	  almost	  coincident	  with	  that	  of	  Political	  Economy.	  Hence	  it	  is,	  that	  so	  many	  writers	  use	  the	  terms	  public	  economy,	  or	  the	  economy	  of	  the	  state	  (Staatswirthschaft),	  and	  National	  Economy	  (Volkswirthschaft),	  as	  synonymous.	  The	  hypothesis,	  in	  accordance	  with	  which,	  this	  science	  should	  discard	  all	  consideration	  of	  the	  state,	  or	  should	  refuse	  to	  presuppose	  its	  formation,	  would	  lead	  us	  into	  an	  ideal	  region,	  difficult	  to	  define,	  probably	  entirely	  impossible,	  and	  inaccessible	  to	  experience.	  (91)	  	  Far	  from	  the	  universalism	  expressed	  by	  Marx,	  Roscher	  took	  the	  position	  that	  to	  conceive	  of	  “the	  public	  economy”	  without	  considering	  the	  specific	  nature	  of	  the	  state	  in	  which	  it	  was	  found	  was	  “probably	  entirely	  impossible.”	  Such	  a	  position	  was	  a	  hallmark	  of	  the	  German	  historical	  school,	  which	  suggested	  that	  all	  studies	  of	  economic	  phenomena	  must	  be	  conducted	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  their	  historical	  specificity,	  which	  included	  looking	  at	  both	  the	  legal	  and	  the	  social	  context	  in	  which	  they	  occurred	  (Hodgson,	  56-­‐64).	  	  	   Such	  a	  position	  was	  not,	  of	  course,	  without	  some	  pitfalls.	  The	  most	  important	  of	  these,	  for	  our	  purposes,	  was	  that	  the	  Historical	  school	  had	  to	  explain	  how,	  if	  economic	  phenomena	  can	  only	  ever	  be	  considered	  in	  a	  specific	  historical	  context,	  one	  could	  ever	  hope	  to	  know	  that	  the	  phenomena	  being	  addressed	  were,	  in	  fact,	  economic	  in	  nature.	  That	  is,	  just	  because	  a	  given	  set	  of	  activities	  (gift	  giving,	  for	  example)	  are	  part	  of	  what	  we	  might	  describe	  as	  “economic”	  activity	  in	  one	  society	  and	  one	  point	  in	  history,	  how	  do	  we	  know	  that	  they	  are	  so	  in	  another	  society	  at	  a	  different	  point	  in	  history?	  The	  answer,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  we	  can’t	  know	  this.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  noun	  form	  of	  “economy,”	  with	  the	  indefinite	  article	  added,	  became	  a	  useful	  conceptual	  innovation	  for	  the	  historical	  school.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  contextual	  
	  73	  
shifts	  that	  might	  occur	  between	  societies,	  or	  between	  specific	  moments	  in	  history,	  if	  “the	  economy”	  (or	  “the	  public	  economy”)	  was	  a	  thing	  or	  a	  place,	  rather	  than	  simply	  a	  set	  of	  activities,	  then	  the	  historicists	  could	  study	  it	  across	  all	  places	  and	  moments,	  asking	  not,	  “Is	  this	  economic?”	  but	  rather,	  “What	  does	  the	  economy	  do	  in	  this	  context?”	  “The	  economy,”	  in	  this	  context,	  became	  almost	  paradoxically	  an	  abstract	  concept	  that	  could	  not	  be	  properly	  conceived	  in	  any	  respect	  but	  by	  its	  name	  outside	  of	  concrete	  and	  specific	  circumstances.	  	   	  By	  the	  1880s,	  references	  to	  “economy”	  as	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  noun	  began	  to	  become	  more	  common	  in	  the	  English	  language.	  For	  example,	  in	  an	  1880	  edition	  of	  
Economic	  Studies	  by	  Walter	  Bagehot,	  one	  may	  find	  a	  chapter	  entitled	  “Adam	  Smith	  and	  Our	  Modern	  Economy.”	  However,	  throughout	  the	  text,	  Bagehot	  uses	  the	  term	  “economy”	  only	  as	  part	  of	  the	  compound	  “political	  economy,”	  or	  in	  its	  older	  meaning	  of	  thrift	  or	  efficiency.	  Thus,	  the	  “Modern	  Economy”	  in	  the	  chapter	  title	  seems	  to	  be	  shorthand	  for	  “modern	  political	  economy.”	  We	  may	  find	  support	  for	  such	  a	  reading	  in	  American	  economist	  Henry	  C.	  Adams’	  “Relations	  of	  the	  State	  to	  Industrial	  Action”	  (1887),	  in	  which	  he	  makes	  the	  following	  statement	  about	  “English	  economy:”	  Yet	  this	  [the	  presumption	  that	  common	  sense	  is	  superior	  to	  a	  scientific	  principle]	  is	  the	  unfortunate	  position	  into	  which	  Professor	  Cairnes,	  by	  his	  trenchant	  analysis	  of	  the	  scientific	  claims	  of	  laissez-­‐
faire,	  has	  brought	  English	  economy.	  In	  its	  present	  condition	  it	  is	  a	  system	  of	  thought	  whose	  formal	  arguments	  are	  quite	  in	  harmony	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  premise	  of	  action	  of	  scientific	  pretensions,	  but	  the	  life	  and	  force	  is	  taken	  from	  these	  arguments	  by	  the	  denial	  of	  such	  a	  premise.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Leaving	  aside,	  for	  the	  moment,	  the	  larger	  argument	  Adams	  is	  making	  here,	  his	  language	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  “English	  economy”	  is	  a	  “system	  of	  thought.”	  In	  positing	  this	  identity,	  Adams	  suggests	  that	  by	  “English	  economy”	  he	  means	  the	  same	  kind	  of	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thing	  his	  contemporaries	  meant	  by	  “English	  political	  economy,”	  referring	  directly	  to	  the	  body	  of	  theory	  derived	  and	  subscribed	  to	  by	  English	  political	  economists.	  	  The	  mid	  1880’s,	  however,	  may	  be	  a	  period	  during	  which	  this	  older	  use	  of	  the	  term	  began	  to	  overlap	  with	  a	  newer	  use,	  which	  looks	  much	  more	  like	  the	  contemporary	  economy,	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  academic	  writing.	  In	  1885,	  Richard	  Ely,	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  American	  Economic	  Association,	  published	  his	  “Report	  of	  the	  Organization	  of	  the	  American	  Economic	  Association,”	  in	  which	  he	  “approved	  state	  economic	  action,	  called	  on	  economists	  to	  turn	  from	  the	  older	  ‘speculative’	  economic	  methods	  to	  historical	  ones,	  and	  named	  the	  ‘conflict	  of	  labor	  and	  capital’	  the	  central	  problem	  of	  modern	  economics”	  (Ross	  1991,	  110).	  The	  statement,	  along	  with	  the	  deliberate	  exclusion	  of	  William	  Graham	  Sumner,	  the	  powerhouse	  of	  classical,	  laissez-­‐faire	  economics,	  from	  the	  newly	  formed	  Association,	  served	  to	  a	  highlight	  a	  substantial	  ideological	  split	  between	  economists	  who	  supported	  the	  older,	  classical	  political	  economy	  model	  and	  those	  were	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  more	  contemporary	  critiques	  of	  the	  German	  Historical	  school.	  In	  this	  split,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  debate	  discussed	  below,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  rising	  influence	  of	  the	  Historical	  school	  in	  English-­‐language	  debates	  over	  the	  direction	  of	  academic	  economics.	  	  In	  1886,	  Science	  Magazine	  published	  a	  discussion	  between	  the	  “old	  school”	  and	  “new	  school”	  economists	  of	  the	  day.	  	  The	  “old	  school”	  was	  represented	  by	  three	  economists:	  Arthur	  T.	  Hadley,	  Frank	  W.	  Taussig,	  and	  Simon	  Newcomb.	  	  Hadley	  and	  Taussig	  were	  both	  part	  of	  the	  younger	  generation	  of	  economists	  at	  the	  time,	  contemporaries	  of	  Ely	  and	  the	  other	  “new	  school”	  economists,	  but	  firm	  adherents	  to	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classical	  principles	  of	  laissez-­‐faire.	  Newcomb	  was	  an	  older	  man,	  a	  lecturer	  at	  Johns	  Hopkins	  and	  an	  ally	  of	  William	  Graham	  Sumner.	  The	  classification	  of	  these	  three	  men	  as	  part	  of	  the	  old	  school	  depended	  upon	  their	  adherence	  to	  classical	  political	  economy’s	  emphasis	  on	  free	  markets,	  as	  well	  as	  upon	  their	  dedication	  to	  the	  development	  of	  abstract	  principles	  of	  political	  economy	  (Ross	  1991).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  new	  school	  was	  represented	  by	  Ely,	  along	  with	  Henry	  C.	  Adams,	  Edwin	  Seligman,	  E.J.	  James,	  Richmond	  Smith,	  and	  Simon	  N.	  Patten.	  These	  men	  were	  characterized	  by	  their	  commitment	  to	  the	  German	  historical	  school	  of	  political	  economy,	  which	  held	  that	  the	  classical	  quest	  for	  universal,	  abstract	  principles	  of	  political	  economy	  was	  doomed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  economic	  behavior	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  particular	  historical	  and	  cultural	  contexts.	  As	  such,	  principles	  of	  political	  economy	  could	  only	  ever	  hope	  to	  be	  derived	  for	  particular	  situations.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  my	  attention	  was	  drawn	  to	  this	  particular	  debate	  by	  the	  Dorothy	  Ross’s	  study	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  American	  social	  science	  (1991).	  Her	  text	  details	  the	  origins	  of	  American	  political	  science,	  sociology,	  and	  economics,	  and	  is	  organized	  around	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  formation	  of	  each	  of	  these	  disciplines	  was	  in	  some	  significant	  way	  influenced	  by	  American	  exceptionalism	  (see	  Farr,	  1991	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  strain	  of	  Ross’s	  thought).	  Her	  method	  is	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  J.G.A	  Pocock	  (a	  member	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Cambridge	  School”	  along	  with	  Quentin	  Skinner).	  Like	  Skinner	  and	  Pocock,	  Ross	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  speech	  of	  elites	  (rather	  than	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  broad,	  discursive	  analysis	  that	  characterizes	  Foucault’s	  work).	  This	  difference	  in	  methodology	  results	  in	  a	  story	  that,	  while	  not	  incompatible	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with	  the	  story	  Foucault	  tells	  about	  the	  emergence	  of	  mercantilism	  and	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  population	  in	  his	  Security,	  Territory,	  Population	  lectures	  (2007	  [1977-­‐78]),	  has	  a	  very	  different	  focus.21	  Ross	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  when	  and	  how	  academic	  social	  scientists	  began	  to	  understand	  themselves	  as	  practitioners	  of	  distinct	  fields.	  Thus,	  while	  she	  is	  not,	  in	  her	  study,	  attentive	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  object	  (or	  an	  effect),	  her	  research	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  discipline	  of	  economics	  in	  America	  is	  so	  comprehensive	  that	  it	  has	  formed	  a	  useful	  starting	  point	  for	  much	  of	  my	  own	  research,	  as	  she	  has	  identified	  many	  of	  the	  important	  texts	  and	  arguments	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  discipline.	  	  	  	  	  For	  example,	  Ross	  identified	  the	  1886	  special	  edition	  of	  Science	  Magazine	  as	  an	  important	  moment	  in	  the	  delineation	  of	  academic	  economics,	  but	  because	  her	  object	  (the	  influence	  of	  American	  exceptionalism	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  social	  sciences	  as	  distinct	  disciplines)	  is	  so	  different	  from	  mine	  ,	  she	  did	  not	  pay	  much	  attention	  to	  one	  particular	  article	  in	  the	  issue	  that	  may	  be	  very	  useful	  to	  our	  inquiry.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  reader	  may	  well	  have	  noted	  that	  the	  story	  I	  am	  telling	  about	  the	  emergence	  (or	  production)	  of	  the	  economy	  effect	  is	  substantially	  different	  from	  the	  one	  Foucault	  tells	  about	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  his	  1977-­‐78	  lectures.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  lies,	  I	  think,	  in	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Foucault	  and	  I	  conceive	  of	  the	  economy.	  For	  Foucault,	  the	  economy	  (which	  he	  claims	  emerges	  in	  the	  18th	  century)	  exists	  primarily	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  raison	  d’etat	  (2007,	  p.348).	  That	  is,	  at	  the	  moment	  at	  which	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  challenge	  a	  particular	  characterization	  of	  raison	  d’etat	  through	  reference	  to	  the	  demands	  or	  requirements	  of	  economic	  mechanisms,	  Foucault	  pronounces	  the	  economy	  to	  have	  been	  born	  (despite	  an	  absence	  of	  direct	  references	  to	  individuals	  in	  the	  era	  he	  describes	  using	  the	  term	  itself).	  While	  he	  provides	  a	  convincing	  case,	  then,	  that	  economic	  considerations	  serve	  as	  a	  significant	  challenge	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  raison	  d’etat	  as	  a	  purely	  political	  phenomenon,	  or	  as	  simply	  the	  will	  of	  the	  sovereign,	  he	  does	  not	  provide	  evidence	  of	  the	  kind	  I	  am	  looking	  for;	  that	  is,	  he	  does	  not	  provide	  evidence	  that	  individual	  thinkers	  in	  the	  18th	  century	  understood,	  or	  discussed,	  an	  object	  (or	  effect)	  to	  which	  they	  referred	  as	  “the	  economy,”	  and	  which	  had	  the	  characteristics	  I	  have	  enumerated	  above.	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In	  his	  contribution	  to	  the	  special	  edition,	  Edwin	  Seligman	  made	  the	  following	  assertion:	  The	  mercantile	  system,	  even	  in	  its	  crudest	  form,	  showed	  that	  statesmen	  and	  authors	  began	  to	  form	  some	  conception	  of	  a	  national	  
economy.	  Practical	  economic	  systems	  can	  never	  be	  entirely	  divorced	  from	  political	  considerations;	  and	  it	  is	  these	  political	  considerations	  alone	  which	  enable	  us	  to	  understand	  some	  of	  the	  fundamental	  mercantilistic	  notions,	  such	  as	  the	  desire	  for	  increased	  population	  or	  the	  ‘balance	  of	  power’	  argument.	  The	  mercantile	  system	  formed	  a	  fitting	  pendant	  to	  the	  political	  attempts	  of	  the	  absolute	  monarchy,	  which	  the	  new	  political	  science	  has	  taught	  us	  to	  regard	  not	  only	  as	  a	  necessary,	  but	  as	  a	  most	  salutary,	  step	  in	  the	  advance	  from	  mediaeval	  feudalism	  to	  modern	  constitutionalism.	  (Seligman	  1886)	  (my	  emphasis)	  	  Seligman	  seems	  here	  to	  refer	  to	  an	  economy	  that	  we	  might	  understand	  in	  the	  contemporary	  sense.	  If	  we	  understand	  the	  mercantile	  system	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  national	  economy,	  then	  we	  can	  interpret	  this	  passage	  as	  a	  suggestion	  that	  this	  type	  of	  economy	  was	  consistent	  with	  the	  particular	  form	  of	  government	  it	  accompanied.	  It	  is	  clear,	  however,	  that	  Seligman	  understands	  this	  economy	  as	  an	  accessory	  to	  the	  political	  system	  in	  question	  (“a	  fitting	  pendant”)	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  causative	  or	  explanatory	  factor.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  statesmen	  may	  select	  an	  economy	  that	  compliments	  their	  politics,	  a	  sentiment	  that	  would	  appear	  to	  undermine	  the	  contextualism	  of	  the	  Historical	  school	  with	  which	  Seligman	  is	  aligned.	  	  	   Seligman	  studied	  economics	  in	  Germany,	  and	  we	  know	  that	  he	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  Roscher	  and	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Historical	  school.	  Economy,	  for	  Roscher,	  is	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  state	  and	  household	  management	  of	  private	  individuals.	  So,	  for	  him,	  to	  discuss	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  abstract,	  and	  specifically	  to	  exclude	  the	  state	  from	  such	  a	  discussion,	  is	  “probably	  entirely	  impossible.”	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This	  makes	  it	  seem	  likely	  that	  “national	  economy”,	  for	  Seligman,	  meant	  not	  some	  kind	  of	  distinct	  realm,	  as	  in	  contemporary	  usage,	  but	  rather	  some	  kind	  of	  coherent	  national	  policy	  regarding	  the	  “economy	  of	  private	  persons.”	  The	  above	  quotation	  can	  certainly	  be	  read	  in	  that	  way,	  suggesting	  that	  mercantilism	  provides	  evidence	  that	  statesmen	  and	  authors	  of	  the	  period	  were	  engaged	  in	  discussions	  regarding	  the	  type	  of	  national	  policy	  that	  would	  affect	  individual	  economy	  in	  the	  desired	  way.	  	  In	  1897,	  Henry	  George	  published	  “The	  Science	  of	  Political	  Economy,”	  one	  of	  the	  projects	  of	  which	  was	  to	  spell	  out	  precisely	  what	  was	  meant	  by	  “The	  Economy	  Called	  Political	  Economy.”	  This	  is	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  an	  early	  instance	  of	  the	  term	  being	  used	  in	  a	  way	  that	  approximates	  the	  contemporary	  usage,	  and	  it	  also	  affords	  us	  the	  rare	  opportunity	  to	  have	  such	  an	  early	  use	  lucidly	  explained	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  user.	  Like	  Schumpeter	  and	  others,	  George	  points	  to	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  term	  in	  economy	  in	  oikos	  and	  nomos,	  stressing	  that	  the	  term	  has	  come	  to	  have	  both	  a	  narrower	  meaning	  denoting	  “the	  avoidance	  of	  waste”	  and	  a	  wider	  meaning	  denoting	  “a	  system	  or	  arrangement	  or	  adaptation	  of	  means	  to	  ends	  or	  of	  parts	  to	  a	  whole.	  Thus	  we	  speak	  of…	  the	  economy	  of	  anything	  which	  involves	  or	  suggests	  the	  adaptation	  of	  means	  to	  ends,	  the	  coordination	  of	  parts	  in	  a	  whole.”	  These	  two	  meanings,	  George	  suggests,	  come	  together	  to	  denote	  a	  system	  of	  adapting	  means	  to	  ends	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  diminution	  or	  elimination	  of	  waste	  and	  the	  maximization	  of	  efficiency.	  It’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  throughout	  this	  discussion,	  George	  continues	  to	  assume	  that	  this	  elimination	  of	  waste	  and	  maximization	  of	  efficiency	  must	  be	  considered	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  particular	  ends	  desired	  by	  the	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system	  in	  question.	  “An	  economy...	  of	  the	  societies	  in	  which	  civilized	  men	  live”,	  George	  goes	  on	  to	  argue,	  would	  thus	  have	  “a	  special	  relation	  to	  the	  adaptation	  or	  system	  by	  which	  material	  wants	  are	  satisfied,	  or	  to	  the	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  wealth.”	  While	  this	  is	  clearly	  getting	  close	  to	  the	  contemporary	  economy,	  it’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  for	  George	  any	  economy	  must	  always	  be	  “the	  economy	  of	  x”	  or	  “an	  economy	  of	  y,”	  never	  simple	  “the	  economy.”	  	  By	  1905	  Seligman	  was	  using	  “economy”	  in	  a	  way	  that	  seems	  very	  close	  to	  modern	  usage.	  In	  Principles	  of	  Economics,	  he	  argues	  that	  economic	  history	  can	  be	  profitably	  divided	  into	  three	  stages,	  “…known	  respectively	  as	  the	  self-­‐sufficing	  economy,	  the	  trade	  or	  commercial	  economy,	  and	  the	  capitalist	  or	  industrial	  economy”	  (73).	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  of	  the	  last	  of	  these	  stages	  that:	  An	  important	  result	  of	  the	  capitalist	  stage	  is	  the	  supplanting	  of	  the	  local	  unit	  by	  the	  nation.	  Production	  and	  consumption	  no	  longer	  take	  place	  within	  the	  local	  boundaries,	  but	  what	  is	  produced	  in	  one	  district	  is	  often	  consumed	  in	  another.	  The	  local	  economy	  broadens	  into	  the	  national	  economy.	  (81)22	  	  	  This	  economy	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  object	  on	  its	  own,	  susceptible	  to	  classification	  and	  investigation,	  but	  also	  subject	  to	  its	  own	  laws	  of	  development	  and	  operation.	  	  	   The	  ability	  to	  classify	  the	  economy	  by	  historical	  stage	  was	  clearly	  a	  boon	  for	  the	  historicist	  project	  being	  championed	  by	  Seligman	  and	  his	  academic	  allies.	  If	  the	  classical	  political	  economists	  were	  right,	  one	  would	  be	  able	  to	  find	  a	  universal	  set	  of	  principles	  underlying	  all	  economic	  activity,	  at	  any	  time	  and	  in	  any	  place.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  historicist	  view	  that	  any	  analysis	  of	  economic	  activity	  needed	  to	  be	  rooted	  in	  the	  specific	  historical	  context	  in	  which	  it	  was	  found	  suggested	  that	  any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  A	  similar	  usage	  can	  be	  found	  as	  early	  as	  1900	  in	  “The	  End	  of	  Villainage	  in	  England”	  by	  Thomas	  Walker	  Page.	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principles	  one	  might	  find	  would	  be	  dependent	  upon	  specific	  historical	  factors.	  The	  economy,	  in	  Seligman’s	  1905	  formulation	  noted	  above,	  is	  quite	  helpful	  to	  the	  Historicists’	  project	  as	  it	  is	  able	  to	  act	  simultaneously	  as	  the	  continuous	  object	  of	  a	  coherent	  investigation	  (economics)	  and	  as	  a	  historically	  contingent	  arrangement	  of	  specific	  relations.	  	   	  The	  historicists,	  however,	  were	  not	  the	  only	  economists	  in	  search	  of	  a	  way	  to	  understand	  and	  articulate	  the	  dynamics	  governing	  economic	  phenomena	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century.	  As	  Dorothy	  Ross	  points	  out,	  this	  was	  a	  period	  during	  which	  the	  liberal-­‐historicist	  school	  (Seligman	  et	  al)	  was	  vying	  with	  the	  marginalists	  (led	  by	  Alfred	  Marshall)	  for	  dominance	  of	  the	  field	  of	  economics23	  (172).	  While	  the	  marginalists	  were	  the	  clear	  victors	  in	  this	  struggle	  (at	  least	  in	  America	  and	  Britain),	  a	  bit	  of	  attention	  to	  the	  contours	  of	  this	  debate	  may	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  what	  was	  at	  stake.	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  Historicist	  position	  was	  that	  economic	  issues	  could	  only	  ever	  be	  understood	  as	  part	  of	  a	  particular	  historical	  context;	  as	  such,	  any	  search	  for	  universal	  economic	  laws	  was	  bound	  to	  be	  futile.	  This	  view	  had	  emerged	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  classical	  school	  of	  economics,	  but	  by	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  it	  found	  a	  much	  greater	  challenge	  in	  the	  marginalist	  school	  of	  thought.	  	  	   The	  marginalists	  presented	  themselves	  as	  neo-­‐classical	  thinkers,	  in	  that	  they	  adopted	  many	  of	  the	  principles	  and	  concerns	  that	  were	  commonly	  associated	  with	  classical	  economics,	  but	  with	  some	  important	  revisions.	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  marginalists	  rejected	  the	  labor	  theory	  of	  value	  (an	  idea	  common	  to	  Smith	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Ross	  also	  notes	  that	  Veblen’s	  socialist	  historico-­‐evolutionary	  school	  was	  a	  party	  in	  this	  struggle,	  but	  that	  Veblen’s	  ideas	  did	  not	  really	  have	  much	  impact	  until	  much	  later	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  (172).	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Ricardo,	  but	  also	  to	  Marx	  and	  Henry	  George),	  instead	  positing	  marginal	  utility	  as	  the	  source	  of	  value.24	  Unlike	  the	  labor	  theory	  of	  value,	  the	  concept	  of	  marginal	  utility	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  susceptible	  to	  a	  radical	  subversion	  pointing	  the	  way	  to	  a	  workers’	  revolution,	  nor	  did	  it	  suggest	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  revolution	  workers’	  only	  hope	  for	  improved	  wages	  could	  be	  found	  in	  population	  reduction.	  	   Additionally,	  as	  Ross	  notes,	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  was	  not	  the	  first	  time	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  marginalism	  had	  been	  raised.	  It’s	  success	  during	  the	  period	  can	  be	  accounted	  for,	  she	  suggests,	  not	  by	  the	  novelty	  and	  promise	  of	  a	  genuinely	  new	  idea,	  but	  rather	  by	  the	  compatibility	  of	  this	  idea	  with	  the	  particular	  standards	  by	  which	  academic	  ideas	  were	  judged	  in	  America	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  Specifically:	  Marginalism	  won	  its	  success	  in	  England	  and	  America	  not	  just	  because	  it	  embodied	  a	  sophisticated	  economic	  theory	  but	  because	  it	  met	  the	  standards	  of	  sophistication	  operative	  in	  those	  cultures.	  Marginalism	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  process	  begun	  by	  Ricardo,	  of	  abstraction	  from	  and	  reification	  of	  the	  liberal	  capitalist	  world	  on	  the	  positivist	  model	  of	  science.	  (177)	  	  	  Marginalism	  offered	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  economic	  phenomena	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Historicist	  view,	  suggested	  that	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  determine	  the	  underlying	  rules	  governing	  these	  phenomena	  in	  all	  situations,	  and	  then	  to	  work	  from	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Rhoads	  (2008)	  provides	  the	  following	  example	  of	  how	  marginalism	  can	  explain	  the	  fact	  that,	  despite	  water	  being	  much	  more	  useful,	  diamonds	  are	  much	  more	  expensive:	  “The	  total	  utility	  or	  satisfaction	  of	  water	  exceeds	  that	  of	  diamonds.	  We	  would	  all	  rather	  do	  without	  diamonds	  than	  without	  water.	  But	  almost	  all	  of	  us	  would	  prefer	  to	  win	  a	  prize	  of	  a	  diamond	  rather	  than	  an	  additional	  bucket	  of	  water.	  To	  make	  this	  last	  choice,	  we	  ask	  ourselves	  not	  whether	  diamonds	  or	  water	  give	  more	  satisfaction	  in	  total,	  but	  whether	  one	  more	  diamond	  gives	  greater	  additional	  satisfaction	  than	  one	  more	  bucket	  of	  water.	  For	  this	  marginal	  utility	  question,	  our	  answer	  will	  depend	  on	  how	  much	  of	  each	  we	  already	  have.	  Though	  the	  first	  units	  of	  water	  we	  consume	  every	  month	  are	  of	  enormous	  value	  to	  us,	  the	  last	  units	  are	  not.	  The	  utility	  of	  additional	  (or	  marginal)	  units	  continues	  to	  decrease	  as	  we	  consume	  more	  and	  more.”	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abstract	  principles	  to	  their	  expression	  in	  empirical	  reality.	  Without	  such	  a	  conception,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  how	  the	  economy	  effect	  could	  have	  come	  to	  be.	  	  	  	   The	  project	  of	  producing	  an	  object	  that	  could	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  such	  a	  scientific	  inquiry	  would	  continue	  to	  preoccupy	  the	  marginalists	  for	  at	  least	  the	  next	  decade.	  In	  a	  response	  to	  an	  article	  published	  in	  1901	  regarding	  “The	  Next	  Decade	  of	  Economic	  Theory”	  (Fetter),	  E.	  A.	  Ross	  made	  the	  following	  assertion:	  It	  is	  necessary	  that	  physical	  distinctions	  between	  goods	  or	  factors	  of	  production	  should	  be	  ignored	  and	  more	  attention	  paid	  to	  abstract	  economic	  distinctions	  based	  on	  utility	  or	  value…	  Another	  thing	  that	  has	  disturbed	  the	  development	  of	  our	  science	  has	  been	  the	  premature	  discussion	  of	  ethical	  questions.	  The	  economist	  not	  only	  tries	  to	  explain	  interest,	  he	  tries	  to	  justify	  it	  by	  making	  it	  compensation	  for	  a	  particular	  sacrifice,	  namely,	  abstinence…	  Now,	  such	  preoccupations	  delay	  the	  development	  of	  economics	  into	  a	  genuine	  science.	  I	  think	  that	  the	  ethical	  aspects	  of	  our	  economic	  system	  should	  come	  after	  a	  rational,	  cold-­‐blooded	  explanation	  of	  what	  is.	  (1901)	  	  E.	  A.	  Ross	  suggests	  that	  economics	  must	  become	  more	  abstract	  in	  order	  to	  grasp	  the	  true	  underlying	  principles	  of	  its	  science.	  Moreover,	  it	  must	  divorce	  itself	  from	  the	  ethical	  concerns	  of	  socialists	  like	  Seligman	  and	  Veblen	  (see	  below),	  dealing	  first	  with	  “what	  is.”	  	  Of	  course,	  an	  explicit	  acceptance	  of	  “what	  is”	  as	  the	  proper	  starting	  point	  for	  study	  is	  both	  an	  acceptance	  of	  the	  object	  of	  economy	  as	  a	  real	  and	  existing	  entity	  and	  an	  endorsement	  of	  the	  status	  quo;	  in	  short,	  this	  is	  a	  normative	  affirmation	  of	  the	  liberal	  economic	  order	  that	  prevailed	  in	  the	  United	  States	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century.	  Here	  we	  see	  the	  beginning	  construction	  of	  the	  abstracted	  economy	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  ethical	  concerns	  and	  subject	  only	  to	  its	  own	  internal	  principles.	  If	  we	  are	  looking	  for	  the	  point	  at	  which	  we	  began	  to	  separate	  the	  economy	  from	  society,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  moment	  at	  which	  we	  started	  positing	  this	  separate	  space	  as	  one	  characterized	  by	  concrete	  laws	  rather	  than	  by	  subjective	  ethics,	  we	  must	  view	  this	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passage	  as	  a	  turning	  point.	  	  
D.	  Adam	  Smith	  as	  the	  Father	  of	  Economics	  In	  Chapter	  3,	  I	  will	  make	  the	  claim	  that,	  despite	  predating	  “the	  economy”	  by	  at	  least	  a	  century,	  Adam	  Smith	  is	  frequently	  read	  as	  though	  “the	  economy”	  is	  his	  object,	  and	  in	  fact,	  as	  though	  he	  “discovered”	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  object	  of	  study.	  That	  chapter	  contains	  an	  analysis	  of	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  effect	  serves	  to	  constrain	  our	  reading	  of	  historical	  texts.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  current	  chapter,	  however,	  I	  will	  ask	  the	  reader	  to	  accept	  the	  more	  humble	  proposition	  that,	  given	  the	  historical	  data	  I’ve	  presented	  which	  suggests	  that	  Smith	  predated	  the	  economy	  in	  its	  contemporary	  usage,	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Smith	  was	  read	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  discipline	  of	  economics	  might	  lend	  us	  valuable	  insight	  regarding	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  “the	  economy”	  was	  constructed.	  Interestingly,	  while	  Seligman	  does	  treat	  Adam	  Smith	  in	  Principles	  of	  
Economics	  (1905),	  he	  does	  not	  assign	  him	  the	  now-­‐familiar	  role	  of	  discoverer	  of	  the	  modern	  economy.	  Instead,	  he	  treats	  Smith	  as	  an	  important	  theorist	  of	  “cosmopolitanism”	  and	  “distribution”	  (118).	  Smith	  is	  given	  shared	  billing	  with	  the	  Physiocrats,	  and	  Seligman	  devotes	  barely	  three	  pages	  to	  them	  in	  combination.	  	  Thorstein	  Veblen	  actually	  takes	  economists	  of	  his	  day	  to	  task	  for	  assuming	  that	  what	  they	  are	  talking	  about	  it	  is	  the	  same	  as	  what	  Smith	  was	  talking	  about:	  It	  has	  been	  the	  habit	  of	  economists	  and	  others	  to	  speak	  of	  “capital”	  as	  a	  stock	  of	  the	  material	  means	  by	  which	  industry	  is	  carried	  on	  –	  industrial	  equipment,	  raw	  materials,	  and	  means	  of	  subsistence.	  This	  view	  is	  carried	  over	  from	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  business	  and	  industry	  stood	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Adam	  Smith	  and	  of	  the	  generation	  before	  Adam	  Smith,	  from	  whose	  scheme	  of	  life	  and	  of	  thought	  he	  drew	  the	  commonplace	  materials	  and	  conceptions	  with	  which	  his	  speculation	  were	  occupied…	  [T]he	  received	  theoretical	  formulations	  regarding	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business	  capital	  and	  its	  relations	  to	  industry	  proceed	  on	  the	  circumstances	  that	  prevailed	  in	  the	  days	  of	  the	  “money	  economy,”	  before	  credit	  and	  the	  modern	  corporation	  methods	  became	  of	  first-­‐	  class	  consequence	  in	  economic	  affairs.	  (1904,	  133-­‐134)	  	  In	  this	  passage,	  Veblen	  is	  clearly	  reading	  the	  economy	  back	  onto	  Smith,	  arguing	  that	  Smith’s	  view	  characterizes	  the	  state	  of	  economic	  issues	  within	  a	  “money	  economy”,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  modern	  “credit”	  economy.	  However,	  Veblen	  is	  not	  suggesting	  that	  Smith	  was	  talking	  about	  the	  same	  thing	  modern	  economists	  are	  concerned	  about	  (as	  I	  claim	  contemporary	  economists	  and	  economic	  historians	  tend	  to	  do);	  instead,	  he	  is	  castigating	  his	  contemporaries	  for	  continuing	  to	  concern	  themselves	  with	  the	  dynamics	  of	  Smith’s	  time	  instead	  of	  the	  changing	  dynamics	  of	  their	  own.	  	  Given	  their	  self-­‐characterization	  as	  neo-­‐classicists,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  not	  surprising	  that	  it	  was	  the	  marginalists	  who	  named	  Smith’s	  work	  as	  the	  direct	  origin	  of	  their	  own	  project:	  He	  [Smith]	  led	  us	  to	  see	  how	  below	  the	  surface	  of	  a	  great	  part	  of	  human	  action	  there	  are	  motives	  which	  can	  be	  measured;	  and	  therefore	  can	  be	  analyzed	  and	  subjected	  to	  the	  processes	  of	  scientific	  reasoning.	  He	  thus	  pointed	  the	  way	  to	  applying	  powerful	  and	  exact	  methods	  of	  study	  to	  an	  important	  part	  of	  social	  phenomena.	  (Marshall	  1890,	  57)	  	  For	  marginalists	  such	  as	  Marshall,	  the	  lesson	  to	  be	  taken	  from	  Smith	  was	  less	  the	  content	  than	  the	  form	  of	  his	  work	  –	  economics	  could	  be	  arranged	  as	  a	  science,	  and	  this	  meant	  that,	  somewhere	  below	  the	  surface	  of	  appearances,	  the	  abstract	  principles	  of	  operation	  demanded	  by	  science	  must	  exist	  in	  the	  economic	  activity	  of	  society.	  It	  is,	  however,	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  while	  by	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  economists	  were	  beginning	  to	  formulate	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  object	  distinct	  from	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society	  and	  free	  from	  ethical	  considerations,	  they	  were	  not	  yet	  ascribing	  this	  actual	  formulation	  (or	  later	  “discovery”)	  to	  Smith.	  In	  a	  1926	  publication	  celebrating	  the	  sesquicentennial	  of	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Wealth	  of	  Nations,	  Jacob	  Hollander	  quotes	  Dr.	  James	  Bonar	  as	  saying	  of	  Smith	  "In	  all	  the	  phenomena	  for	  which	  economists	  try	  to	  account	  in	  theory…	  he	  tried	  to	  show	  there	  was	  one	  element	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  all	  the	  rest	  in	  society	  as	  he	  then	  found	  it,	  viz.	  Competition"	  (Hollander	  in	  Clark,	  ed.,	  20).	  Hollander,	  however,	  goes	  on	  to	  make	  very	  clear	  that,	  while	  he	  does	  not	  dispute	  Smith’s	  importance,	  it	  lies	  more	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  project	  than	  its	  direct	  outcome:	  	  Adam	  Smith's	  "laws"	  were	  often	  unverified	  theories;	  his	  "theories,"	  sometimes	  fanciful	  hypotheses.	  Limpid	  style,	  picturesque	  detail,	  vehement	  advocacy,	  emotional	  warmth,	  and	  constructive	  proposal	  mask	  lapses	  of	  thought	  and	  defects	  of	  logic.	  But	  withal	  the	  Wealth	  of	  
Nations	  constituted	  a	  definite	  base	  line	  for	  succeeding	  economic	  thinkers.	  (20-­‐21)	  	  In	  short,	  what	  Smith	  should	  be	  lauded	  for,	  Hollander	  seems	  to	  agree	  with	  Marshall,	  is	  the	  suggestion	  of	  the	  project	  (the	  scientificization	  of	  the	  study	  of	  economic	  phenomena)	  rather	  than	  its	  enactment.	  	  It	  is	  the	  economists	  of	  the	  (then)	  present	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  actual	  execution	  of	  this	  project,	  who	  are	  actually	  applying	  scientific	  principles	  to	  the	  study	  of	  economic	  phenomena,	  and	  who	  are,	  in	  the	  process,	  producing	  (or,	  as	  they	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  understand	  it,	  uncovering)	  an	  object	  to	  which	  they	  are	  coming	  to	  refer	  as	  “the	  economy.”	  	  	   In	  fact,	  it’s	  clear	  that	  as	  late	  as	  1938,	  the	  content	  of	  Smith’s	  work	  was	  understood	  by	  some	  conservative	  economists	  as	  having	  contributed	  not	  to	  the	  basic	  tradition	  of	  capitalist,	  free-­‐market	  economics,	  but	  rather	  to	  the	  tradition	  of	  socialism.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  following	  lines	  from	  Frank	  H.	  Knight’s	  review	  of	  a	  new	  edition	  of	  Wealth	  of	  Nations	  with	  an	  introduction	  by	  Max	  Lerner:	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It	  certainly	  was	  not	  by	  living	  in	  the	  world	  and	  observing	  it	  that	  either	  Adam	  Smith	  or	  Mr.	  Lerner's	  prophet,	  Karl	  Marx,	  got	  the	  idea	  that	  economic	  value	  bears	  any	  particular	  relation	  to	  "labor."	  And	  it	  was	  not	  by	  critical	  reflection	  on	  the	  world,	  and	  human	  nature	  and	  its	  wishes	  and	  ideals,	  that	  anybody	  ever	  got	  the	  notion	  that	  this	  either	  could	  or	  should	  be	  the	  case.	  But	  the	  classical	  economists	  long	  "believed"	  this,	  and	  their	  most	  radical	  antagonists	  still	  "believe"	  it,	  "religiously.”	  (853)	  	  Knight,	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  Chicago	  School	  of	  economics,	  clearly	  sees	  Smith’s	  theory	  of	  value	  as	  erroneous	  and	  dangerous	  to	  the	  capitalist	  order.	  Even	  as	  he	  identifies	  Smith’s	  relationship	  to	  contemporary	  radicals	  as	  one	  of	  “antagonists,”	  he	  nonetheless	  places	  them	  in	  the	  same	  ideological	  tradition	  of	  those	  subscribing	  to	  a	  labor	  theory	  of	  value.	  Certainly	  this	  is	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  the	  beatification	  of	  Smith	  as	  the	  father	  of	  capitalism	  that	  one	  might	  expect	  based	  upon	  contemporary	  views.	  	  	   By	  the	  bicentennial	  of	  the	  publication	  of	  Wealth	  of	  Nations,	  however,	  the	  picture	  had	  begun	  to	  look	  very	  different.	  In	  his	  contribution	  to	  a	  special	  issue	  of	  The	  
Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Economics	  entitled	  “1776:	  The	  Revolution	  in	  Social	  Thought,”	  Terrence	  Hutchison	  made	  the	  following	  claim:	  What	  might	  be	  called	  Smith's	  micro-­‐economics	  and	  international	  economics	  are	  concerned	  with	  how	  free	  competitive	  markets	  allow	  the	  division	  of	  labour	  to	  contribute	  with	  its	  full	  force	  to	  economic	  progress;	  while	  his	  macro-­‐economics	  shows	  how,	  under	  his	  simple	  system	  of	  natural	  liberty,	  individual	  frugality	  can	  be	  fully	  implemented	  in	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  economy.	  (1976,	  518)	  	  And	  Hutchison	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  this	  claim.	  In	  the	  same	  special	  edition,	  Bernard	  Bailyn	  suggested	  that:	  What	  Adam	  Smith	  attacked	  was	  an	  intricate	  protective	  mesh	  that	  had	  originally	  been	  woven	  around	  a	  small	  commercial	  plant;	  these	  regulations	  had	  become	  more	  and	  more	  elaborate,	  more	  and	  more	  complex	  as	  the	  plant	  had	  grown	  this	  way	  and	  that,	  and	  they	  had	  finally	  been	  torn	  through	  completely	  by	  the	  explosive	  force	  of	  the	  eighteenth-­‐century	  economy.	  (462)	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Both	  Hutchison	  and	  Bailyn,	  by	  1976,	  not	  only	  see	  Smith	  as	  a	  theorist	  of	  the	  economy,	  but	  understand	  this	  identity	  as	  so	  unproblematic	  an	  assertion	  that	  it	  does	  not	  even	  require	  substantial	  textual	  or	  theoretical	  support.	  Moreover,	  they	  understand	  his	  most	  valuable	  contribution	  to	  economic	  thought	  to	  lie	  not	  in	  (or	  at	  least,	  not	  only	  in)	  his	  structural	  organization,	  or	  in	  his	  suggestion	  of	  a	  valuable	  project	  that	  will	  be	  taken	  up	  by	  later	  generations,	  but	  rather	  in	  his	  argument	  against	  excessive	  state	  regulation	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  What,	  then,	  changed	  so	  substantially	  between	  1926	  and	  1976	  that	  economists	  came	  to	  understand	  Smith’s	  work	  so	  differently?	  Certainly,	  there	  were	  changes	  in	  the	  study	  of	  economics,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  characterize	  these	  changes	  as	  a	  “return	  to	  Smith”	  in	  any	  substantive	  way.	  Economists	  did	  not	  move	  back	  towards	  Smith’s	  categories	  of	  productive	  and	  unproductive	  labor	  during	  this	  period;	  nor	  did	  they	  tend	  to	  re-­‐adopt	  Smith’s	  labor	  theory	  of	  value	  or	  his	  arguments	  about	  price.	  Instead,	  I	  argue,	  much	  of	  this	  change	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  changing	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  came	  to	  understand	  the	  economy,	  and	  it’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  important	  political	  struggles	  of	  the	  day,	  during	  this	  period.	  By	  the	  1930’s	  the	  project	  of	  abstracting	  “the	  economy”	  as	  the	  object	  of	  which	  economics	  was	  the	  study	  had	  become	  sufficiently	  mature	  that	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  find	  references	  to	  the	  economy	  in	  academic	  texts,	  particularly	  those	  contrasting	  capitalism	  to	  communism	  (e.g.	  Commons,	  1935;	  Davis,	  1931;	  and	  Bukharin,	  1936).	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  in	  this	  period	  that	  we	  may	  begin	  to	  find	  explicit	  references	  to	  Smith	  as	  a	  theorist	  of	  the	  economy.	  For	  example	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  Smith’s	  reception	  by	  English	  entrepreneurs	  during	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution,	  Eli	  Ginzberg	  writes	  that	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“The	  successful	  bourgeoisie	  were	  certain	  that	  the	  wise	  men	  of	  the	  past	  foretold	  their	  conquests	  when	  they	  prophesied	  that	  England	  would	  be	  blessed	  with	  a	  great	  capitalistic	  economy”	  (1934	  [reprinted	  2002],	  8).	  Despite	  this	  usage	  by	  Ginzberg,	  however,	  the	  view	  of	  Smith	  as	  primarily	  a	  theorist	  of	  the	  previously	  undiscovered	  free-­‐market	  economy	  was	  far	  from	  widespread	  during	  this	  period.	  	  By	  the	  late	  1940s,	  however,	  one	  may	  fairly	  easily	  begin	  to	  find	  references	  to	  Smith	  as	  a	  theorist	  of	  the	  economy.	  For	  example,	  in	  1947	  Joseph	  Spengler	  wrote	  an	  article	  entitled	  “The	  Role	  of	  the	  State:	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  State	  in	  Shaping	  Things	  Economic”	  in	  which	  he	  made	  the	  following	  claim:	  In	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  however,	  after	  state	  and	  community	  had	  re-­‐established	  a	  measure	  of	  mercantile	  order,	  the	  Physiocrats	  and	  others	  gave	  various	  expression	  to	  several	  principles	  which	  were	  subsequently	  integrated	  by	  Adam	  Smith:	  an	  economy	  can	  function	  most	  effectively	  when	  state	  action	  is	  at	  a	  minimum;	  the	  interests	  of	  society	  (usually	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  individuals)	  are	  best	  served	  when	  each	  individual	  is	  allowed	  to	  pursue	  his	  own	  interest	  in	  his	  own	  way.	  (127)	  	  The	  tripartite	  division	  of	  the	  social	  totality	  into	  state,	  economy,	  and	  society	  seems	  so	  obvious,	  so	  given,	  to	  Spengler,	  that	  he	  writes	  as	  though	  it	  must	  have	  been	  obvious	  to	  Smith	  and	  the	  Physiocrats	  as	  well,	  despite	  the	  evidence	  we’ve	  seen	  to	  the	  contrary.	  Nor	  was	  Spengler	  alone	  in	  this.	  In	  1948,	  William	  D.	  Grampp	  argued	  that:	  If	  he	  [Smith]	  was	  at	  all	  optimistic,	  it	  was	  only	  in	  thinking	  that	  the	  economic	  man	  –	  as	  frail	  as	  he	  was	  in	  understanding	  and	  frailer	  still	  in	  execution	  –	  still	  knew	  his	  interests	  better	  than	  his	  governors	  could	  know	  them,	  and	  in	  thinking	  that	  the	  economy	  would	  be	  better	  off	  if	  each	  individual	  looked	  after	  his	  own	  interests	  in	  his	  own	  way.	  (334)	  	  In	  1949,	  Ben	  Lewis	  joined	  the	  chorus,	  suggesting	  that:	  Smith’s	  heresy	  consisted	  in	  the	  proposition	  that	  if	  the	  king	  really	  wanted	  to	  rule	  over	  an	  economically	  strong	  nation	  he	  should	  take	  up	  badminton	  and	  let	  the	  economy	  run	  itself.	  (370)	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  I	  don’t	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  a	  coincidence	  that	  each	  of	  these	  quotes	  focus	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  Smith	  believed,	  (or	  rather,	  did	  not	  believe)	  that	  the	  government	  should	  attempt	  to	  control	  the	  economy.	  	  The	  Google	  Ngram25	  viewer	  reveals	  that	  the	  usage	  level	  of	  the	  gram	  “the	  economy”	  was	  fairly	  low	  between	  1850	  and	  1930;	  in	  fact,	  it	  even	  declined	  a	  bit	  in	  frequency	  over	  this	  period.	  In	  1850,	  “the	  economy”	  accounted	  for	  roughly	  one	  in	  every	  285,000	  pairs	  of	  words	  (or	  bi-­‐grams).	  By	  1930,	  this	  rate	  had	  fallen	  to	  about	  1	  in	  500,000	  bi-­‐grams.	  This	  decline	  might	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  usage	  of	  economy	  both	  as	  a	  synonym	  for	  thrift	  and	  as	  a	  general	  term	  for	  a	  complex	  system	  during	  this	  period.	  This	  trend	  reversed	  dramatically	  between	  1930	  and	  1980,	  however;	  by	  1950	  the	  rate	  had	  risen	  to	  greater	  than	  1	  in	  125,000	  bi-­‐grams,	  and	  by	  1980	  the	  term	  had	  become	  so	  ubiquitous	  that	  it	  accounted	  for	  greater	  than	  1	  in	  40,000	  bi-­‐grams	  (Google	  Ngram	  viewer).	  	   Meanwhile,	  in	  1915,	  the	  word	  “communist”	  accounted	  for	  only	  about	  one	  in	  every	  5	  million	  words	  on	  the	  Ngram	  sample.	  By	  1930	  the	  frequency	  of	  its	  usage	  had	  risen	  by	  more	  than	  a	  factor	  of	  10,	  to	  roughly	  one	  in	  400,000.	  By	  1950,	  it	  had	  reached	  a	  rate	  of	  about	  1	  in	  125,000	  grams	  (interestingly,	  almost	  exactly	  the	  same	  frequency	  as	  “the	  economy”).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  While	  it	  is	  clearly	  a	  fairly	  blunt	  instrument,	  Google’s	  Ngram	  viewer	  is	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  track	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “the	  economy”	  over	  time.	  Ngram	  viewer	  works	  by	  analyzing	  the	  text	  of	  over	  5	  million	  books	  published	  between	  1500	  and	  the	  present	  and	  digitized	  by	  the	  Google	  Books	  project.	  This	  set	  of	  texts	  is	  broken	  down	  into	  individual	  words	  (or	  grams);	  the	  entire	  corpus	  contains	  over	  500	  billion	  grams,	  of	  which	  361	  billion	  are	  in	  English.	  The	  data	  set	  is	  most	  meaningful	  for	  books	  published	  since	  1800.	  The	  Ngram	  viewer	  maps	  the	  frequency	  of	  any	  particular	  gram,	  or	  group	  of	  grams,	  as	  compared	  to	  all	  other	  grams	  for	  any	  given	  year	  (Michel,	  et	  al	  2011).	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   When	  the	  focus	  of	  economic	  debate	  in	  academia	  centered	  on	  the	  question	  of	  what	  type	  of	  project	  the	  study	  of	  economics	  was	  to	  be,	  Smith	  was	  mobilized	  as	  the	  proponent	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  project	  (that	  of	  scientific	  inquiry	  and	  systematization).	  However,	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period,	  when	  the	  focus	  of	  economics	  shifted	  (as	  did	  most	  of	  academic	  social	  sciences)	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  relative	  merits	  of	  planning	  versus	  market-­‐based	  decision	  making,	  Smith	  began	  to	  be	  mobilized	  as	  a	  proponent	  of	  the	  market.	  In	  order	  to	  use	  Smith	  effectively	  in	  this	  debate,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  allow	  him	  to	  speak	  the	  language	  in	  which	  the	  debate	  was	  being	  conducted,	  and	  in	  this	  case	  that	  was	  the	  language	  of	  “the	  economy.”	  	   In	  either	  case,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  canon	  for	  a	  given	  discipline	  is	  as	  much	  an	  inventive	  or	  productive	  exercise	  as	  a	  scholarly	  one.	  There	  is	  a	  substantial	  process	  of	  selection,	  interpretation	  and	  conceptual	  innovation	  involved	  not	  only	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  include	  or	  exclude	  a	  given	  work	  from	  the	  cannon,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  role	  that	  work	  will	  play	  in	  the	  constellation	  of	  other	  works	  into	  which	  it	  is	  placed.	  Thus	  we	  can	  see	  that	  when	  economics	  was	  a	  nascent	  science,	  Smith	  was	  included	  in	  the	  canon	  as	  the	  originator	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  economics	  
as	  a	  science.	  Once	  placed	  into	  this	  founding	  position,	  Smith’s	  duties	  may	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  developed	  along	  with	  the	  science	  he	  was	  credited	  with	  founding.	  As	  such,	  when	  the	  battleground	  shifted	  from	  the	  nature	  and	  validity	  of	  economics	  as	  science	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  markets	  and	  planning	  in	  economics,	  Smith	  was	  transformed	  from	  an	  advocate	  of	  the	  systematization	  of	  economics	  as	  a	  science	  to	  a	  proponent	  of	  limited	  government	  and	  a	  hands-­‐off	  approach	  to	  the	  economy.	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   One	  interesting	  visual	  example	  of	  canon	  construction	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Paul	  Samuelson’s	  foundational	  textbook	  Economics,	  originally	  published	  in	  1948.	  As	  Mark	  Skousen	  notes:	  Paul	  Samuelson's	  Economics	  ranks	  with	  the	  most	  successful	  text	  books	  ever	  published	  in	  the	  field,	  including	  the	  works	  of	  Adam	  Smith,	  David	  Ricardo,	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  and	  Alfred	  Marshall.	  His	  15	  editions	  have	  sold	  over	  four	  million	  copies	  and	  have	  been	  translated	  into	  41	  languages…	  Its	  legacy	  goes	  beyond	  sales	  figures;	  in	  fact,	  the	  textbook	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  in	  the	  top	  10	  sellers	  in	  the	  U.S.	  market.	  However,	  most	  of	  the	  existing	  popular	  textbooks	  borrow	  heavily	  from	  Samuelson's	  pedagogy,	  both	  in	  matters	  of	  tone	  and	  in	  the	  use	  and	  exposition	  of	  diagrams,	  like	  supply	  and	  demand,	  cost	  curves,	  the	  multiplier	  and	  the	  Keynesian	  cross.	  (1997)	  	  The	  significant	  and	  extended	  influence	  of	  Samuelson’s	  text	  makes	  the	  following	  chart	  (from	  the	  inside	  back	  cover	  of	  the	  1985	  edition	  of	  Samuelson’s	  text,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Balabkins	  1993)	  quite	  useful	  in	  thinking	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  canon	  of	  “scientific	  economics”	  has	  been	  constructed	  around	  Smith	  (Figure	  1).	  On	  first	  viewing,	  several	  things	  jump	  out	  at	  the	  chart’s	  viewer.	  First,	  Adam	  Smith	  is	  given	  obvious	  pride	  of	  place.	  His	  position	  on	  the	  chart	  is	  central;	  in	  Smith,	  the	  prior	  strands	  of	  economic	  thinking	  come	  together,	  and	  from	  Smith	  all	  later	  threads	  of	  economic	  thought	  emanate.	  Second,	  despite	  its	  demonstrated	  importance	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  academic	  discipline	  of	  economics,	  the	  Historical	  school	  is	  nowhere	  to	  be	  found	  in	  Samuelson’s	  family	  tree.	  By	  1985,	  the	  marginalist	  victory	  is	  so	  complete	  that	  the	  Historicists	  have	  begun	  to	  be	  expunged	  from	  the	  history	  of	  economics.	  Finally,	  while	  all	  of	  the	  post-­‐Smith	  schools	  of	  economic	  thought	  on	  the	  chart	  find	  their	  basis	  in	  Smith,	  Samuelson	  has	  taken	  great	  pains	  to	  distance	  “mainstream”	  economics	  from	  the	  Marxist	  cluster	  on	  the	  chart.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  difficult	  line	  to	  follow	  on	  this	  chart	  is	  the	  one	  that	  demonstrates	  that	  Marx	  and	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Marshall	  have	  a	  common	  intellectual	  ancestor	  in	  David	  Ricardo.	  
	  Figure	  1:	  Paul	  Samuelson’s	  Family	  Tree	  of	  Economic	  Science	  	  The	  repurposing	  of	  Smith	  by	  the	  mainstream	  of	  post-­‐war	  economists	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  making	  the	  argument	  about	  government	  intervention	  in	  the	  economy	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  ongoing	  since	  1776.	  The	  theoretical	  narrative	  constructed	  on	  this	  basis	  caused	  the	  modern	  United	  States	  to	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  an	  experiment	  in	  the	  application	  of	  Smith’s	  principles	  of	  minimal	  intervention,	  and	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conversely,	  any	  questioning	  of	  this	  principle	  began	  to	  appear	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  greatness	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  By	  mobilizing	  Smith	  to	  make	  a	  political	  decision	  (to	  privilege	  markets	  over	  planning	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  distinct	  realm	  of	  human	  activity)	  being	  made	  in	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  determined	  in,	  and	  largely	  unchallenged	  since,	  the	  late	  18th	  century,	  post-­‐war	  economists	  were	  able	  to	  bolster	  their	  own	  credibility	  substantially.	  We’ll	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  effects	  and	  implications	  of	  this	  usage	  of	  Smith	  in	  Chapter	  3.	   	  
E.	  Development	  Economics	  and	  An	  Alternate	  View	  of	  the	  Economy	  	   Of	  course,	  no	  discourse	  is	  singular	  and	  uniquely	  dominant;	  instead,	  discourse	  is	  always	  plural,	  and	  there	  is	  always	  competition	  over	  usage.	  The	  concepts	  that	  have	  the	  most	  profound	  impact	  on	  our	  perception	  of	  the	  horizon	  of	  possibility,	  however,	  are	  those	  that	  are	  central	  not	  only	  to	  one	  of	  a	  few	  discourses	  among	  many,	  but	  rather	  those	  that	  are	  shared	  between	  multiple,	  competing	  discourses.	  It	  is	  these	  concepts	  that	  are	  treated	  as	  the	  ground	  on	  which	  any	  convincing	  argument	  must	  be	  made	  to	  stand.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	  marginalists	  and	  the	  historicists	  were	  fighting	  for	  dominance	  in	  American	  academic	  economics,	  in	  India	  another	  important	  part	  of	  the	  story	  of	  the	  economy,	  though	  with	  some	  of	  the	  same	  players,	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  unfolding.	  The	  problems	  that	  India	  embodied	  for	  the	  British	  empire,	  and	  the	  efforts	  by	  various	  interested	  parties	  to	  solve	  these	  types	  of	  problems,	  both	  in	  India	  and	  elsewhere,	  lead	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  discourse	  that	  in	  some	  respects	  competed	  with	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  marginalist	  revolution	  detailed	  above,	  but	  that	  also	  served	  to	  uphold	  and	  reinforce	  the	  economy	  effect.	  	  
	  94	  
	   Romesh	  Chunder	  Dutt	  begins	  his	  1906	  work	  An	  Economic	  History	  of	  India	  in	  
the	  Victorian	  Age	  with	  an	  anecdote	  about	  Queen	  Victoria’s	  diamond	  jubilee	  of	  1897.	  Representatives	  from	  all	  colonies	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  were	  in	  attendance,	  he	  relates,	  giving	  rise	  to	  heady	  thoughts	  of	  colonial	  unity.	  The	  presence	  of	  India	  in	  this	  group	  of	  colonies,	  however,	  served	  as	  something	  of	  a	  fly	  in	  the	  ointment,	  because	  India	  was	  so	  much	  less	  affluent	  than	  the	  other	  colonies.	  In	  fact,	  its	  extreme	  poverty	  coupled	  with	  its	  massive	  size	  meant	  that	  it	  in	  many	  respects	  eclipsed	  the	  wealth	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  empire.	  Dutt	  goes	  on	  the	  report	  that	  at	  the	  most	  recent	  meeting	  of	  the	  British	  Association,	  economist	  Robert	  Giffin	  [sic]	  suggested	  that	  India	  “…was	  ‘a	  permanent	  and	  formidable	  difficulty	  in	  the	  British	  Empire,	  to	  which	  more	  thought	  must	  be	  given	  by	  our	  public	  men,	  the	  more	  the	  idea	  of	  Imperial	  Unity	  become	  a	  working	  force.’”	  (vi)	  	  	   The	  economic	  problem	  with	  India,	  in	  short,	  was	  that	  it	  was	  a	  huge	  country,	  and	  in	  many	  respects	  rich	  in	  important	  resources,	  and	  yet	  its	  people	  were	  desperately	  poor.	  In	  1906,	  according	  to	  Dutt,	  the	  per	  capita	  annual	  income	  in	  British	  colonies	  other	  than	  India	  was	  £48,	  and	  in	  Britain	  itself	  £42.	  India,	  however,	  had	  an	  annual	  per	  capita	  income	  of	  only	  £2	  (vi).	  Additionally,	  because	  India	  was	  a	  colony,	  the	  British	  had	  a	  strong	  interest	  in	  improving	  its	  economic	  output	  in	  order	  to	  extract	  more	  wealth	  from	  it.	  This	  wealth	  extraction,	  however,	  was	  clearly	  one	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  India’s	  extreme	  poverty.	  Thus,	  the	  largely	  British	  (or	  British-­‐trained)	  economists	  and	  administrators	  who	  were	  charged	  with	  finding	  solutions	  to	  the	  “India	  problem”	  were	  in	  reality	  faced	  with	  a	  double	  problem:	  how	  can	  India	  be	  made	  more	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productive,	  or	  be	  better	  managed,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  both	  reduces	  poverty	  in	  India	  and	  maintains	  or	  increases	  the	  massive	  flows	  of	  capital	  from	  India	  to	  England?	  Similarly,	  even	  after	  India	  gained	  independence	  from	  the	  British	  in	  1947,	  economists	  working	  on	  India	  (and	  other	  “poor”	  countries)	  were	  largely	  focused	  not	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  planned	  or	  free	  market	  system	  was	  best	  for	  an	  industrialized	  “economy,”	  but	  rather,	  how	  best	  to	  industrialize	  “economies”	  that	  came	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  “international	  depressed	  areas.”	  	   Many	  point	  to	  Paul	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan’s	  article	  1943	  article	  “Problems	  of	  Industrialisation	  in	  Eastern	  and	  South-­‐Eastern	  Europe”	  as	  one	  of	  the	  first	  examples	  of	  the	  emerging	  school	  of	  development	  economics.26	  While	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  was	  not	  himself	  focused	  on	  India,	  his	  work	  certainly	  informed	  much	  of	  the	  work	  on	  India	  that	  was	  to	  follow.	  The	  problem	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  took	  on	  was	  that	  the	  area	  between	  German,	  Russia,	  and	  Italy	  (which	  included	  Poland,	  Slovakia,	  Yugoslavia,	  Hungary,	  and	  Romania),	  though	  geographically	  large	  and	  relatively	  heavily	  populated,	  was	  not	  producing	  as	  much	  as	  he	  believed	  that	  it	  could.	  He	  claimed	  that	  the	  total	  (presumably	  annual)	  income	  of	  this	  area	  amounted	  to	  only	  £2	  billion,	  or	  about	  40%	  of	  the	  income	  of	  Great	  Britain.	  (203)	  	  	   There	  were,	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  argued,	  two	  main	  ways	  in	  which	  one	  might	  think	  about	  potential	  solutions	  to	  this	  problem.	  First,	  there	  was	  the	  “Russian	  model,”	  by	  which	  he	  was	  quick	  to	  note	  he	  did	  not	  mean	  communism.	  Rather,	  this	  model	  consisted	  of	  an	  attempt	  to	  develop	  a	  discrete	  economic	  area,	  capable	  of	  producing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  While	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  never	  uses	  the	  term	  “development	  economics”	  in	  this	  article,	  he	  does	  refer	  to	  both	  “development	  investment”	  and	  projects	  of	  “national	  development”	  (208).	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everything	  its	  population	  needed	  or	  wanted,	  and	  largely	  free	  of	  the	  need	  to	  trade	  with	  other	  areas;	  as	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  put	  it,	  “…a	  national	  economy	  built	  like	  a	  vertical	  industrial	  concern.”	  (203)	  This	  was	  not,	  however,	  his	  preferred	  path,	  both	  because	  this	  particular	  type	  of	  industrialization	  would	  be	  doomed	  to	  progress	  slowly	  and	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  of	  the	  population	  (as	  all	  necessary	  capital	  would	  have	  to	  be	  amassed	  internally),	  and	  because	  such	  a	  path	  to	  industrialization	  would	  not	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  possible	  efficiencies	  of	  division	  of	  labor	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  	  	   The	  better	  path,	  he	  argued,	  was	  for	  this	  area	  to	  industrialize	  in	  a	  way	  that	  was	  complimentary	  to	  the	  industrialization	  that	  had	  already	  taken	  place	  in	  Western	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  for	  it	  do	  so	  largely	  through	  foreign	  capital	  investment.	  The	  advantages	  to	  this	  alternative	  were	  that	  no	  substantial	  sacrifices	  would	  be	  necessary	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  local	  population;	  the	  process	  could	  occur	  relatively	  quickly	  (as	  the	  availability	  of	  foreign	  capital	  far	  exceeded	  that	  of	  internal	  capital);	  and	  it	  would	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  efficiencies	  of	  the	  international	  division	  of	  labor	  by	  utilizing,	  rather	  than	  replicating,	  the	  industrial	  capacity	  of	  the	  US	  and	  Western	  Europe.	  	  	   In	  advocating	  this	  second	  avenue	  of	  industrialization,	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  saw	  the	  state	  as	  a	  vitally	  important	  actor.	  “Complementarity	  of	  different	  industries	  provides	  the	  most	  important	  set	  of	  arguments	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  large-­‐scale	  planned	  industrialization.”	  (205)	  In	  the	  effort	  to	  aid	  this	  “depressed”	  area,	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  comes	  down	  clearly	  on	  the	  side	  of	  planning,	  though	  he	  is	  careful	  to	  moderate	  his	  position:	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…[W]hile	  in	  the	  highly	  developed	  and	  rich	  countries	  with	  their	  more	  variegated	  needs	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  assess	  the	  prospective	  demand	  of	  the	  population,	  it	  is	  not	  as	  difficult	  to	  foresee	  on	  what	  the	  formerly	  unemployed	  workers	  would	  spend	  their	  wages	  in	  regions	  where	  a	  low	  standard	  of	  living	  obtains.	  (206)	  	  Planning	  might	  make	  sense	  for	  Poland,	  where	  wants	  are	  simple,	  but	  certainly	  not	  for	  the	  US	  or	  Britain.	  	  	   One	  of	  the	  big	  problems	  with	  allowing	  the	  market	  to	  rule	  in	  an	  economy	  in	  which	  “a	  low	  standard	  of	  living	  obtains,”	  he	  argues,	  is	  that	  there	  is	  not	  necessarily	  an	  identity	  between	  the	  perceived	  potential	  profitability	  of	  a	  given	  venture	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  an	  individual	  and	  the	  perceived	  potential	  profitability	  of	  the	  same	  venture	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  (or	  its	  proxy,	  the	  planner).	  This	  is	  true	  for	  two	  reasons:	  first,	  the	  individual	  investor	  will	  never	  have	  as	  much	  information	  regarding	  the	  market	  as	  a	  whole	  as	  the	  planner,	  leading	  to	  a	  greater	  perception	  of	  risk	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  individual	  investor;	  second,	  there	  may	  be	  individual	  projects	  which	  are	  in	  actual	  fact	  not	  profitable	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  individual	  investor,	  but	  which	  are	  useful	  enough	  to	  those	  other	  projects	  that	  do	  have	  the	  potential	  for	  profitability	  that	  they	  may	  be	  worth	  undertaking	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  if	  your	  goal	  is	  an	  overall	  increase	  in	  economic	  activity	  in	  a	  given	  political	  unit.	  For	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan,	  planning	  provides	  the	  opportunity	  to	  ensure	  that	  an	  “economic	  structure”	  can	  be	  constructed	  in	  which	  the	  parts	  compliment	  one	  another,	  and	  in	  which	  even	  those	  projects	  such	  as	  infrastructure	  and	  transportation	  are	  undertaken.	  (207)	  	   For	  our	  purposes,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan’s	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  state	  interacts	  with	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  an	  investor	  interacts	  with	  a	  business	  concern.	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  state	  is	  not	  simply	  to	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provide	  a	  minimal	  legal	  infrastructure	  within	  which	  the	  economy	  may	  be	  allowed	  to	  regulate	  itself,	  but	  rather	  actively	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  economy	  that	  is	  structured	  not	  around	  the	  profit	  of	  a	  few	  investors,	  but	  rather	  the	  needs	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  All	  of	  this	  is	  to	  be	  done	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  market,	  however;	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  is	  clear	  that	  he	  is	  not	  advocating	  communism.	  Rather,	  he	  is	  suggesting	  that	  the	  line	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  economy	  may	  not	  be	  so	  stark	  (at	  least	  for	  “depressed”	  or	  unindustrialized	  countries)	  as	  the	  economists	  we	  examined	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter	  suggested	  it	  was,	  and	  that	  a	  reliance	  on	  private	  interest	  alone	  may	  not	  be	  the	  best	  way	  to	  encourage	  economic	  growth.	  	  	   In	  order	  really	  to	  get	  at	  the	  roots	  of	  this	  argument,	  and	  to	  explain	  why	  we	  are	  doing	  so,	  we	  have	  to	  go	  back	  to	  a	  time	  far	  before	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  and	  his	  colleagues	  began	  talking	  about	  development	  economics	  (or	  “industrialization”)	  in	  the	  contemporary	  sense,	  and	  when	  instead	  the	  main	  question	  of	  the	  day	  was	  whether	  one	  could	  possible	  make	  a	  profit	  by	  transporting	  gold	  and	  silver	  out	  of	  one’s	  own	  country.	  	  	   William	  Barber	  (1975)	  makes	  the	  convincing	  assertion	  that,	  even	  though	  no	  one	  talked	  about	  “development	  economics”	  as	  such	  until	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  the	  idea	  has	  a	  much	  longer	  history,	  going	  back	  at	  least	  to	  the	  era	  of	  the	  British	  East	  India	  Company.	  Fascinatingly,	  while	  Barber	  makes	  a	  compelling	  case	  that	  there	  was,	  in	  a	  sense,	  an	  attempt	  at	  a	  systematic	  understanding	  of	  the	  development	  of	  economic	  forces	  being	  undertaken	  at	  this	  time,	  this	  case	  suggests	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that	  the	  economic	  unit	  on	  which	  this	  attempt	  was	  focused	  was	  not	  India	  at	  all,	  but	  instead	  England.	  	  By	  1600,	  when	  the	  British	  East	  India	  Company	  was	  first	  granted	  a	  charter	  to	  engage	  in	  trade	  east	  of	  the	  Cape	  of	  Good	  Hope,	  England	  was	  lagging	  behind	  Holland,	  Spain,	  and	  Portugal	  in	  forging	  economic	  bonds	  with	  the	  world	  outside	  of	  Europe.	  Despite	  the	  relative	  success	  of	  these	  three	  great	  European	  powers	  in	  engaging	  in	  inter-­‐continental	  trade,	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  British	  East	  India	  Company	  were	  a	  source	  of	  consternation	  for	  many	  influential	  Englishmen	  of	  the	  time.	  The	  problem,	  as	  they	  understood	  it,	  was	  that	  trade	  with	  far-­‐off	  countries	  (like,	  for	  example,	  India)	  necessarily	  meant	  transportation	  of	  money	  from	  England	  to	  these	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  trade	  for	  their	  goods.	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  India	  trade	  consisted	  chiefly	  of	  spices,	  pepper	  from	  Indonesia,	  and	  fabric.	  Opponents	  of	  the	  East	  India	  Company	  argued	  that	  by	  trading	  the	  country’s	  stock	  of	  gold	  and	  silver	  for	  pepper	  and	  cotton,	  England	  could	  only	  become	  poorer	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  This	  position	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  general,	  private	  concerns	  were	  not	  given	  access	  to	  the	  royal	  treasure	  (composed	  of	  precious	  metals)	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  trade.	  For	  the	  East	  India	  Company,	  however,	  an	  exception	  was	  made;	  strict	  limits	  were	  imposed	  at	  first,	  but	  these	  limits	  were	  gradually	  relaxed.	  In	  1600,	  for	  example,	  the	  Company	  was	  allowed	  to	  ship	  no	  more	  than	  £30,000	  of	  silver	  abroad	  per	  year,	  and	  this	  was	  required	  to	  be	  in	  the	  form	  of	  coinage	  from	  other	  countries.	  By	  1629,	  the	  Company	  had	  gained	  the	  right	  to	  export	  as	  much	  as	  £120,000	  per	  year	  in	  gold	  and	  silver,	  up	  to	  one	  quarter	  of	  which	  could	  be	  in	  the	  form	  of	  English	  coins	  (Barber,	  9).	  Following	  Barber’s	  convincing	  assertion,	  I	  have	  examined	  the	  primary	  literature	  around	  which	  the	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debate	  over	  the	  exportation	  of	  currency	  revolved,	  with	  a	  particular	  eye	  toward	  language	  that	  suggests	  the	  development	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  effect.	  	  In	  1615	  Robert	  Kayll	  published	  a	  pamphlet	  entitled	  The	  Trade’s	  Increase	  that	  took	  the	  Company	  to	  task	  for	  working	  to	  impoverish,	  rather	  than	  to	  enrich,	  the	  people	  of	  England.	  He	  argued,	  first,	  that	  the	  excessive	  amount	  of	  ship	  building	  and	  repairing	  required	  by	  the	  India	  trade	  was	  driving	  up	  the	  price	  of	  wood	  and	  limiting	  the	  supply	  available	  to	  Englishmen	  in	  professions	  other	  than	  shipping	  (17).	  Similarly,	  he	  claimed	  that	  the	  huge	  demand	  for	  sailors	  created	  by	  the	  India	  trade	  weakened	  England’s	  potential	  naval	  strength	  by	  drawing	  able	  seamen	  from	  naval	  service	  into	  commerce	  (22).	  	  Finally	  he	  suggested	  that	  the	  correct	  response	  to	  the	  India	  trade,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  with	  other	  far-­‐off	  countries,	  was	  to:	  …Let	  the	  whole	  land	  murmure	  at	  the	  transport	  of	  treasure,	  and	  bring	  Charles	  the	  fifth	  his	  opinion,	  speaking	  to	  the	  Portugals	  of	  their	  trade	  to	  the	  East	  Indies,	  who	  said	  that	  they	  were	  the	  enemies	  of	  Christendome,	  for	  they	  carried	  away	  the	  treasure	  of	  Europe	  to	  enrich	  the	  heathen…	  (32)	  	  The	  answer	  to	  all	  of	  these	  problems,	  Kayll	  suggested,	  was	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  fishing	  industry	  in	  and	  around	  English	  waters,	  rather	  than	  the	  promotion	  of	  international	  trade.	  Indeed,	  Kayll	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  oddly	  preoccupied	  with	  herring,	  suggesting	  more	  than	  once	  in	  his	  pamphlet	  that	  in	  this	  humble	  fish	  lay	  the	  answer	  to	  all	  of	  England’s	  economic	  woes.	  	  	   The	  important	  theme	  in	  Kayll’s	  work,	  for	  our	  purposes,	  is	  that	  it	  focuses	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  what	  the	  India	  trade	  draws	  out	  of	  England,	  with	  very	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  reciprocal	  effect	  of	  incoming	  trade	  from	  India	  and	  Indonesia.	  Caught	  up	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  wealth	  is	  a	  literal	  stockpile	  of	  goods	  (wood,	  gold,	  etc.),	  it	  is	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difficult	  for	  Kayll	  and	  his	  contemporaries	  to	  conceive	  of	  a	  system	  of	  value	  in	  which	  it	  might	  make	  sense	  to	  send	  these	  things	  abroad.	  Not	  only	  will	  such	  action	  deplete	  England’s	  stores	  of	  resources;	  any	  goods	  that	  come	  from	  India	  are	  goods	  not	  being	  produced	  by	  English	  workers	  in	  England.	  The	  only	  people	  who	  benefit	  from	  this	  trade,	  Kayll	  argues,	  are	  those	  who	  make	  a	  direct	  profit	  from	  the	  shipping	  industry.	  	   It	  is	  left,	  unsurprisingly,	  to	  a	  representative	  of	  this	  industry	  to	  make	  the	  counter-­‐argument	  that	  the	  shipping	  industry	  in	  fact	  benefits	  England	  as	  a	  whole.	  Thomas	  Mun,	  who	  became	  a	  director	  of	  the	  Company	  in	  1615	  (the	  year	  in	  which	  Kayll’s	  pamphlet	  was	  published),	  wrote	  three	  major	  pieces	  regarding	  the	  economics	  of	  the	  India	  trade:	  A	  Discourse	  of	  Trade	  from	  England	  unto	  the	  East	  Indies	  (1621),	  The	  
Petition	  and	  Remonstrance	  of	  the	  Governor	  and	  the	  Company	  of	  Merchants	  of	  London,	  
Trading	  to	  the	  East	  Indies	  (1628),	  and	  England’s	  Treasure	  by	  Forraign	  Trade	  (1664).	  In	  these	  three	  texts	  he	  made	  an	  argument	  that	  will	  sound	  quite	  familiar	  to	  contemporary	  readers.	  	   In	  the	  first	  of	  these	  publications	  (1621),	  Mun	  broke	  the	  objections	  of	  critics	  of	  the	  India	  trade	  such	  as	  Kayll	  down	  into	  four	  main	  groups,	  to	  each	  of	  which	  he	  then	  responded.	  The	  first	  objection	  he	  identified,	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  he	  answered	  it,	  may	  help	  us	  get	  at	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  economic	  issues	  (or	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  at	  a	  particular	  manifestation	  of	  what	  will	  come	  to	  be	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  effect	  and	  the	  state	  effect),	  as	  Mun	  asked	  his	  reader	  to	  shift	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  he	  thought	  about	  wealth,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  holding	  onto	  much	  of	  what	  makes	  the	  classical	  conception	  of	  wealth	  distinct	  from	  the	  modern	  one.	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   The	  objection	  itself	  is	  quite	  predictable:	  It	  were	  a	  happie	  thing	  for	  Christendome	  (say	  many	  men)	  that	  the	  Navigation	  to	  the	  East-­‐Indies,	  by	  way	  of	  the	  Cape	  of	  Good	  hope,	  had	  never	  bene	  found	  out;	  For	  in	  the	  fleetes	  of	  shippes,	  which	  are	  sent	  thtither	  yearely	  out	  of	  England,	  Portingall,	  and	  the	  Low	  countries;	  The	  gold,	  silver,	  and	  Coyne	  of	  Christendome,	  and	  particularly	  of	  this	  Kingdome,	  is	  exhausted,	  to	  buy	  unecessarie	  wares.	  (4-­‐5)	  	  In	  short,	  according	  to	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  the	  goods	  that	  English	  ships	  were	  carrying	  back	  from	  India	  were	  largely	  useless,	  while	  the	  gold	  and	  silver	  they	  shipped	  out	  were	  useful	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  what	  make	  up	  actual	  wealth.	  	  Mun	  had	  several	  arguments	  in	  response	  to	  this.	  First,	  he	  suggested	  that	  the	  goods	  that	  came	  from	  the	  East-­‐Indies	  were	  not	  unnecessary,	  as	  evidenced	  both	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  people	  wanted	  them	  enough	  to	  buy	  them,	  and	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  goods	  were	  already	  imported	  prior	  to	  navigation	  of	  the	  Cape	  of	  Good	  Hope,	  but	  were	  simply	  bought	  from	  Turkish	  merchants	  at	  higher	  prices.	  	  	   Second,	  Mun	  noted	  that,	  at	  the	  time	  in	  question,	  the	  Company	  was	  allowed	  only	  to	  use	  silver	  coined	  in	  other	  kingdoms	  for	  the	  India	  trade,	  and	  thus	  could	  not	  be	  said	  in	  any	  way	  to	  be	  depleting	  the	  coin	  of	  England.	  More	  importantly,	  though,	  Mun	  endeavored	  to	  show	  that	  the	  India	  trade	  actually	  brought	  in	  more	  precious	  metal	  than	  it	  sent	  out.	  Using	  an	  example	  in	  which	  the	  Company	  uses	  £100,000	  sterling	  to	  buy	  quantities	  of	  pepper,	  cloves,	  nutmeg,	  mace,	  indigo,	  silk,	  and	  calico	  which	  have	  a	  value	  of	  £494,223	  in	  England,	  Mun	  showed	  that	  these	  imports	  must	  either	  replace	  English	  products,	  thus	  freeing	  those	  products	  for	  export,	  or	  must	  be	  intended	  for	  export	  themselves.	  In	  fact,	  Mun	  suggested	  that	  while	  the	  value	  of	  the	  goods	  brought	  to	  England	  from	  India	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  original	  £100,000	  sterling	  was	  close	  to	  £500,000	  sterling,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  portion	  of	  those	  goods	  actually	  consumed	  in	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England	  was	  only	  about	  £120,000	  sterling.	  Thus,	  he	  argued,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  goods	  brought	  into	  England	  only	  to	  be	  exported	  again	  must	  have	  been	  around	  £380,000	  sterling.	  This	  led	  to	  his	  formation	  of	  a	  doctrine	  based	  around	  the	  idea	  of	  balance	  of	  trade:	   …[W]hen	  the	  value	  of	  our	  commodyties	  exported	  doth	  over-­‐balance	  the	  worth	  of	  all	  those	  forraigne	  wares	  which	  are	  imported	  and	  consumed	  in	  this	  kingdome,	  then	  the	  remainder	  of	  our	  stock	  which	  is	  sent	  forth,	  must	  of	  necessitie	  returne	  to	  us	  in	  Treasure.	  (27)	  	  	  It	  might	  well	  seem	  to	  the	  modern	  reader	  that	  there	  are	  important	  questions	  left	  unasked	  by	  Kayll	  and	  unanswered	  by	  Mun,	  including	  “Whose	  money	  got	  sent	  out,	  and	  to	  whom	  does	  the	  profit	  from	  that	  money	  accrue?”	  and	  “What	  happens	  to	  the	  prices	  of	  the	  goods	  the	  people	  of	  England	  were	  already	  buying	  as	  shipping	  shifts	  from	  the	  land	  route	  (through	  Turkey)	  to	  the	  sea	  route?”	  The	  fact,	  however,	  that	  these	  questions	  do	  not	  seem	  obvious	  either	  to	  Kayll	  or	  to	  Mun	  suggests	  that	  they	  are	  both	  working	  with	  a	  somewhat	  different	  concept	  of	  wealth	  than	  we	  are.	  	   While	  Mun	  clearly	  demonstrates	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  conception	  of	  wealth	  in	  his	  reply	  than	  Kayll	  did	  in	  his	  initial	  critique,	  there	  remains	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  wealth	  of	  England	  is	  a	  literal	  stockpile	  of	  goods,	  and	  that	  the	  wealth	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  England	  is	  largely	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  wealth	  of	  its	  inhabitants.	  Also,	  importantly	  for	  our	  purposes,	  there	  is	  no	  suggestion	  that	  there	  are	  any	  forces	  in	  play	  other	  than	  the	  simple	  choice	  to	  increase	  wealth;	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  choices	  are	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  India	  trade,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  benefits	  enumerated	  by	  Mun	  will	  accrue,	  or	  to	  refrain	  from	  engaging	  in	  such	  trade,	  in	  which	  the	  status	  quo	  will	  be	  maintained.	  There	  is	  no	  temptation	  to	  cast	  economic	  incentives	  as	  irresistible	  forces	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  because	  they	  are	  obviously	  subservient	  to	  political	  power	  in	  a	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state	  where	  the	  King’s	  permission	  is	  required	  to	  engage	  in	  trade.	  	  	   The	  idea	  of	  the	  balance	  of	  trade	  serves	  for	  Mun	  not	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  economic	  necessity,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  particular	  tool	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  strategic	  effort	  to	  increase	  the	  wealth	  of	  the	  kingdom.	  Moreover,	  we	  must	  remember	  that	  Mun	  is	  an	  employee	  of	  the	  company.	  Balance	  of	  trade	  serves	  as	  a	  solution,	  for	  his	  employers,	  of	  the	  particular	  political	  problem	  with	  which	  they	  are	  faced:	  how	  can	  they	  present	  an	  argument	  which	  will	  allow	  them	  to	  continue	  to	  enrich	  themselves	  through	  the	  India	  trade	  while	  not	  appearing	  to	  impoverish	  their	  country	  in	  the	  process?	  Its	  service	  of	  this	  function	  does	  not,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember,	  make	  it	  less	  true;	  however,	  we	  would	  do	  well	  to	  remember	  that	  in	  any	  given	  situation	  there	  are	  likely	  many	  true	  statements	  that	  may	  be	  made,	  only	  some	  of	  which	  also	  serve	  the	  strategic	  interests	  of	  the	  speaker.	  Mun’s	  casting	  of	  the	  India	  trade	  in	  the	  language	  of	  an	  overall	  balance	  of	  imports	  and	  exports	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  statement	  which,	  while	  true,	  serves	  to	  frame	  the	  question	  in	  a	  way	  that	  renders	  inevitable	  the	  answer	  he	  seeks.	  	  	   I	  am	  convinced	  by	  Barber’s	  (1975)	  argument	  that	  Mun’s	  most	  historically	  significant	  contribution	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  England	  stood	  to	  gain	  from	  foreign	  trade,	  despite	  its	  lack	  of	  products	  which	  might	  be	  exported	  profitably,	  due	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  “trade	  with	  its	  money.”	  (17)	  That	  is,	  Barber	  argues,	  in	  the	  17th	  century	  there	  was	  substantial	  profit	  to	  be	  made	  through	  commercial,	  rather	  than	  industrial,	  endeavors	  –	  the	  simple	  act	  of	  moving	  products	  from	  one	  place	  to	  another	  could	  result	  in	  substantial	  increases	  in	  wealth.	  	  England	  was	  particularly	  well	  situated	  to	  engage	  in	  this	  commercial	  activity	  precisely	  because	  it	  had	  a	  relatively	  large	  supply	  of	  precious	  metals	  for	  which	  it	  had	  no	  direct	  domestic	  use.	  By	  using	  this	  possession	  of	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precious	  metals	  as	  a	  comparative	  advantage,	  or	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  by	  exporting	  money,	  England	  stood	  to	  gain	  substantially.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  service	  of	  justifying	  and	  explaining	  the	  potential	  for	  such	  a	  gain	  that	  Mun	  undertakes	  a	  task	  of	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  what	  we	  will	  come	  to	  call	  the	  economy	  effect.	  	  	   What,	  then,	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  argument	  Mun	  makes	  in	  1621,	  the	  argument	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  makes	  in	  1943,	  and	  “the	  economy”	  as	  produced	  by	  the	  American	  economists	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter?	  Mun	  and	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan,	  despite	  their	  differences,	  come	  together	  to	  form	  one	  pole	  of	  a	  discursive	  conflict	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  which	  we	  can	  find	  the	  marginalists	  described	  above.	  	   Clearly,	  one	  huge	  difference	  between	  the	  argument	  that	  Mun	  made,	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  argument	  put	  forth	  later	  by	  “development	  economists”	  like	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan,	  is	  that	  most	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  India	  trade	  in	  the	  17th	  century	  weren’t	  particularly	  interested	  in	  India	  at	  all,	  except	  insofar	  as	  it	  served	  to	  enrich	  or	  impoverish	  England.	  The	  destination	  of	  all	  of	  these	  ships	  and	  sailors	  tends	  to	  be	  treated	  more	  like	  a	  resource	  to	  be	  exploited	  than	  like	  a	  potential	  partner	  in	  trade.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  are	  some	  fascinating	  similarities	  between	  these	  two	  arguments,	  separated	  by	  300	  years.	  Both	  Mun	  and	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  states	  should	  not	  focus	  simply	  on	  what	  they	  can	  produce	  for	  themselves	  within	  their	  own	  borders	  when	  they	  think	  about	  how	  to	  increase	  their	  prosperity.	  Both	  authors	  also	  suggest	  that	  some	  level	  of	  state	  involvement	  in	  economic	  decisions	  is	  desirable	  during	  the	  period	  in	  which	  a	  given	  industry	  or	  sector	  is	  establishing	  itself.	  	   What	  we	  can	  see	  in	  the	  confluence	  between	  Mun	  and	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  is	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the	  outline	  of	  a	  conception	  of	  human	  activity	  in	  society	  that	  offers	  a	  different	  set	  of	  divisions	  between	  “the	  economy”	  and	  its	  surrounding	  spheres	  than	  that	  developed	  by	  post-­‐war	  economists	  such	  as	  Spengler,	  Grampp,	  and	  Lewis	  discussed	  above.	  The	  conception	  shared	  by	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  and	  Mun	  is	  one	  that	  leans	  toward	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  state	  must	  be	  an	  active	  participant	  in	  economic	  activity	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  economy	  meets	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  state,	  rather	  than	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  state	  must	  bend	  to	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  economy.	  There	  is,	  to	  be	  sure,	  an	  interplay	  of	  both	  these	  ideas	  in	  each	  of	  these	  traditions,	  but	  the	  trajectory	  of	  development	  economics	  is	  such	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  encouraging	  the	  right	  type	  of	  economic	  development	  and	  growth	  supersedes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  constraining	  and	  defining	  the	  appropriate	  actions	  of	  the	  state.	  	  	   In	  our	  examination	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  academic	  discipline	  of	  economics	  in	  America,	  we	  were	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  group	  of	  men	  who	  were	  attempting	  to	  define	  and	  describe	  a	  new	  academic	  discipline	  helped	  to	  develop	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  economy	  that	  suited	  their	  purposes	  admirably,	  first	  by	  helping	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  discipline	  had	  an	  object	  with	  the	  requisite	  independence	  from	  that	  of	  other	  disciplines,	  and	  second	  by	  securing	  that	  object	  to	  the	  dominant	  political	  and	  ideological	  conflict	  of	  the	  day.	  First	  they	  built	  the	  economy,	  and	  then	  they	  put	  it	  to	  work	  in	  the	  fight	  between	  capitalism	  and	  communism.	  The	  case	  of	  development	  economics,	  however,	  tells	  a	  different	  story:	  that	  of	  another	  set	  of	  men	  who	  saw	  the	  economy	  as	  solution	  to	  a	  very	  different	  set	  of	  political	  problems,	  and	  used	  it	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  aid	  in	  both	  the	  mitigation	  and	  justification	  of	  global	  economic	  inequality.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  proponents	  of	  development	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economics	  seek	  to	  construct	  a	  different	  set	  of	  linguistic	  practices	  regarding	  the	  economy27	  than	  did	  marginalist	  economists;	  they	  sought	  to	  do	  so	  at	  least	  in	  part	  through	  the	  outright	  rejection	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  formal	  modeling	  that	  was	  the	  bread	  of	  butter	  of	  these	  other	  schools	  (see	  Krugman	  1994).	  	   One	  of	  the	  ideas	  proposed	  by	  this	  new	  group	  of	  “development	  economists”	  was	  the	  “big	  push”	  advocated	  by	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  and	  others	  (including	  Arthur	  Lewis	  and	  Ragnar	  Nurkse).	  This	  was	  the	  idea	  that	  underdeveloped	  or	  “backward”	  economies	  could	  be	  kick-­‐started	  and	  transformed	  into	  modern	  economies	  by	  the	  strategic	  use	  of	  massive,	  simultaneous	  investment	  in	  multiple	  industries.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  this	  conception	  rested	  upon	  the	  conviction	  that	  if	  supply	  and	  demand	  could	  be	  elevated	  simultaneously	  (the	  former	  by	  a	  massive	  increase	  in	  production,	  and	  the	  latter	  by	  the	  corresponding	  increase	  in	  employment),	  a	  new	  cycle	  of	  production	  and	  consumption	  could	  be	  substituted	  for	  the	  older,	  less	  dynamic	  one.	  	  	   One	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  this	  conception	  of	  the	  economy	  is	  that	  it	  is,	  when	  one	  really	  gets	  down	  to	  it,	  at	  least	  two	  different	  conceptions	  of	  the	  economy	  rolled	  into	  one.	  On	  one	  side,	  we	  find	  the	  underdeveloped	  (or	  “unindustrialized”)	  economy,	  which	  is	  characterized	  not	  only	  as	  poor	  (relative,	  of	  course,	  to	  developed	  or	  modern	  economies),	  but	  also	  as	  largely	  static	  and	  incapable	  of	  growth.	  	  Ragnar	  Nurkse,	  for	  example,	  suggests	  that:	  The	  circular	  constellation	  of	  the	  stationary	  system	  [of	  national	  poverty]	  is	  real	  enough,	  but	  fortunately	  the	  circle	  is	  not	  unbreakable.	  And	  once	  it	  is	  broken	  at	  any	  point,	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  the	  relation	  is	  circular	  tends	  to	  make	  for	  cumulative	  advance.	  We	  should	  perhaps	  hesitate	  to	  call	  the	  circle	  vicious;	  it	  can	  become	  beneficent.	  (11)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  We’ll	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  this	  idea	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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We	  can	  see	  here,	  of	  course,	  Nurkse’s	  advocacy	  for	  the	  big	  push,	  or	  as	  he	  would	  prefer,	  the	  theory	  of	  balanced	  growth.	  However,	  we	  can	  also	  find	  a	  suggestion	  that	  the	  economy	  may	  take	  on	  at	  least	  two	  forms.	  The	  first	  is	  this	  static	  circle	  of	  poverty	  which	  is	  characterized	  by	  low	  levels	  of	  both	  supply	  and	  demand,	  and	  which	  cannot	  hope	  to	  break	  out	  of	  this	  cycle	  by	  virtue	  of	  incremental	  progress	  because,	  Nurkse	  argues,	  the	  incentive	  to	  create	  the	  kind	  of	  infrastructure	  required	  for	  regular	  investment	  is	  simply	  not	  sufficient.	  He	  asks	  us	  to	  imagine	  a	  Robinson	  Crusoe	  character,	  stranded	  on	  an	  island.	  If	  this	  character	  has	  a	  few	  hundred	  nails	  and	  wishes	  to	  drive	  them	  into	  trees	  in	  order	  to	  support	  fishing	  nets,	  Nurkse	  suggests,	  then	  it	  is	  probably	  worth	  it	  to	  him	  to	  build	  a	  hammer.	  However,	  if	  he	  has	  only	  a	  few	  such	  nails,	  he	  will	  likely	  simply	  pick	  up	  a	  rock.	  The	  same	  principle	  holds	  true	  for	  investment,	  according	  to	  this	  argument.	  If	  the	  market	  is	  not	  of	  a	  sufficient	  size	  to	  justify	  the	  formation	  of	  modern	  industrial	  techniques	  (and	  their	  accompanying	  levels	  of	  investment)	  then	  growth	  will	  always	  be	  severely	  limited.	  	  Without	  some	  kind	  of	  outside	  stimulation	  (or,	  in	  the	  language	  of	  economics,	  some	  external	  economy),	  the	  poor	  economy	  will	  remain	  poor,	  always	  lacking	  the	  incentive	  structure	  to	  generate	  regular	  growth.	  	   If	  we	  can	  break	  this	  vicious	  circle,	  however,	  we	  may	  hope	  to	  transform	  it	  into	  the	  second	  type	  of	  economy,	  which	  Nurkse	  implies	  we	  might	  think	  of	  as	  a	  beneficent	  circle,	  but	  which	  is	  probably	  better	  described	  as	  a	  beneficent	  spiral.	  This	  spiral	  of	  growth	  is	  the	  modern	  economy,	  which	  has	  achieved	  the	  necessary	  scale	  to	  implement	  modern	  industrial	  techniques	  in	  virtually	  all	  spheres	  of	  production.	  	  Leaving	  aside	  for	  the	  moment	  the	  question	  of	  how	  exactly	  this	  modern	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economy	  functions	  to	  produce	  this	  consistent	  growth,	  one	  of	  the	  more	  interesting	  aspects	  of	  Nurkse’s	  argument	  is	  that	  he	  seems	  to	  regard	  the	  static,	  poor	  economy	  as	  the	  more	  natural	  of	  our	  two	  choices.	  “[T]he	  theory	  of	  stagnation,”	  he	  writes,	  “must	  be	  succeeded	  by	  a	  theory	  of	  development	  explaining	  the	  forces	  that	  are	  required,	  or	  that	  were	  observed	  in	  the	  past,	  to	  lift	  the	  economy	  out	  of	  the	  stationary	  state	  in	  which	  it	  would	  otherwise	  tend	  to	  settle”	  (11).	  The	  mystery,	  for	  Nurkse,	  isn’t	  that	  some	  economies	  fail	  to	  exhibit	  consistent	  growth;	  rather,	  it’s	  that	  some	  economies	  do	  manage	  to	  exhibit	  such	  growth,	  despite	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  a	  tendency	  toward	  stagnation.	  It’s	  not,	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  question	  of	  how	  to	  account	  for	  the	  deficiencies	  that	  lead	  to	  “backwardness,”	  but	  rather	  a	  question	  of	  how	  to	  explain	  the	  presence	  of	  those	  activities	  that	  lead	  to	  “progress.”	  	   The	  idea	  that	  the	  natural	  state	  of	  the	  economy	  is	  one	  of	  stagnation	  carries	  with	  it	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  political	  possibilities	  that	  Nurkse	  himself	  does	  not	  pursue.	  If,	  for	  example,	  growth	  does	  not	  happen	  without	  some	  kind	  of	  exceptional	  destruction	  of	  the	  circle	  of	  stagnation,	  we	  might	  legitimately	  ask	  whether	  we	  are	  better	  or	  worse	  off	  in	  an	  economy	  that	  grows	  than	  we	  would	  be	  in	  one	  that	  does	  not.	  Similarly,	  we	  might	  ask	  if	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  exceptional	  breakage	  of	  the	  circle	  of	  stagnation	  might	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  spiral	  of	  growth;	  could	  we	  choose	  to	  get	  off	  at	  a	  level	  of	  our	  choosing,	  returning	  to	  a	  circle	  of	  stagnation	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  material	  well-­‐being?	  In	  short,	  if	  growth	  is	  the	  result	  not	  of	  the	  natural	  existence	  of	  this	  sphere	  we	  call	  the	  economy,	  if	  it	  is	  not	  a	  command	  from	  the	  world	  over	  which	  we	  have	  no	  control,	  but	  is	  instead	  only	  ever	  the	  result	  of	  intentional	  human	  activity	  (whether	  that	  intention	  is	  directed	  at	  growth,	  per	  se,	  or	  simply	  at	  personal	  material	  gain),	  then	  we	  might	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legitimately	  suggest	  that	  when	  some	  other	  political	  priority	  comes	  up	  against	  growth,	  it	  should	  not	  always	  be	  growth	  that	  wins.	  This	  is,	  in	  many	  ways,	  an	  idea	  of	  growth	  that	  runs	  counter	  to	  the	  most	  obvious	  metaphors.	  We	  tend	  to	  think	  of	  growth	  as	  the	  result	  of	  natural	  processes	  in	  autonomous	  entities;	  children,	  seeds,	  and	  shadows	  grow,	  but	  they	  do	  so	  inevitably,	  and	  without	  the	  possibility	  that	  they	  might	  exist	  indefinitely	  in	  a	  state	  of	  not-­‐growth	  before	  such	  growth	  is	  instigated.	  In	  contrast,	  Nurkse’s	  idea	  of	  growth	  seems	  to	  describe	  an	  exceptional	  state,	  one	  in	  which	  some	  economies	  may	  never	  find	  themselves,	  and	  one	  that	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  natural	  or	  inevitable	  for	  any	  economy.	  	   Moreover,	  this	  conception	  of	  growth	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  development	  economics	  asks	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  economy	  in	  general.	  While	  Nurkse’s	  conception	  certainly	  calls	  upon	  (and	  contributes	  to)	  the	  larger	  discourse	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  discrete	  realm	  of	  human	  activity,	  it	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  this	  realm	  may	  be	  in	  some	  ways	  mutable,	  and	  certainly	  amenable	  to	  concerted	  human	  activity.	  Indeed,	  if	  the	  laws	  that	  govern	  the	  economy	  will	  tend,	  on	  their	  own,	  to	  a	  sort	  of	  low-­‐level	  stagnation,	  and	  if	  it	  is	  only	  by	  the	  direct	  and	  intentional	  intervention	  of	  government	  that	  this	  steady-­‐state	  can	  be	  disrupted	  and	  transformed	  into	  a	  cycle	  of	  growth,	  then	  reality	  must	  fall	  between	  the	  poles	  of	  these	  two	  conceptions	  of	  the	  economy.	  That	  is,	  for	  development	  economists	  the	  truth	  must	  lie	  somewhere	  between	  the	  idea	  that	  constant	  government	  intervention	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  sustain	  economic	  growth,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  supposition	  that	  the	  economy	  forms	  a	  sphere	  of	  activity	  distinct	  from	  the	  state	  is	  clearly	  faulty,	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  economy	  can	  be	  shocked	  out	  of	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a	  cycle	  of	  stagnation	  and	  into	  a	  new,	  and	  perpetually	  self-­‐maintaining	  cycle	  of	  growth,	  in	  which	  case	  we	  must	  assume	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  economy,	  far	  from	  being	  immutable,	  are	  subject	  to	  perpetual	  change	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  direct	  human	  action.	  In	  either	  case,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  economy	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  believe	  that,	  far	  from	  being	  a	  constant	  with	  which	  we	  must	  cope,	  it	  is	  an	  object	  for	  direct	  government	  which	  we	  must,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  get	  anywhere	  at	  all,	  focus	  upon	  bending	  to	  our	  will.	  	   In	  this	  context,	  it’s	  interesting	  to	  note	  that,	  along	  with	  the	  German	  Historical	  school,	  development	  economists	  are	  entirely	  absent	  from	  Samuelson’s	  family	  tree	  of	  economic	  science	  (see	  above).	  Their	  omission	  helps	  to	  cement	  the	  view	  that	  the	  economy	  as	  envisioned	  by	  the	  marginalists	  and	  their	  intellectual	  descendants	  is	  the	  one	  true	  economy,	  and	  that	  all	  other	  visions	  are	  in	  some	  way	  marginal.28	  However,	  for	  our	  purposes,	  the	  competing	  vision	  of	  development	  economics	  may	  be	  useful,	  as	  it	  demonstrates	  not	  only	  that	  there	  is	  discursive	  conflict	  in	  the	  production	  of	  the	  economy,	  but	  that	  some	  of	  these	  existing	  strains	  of	  discourse	  can	  be	  mobilized	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  the	  economy	  effect	  can	  be	  bent	  to	  will	  of	  political	  actors.	  The	  development	  economists’	  view	  of	  the	  economy	  is	  in	  some	  respects	  incompatible	  with	  the	  ideas	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  protected	  realm,	  free	  from	  ethical	  concerns,	  and	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  an	  agent,	  capable	  of	  acting	  on	  its	  own.	  As	  such	  it	  might	  serve	  as	  a	  model	  (admittedly,	  with	  some	  flaws	  to	  be	  worked	  out)	  for	  those	  of	  us	  in	  search	  of	  a	  concept	  of	  the	  economy	  that	  can	  aid,	  rather	  than	  inhibit,	  efforts	  to	  diminish	  material	  inequality.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Pun	  intended.	  
	  112	  
F.	  How	  Presidents	  Have	  Talked	  About	  the	  Economy	  If	  the	  economy	  is	  (potentially)	  an	  object	  that	  may	  be	  bent	  to	  our	  will	  through	  intentional	  acts	  of	  government,	  then	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  state	  actors	  is	  another	  important	  aspect	  of	  this	  story.	  While	  an	  exhaustive	  exploration	  of	  the	  usages	  of	  the	  economy	  by	  state	  actors	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  project,	  one	  set	  of	  data	  gives	  a	  particularly	  stark	  example	  of	  the	  sudden	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  burst	  onto	  the	  stage	  of	  national	  politics.	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project	  at	  the	  University	  of	  California	  Santa	  Barbara	  maintains	  an	  archive	  of	  104,406	  documents	  “related	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  presidency.”	  Among	  these	  documents	  are	  virtually	  all	  presidential	  speeches,	  transcripts	  of	  news	  conferences,	  and	  other	  public	  papers	  from	  1789	  through	  201329.	  One	  of	  the	  Project’s	  chief	  accomplishments	  is	  the	  digitization	  and	  indexing	  of	  these	  documents,	  resulting	  in	  a	  searchable	  database.	  	   At	  first,	  a	  search	  of	  this	  database	  for	  the	  term	  “economy”	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  demonstrate	  any	  remarkable	  trends;	  the	  term	  is	  used	  by	  every	  president	  from	  Washington	  to	  Obama,	  though	  with	  varying	  frequency.	  A	  second	  perusal	  of	  the	  data	  shows,	  not	  terribly	  surprisingly,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  the	  frequency	  with	  which	  the	  term	  appears	  beginning	  with	  Hoover’s	  presidency	  in	  1929.	  From	  1901	  to	  1909,	  the	  term	  appears	  in	  Teddy	  Roosevelt’s	  papers	  only	  nine	  times.	  Taft	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  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  collection	  contains	  substantially	  more	  detail	  for	  the	  period	  1929-­‐2013	  than	  for	  the	  period	  1789-­‐1928,	  though	  it	  does	  contain	  a	  large	  number	  of	  documents	  from	  the	  earlier	  period.	  In	  order	  to	  bolster	  the	  results	  herein,	  I	  have	  also	  consulted	  James	  Richardson’s	  Compilation	  of	  the	  Messages	  and	  Papers	  of	  the	  Presidents,	  which	  is	  a	  highly	  detailed	  collection	  of	  presidential	  documents	  from	  1789	  to	  1902.	  I	  have	  not	  found	  a	  similarly	  detailed	  source	  for	  1903-­‐1928,	  so	  it’s	  possible	  that	  the	  change	  I	  discuss	  occurred	  a	  decade	  or	  two	  earlier	  than	  I	  claim,	  though	  the	  trend	  in	  usage	  I	  observed	  makes	  this	  seem	  unlikely.	  	  
	  113	  
used	  it	  six	  times	  between	  1909	  and	  1912,	  Wilson	  11	  between	  1913	  and	  1920.	  Harding	  used	  it	  four	  times	  in	  1921	  and	  1922.	  The	  uptick	  begins	  with	  Coolidge,	  who	  despite	  his	  characteristic	  taciturnity,	  used	  the	  word	  in	  26	  of	  these	  documents	  between	  1923	  and	  1929.	  The	  trend	  begins	  in	  earnest,	  though,	  with	  Hoover’s	  93	  uses	  between	  1929	  and	  1933,	  and	  continues	  with	  FDR’s	  150	  uses	  between	  1933	  and	  1945.	  	  	   As	  we	  know,	  however,	  simply	  counting	  the	  number	  of	  times	  the	  term	  “economy”	  is	  used	  doesn’t	  tell	  us	  much	  about	  what	  it’s	  being	  used	  to	  signify.	  In	  this	  case,	  a	  third	  look	  at	  the	  data	  shows	  a	  sharp	  division	  in	  the	  uses	  to	  which	  the	  term	  is	  being	  put.	  Almost	  every	  instance	  of	  Hoover’s	  usage,	  for	  example,	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  synonym	  for	  thrift	  (which	  makes	  the	  frequency	  of	  its	  use	  unsurprising	  given	  his	  politics).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  FDR	  regularly	  refers	  to	  a	  “national	  economy”	  that	  clearly	  shares	  some	  important	  traits	  with	  the	  object	  of	  our	  investigation.	  So,	  Hoover	  talks	  about	  economy	  in	  the	  following	  way	  in	  February	  1933:	  If	  your	  conference	  can	  help	  to	  make	  a	  scientific	  division	  of	  tax	  sources	  amongst	  the	  various	  governmental	  authorities,	  you	  will	  have	  made	  a	  distinct	  contribution	  to	  the	  efficiency	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  economy	  of	  our	  whole	  governmental	  system.	  I	  warmly	  hope	  that	  your	  deliberations	  may	  produce	  fruitful	  results	  in	  this	  most	  important	  field.	  (Remarks	  to	  the	  Interstate	  Conference	  of	  Legislators,	  2/3/1933)	  	  Twenty-­‐nine	  days	  later,	  Roosevelt	  talks	  about	  it	  this	  way	  in	  his	  first	  inaugural	  address:	  Through	  this	  program	  of	  action	  we	  address	  ourselves	  to	  putting	  our	  own	  national	  house	  in	  order	  and	  making	  income	  balance	  outgo.	  Our	  international	  trade	  relations,	  though	  vastly	  important,	  are	  in	  point	  of	  time	  and	  necessity	  secondary	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  sound	  national	  economy.	  I	  favor	  as	  a	  practical	  policy	  the	  putting	  of	  first	  things	  first.	  I	  shall	  spare	  no	  effort	  to	  restore	  world	  trade	  by	  international	  economic	  readjustment,	  but	  the	  emergency	  at	  home	  cannot	  wait	  on	  that	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accomplishment.	  (Inaugural	  Address,	  3/4/1933)	  	  In	  fact,	  an	  even	  clearer	  trend	  can	  be	  seen	  if	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  use	  of	  economy	  as	  “national	  economy.”	  A	  search	  for	  this	  term	  yields	  811	  results	  across	  the	  entire	  presidency.	  Of	  these,	  only	  20	  predate	  FDR’s	  presidency.	  One	  of	  these	  twenty	  is	  Woodrow	  Wilson’s	  Sixth	  Annual	  Message	  from	  1918,	  in	  which	  he	  uses	  the	  term	  to	  mean	  national	  thriftiness.	  The	  remaining	  19	  are	  all	  from	  Hoover’s	  presidency,	  and	  they	  show	  a	  gradual	  intermixing	  of	  the	  two	  uses	  of	  the	  term	  in	  1931	  and	  1932.	  For	  example,	  in	  1931	  Hoover	  told	  reporters	  at	  a	  news	  conference	  “Some	  of	  these	  [European]	  countries	  are	  feeling	  to	  a	  serious	  extent	  the	  drain	  of	  this	  depression	  on	  national	  economy”	  (President’s	  News	  Conference,	  6/20/1931).	  In	  this	  same	  vein,	  in	  February	  1932	  he	  assured	  the	  National	  Education	  Association	  that	  “however,	  the	  national	  economy	  may	  vary	  or	  whatever	  fiscal	  adjustments	  may	  need	  be	  made,	  the	  very	  first	  obligation	  upon	  the	  National	  resources	  is	  the	  undiminished	  financial	  support	  of	  the	  public	  schools”	  (Message	  to	  the	  National	  Education	  Association,	  2/25/1932).	  As	  late	  as	  1932,	  however,	  he	  was	  still	  using	  the	  term	  in	  its	  older	  sense	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  “National	  Economy	  measure”	  he	  supported,	  which	  would	  have	  cut	  government	  spending	  by	  80%	  (Address	  in	  St.	  Paul,	  Minnesota,	  11/5/1932).	  	   The	  remaining	  791	  uses	  show	  a	  remarkable	  consistency.	  They	  all	  treat	  the	  “national	  economy”	  as	  an	  object	  or	  sphere	  of	  activity.	  They	  begin	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  metaphors	  through	  which	  we	  construct	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  sphere	  with	  its	  own	  autonomous	  functions:	  When	  this	  Administration	  came	  to	  Washington	  on	  the	  fourth	  of	  March,	  1933,	  the	  machine	  of	  our	  national	  economy	  had	  completely	  broken	  down.	  For	  twelve	  long	  years	  it	  had	  been	  neglected	  by	  those	  who	  believed	  that	  machines	  did	  not	  need	  tending.	  We	  tried	  to	  rebuild	  that	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machine,	  to	  modernize	  it	  and	  to	  turn	  on	  the	  purchasing	  power.	  (FDR,	  Address	  at	  Providence,	  R.	  I.,	  10/21/1936)	  	  But	  perhaps	  more	  interesting	  than	  these	  usages,	  which	  we	  have	  discussed	  already	  in	  other	  contexts,	  is	  the	  consistency	  with	  which	  the	  term,	  which	  does	  not	  appear	  at	  all	  in	  the	  Presidents’	  Public	  Papers	  prior	  to	  Wilson’s	  use	  in	  1918,	  shows	  up	  in	  the	  documents	  of	  the	  Presidents	  who	  follow	  FDR.	  Every	  single	  President	  since	  FDR	  has	  used	  the	  term	  “national	  economy”	  at	  least	  once	  (and	  most	  times	  many	  more)	  in	  every	  year	  of	  his	  presidency.	  The	  term,	  which	  showed	  up	  once	  in	  1918,	  then	  disappeared,	  went	  on	  to	  be	  used	  in	  each	  year	  from	  1931	  to	  the	  present.	  	  The	  following	  chart	  shows	  the	  general	  shape	  of	  the	  term’s	  usage	  from	  1789	  through	  today.	  
	  Figure	  2:	  Uses	  of	  the	  Term	  “National	  Economy”	  per	  Year,	  by	  President	  (All)	  	  And	  here’s	  another	  version	  of	  the	  same	  chart	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  period	  from	  Hoover	  through	  the	  present.	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  Figure	  3:	  Uses	  of	  the	  Term	  “National	  Economy”	  per	  Year,	  by	  President	  (Hoover	  through	  Obama)	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visualize	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  it	  seems	  such	  an	  inevitable	  and	  important	  object;	  once	  it	  was	  introduced,	  it	  quickly	  became	  omnipresent	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  it	  hard	  to	  imagine	  how	  we	  ever	  lived	  without	  it.	  	  
G.	  Conclusion	  	   As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  story	  of	  the	  production	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  effect	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  one.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  it	  involves	  the	  intertwining	  histories	  of	  the	  discipline	  of	  economics,	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  trade	  on	  the	  part	  of	  17th	  century	  merchants	  and	  19th	  and	  20th	  century	  colonial	  governors,	  the	  efforts	  to	  industrialize	  poor	  countries	  in	  the	  postwar	  era,	  the	  conflict	  between	  capitalism	  and	  communism	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  the	  language	  of	  presidential	  speeches.	  What	  is	  clear	  from	  our	  examination	  of	  these	  histories,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  neither	  as	  old,	  nor	  as	  stable	  and	  uncontested,	  as	  we	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  think	  of	  it	  as	  being.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  invention,	  and	  one	  for	  which	  much	  history	  had	  to	  be	  rewritten	  or	  ignored	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  the	  appearance	  of	  naturalness	  and	  inevitability.	  Moreover,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  there	  are	  significant	  threads	  of	  economic	  thought	  that	  provide	  discursive	  ammunition	  for	  the	  idea	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  neither	  natural	  nor	  inevitable,	  the	  economy	  should	  not	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  an	  agent,	  nor	  as	  free	  from	  ethical	  considerations.	  In	  short,	  this	  etymological	  history	  of	  the	  economy	  effect	  demonstrates	  both	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  this	  effect	  is	  pervasive,	  and	  also	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  even	  the	  most	  pervasive	  phenomenon	  is	  open	  to	  contestation.	  	   In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  we	  will	  begin	  our	  examination	  of	  the	  ways	  which	  the	  economy	  effect	  serves	  to	  constrain	  the	  possibilities	  for	  political	  action	  by	  taking	  a	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CHAPTER	  3	  
Adam	  Smith	  and	  the	  Inevitability	  of	  the	  Economy	  
A.	  Introduction	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  we	  investigated	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  economy	  effect.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we’ll	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  effect	  might	  serve	  to	  constrain	  the	  possibilities	  for	  political	  action	  by	  examining	  the	  practice	  of	  reading	  the	  economy	  back	  onto	  the	  work	  of	  Adam	  Smith.	  As	  noted	  above,	  “the	  economy”	  plays	  a	  unique	  role	  in	  our	  lives.	  We	  all	  know	  and	  agree	  that	  it	  exists,	  and	  that	  is	  has	  real	  consequences,	  yet	  we	  are	  frequently	  unable	  to	  agree	  upon	  its	  state	  of	  wellbeing,	  and	  are	  rarely	  able	  to	  come	  to	  a	  consensus	  regarding	  the	  actions	  we	  should	  take	  in	  order	  to	  get	  it	  to	  do	  what	  we	  want.	  We	  have	  experts	  on	  the	  subject	  who	  are,	  at	  almost	  all	  universities,	  among	  the	  highest	  paid	  social	  scientists	  (American	  Sociological	  Association,	  2011).	  Despite	  this,	  there	  is	  no	  real	  professional	  agreement	  regarding	  the	  nature	  or	  dynamics	  of	  the	  object	  (or	  effect)	  in	  question.	  Economic	  policies	  proposed	  by	  these	  experts	  seem	  as	  likely	  to	  fail	  as	  to	  succeed,	  and	  even	  determining	  which	  of	  these	  outcomes	  has	  occurred	  is	  often	  difficult.	  How	  did	  an	  object30	  that	  we	  cannot	  see,	  touch,	  describe,	  or	  predict	  with	  any	  real	  consistency	  and	  accuracy	  come	  to	  function	  as	  such	  a	  significant	  constraint	  on	  political	  action?	  One	  part	  of	  the	  answer,	  I	  propose,	  is	  that	  we	  have	  lent	  this	  object	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  authority	  by	  associating	  it	  with	  foundational	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  While	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  we	  may	  better	  understand	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  effect,	  this	  does	  not	  change	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  both	  scholarly	  discourse	  and	  every	  day	  langauge,	  it	  is	  typically	  treated	  as	  an	  object	  (or	  a	  place).	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political	  thinkers	  whose	  work	  long	  predates	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  contemporary	  sense.	  	  By	  reading	  the	  economy	  back	  onto	  thinkers	  like	  Adam	  Smith,	  we	  engage	  in	  a	  set	  of	  linguistic	  practices	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  economy	  as	  we	  understand	  it	  today	  is	  made	  to	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  inevitable	  outcome	  of	  hundreds	  of	  years	  of	  “discovery”	  in	  the	  science	  of	  economics.	  As	  Michel	  Callon	  puts	  it,	  there	  can	  be	  “no	  economy	  without	  economics”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Caliskan	  and	  Callon,	  2009,	  p.	  370).	  The	  discipline	  of	  economics	  is	  instrumental	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  economy,	  and	  so	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  articulate	  the	  story	  of	  the	  development	  of	  this	  discipline	  will	  necessarily	  affect	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  economy	  itself.	  	  Similarly,	  Foucault	  suggests	  that	  “[t]he	  constitution	  of	  a	  knowledge	  of	  government	  is	  absolutely	  inseparable	  from	  a	  knowledge	  of…	  what	  we	  now	  call	  ‘the	  economy.’”	  We	  must,	  that	  is,	  be	  capable	  of	  understanding	  the	  world	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  government	  does,	  in	  order	  to	  conceive	  of	  a	  sphere	  of	  activity	  that	  fits	  our	  current	  understanding	  of	  “the	  economy.”	  In	  particular,	  Foucault	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  through	  “continuous	  reference	  to	  this	  continuous	  and	  multiple	  network	  of	  relationships	  between	  the	  population,	  territory,	  and	  wealth…”	  that	  “intervention	  in	  the	  field	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  population…”	  is	  made	  possible	  (2007,	  106).	  This	  triad	  of	  population,	  territory,	  and	  wealth,	  he	  argues,	  allows	  us	  to	  conceive	  of	  large	  groups	  of	  people	  as	  having	  a	  largely	  statistical	  significance,	  a	  conception	  into	  which	  “the	  economy”	  fits	  nicely.	  	  Of	  course,	  as	  with	  any	  interesting	  question,	  there	  is	  no	  single	  answer,	  and	  no	  single	  portion	  of	  the	  answer	  functions	  in	  only	  one	  manner.	  In	  this	  case,	  while	  the	  reading	  back	  of	  the	  economy	  onto	  thinkers	  like	  Smith,	  whose	  work	  predates	  its	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development,	  contributes	  to	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  economy	  of	  the	  economy	  effect	  in	  the	  present,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  one	  outcome	  of	  the	  economy	  effect	  that	  is	  thus	  produced	  and	  maintained.	  That	  is,	  we	  cannot	  (easily)	  conceive	  of	  Smith	  without	  thinking	  his	  work	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  economy	  effect,	  and	  this	  reinforces	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  materialization.31	  	  	  	  This	  chapter	  contributes	  to	  a	  body	  of	  work	  on	  the	  relative	  newness	  of	  contemporary	  views	  of	  the	  economy	  that	  has	  grown	  significantly	  in	  recent	  years	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  our	  tendency	  to	  read	  this	  relatively	  new	  view	  onto	  historical	  texts	  (caused,	  perhaps,	  by	  our	  implicit	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  both	  inevitable	  and	  natural)	  limits	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  might	  interpret	  both	  those	  texts,	  and	  the	  political	  possibilities	  of	  the	  present.	  Some	  have	  noted	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  natural	  world	  have	  changed	  over	  the	  past	  300	  years	  (Gammon,	  2010),	  while	  others	  have	  examined	  efforts	  to	  create	  the	  kinds	  of	  economic	  subjects	  required	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	  conception	  of	  the	  economy	  (Fridman,	  2010).	  	  Timothy	  Mitchell	  has	  noted	  that	  the	  development	  of	  new	  energy	  sources	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  because	  they	  allowed	  for	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  infinite	  economy	  growth	  (2009),	  and	  has	  more	  recently	  argued	  that	  the	  economy	  can	  usefully	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  effect	  (2014).	  Others	  have	  commented	  on	  recent	  developments	  in	  the	  relationship	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Gibson-­‐Graham	  point	  out	  that:	  “[The]	  economy	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  ideological	  concept	  susceptible	  to	  intellectual	  debunking,	  but	  a	  materialization	  that	  participates	  in	  organizing	  the	  practices	  and	  processes	  that	  surround	  it,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  being	  organized	  and	  maintained	  by	  them“(2006,	  xi).	  See	  Chapter	  4	  for	  a	  more	  thorough	  discussion	  of	  the	  term	  and	  its	  relationshp	  to	  the	  economy	  effect.	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between	  economy	  and	  morality	  (Shamir,	  2008),	  on	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  physical	  operations	  of	  stock	  exchanges	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  new	  conceptions	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  market	  information	  (Pardo-­‐Guerra,	  2010),	  and	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  modern	  corporation	  in	  the	  development	  of	  bio-­‐power	  (Schrauwers,	  2011).	  This	  chapter,	  by	  examining	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  our	  readings	  of	  classical	  political	  economy	  affect	  our	  current	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy,	  seeks	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  our	  tendency	  to	  read	  these	  thinkers	  as	  though	  they	  shared	  our	  concept	  of	  the	  economy	  encourages	  and	  reinforces	  linguistic	  practices	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  economy	  effect.	  	  If	  Adam	  Smith,	  for	  example,	  was	  really	  talking	  and	  writing	  about	  the	  economy,	  and	  moreover,	  if	  he	  discovered	  the	  economy	  as	  something	  that	  had	  always	  already	  been	  there,	  then	  the	  status	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  natural	  and	  inevitable	  is	  cemented.	  Moreover,	  if	  Smith	  can	  be	  understood	  not	  only	  to	  have	  discovered	  the	  economy,	  but	  to	  have	  discovered	  that	  it	  was	  an	  object	  fitting	  our	  six	  criteria,	  then	  credence	  is	  also	  lent	  to	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  ahistorical	  constant	  on	  and	  around	  which	  a	  successful	  society	  must	  be	  built.	  This	  serves	  not	  only	  to	  strengthen	  the	  particular	  character	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  effect,	  but	  also	  to	  occlude	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  production	  of	  the	  economy	  effect	  without	  the	  corresponding	  production	  of	  the	  state	  effect	  (Mitchell,	  1991).	  This	  occlusion	  is	  important,	  because	  if	  the	  economy	  is	  produced,	  rather	  than	  discovered,	  and	  if	  this	  production	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  prior	  (or	  simultaneous)	  production	  of	  the	  state	  as	  an	  effect,	  then	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  natural	  and	  inevitable	  (which	  undergirds	  its	  other	  functions)	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  maintain.	  Thus,	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“reading	  back”	  is	  one	  of	  the	  central	  practices	  through	  which	  the	  economy	  effect	  is	  produced	  and	  maintained.	  	  
B.	  Contemporary	  Accounts	  of	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Economy	  Contemporary	  accounts	  of	  “the	  economy”	  tend	  to	  portray	  it	  as	  a	  realm	  of	  human	  activity	  in	  which	  resources	  are	  produced,	  distributed,	  and	  consumed,	  distinct	  from	  all	  non-­‐economic	  realms,	  including	  both	  “society”	  (where	  peoples’	  private	  lives,	  and	  their	  non-­‐productive	  public	  actions,	  take	  place),	  and	  from	  the	  “state”	  (which	  is	  the	  site	  of	  political	  representation	  and	  activity,	  and	  may	  or	  may	  not	  intervene	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  economy).	  This	  sectioning	  off	  of	  the	  economy	  can	  be	  identified	  by	  at	  least	  six	  discrete	  criteria,	  as	  I	  suggested	  above.	  In	  short	  form,	  the	  economy	  is	  (1)	  independent	  and	  unique;	  (2)	  impersonal;	  (3)	  a	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality;	  (4)	  potentially	  infinite;	  (5)	  natural	  and	  inevitable;	  and	  (6)	  agential.	  	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  this	  contemporary	  view32	  of	  the	  economy	  emerged	  over	  a	  number	  of	  decades,	  and	  as	  the	  result	  of	  discrete	  solutions	  to	  a	  number	  of	  specific	  political	  problems	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  diverse	  array	  of	  actors.	  In	  that	  discussion,	  however,	  we	  left	  two	  important	  and	  related	  issues	  undiscussed:	  the	  distinction,	  if	  any,	  between	  “the	  economy”	  and	  “the	  market;”	  and	  the	  role	  of	  neoliberalism	  in	  this	  story	  of	  the	  economy	  effect.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  address	  both	  of	  these	  issues	  before	  we	  move	  on.	  	  Several	  persuasive	  critics	  of	  earlier	  drafts	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  it	  is	  not	  immediately	  clear	  why	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  project	  is	  “the	  economy”	  rather	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  While	  this	  view	  is	  often	  associated	  with	  liberal	  capitalism,	  anticapitalists	  (e.g.	  Polanyi	  or	  Wolin)	  seem	  to	  be	  as	  likely	  to	  adopt	  this	  view	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  their	  opponents.	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than	  “the	  market.”	  While	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  two	  concepts	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  one,	  there	  are	  several	  reasons	  for	  which	  I	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  economy.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  we	  often	  talk	  about	  the	  market	  as	  though	  it	  is	  one	  component	  of	  the	  economy	  (as	  in	  “the	  market	  has	  recovered	  more	  quickly	  than	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole”)	  or	  one	  type	  of	  economy	  (as	  in	  “the	  market	  economy”).	  As	  such,	  the	  economy	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  more	  inclusive	  term,	  insofar	  as	  there	  are	  aspects	  of	  the	  economy	  that	  are	  not	  simply	  the	  market,	  and/or	  there	  are	  types	  of	  economy	  that	  are	  not	  market	  economies.	  So,	  it’s	  not	  clear	  that	  we	  miss	  much	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  economy	  rather	  than	  the	  market,	  while	  it	  does	  seem	  as	  though	  we	  would	  miss	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  economy	  (for	  example,	  the	  GDP)	  were	  we	  to	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  market.	  Additionally,	  while	  the	  market	  seems	  to	  fit	  many	  of	  the	  criteria	  that	  I	  have	  suggested	  for	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  (specifically,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  realm	  protected	  from	  ethical	  concerns,	  subject	  to	  laws	  of	  its	  own,	  and	  capable	  of	  making	  demands),	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  arge	  that	  the	  market	  is	  natural	  or	  inevitable.	  Instead,	  the	  market	  is	  an	  obviously	  constructed	  contrivance	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  buy	  and	  sell	  goods	  and	  services	  within	  the	  economy.	  One	  may	  intelligibly	  talk	  about	  entering	  and	  leaving	  the	  market,	  for	  example,	  but	  one	  may	  not	  do	  so	  with	  the	  economy,	  which	  acts	  on	  us	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  with	  to	  interact	  with	  it.	  This	  discussion	  of	  the	  market	  leads	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  claims	  I	  make	  about	  the	  economy	  can	  be	  extended	  into	  the	  era	  of	  neoliberalism.	  “Neoliberalism,”	  David	  Harvey	  writes:	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is	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  a	  theory	  of	  political	  economic	  practices	  that	  proposes	  that	  human	  well-­‐being	  can	  best	  be	  advanced	  by	  liberating	  individual	  entrpreneurial	  freedoms	  and	  skills	  within	  an	  institutional	  framework	  characterized	  by	  strong	  private	  property	  rights,	  free	  markets,	  and	  free	  trade.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  state	  is	  to	  create	  and	  preserve	  an	  institutional	  framework	  appropriate	  to	  such	  practices.	  (2005,	  2)	  	  As	  suggested	  above,	  this	  focus	  on	  markets	  does	  not	  necessarily	  represent	  a	  departure	  from,	  or	  a	  diminution	  of,	  the	  economy	  effect.	  Instead,	  it	  suggests	  that	  during	  the	  era	  of	  neoliberalism	  (the	  roots	  of	  which	  Harvey	  traces	  back	  to	  the	  early	  1940s,	  but	  the	  predominance	  of	  which	  he	  suggests	  begins	  in	  or	  around	  1978),	  the	  economy	  effect	  takes	  on	  a	  particular	  inflection	  that	  involves	  a	  heavy	  focus	  on	  markets	  (specifically	  on	  free	  markets).	  This	  inflection	  does	  not,	  however,	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  replace	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  economy	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  market.	  If	  it	  had,	  James	  Carville’s	  sign	  in	  Clinton	  campaign	  headquarters	  reminding	  staffers	  and	  volunteers	  to	  focus	  on:	  “1)Change	  vs.	  more	  of	  the	  same;	  2)	  The	  economy,	  stupid;	  and	  3)Don’t	  forget	  the	  healthcare	  law”	  would	  at	  best	  have	  appeared	  anachronistic,	  and	  at	  worst	  would	  have	  been	  largely	  unintelligible.	  33	  Neoliberalism	  is	  not	  a	  theory	  that	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  but	  the	  state	  and	  the	  market;	  instead,	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  most	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  economy	  is	  the	  (free)	  market,	  and	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  state	  should	  be	  firmly	  upon	  the	  maintenance	  and	  preservation	  of	  these	  markets,	  even	  when	  such	  maintenance	  appears	  in	  the	  short	  term	  to	  run	  counter	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  economy.	  It	  may,	  for	  this	  reason,	  constitute	  a	  shift	  in	  position	  with	  respect	  to	  how	  and	  when	  we	  should	  respond	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  economy,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  a	  rejection	  or	  disollution	  of	  the	  economy	  effect	  itself.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Imagine	  a	  sign	  that	  exhorted	  campaign	  staffers	  to	  keep	  an	  eye	  toward	  “increasing	  the	  economy	  with	  which	  we	  exercise	  the	  science	  of	  the	  legislator.”	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In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  immediately	  foregoing	  discussion,	  we	  focused	  primarily	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  historical	  actors	  discussed,	  or	  came	  to	  discuss,	  the	  economy	  as	  it	  related	  to	  their	  own	  present	  tense.	  Another	  important	  aspect	  of	  this	  story,	  relates	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  discuss	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  element	  of	  the	  past.	  As	  Michel-­‐Rolph	  Trouillot	  points	  out:	  	  	  …[H]istory	  means	  both	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  matter	  and	  a	  narrative	  of	  those	  facts,	  both	  ‘what	  happened’	  and	  ‘that	  which	  is	  said	  to	  have	  happened.’	  This	  first	  meaning	  places	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  sociohistorical	  process,	  the	  second	  on	  our	  knowledge	  about	  that	  process	  or	  on	  a	  story	  about	  that	  process	  (1995,	  2).	  	  What	  stories	  do	  we	  tell	  about	  the	  economy?	  How	  do	  these	  stories	  shape	  our	  understanding	  of	  its	  present	  form?	  Can	  we	  shed	  light	  on	  real	  political	  possibilities	  in	  the	  present	  by	  examining	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  stories	  have	  changed	  over	  time?	  How	  does	  our	  history	  of	  the	  economy	  constrain	  the	  political	  possibilities	  of	  the	  present?	  More	  specifically,	  how	  does	  this	  history	  produce	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  obstacle	  for	  political	  claims	  regarding	  the	  production	  and	  reduction	  of	  material	  inequality?	  One	  feature	  of	  the	  story	  by	  which	  the	  modern	  economy	  gains	  and	  maintains	  the	  appearance	  of	  naturalness	  that	  contributes	  to	  its	  capacity	  to	  obstruct	  demands	  for	  greater	  equality	  is	  clear	  and	  nearly	  universal:	  Adam	  Smith	  plays	  a	  formative	  role	  in	  our	  modern	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy,	  and	  is	  also	  a	  foundational	  thinker	  for	  the	  political	  tradition	  that	  informs	  our	  democracy.	  The	  association	  of	  Smith	  with	  “the	  economy”	  creates	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  liberal	  ideals	  of	  freedom	  and	  democracy	  that	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  challenge	  the	  authority	  of	  one	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without	  taking	  on	  the	  others.	  This	  is	  a	  problem	  for	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  pursue	  a	  politics	  that	  calls	  for	  reduced	  inequality	  in	  the	  service	  of	  democracy	  and	  freedom.	  Reading	  the	  economy	  back	  onto	  foundational	  thinkers	  like	  Smith	  helps	  to	  reinforce	  a	  narrative	  wherein	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  a	  free,	  democratic	  society,	  and	  also	  wherein	  the	  main	  problem	  of	  autocratic,	  nominally	  socialist	  or	  communist	  regimes	  is	  their	  inability	  or	  unwillingness	  to	  cede	  control	  of	  material	  resources	  to	  the	  economy.	  As	  such,	  this	  process	  of	  reading	  back	  allows	  opponents	  of	  political	  programs	  that	  call	  for	  government	  action	  to	  reduce	  inequality	  to	  suggest	  that	  these	  programs	  are	  in	  reality	  threats	  to	  freedom	  and	  democracy.	  	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  account	  of	  Adam	  Smith	  provided	  by	  Mark	  Skousen	  in	  The	  Big	  Three	  in	  Economics,	  a	  pop-­‐scholarly	  (and	  very	  nicely	  written)	  book	  about	  Smith,	  Marx,	  and	  Keynes.	  Skousen	  describes	  Smith’s	  achievements	  in	  terms	  worthy	  of	  any	  founding	  myth.	  After	  noting	  that	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  was	  signed	  in	  1776,	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that:	  Four	  months	  earlier,	  an	  equally	  monumental	  work	  had	  been	  published	  across	  the	  Atlantic	  in	  England.	  On	  March	  9,	  1776,	  the	  London	  printers	  William	  Strahan	  and	  Thomas	  Cadell	  released	  a	  1,000-­‐page,	  two-­‐volume	  work	  entitled	  An	  Inquiry	  in	  the	  Nature	  and	  Causes	  of	  
the	  Wealth	  of	  Nations.	  It	  was	  a	  fat	  book	  with	  a	  long	  title	  destined	  to	  have	  gargantuan	  global	  impact.	  (2007,	  4)	  	  	  He	  calls	  The	  Wealth	  of	  Nations	  a	  “declaration	  of	  economic	  independence,”	  and	  then	  finally	  remarks	  “[i]t	  was	  no	  accident	  that	  the	  modern	  economy	  began	  in	  earnest	  shortly	  after	  1776”	  (2007,	  5).	  In	  support	  of	  this	  claim,	  Skousen	  makes	  reference	  to	  a	  line	  graph	  of	  the	  “Income	  of	  England”	  showing	  a	  relatively	  flat	  line	  from	  1100	  to	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  18th	  century,	  followed	  by	  a	  sharp	  upturn	  indicating	  that	  this	  income	  increased	  by	  at	  least	  a	  factor	  of	  8	  between	  1800	  and	  1995.	  This	  seems	  to	  suggest	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that	  the	  “modern	  economy”	  is	  characterized	  by	  this	  rapid	  growth	  in	  GDP,	  and	  that	  this	  growth	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  Smith’s	  theories.	  	  It’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  Skousen	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  Smith	  created	  the	  economy	  in	  general;	  instead	  he	  merely	  suggests	  that	  Smith	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  inception	  of	  its	  modern	  phase	  (characterized	  by	  rapid	  growth).	  In	  fact,	  Skousen	  seems	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  economy	  itself	  is	  a	  natural	  object,	  simply	  taking	  on	  different	  characters	  in	  different	  eras.	  For	  example,	  he	  suggests	  that	  “[o]ne	  of	  Smith’s	  major	  objectives	  in	  writing	  The	  Wealth	  of	  Nations	  was	  to	  smash	  the	  conventional	  view	  of	  the	  economy”	  (2007,	  7).	  Rather	  than	  suggesting	  the	  Smith	  discovered	  or	  created	  the	  economy,	  Skousen	  instead	  implies	  that	  Smith	  enhanced	  our	  understanding	  of	  this	  naturally	  occurring	  object.	  We	  might	  understand	  Smith,	  from	  this	  perspective,	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  Copernicus	  of	  economics;	  he	  did	  not	  discover	  the	  solar	  system,	  but	  instead	  he	  moved	  our	  understanding	  of	  it	  much	  closer	  to	  its	  true	  nature,	  “smash[ing]”	  the	  older,	  wrong-­‐headed	  conception.	  Moreover,	  Skousen’s	  narrative	  leaves	  the	  reader	  with	  no	  doubt	  whatsoever	  that	  Smith	  undertook	  this	  task	  of	  smashing	  in	  full	  knowledge	  of	  what	  he	  was	  doing,	  claiming	  it	  was	  indeed	  one	  of	  his	  “major	  objectives.”	  All	  of	  this	  results	  in	  the	  distinct	  impression	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  reader	  that	  political	  economists	  in	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century	  spent	  their	  time	  engaged	  in	  heated	  debates	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  “the	  economy.”	  Skousen	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  this	  narrative;	  in	  fact,	  I	  picked	  on	  him	  because	  I	  found	  his	  particular	  phrasing	  to	  be	  exemplary	  of	  a	  general	  trend	  in	  contemporary	  writing	  on	  the	  history	  of	  economic	  thought.	  Consider,	  in	  this	  light,	  the	  following	  lines	  from	  
Politics	  and	  Vision:	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The	  new	  domain	  of	  economy	  theorized	  by	  Adam	  Smith	  and	  the	  classical	  and	  neo-­‐classical	  economists	  recognized	  that	  power	  relationships	  flourished	  in	  the	  economy,	  e.g.,	  between	  owners	  and	  workers,	  yet	  it	  emerged	  as	  a	  domain	  that,	  unlike	  religion	  during	  the	  Reformation	  or	  politics	  during	  the	  seventeenth	  and	  eighteenth	  centuries,	  was	  never	  seriously	  exposed	  to	  democratization.	  (Wolin,	  2004,	  400)	  	  Leaving	  aside,	  for	  the	  moment,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  Smith	  had	  anything	  at	  all	  to	  say	  about	  “the	  economy,”	  Wolin	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  make	  the	  assumption	  that	  it	  is	  a	  naturally	  occurring	  realm.	  However,	  when	  we	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  his	  language,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  he	  is	  discussing	  not	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  historical	  object,	  but	  rather	  the	  uncovering	  of	  an	  already	  existing	  realm.	  That	  is,	  in	  order	  for	  Smith	  to	  “recognize	  that	  power	  relationships	  flourished	  in	  the	  economy”	  (my	  emphasis),	  the	  economy	  itself	  had	  to	  exist.	  Smith’s	  theorization,	  then,	  looks	  more	  like	  an	  uncovering	  or	  a	  discovery	  than	  an	  act	  of	  discursive	  production,	  and	  the	  economy	  looks	  more	  like	  an	  eternal	  truth	  or	  an	  a	  priori	  given	  than	  a	  product	  of	  human	  activity	  (Wolin,	  2004;	  see	  also	  Hirschman,	  1986,	  p.44;	  Bowles,	  1986,	  p.109;	  and	  Kalyvas	  and	  Katznelson,	  2001,	  550).	  	  Karl	  Polanyi,	  who	  in	  1944	  made	  the	  case	  that	  the	  “market	  economy”	  was	  a	  fairly	  recent	  development,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  not	  at	  all	  a	  natural	  occurrence,	  also	  participates	  in	  this	  discourse.	  He	  claims	  that:	  	  [n]o	  society	  could,	  naturally,	  live	  for	  any	  length	  of	  time	  unless	  it	  is	  possessed	  of	  an	  economy	  of	  some	  sort;	  but	  previously	  to	  our	  time	  no	  economy	  has	  ever	  existed	  that,	  even	  in	  principle,	  was	  controlled	  by	  markets.	  (1944,	  43)	  	  Clearly,	  for	  Polanyi,	  the	  economy	  itself	  is	  naturally	  occurring,	  though	  obviously	  there	  is	  some	  variation	  in	  how	  it	  functions.	  That	  is,	  from	  Polanyi’s	  perspective,	  the	  dividing	  line	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  totality	  of	  human	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existence	  (what	  we	  are	  calling	  the	  economy	  effect)	  is	  itself	  natural;	  it	  is	  only	  the	  particular	  character	  of	  this	  economy	  that	  is	  contingent.	  Thus,	  what	  is	  important	  to	  Polanyi	  in	  The	  Great	  Transformation	  is	  that	  the	  naturally	  ocurring	  economy	  is	  currently	  “controlled	  by	  markets,”	  suggesting	  that	  it	  has	  the	  kind	  of	  existence	  independent	  of	  direct	  human	  control	  that	  I	  have	  suggested	  characterizes	  contemporary	  views	  of	  the	  economy.	  Similarly,	  even	  while	  downplaying	  the	  correctness	  of	  Smith’s	  direct	  observations	  on	  human	  nature,	  Polanyi	  pinpoints	  the	  publication	  of	  Wealth	  of	  Nations	  as	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  contemporary	  view	  of	  the	  economy	  began	  to	  take	  hold.	  	   The	  prevalence	  of	  narratives	  like	  this	  is	  important	  for	  at	  least	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  the	  presumption	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  naturally	  occurring	  object	  frees	  it	  from	  moral	  or	  ethical	  constraints.	  If	  the	  economy	  is	  inevitable,	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  spend	  any	  time	  at	  all	  considering	  whether	  we	  would	  be	  better	  off	  if	  it	  were	  fundamentally	  different,	  or	  even	  if	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  us	  at	  all.	  A	  naturally	  occurring	  economy	  is	  an	  object	  to	  be	  explored	  and	  experimented	  upon,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  an	  object	  the	  basic	  nature	  of	  which	  is	  fixed.	  It	  is	  possible,	  as	  we	  will	  discuss	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  to	  apply	  modifying	  terms	  to	  the	  economy	  (such	  as	  “green”,	  “sharing”	  or	  “growth”),	  but	  these	  modifications	  cannot	  alter	  the	  basic	  character	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  space	  free	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  (and	  in	  many	  cases	  capable	  of	  acting	  as	  a	  constrain	  on)	  both	  politics	  and	  ethics.	  We	  might	  bring	  ethical	  concerns	  to	  bear	  on	  questions	  of	  how	  we	  should	  interact	  with	  the	  economy,	  but	  we	  cannot	  do	  so	  with	  questions	  of	  how	  the	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economy	  should	  interact	  with	  us.34	  	   Secondly,	  the	  association	  of	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  economy	  with	  Adam	  Smith	  strengthens	  the	  economy	  effect	  insofar	  as	  it	  generates	  the	  appearance	  not	  only	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  natural	  and	  inevitable,	  but	  also	  that	  even	  if	  it	  were	  possible	  to	  change	  the	  economy,	  we	  would	  not	  wish	  to	  do	  so	  as	  such	  change	  would	  threaten	  the	  maintenance	  of	  democracy	  and	  freedom.	  Again,	  Skousen	  provides	  exemplary	  language	  in	  regard	  to	  common	  perceptions	  of	  Smith:	  	  Certain	  dates	  are	  turning	  points	  in	  the	  history	  of	  mankind.	  The	  year	  1776	  is	  one	  of	  them.	  In	  that	  prophetic	  year,	  two	  vital	  freedoms	  were	  proclaimed	  –	  political	  liberty	  and	  free	  enterprise	  –	  and	  the	  two	  worked	  together	  to	  set	  in	  motion	  the	  industrial	  revolution.	  (2007,	  5)	  	  In	  this	  narrative,	  the	  economy	  is	  securely	  attached	  to	  other	  Smithian	  ideas	  including	  the	  division	  of	  labor,	  free	  trade,	  and	  class	  mobility.	  Indeed,	  one	  is	  left	  with	  the	  view	  that,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  “the	  economy,”	  Smith	  never	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  come	  up	  with	  these	  other	  ideas.	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  absurd,	  because	  Smith	  actually	  did	  articulate	  ideas	  regarding	  division	  of	  labor,	  free	  trade,	  and	  class	  mobility,	  and	  he	  did	  so	  without	  any	  reference	  whatsoever	  to	  “the	  economy.”	  By	  attaching	  the	  economy	  to	  Smith,	  and	  Smith	  to	  large-­‐scale	  increases	  in	  wealth,	  writers	  like	  Skousen	  strengthen	  the	  story	  in	  which	  Smith’s	  discovery	  of	  the	  economy	  allowed	  European	  society	  to	  act	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Of	  course,	  we	  ask	  all	  the	  time	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  given	  economic	  outcome	  is	  fair.	  However,	  such	  questions	  and	  objections	  typically	  treat	  the	  economy	  itself	  as	  a	  given,	  asking	  instead	  how	  or	  whether	  governments	  should	  act	  in	  order	  to	  mitigate	  or	  alleviate	  the	  unfair	  outcomes	  produced	  (inevitably)	  by	  the	  economy.	  While	  there	  are	  certainly	  some	  attempts	  to	  push	  back	  against	  this	  (as	  in	  the	  Institute	  for	  New	  Economic	  Thinking’s	  call	  for	  a	  “new	  economics”),	  in	  general	  organizations	  like	  Occupy	  Wallstreet	  instead	  call	  for	  minimum	  wages	  and	  tax	  schemes	  that	  rely	  on	  “extra-­‐economic”	  transfers	  that	  rely	  upon	  direct	  state	  activity	  to	  remedy	  the	  inequality	  generated	  by	  the	  black	  box	  of	  the	  economy.	  While	  this	  may	  serve	  the	  function	  of	  diminishing	  material	  inequality,	  it	  fails	  to	  address	  the	  perceived	  division	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  state	  that	  helps	  to	  maintain	  both	  effects.	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upon	  it	  in	  newly	  scientific	  ways,	  leading	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  wealth.	  The	  result	  is	  the	  view	  that	  the	  economy	  has	  always	  existed	  as	  a	  natural	  object,	  and	  that	  once	  it	  was	  uncovered	  and	  described	  by	  Smith,	  it	  became	  possible	  to	  shape	  society	  to	  meet	  the	  economy’s	  requirements,	  thus	  allowing	  for	  the	  intentional	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  wealthy,	  free,	  democratic	  states,	  all	  resting	  on	  the	  natural,	  immutable,	  and	  inevitable	  characteristics	  of	  this	  newly	  discovered	  object.	  	   Again,	  to	  be	  clear,	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  suggest	  that	  Smith	  is	  the	  only	  author	  for	  whom	  such	  an	  examination	  could	  be	  conducted;	  instead,	  this	  anlaysis	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  single	  example	  of	  a	  larger	  phenomenon.	  Smith	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  because	  his	  work	  has	  come	  to	  be	  so	  closely	  aligned	  with	  discourses	  that	  support	  and	  reify	  the	  economy	  effect,	  but	  he	  is	  certainly	  not	  alone.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  for	  example,	  Marx	  might	  be	  an	  interesting	  possiblity	  for	  a	  similar	  analysis,	  as	  would	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Scottish	  enlightenment.	  However,	  	  because	  the	  link	  between	  Smith	  and	  the	  economy	  (first	  as	  a	  distinct	  realm	  of	  human	  activity	  subject	  to	  laws	  and	  rules	  of	  its	  own,	  and	  later	  as	  a	  realm	  characterized	  specifically	  my	  market-­‐based	  interaction)	  seems	  to	  be	  one	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  economy	  achieves	  and	  maintains	  the	  appearance	  of	  naturalness,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  continue	  my	  analysis	  of	  his	  work	  by	  directly	  addressing	  the	  validity	  of	  this	  link.	  I	  will	  argue	  that,	  consistent	  with	  the	  timeline	  laid	  out	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  Smith’s	  writings	  do	  not	  suggest	  that	  he	  conceived	  of	  an	  object	  fitting	  the	  six	  criteria	  for	  the	  modern	  economy	  laid	  out	  above,	  nor	  indeed	  that	  he	  ever	  made	  reference	  to	  “the	  economy”	  at	  all,	  but	  that	  such	  an	  object	  is	  frequently	  “read	  back”	  on	  Smith.	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  I	  have,	  of	  course,	  had	  to	  pick	  and	  choose	  in	  providing	  evidence	  of	  the	  “modern”	  conception	  of	  the	  economy.	  Where	  given	  a	  choice,	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  use	  popular	  authors	  as	  examples	  of	  this	  modern	  conception,	  as	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  get	  at	  the	  most	  common	  conception(s)	  of	  what	  we	  understand	  the	  economy	  to	  be.	  These	  popular	  authors,	  by	  necessity,	  call	  upon	  an	  implicit,	  shared	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy	  on	  order	  to	  make	  their	  statements	  sensible,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  implicit	  understanding	  that	  is	  the	  target	  of	  my	  analysis	  in	  this	  chapter.	  It	  is	  certainly	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  modern	  conception	  is	  a	  fixed	  object	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  subject	  to	  contestation.	  Instead,	  I	  suggest	  that	  while	  such	  contestation	  is	  certainly	  ongoing	  (as	  this	  project	  and	  others	  like	  it	  demonstrate),	  it	  tends	  to	  go	  on	  within	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  confines	  that	  form	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  discourse.	  If	  you	  go	  too	  far	  outside	  of	  these	  boundaries,	  you’re	  no	  longer	  taken	  to	  be	  talking	  about	  the	  economy	  at	  all35,	  but	  instead	  about	  politics	  or	  society.	  These	  boundaries	  are,	  to	  be	  sure,	  constantly	  being	  shifted	  and	  reconstructed,	  but	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  popular	  discourse	  regarding	  the	  economy,	  we	  might	  at	  least	  get	  an	  idea	  about	  their	  general	  shape	  and	  location.	  	  	  Such	  an	  inquiry	  has	  at	  least	  three	  potential	  uses.	  First,	  as	  a	  historical	  exercise	  it	  can	  help	  to	  clarify	  the	  meaning	  of	  an	  important	  and	  oft-­‐quoted	  theorist.	  However,	  as	  my	  goal	  in	  relation	  to	  Smith	  is	  to	  some	  degree	  negative	  (that	  is,	  to	  show	  simply	  that	  he	  did	  not	  conceive	  of	  an	  object	  that	  fits	  the	  contemporary	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy,	  let	  alone	  use	  the	  phrase),	  this	  chapter	  does	  less	  to	  clarify	  meaning	  than	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  File	  sharing,	  for	  example,	  or	  potluck	  dinners,	  are	  both	  activities	  that	  involve	  the	  distribution	  and	  consumption	  of	  goods,	  but	  that	  are	  rarely	  considered	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  its	  contemporary	  form.	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debunk	  what	  I	  argue	  is	  an	  erroneous	  assumption	  about	  Smith’s	  theoretical	  position.	  Such	  a	  debunking	  is	  worthwhile	  because,	  as	  I	  have	  suggested	  above,	  the	  claim	  that	  Smith	  wrote	  about	  the	  economy	  is	  one	  piece	  of	  the	  intellectual	  apparatus	  through	  which	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  economy’s	  naturalness	  and	  inevitability	  is	  maintained;	  as	  such,	  debunking	  this	  claim	  makes	  it	  easier	  to	  dispute	  this	  appearance.	  This	  leads	  directly	  into	  the	  second	  potential	  use:	  as	  a	  demonstration	  of	  the	  contingency	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  economy	  effect,	  it	  can	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  not	  only	  that	  things	  could	  have	  been	  otherwise,	  but	  that	  things	  were	  previously	  otherwise.	  Such	  a	  demonstration	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  field	  of	  political	  action	  because	  it	  makes	  evident	  not	  only	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  itself	  the	  product	  of	  specific	  decisions	  and	  actions	  by	  particular	  individuals,	  but	  that	  even	  in	  an	  era	  in	  which	  we	  tend	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  economy	  was	  already	  being	  produced,	  and	  had	  already	  achieved	  a	  central	  role	  in	  human	  activity,	  it	  was	  in	  fact	  being	  done	  without.	  In	  short,	  debunking	  the	  idea	  that	  Adam	  Smith	  was	  a	  theorist	  of	  the	  economy	  serves	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  economy	  can	  be	  done	  without	  in	  a	  context	  in	  which	  we	  tend	  to	  assume	  it	  was	  necessary.	  If	  we	  can	  show	  that	  the	  economy	  could	  have	  been	  otherwise,	  and	  in	  fact	  was	  at	  one	  time	  done	  without	  entirely,	  the	  logical	  questions	  that	  follows	  are	  “How	  might	  it	  be	  made	  otherwise	  in	  the	  present	  or	  the	  future?”	  and	  “Does	  it	  improve	  our	  world,	  or	  might	  we	  be	  better	  off	  trying	  to	  do	  without	  it	  again?”	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  	  a	  demonstration	  of	  the	  economy	  effect	  as	  contingent	  upon	  (and	  contributing	  to)	  a	  particular	  construction	  of	  narratives	  of	  the	  past	  might	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  specific	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  constrains	  our	  readings	  of	  both	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  texts.	  Even	  better,	  it	  might	  help	  us	  to	  resist	  or	  reconfigure	  this	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effect,	  through	  the	  construction	  of	  alternative	  narratives	  of	  the	  past,	  in	  ways	  that	  seek	  to	  overcome	  the	  constraints	  the	  economy	  effect	  places	  on	  political	  action	  directed	  towards	  increased	  material	  equality.	  Finally,	  as	  Quentin	  Skinner	  points	  out,	  such	  an	  inquiry	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  effort	  to	  understand	  the	  constraints	  and	  limits	  the	  economy	  places	  on	  political	  action	  in	  the	  present.	  A	  rigorous	  approach	  to	  the	  history	  of	  ideas	  is	  necessary	  for	  such	  an	  enterprise	  because:	  …it	  is	  remarkably	  difficult	  to	  avoid	  falling	  under	  the	  spell	  of	  our	  own	  intellectual	  heritage.	  As	  we	  analyse	  and	  reflect	  on	  our	  normative	  concepts,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  become	  bewitched	  into	  believing	  that	  the	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  them	  bequeathed	  to	  us	  by	  the	  mainstream	  of	  our	  intellectual	  traditions	  must	  be	  the	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  them…	  The	  history	  of	  philosophy,	  and	  perhaps	  especially	  of	  moral,	  social	  and	  political	  philosophy,	  is	  there	  to	  prevent	  us	  from	  becoming	  too	  readily	  bewitched.	  The	  intellectual	  historian	  can	  help	  us	  to	  appreciate	  how	  far	  the	  values	  embodied	  in	  our	  present	  way	  of	  life,	  and	  our	  present	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  those	  values,	  reflect	  a	  series	  of	  choices	  made	  at	  different	  times	  between	  different	  possible	  worlds.	  This	  awareness	  can	  help	  to	  liberate	  us	  from	  the	  grip	  of	  any	  one	  hegemonal	  account	  of	  those	  values	  and	  how	  they	  should	  be	  interpreted	  and	  understood.	  (1998,	  116-­‐117)	  	  	  	  If	  the	  political	  possibilities	  of	  the	  present	  are	  in	  some	  respects	  constrained	  by	  the	  economy	  effect,	  and	  if	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  effect	  is	  produced	  and	  maintained	  depends	  in	  part	  upon	  an	  understanding	  of	  Smith	  as	  a	  theorist	  of	  the	  economy,	  then	  a	  clear	  account	  of	  the	  route	  by	  which	  we	  arrived	  at	  such	  an	  understanding,	  and	  of	  the	  choices	  made	  along	  the	  way,	  can	  help	  to	  “liberate”	  us	  from	  the	  grip	  of	  the	  “hegemonal	  account”	  that	  suggests	  not	  only	  that	  the	  economy	  must	  be	  this	  way	  in	  particular,	  but	  even	  that	  the	  economy	  must	  be	  at	  all.	  	  Importantly,	  as	  Skinner	  notes,	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  historical	  use	  of	  concepts	  is	  vital	  to	  such	  a	  project	  because:	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…what	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  do	  in	  politics	  is	  generally	  limited	  by	  what	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  legitimise	  .	  What	  you	  can	  hope	  to	  legitimise,	  however,	  depends	  on	  what	  courses	  of	  action	  you	  can	  plausibly	  range	  under	  existing	  normative	  principles.	  But	  this	  implies	  that,	  even	  if	  your	  professed	  principles	  never	  operate	  as	  your	  motives,	  but	  only	  as	  rationalisations	  of	  your	  behaviour,	  they	  will	  nevertheless	  help	  to	  shape	  and	  limit	  what	  lines	  of	  action	  you	  can	  successfully	  pursue.	  So	  we	  cannot	  avoid	  invoking	  the	  presence	  of	  such	  principles	  if	  we	  wish	  to	  explain	  why	  certain	  policies	  are	  chosen	  at	  particular	  times	  and	  are	  then	  articulated	  and	  pursued	  in	  particular	  ways.	  (1998,	  105-­‐106)	  	  	  	  	  The	  “normative	  principles”	  established	  by	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  economy	  effect	  form,	  in	  a	  very	  real	  sense,	  the	  bounds	  of	  “what	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  do	  in	  politics,”	  and	  many	  of	  these	  normative	  principles	  (including	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  natural,	  inevitable,	  subject	  to	  its	  own	  laws,	  and	  free	  from	  ethical	  concerns)	  are	  secured	  by	  a	  version	  of	  the	  history	  of	  political	  thought	  that	  suggests	  that	  Smith	  discovered	  the	  economy	  in	  general	  as	  an	  object	  for	  science,	  and	  that	  in	  so	  doing	  he	  initiated	  the	  modern	  stage	  of	  the	  economy.	  If	  we	  can,	  through	  this	  process	  of	  debunking,	  destabilize	  this	  version	  of	  history,	  and	  offer	  our	  own	  in	  its	  place,	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  call	  into	  question	  some	  of	  the	  normative	  principles,	  thereby	  allowing	  us	  to	  reconfigure	  some	  of	  the	  constraints	  governing	  “what	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  do	  in	  politcs.”	  	   One	  might	  very	  reasonably	  ask,	  at	  this,	  point,	  why	  I	  might	  expect	  this	  project	  to	  have	  such	  potential,	  when,	  as	  I	  have	  pointed	  out,	  many	  others	  have	  already	  called	  into	  question	  the	  naturalness	  of	  the	  economy.	  One	  answer	  is	  that	  I	  hope	  this	  project	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  join	  forces	  (and	  my	  voice)	  with	  those	  others	  who	  have	  questioned	  the	  economy,	  and	  that	  eventually	  the	  sheer	  accretion	  of	  critical	  voices	  will	  lend	  strength	  to	  the	  effort	  to	  lift	  some	  of	  the	  these	  constraints.	  In	  addition,	  I	  hope	  that	  this	  text	  will	  be	  accessible	  to	  a	  larger	  audience	  than	  many	  of	  the	  scholarly,	  academic	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sources	  I	  have	  cited.	  My	  project	  is	  not	  merely	  one	  of	  critique,	  but	  of	  a	  call	  to	  critique	  as	  political	  action.	  I	  hope	  that	  one	  result	  of	  this	  critique	  will	  be	  that	  the	  reader	  will	  go	  on	  “high	  alert”	  whenever	  he	  or	  she	  hears	  “the	  economy”	  offered	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  political	  activity,	  and	  that	  the	  analysis	  offered	  herein	  will	  allow	  this	  hypothetical	  reader	  to	  respond	  by	  calling	  into	  question	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  this	  justification.	  To	  return	  to	  the	  example	  from	  the	  introduction,	  had	  I	  had	  access	  to	  this	  critique	  when	  I	  found	  myself	  at	  the	  bargaining	  table	  arguing	  over	  healthcare36,	  it	  might	  have	  enabled	  me	  to	  respond	  by	  saying:	  “We	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  your	  assessment	  of	  ‘this	  economy’	  or	  the	  constraints	  it	  places	  on	  our	  negotiations.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  talk	  about	  it	  as	  thought	  it	  has	  always	  been	  there,	  and	  has	  always	  served	  to	  constrain	  politics,	  we	  understand	  ‘this	  economy’	  as	  a	  relatively	  recent	  invention	  that	  in	  this	  context	  serves	  a	  specific	  political	  purpose	  of	  removing	  negotiations	  over	  material	  conditions	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  ethics	  and	  politics,	  and	  we	  refuse	  to	  concede	  that	  ground.	  The	  question	  is	  not	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  should	  pay	  more	  for	  health	  insurance	  due	  to	  the	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  ‘this	  economy;’	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  our	  paying	  more	  for	  health	  insurance	  represents	  a	  politically	  just	  and	  ethically	  fair	  outcome,	  and	  we	  say	  it	  does	  not.”	  While	  such	  a	  response	  would	  not,	  of	  course,	  have	  won	  the	  fight	  for	  us,	  it	  might	  have	  put	  the	  fight	  on	  a	  ground	  that	  gave	  us	  a	  better	  chance	  of	  winning.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Where	  I	  was	  told	  that	  the	  graduate	  student	  union	  I	  represented	  would	  have	  to	  take	  on	  a	  larger	  portion	  of	  its	  own	  healthcare	  costs	  because	  “in	  this	  economy”	  there	  was	  no	  way	  the	  University	  could	  do	  so.	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C.	  Smith	  and	  the	  Œconomy	  In	  order	  to	  examine	  Smith’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  modern	  economy,	  we	  must	  first	  discover	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  he	  uses	  the	  term	  himself.	  He	  tends	  to	  use	  the	  term	  “œconomy”	  in	  one	  of	  two	  ways.	  The	  first	  way	  is	  described	  in	  the	  following	  quotation:	  Political	  œconomy,	  considered	  as	  a	  branch	  of	  the	  science	  of	  a	  statesman	  or	  legislator,	  proposes	  two	  distinct	  objects;	  first,	  to	  provide	  a	  plentiful	  revenue	  or	  subsistence	  for	  the	  people,	  or	  more	  properly	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  provide	  such	  a	  revenue	  or	  subsistence	  for	  themselves;	  and	  secondly,	  to	  supply	  the	  state	  or	  commonwealth	  with	  a	  revenue	  sufficient	  for	  the	  publick	  services.	  It	  proposes	  to	  enrich	  both	  the	  people	  and	  the	  sovereign.	  (1981,	  347)	  	  “Œconomy”	  follows	  “political,”	  and	  the	  term	  is	  used	  to	  designate	  a	  particular	  aspect	  of	  the	  science	  of	  the	  legislator	  that	  is	  dedicated	  to	  providing	  a	  “plentiful	  revenue”	  to	  both	  the	  people	  and	  the	  sovereign.	  The	  second	  usage	  is	  to	  denote	  thrift	  or	  parsimony,	  as	  in	  the	  following	  passage:	  	  In	  an	  extensive	  corn	  country,	  between	  all	  the	  different	  parts	  of	  which	  there	  is	  a	  free	  commerce	  and	  communication,	  the	  scarcity	  occasioned	  by	  the	  most	  unfavourable	  seasons	  can	  never	  be	  so	  great	  as	  to	  produce	  a	  famine;	  and	  the	  scantiest	  crop,	  if	  managed	  with	  frugality	  and	  œconomy,	  will	  maintain,	  through	  the	  year,	  the	  same	  number	  of	  people	  that	  are	  commonly	  fed	  in	  a	  more	  affluent	  manner	  by	  one	  of	  moderate	  plenty.	  (1981,	  416	  )	  	  As	  this	  second	  usage	  is	  both	  less	  common	  in	  Smith’s	  writing,	  and	  less	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  object	  at	  hand,	  than	  the	  first,	  it	  is	  to	  the	  former	  that	  we	  will	  direct	  the	  bulk	  of	  our	  attention.	  It	  would,	  however,	  be	  a	  mistake	  completely	  to	  disregard	  the	  association	  between	  œconomy	  and	  thrift,	  as	  it	  may	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “political	  œconomy”	  more	  completely.	  To	  a	  modern	  reader,	  the	  term	  political	  economy	  may	  seem	  to	  suggest	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  economy	  from	  the	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perspective	  of	  politics,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  For	  example,	  a	  recent	  job	  posting	  for	  an	  Assistant	  Professor	  with	  a	  concentration	  in	  international	  political	  economy	  describes	  the	  field	  as	  “the	  interplay	  between	  economic	  and	  political	  forces	  at	  the	  international	  level”	  (C.	  Carpenter,	  personal	  communication,	  October	  19,	  2010).	  However,	  from	  Smith’s	  perspective,	  it	  was	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  evoke	  an	  idea	  of	  thrifty	  or	  efficient	  application	  of	  the	  “science	  of	  a	  statesman”	  regarding	  the	  material	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  state	  (Mitchell,	  2005).	  Rather	  than	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  interplay	  between	  economic	  and	  political	  forces,	  political	  œconomy	  was	  an	  economic	  (efficient	  or	  thrifty)	  application	  of	  political	  principles.	  The	  “political”	  in	  “political	  economy”	  served	  to	  differentiate	  the	  activity	  from	  “household”	  or	  “personal”	  economy,	  rather	  than	  from	  apolitical	  economy.	  	  That	  is,	  in	  this	  formulation,	  “political”	  designates	  the	  sphere	  of	  activity	  in	  which	  “economy”	  is	  being	  exercised.	  One	  important	  distinction,	  then,	  between	  Smith’s	  vision	  of	  œconomy	  and	  the	  modern	  conception	  of	  economy	  is	  that	  œconomy	  always	  describes	  actions	  or	  activities,	  and	  never	  a	  specific	  thing	  or	  group	  of	  things;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  space	  or	  arena	  of	  activity	  but	  a	  kind	  or	  type	  of	  activity.	  A	  particular	  practice	  or	  policy	  may	  be	  œconomical	  or	  not,	  politics	  or	  agriculture	  may	  be	  practiced	  with	  or	  without	  œconomy,	  but	  œconomy	  is	  always	  a	  characteristic	  of	  these	  activities	  rather	  than	  a	  thing	  in	  itself.	  Smith’s	  object	  is	  not	  “the	  economy;”	  instead,	  it	  is	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  “science	  of	  the	  legislator”	  may	  be	  applied	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  the	  accumulation	  of	  national	  wealth.	  Contrast	  that	  view	  with	  the	  following	  passage	  from	  the	  Atlantic:	  Even	  if	  the	  economy	  were	  to	  immediately	  begin	  producing	  600,000	  jobs	  a	  month—more	  than	  double	  the	  pace	  of	  the	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  1990s,	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when	  job	  growth	  was	  strong—it	  would	  take	  roughly	  two	  years	  to	  dig	  ourselves	  out	  of	  the	  hole	  we’re	  in.	  The	  economy	  could	  add	  jobs	  that	  fast,	  or	  even	  faster—job	  growth	  is	  theoretically	  limited	  only	  by	  labor	  supply,	  and	  a	  lot	  more	  labor	  is	  sitting	  idle	  today	  than	  usual.	  (Peck,	  March	  2010)	  	  The	  contemporary	  economy	  is	  an	  actor	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  The	  economy	  has	  agency	  and	  is	  capable	  of	  adding	  jobs	  or	  losing	  jobs,	  preventing	  or	  abetting	  justice,	  and	  imposing	  undesireable	  solutions	  to	  political	  problems;	  moreover,	  it	  is	  limited	  in	  this	  capacity	  only	  by	  the	  theoretical	  laws	  that	  govern	  its	  activity. Œconomy	  is	  merely	  a	  descriptor	  of	  discrete	  actions	  undertaken	  by	  individuals	  or	  states.	  	  	  	  	   One	  might	  quite	  reasonably	  argue	  that	  I	  have	  created	  a	  red	  herring	  by	  focusing	  so	  intently	  on	  Smith’s	  use	  of	  œconomy	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  modern	  economy.	  After	  all,	  such	  an	  argument	  might	  go,	  aren’t	  we	  really	  generally	  talking	  about	  the	  gross	  domestic	  product	  when	  we	  discuss	  the	  economy?	  If	  so,	  don’t	  passages	  such	  as	  the	  following	  suggest	  that	  while	  Smith	  might	  not	  have	  shared	  our	  term,	  he	  certainly	  shared	  our	  concept?	  The	  gross	  revenue	  of	  all	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  a	  great	  country,	  comprehends	  the	  whole	  annual	  produce	  of	  their	  land	  and	  labour;	  the	  neat	  revenue,	  what	  remains	  free	  to	  them	  after	  deducting	  the	  expence	  of	  maintaining;	  first,	  their	  fixed;	  and,	  secondly,	  their	  circulating	  capital;	  or	  what,	  without	  encroaching	  upon	  their	  capital,	  they	  can	  place	  in	  their	  stock	  reserved	  for	  immediate	  consumption,	  or	  spend	  upon	  their	  subsistence,	  conveniencies,	  and	  amusements.	  Their	  real	  wealth	  too	  is	  in	  proportion,	  not	  to	  their	  gross,	  but	  to	  their	  neat	  revenue.	  (1981,	  255)	  	  Certainly	  such	  an	  argument	  has	  some	  merit.	  One	  can	  easily	  find	  such	  uses	  of	  economy	  in	  popular	  culture.	  A	  quick	  perusal	  of	  CNN.com,	  for	  instance,	  yields	  the	  following:	  China's	  economic	  growth	  slowed	  for	  the	  second	  quarter	  in	  a	  row,	  cooling	  fears	  that	  its	  economy	  is	  growing	  at	  an	  unsustainable	  pace.	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China's	  gross	  domestic	  product,	  the	  broadest	  measure	  of	  economic	  output,	  grew	  at	  an	  annual	  rate	  of	  9.6%	  during	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  2010,	  according	  to	  figures	  from	  the	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics	  released	  Thursday.	  (Censky,	  October	  21,	  2010)	  	  This	  usage	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  simply	  a	  shorthand	  term	  for	  the	  GDP,	  and	  that	  growth	  in	  the	  latter	  translates	  directly	  to	  growth	  in	  the	  former.	  The	  fact	  that	  such	  usage	  is	  commonplace	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  certainly	  a	  relationship	  between	  Smith’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  general	  stock	  of	  society	  and	  the	  contemporary	  economy.	  	  	   However,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  usage	  found	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  is	  also	  commonplace	  suggests	  that	  the	  economy	  has	  characteristics	  that	  go	  far	  beyond	  Smith’s	  general	  stock,	  which	  he	  never	  suggests	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  create	  employment,	  or	  take	  any	  other	  action	  at	  all.	  This	  distinction	  is	  important	  to	  my	  argument;	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  there	  is	  no	  relationship	  between	  Smith’s	  ideas	  and	  the	  contemporary	  concept	  of	  the	  economy.	  Instead,	  I	  am	  suggesting	  that	  Smith	  would	  not	  have	  understood	  our	  contemporary	  understanding	  as	  being	  the	  same	  as	  what	  he	  was	  talking	  about,	  and	  that	  the	  tendency	  of	  contemporary	  critics	  to	  read	  him	  as	  though	  he	  would	  have	  has	  substantial	  effects	  not	  only	  upon	  our	  reading	  of	  Smith,	  but	  upon	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  past	  and	  the	  present.	  	   One	  such	  effect	  is	  that	  when	  we	  read	  Smith	  as	  though	  he	  had	  the	  same	  object	  in	  mind	  as	  we	  do	  when	  we	  discuss	  the	  contemporary	  economy,	  we	  lend	  credence	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  economy	  are	  fixed	  and	  ahistorical.	  If,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  Smith	  had	  a	  different	  object	  in	  mind,	  then	  we	  must	  accept	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  historically	  produced,	  in	  which	  case	  ceases	  to	  function	  simply	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  the	  future,	  and	  becomes	  instead	  one	  element	  of	  the	  change	  we	  must	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imagine	  when	  we	  imagine	  a	  future	  that	  is	  different	  from	  the	  present.	  Additionally,	  when	  we	  treat	  Smith	  as	  though	  his	  object	  is	  the	  same	  as	  ours,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  we	  have	  shown,	  our	  contemporary	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy	  includes	  many	  things	  that	  Smith	  did	  not	  deal	  with	  at	  all	  (such	  as	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  agent),	  we	  then	  tend	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  arguments	  Smith	  made	  (for	  example,	  his	  famous	  argument	  about	  the	  “invisible	  hand”)	  can	  be	  appropriately	  applied	  to	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy.	  	  	   The	  result	  is	  that	  Smith’s	  relatively	  small	  claim	  (which	  is	  simply	  that,	  insofar	  as	  individual	  interests	  in	  supporting	  domestic	  products	  over	  foreign	  ones	  and	  in	  maximizing	  individual	  profits	  align	  with	  collective	  interests,	  we	  will	  act	  for	  the	  public	  good	  without	  intending	  to	  do	  so)	  is	  expanded	  to	  form	  the	  whole	  basis	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  must	  allow	  the	  economy	  free	  reign	  to	  dictate	  the	  limits	  of	  policy	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  conflict	  with	  the	  invisible	  hand.	  Such	  an	  assumption	  is	  not	  merely	  historically	  problematic;	  it	  limits	  our	  ability	  to	  comprehend	  Smith’s	  argument,	  because	  he	  makes	  the	  claim	  about	  the	  invisible	  hand	  (Book	  IV,	  Chapter	  2)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  assumptions	  about	  how	  individual	  producers	  will	  respond	  to	  questions	  about	  how	  to	  employ	  their	  capital.	  As	  he	  makes	  clear	  elsewhere	  (see	  below),	  Smith	  certainly	  doesn’t	  think	  that	  the	  invisible	  hand	  (rather	  than,	  as	  he	  puts	  it,	  the	  “advantage”	  or	  “inconveniency”	  of	  society)	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  dictate	  wages	  for	  laborers.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  for	  Smith,	  because	  as	  he	  understands	  it,	  wages	  for	  workers	  and	  employment	  of	  capital	  for	  small	  producers	  are	  two	  separate	  questions;	  however,	  when	  we	  lump	  them	  under	  the	  label	  “the	  economy,”	  we	  begin	  to	  run	  into	  problems	  which	  cause	  us	  to	  assume	  that	  one	  or	  the	  other	  of	  the	  conflicting	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principles	  is	  the	  “right”	  interpretation.	  	  	   We	  may	  further	  differentiate	  Smith’s	  understanding	  from	  the	  economy	  by	  examining	  the	  question	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  growth.	  Smith	  believes	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  wealth	  that	  a	  given	  society	  may	  attain	  is	  limited:	  In	  a	  country	  which	  had	  acquired	  that	  full	  complement	  of	  riches	  which	  the	  nature	  of	  its	  soil	  and	  climate,	  and	  its	  situation	  with	  respect	  to	  other	  countries	  allowed	  it	  to	  acquire;	  which	  could,	  therefore,	  advance	  no	  further,	  and	  which	  was	  not	  going	  backwards,	  both	  the	  wages	  of	  labour	  and	  the	  profits	  of	  stock	  would	  probably	  be	  very	  low.	  (1981,	  128)	  	  Once	  a	  country	  has	  exhausted	  the	  potential	  of	  its	  soil	  and	  its	  climate,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  comparative	  advantages	  in	  comparison	  with	  its	  neighbors,	  it	  can	  become	  no	  wealthier.	  This	  belief	  that	  soil	  and	  climate	  function	  as	  inherent	  limits	  on	  the	  wealth	  of	  a	  country	  suggests	  that	  Smith	  doesn’t	  understand	  innovation	  or	  invention	  as	  fundamental	  sources	  of	  national	  wealth,	  and	  puts	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  “general	  stock”	  of	  society	  at	  substantial	  odds	  with	  the	  contemporary	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  paper	  hosted	  by	  the	  Organization	  of	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development,	  Stanford	  Professor	  of	  Economics	  Emeritus	  Nathan	  Rosenberg	  notes	  offhandedly	  in	  his	  introductory	  paragraph	  that	  “[i]t	  is	  taken	  as	  axiomatic	  that	  innovative	  activity	  has	  been	  the	  single,	  most	  important	  component	  of	  long-­‐term	  economic	  growth….”	  (2004).	  Our	  understanding	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  requires,	  as	  noted	  above,	  that	  it	  be	  capable	  of	  infinite	  growth	  without	  regard	  for	  physical	  limitations;	  Smith,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  real,	  physical	  limits	  to	  growth.	  He	  cannot,	  therefore,	  possibly	  be	  discussing	  an	  object	  that,	  name	  aside,	  shares	  a	  concept	  with	  “the	  economy.”	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Another	  way	  to	  get	  at	  this	  distinction	  is	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  Smith’s	  concepts	  of	  productive	  and	  unproductive	  labor,	  which	  lead	  him	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  price	  and	  value	  that	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  dominant	  current	  (marginalist-­‐influenced)	  understanding:	  There	  is	  one	  sort	  of	  labour	  which	  adds	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  subject	  upon	  which	  it	  is	  bestowed:	  There	  is	  another	  which	  has	  no	  such	  effect.	  The	  former,	  as	  it	  produces	  a	  value,	  may	  be	  called	  productive;	  the	  latter,	  unproductive	  labour.	  Thus	  the	  labour	  of	  a	  manufacturer	  adds,	  generally,	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  materials	  which	  he	  works	  upon,	  that	  of	  his	  own	  maintenance,	  and	  of	  his	  master’s	  profit.	  The	  labour	  of	  a	  menial	  servant,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  adds	  to	  the	  value	  of	  nothing.	  (1981,	  287)	  	  The	  sovereign,	  for	  example,	  with	  all	  the	  officers	  both	  of	  justice	  and	  war	  who	  serve	  under	  him,	  the	  whole	  army	  and	  navy,	  are	  unproductive	  labourers…	  In	  the	  same	  class	  must	  be	  ranked,	  some	  both	  of	  the	  gravest	  and	  most	  important,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  most	  frivolous	  professions:	  churchmen,	  lawyers,	  physicians,	  men	  of	  letters	  of	  all	  kinds;	  players,	  buffoons,	  musicians,	  opera–singers,	  opera–dancers,	  &c.	  The	  labour	  of	  the	  meanest	  of	  these	  has	  a	  certain	  value,	  regulated	  by	  the	  very	  same	  principles	  which	  regulate	  that	  of	  every	  other	  sort	  of	  labour;	  and	  that	  of	  the	  noblest	  and	  most	  useful,	  produces	  nothing	  which	  could	  afterwards	  purchase	  or	  procure	  an	  equal	  quantity	  of	  labour.	  (1981,	  287)	  	  According	  to	  Smith’s	  categories	  of	  productive	  and	  unproductive	  labor,	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  wealth	  is	  material	  labor.	  While	  certainly,	  as	  emphasized	  in	  the	  first	  quotation	  above,	  not	  all	  material	  labor	  is	  productive,	  the	  second	  quotation	  seems	  to	  make	  clear	  that	  all	  labor	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  the	  manufacture	  or	  direct	  improvement	  of	  a	  material	  good	  is	  unproductive.	  Notably,	  included	  in	  the	  category	  of	  unproductive	  laborers	  are	  physicians	  and	  men	  of	  letters	  of	  all	  kinds.	  Smith,	  by	  arguing	  that	  “the	  noblest	  and	  most	  useful”	  of	  these	  unproductive	  laborers	  “produces	  nothing	  which	  could	  afterwards	  purchase	  or	  procure	  an	  equal	  quantity	  of	  labour,”	  demonstrates	  a	  peculiar	  fixation	  on	  the	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material	  forms	  which	  make	  up	  wealth,	  particularly	  for	  someone	  who	  subscribes	  to	  a	  labor-­‐based	  theory	  of	  value.	  Below,	  for	  example,	  we	  see	  Smith’s	  statement	  of	  exactly	  such	  a	  theory	  of	  value,	  which	  appears	  to	  contradict	  his	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  labor:	  The	  real	  price	  of	  every	  thing,	  what	  every	  thing	  really	  costs	  to	  the	  man	  who	  wants	  to	  acquire	  it,	  is	  the	  toil	  and	  trouble	  of	  acquiring	  it.	  What	  every	  thing	  is	  really	  worth	  to	  the	  man	  who	  has	  acquired	  it,	  and	  who	  wants	  to	  dispose	  of	  it	  or	  exchange	  it	  for	  something	  else,	  is	  the	  toil	  and	  trouble	  which	  it	  can	  save	  to	  himself,	  and	  which	  it	  can	  impose	  upon	  other	  people.	  What	  is	  bought	  with	  money	  or	  with	  goods	  is	  purchased	  by	  labour	  as	  much	  as	  what	  we	  acquire	  by	  the	  toil	  of	  our	  own	  body.	  (1981,	  84)	  	  If	  labor	  is	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  all	  value,	  then	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  the	  material	  components	  of	  most	  commodities	  (excepting	  those	  that	  must	  be	  imported)	  should	  be	  largely	  irrelevant	  to	  their	  value.	  While	  certainly	  possession	  of	  certain	  raw	  materials	  will	  give	  one	  person	  a	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  labor	  required	  to	  acquire	  a	  given	  commodity,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  the	  value	  of	  that	  commodity	  is,	  for	  Smith,	  defined	  by	  this	  quantity	  of	  labor	  represented	  by	  the	  commodity	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  buyer.37	   	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  one	  might	  legitimately	  wonder	  why	  Smith	  is	  so	  adamant	  that	  labor	  that	  does	  not	  result	  in	  the	  direct	  creation	  of	  material	  goods	  is	  “unproductive.”	  To	  take	  a	  particularly	  obvious	  case,	  the	  labor	  of	  the	  physician	  is	  understood	  as	  having	  a	  relatively	  high	  price,	  and	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  may	  be	  easily	  comprehended	  using	  only	  Smith’s	  labor	  theory	  of	  value.	  Illness	  may	  be	  seen	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37The	  modern	  economy,	  because	  of	  its	  association	  with	  Marginalism	  (see	  Chapter	  2),	  rests	  not	  on	  such	  a	  labor	  theory	  of	  value,	  but	  instead	  on	  one	  that	  focuses	  on	  price	  as	  a	  result	  of	  marginal	  utility.	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constitute	  a	  substantial	  inconvenience	  for	  the	  suffering	  individual	  –	  indeed,	  one	  might	  say	  that,	  in	  the	  best-­‐case	  scenario,	  illness	  requires	  some	  substantial	  labor	  to	  overcome,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  energy	  devoted	  to	  recovery	  rather	  than	  any	  other	  activities.	  For	  this	  reason,	  one	  might	  quite	  reasonably	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  a	  physician	  for	  a	  remedy	  that	  will	  decrease	  this	  recovery	  time,	  and	  one	  might	  understand	  the	  value	  of	  such	  a	  service	  as	  being	  equivalent	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  labor	  that	  might	  be	  performed	  in	  the	  time	  that	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been	  spent	  in	  recovery.	  	  	   Smith,	  however,	  understands	  the	  physician’s	  labor	  in	  this	  case	  as	  unproductive,	  because	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  task,	  no	  additional	  material	  wealth	  has	  been	  created;	  instead,	  wealth	  is	  simply	  transferred	  from	  the	  sick	  laborer	  to	  the	  doctor.	  The	  same	  analysis	  holds	  true	  for	  teachers,	  lawyers,	  and	  all	  other	  workers	  who	  provide	  services	  rather	  than	  producing	  goods.	  One	  reason	  Smith	  might	  not	  understand	  this	  as	  a	  contradiction	  within	  his	  work	  is	  that	  he	  doesn’t	  understand	  an	  identity	  between	  price	  and	  value	  (or	  wealth)	  in	  the	  way	  that	  we	  tend	  to	  today.	  Labor	  may	  dictate	  the	  price	  of	  the	  services	  provided	  by	  these	  various	  unproductive	  laborers,	  and	  still	  do	  nothing	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  wealth	  of	  the	  nation.	  	  This	  distinction	  in	  Smith’s	  work	  has	  two	  main	  implications	  for	  our	  current	  discussion:	  first,	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  substantial	  difference	  between	  Smith’s	  concept	  of	  the	  “general	  stock”	  and	  the	  contemporary	  idea	  of	  gross	  domestic	  product;	  and	  second,	  Smith’s	  preoccupation	  with	  material	  production	  provides	  evidence	  that	  he	  does	  not	  understand	  the	  production	  of	  wealth	  to	  be	  the	  product	  of	  a	  complex	  network	  of	  human	  interaction	  in	  the	  way	  that	  we	  currently	  understand	  the	  economy.	  	   The	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  defines	  GDP	  as	  “[t]he	  market	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value	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  produced	  by	  labor	  and	  property	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  regardless	  of	  nationality”	  (Bureau	  of	  Economy	  Analysis	  Online	  Glossary,	  http://www.bea.gov).	  The	  mere	  inclusion	  of	  “services”	  in	  this	  definition	  suggests	  a	  departure	  from	  Smith’s	  “general	  stock.”	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Analysis	  (BEA),	  this	  departure	  is	  significant	  in	  magnitude.	  In	  2009,	  total	  US	  GDP	  was	  just	  over	  $14.1	  trillion	  dollars.	  Personal	  expenditures	  on	  services	  accounted	  for	  nearly	  $6.8	  trillion,	  or	  about	  48	  percent,	  of	  this	  $14.1	  trillion	  (BEA,	  2011).	  	   This	  is	  more	  than	  just	  a	  technical	  difference	  or	  the	  natural	  evolution	  of	  the	  economy.	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  the	  BEA,	  the	  US	  GDP	  increased	  by	  over	  4700	  percent	  between	  1951	  and	  2009.	  However,	  if	  we	  remove	  the	  category	  of	  personal	  expenditures	  on	  services	  from	  the	  calculation,	  we	  see	  less	  than	  a	  3300	  percent	  increase.	  To	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  the	  GDP	  increased	  nearly	  30	  percent	  more	  than	  the	  “general	  stock”	  over	  this	  period.	  Using	  the	  more	  detailed	  data	  available	  for	  more	  recent	  years,	  we	  can	  see	  this	  distinction	  in	  even	  starker	  terms.	  According	  to	  the	  BEA,	  US	  GDP	  grew	  by	  a	  very	  modest	  1.92	  percent	  between	  2005	  and	  2009.	  However,	  if	  we	  remove	  all	  of	  the	  categories	  that	  Smith	  would	  deem	  “unproductive,”38	  the	  numbers	  tell	  a	  very	  different	  story.	  Instead	  of	  growing	  slowly,	  the	  “general	  stock”	  decreased	  by	  4.86	  percent	  over	  the	  same	  period	  (BEA	  Table	  1.5.6).	  During	  this	  four-­‐year	  period,	  the	  economy	  grew	  while	  the	  “general	  stock”	  shrank.	  	  	   The	  designation	  of	  these	  services	  as	  “productive”	  has	  not	  been	  uncontested	  in	  the	  contemporary	  era,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  GDP	  is	  often	  treated	  not	  as	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  I	  removed	  the	  following	  categories:	  Personal	  expenditures	  on	  services,	  imports	  and	  exports	  of	  services,	  and	  consumption	  rather	  than	  investment	  expenditures	  by	  the	  government.	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political	  artifact,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  concrete,	  objective	  indicator	  of	  economic	  output.	  In	  fact,	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  calculate	  GDP	  demonstrates	  that	  all	  such	  decisions	  are	  politically	  fraught.	  As	  Brett	  Christophers	  notes,	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  calculate	  the	  economic	  contribution	  made	  by	  the	  financial	  sector	  has	  been	  politically	  fraught	  since	  the	  inception	  of	  national	  accounts.	  In	  fact,	  while	  we	  tend	  to	  treat	  GDP	  as	  an	  indicator	  well	  suited	  to	  comparing	  the	  economic	  output	  of	  multiple	  countries,	  there	  has	  been	  significant	  variation	  regarding	  its	  calculation	  over	  its	  history.	  Much	  of	  this	  variation	  has	  been	  the	  result	  of	  differing	  answers	  to	  the	  “banking	  problem”	  specifically,	  and	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  distinguishing	  income	  (or	  value	  added)	  from	  simple	  transfers	  of	  wealth	  from	  one	  member	  of	  society	  to	  another	  more	  generally.	  A	  general	  consensus	  has	  been	  reached,	  however,	  that	  income	  from	  interest,	  for	  example,	  should	  be	  counted	  as	  value	  added,	  while	  the	  cost	  of	  interest	  to	  consumers	  will	  generally	  be	  written	  off	  as	  losses	  to	  a	  fictional	  sector	  of	  the	  economy	  created	  for	  this	  purpose.	  While	  this	  has	  the	  same	  effect	  on	  the	  calculation	  of	  the	  overall	  GDP	  that	  simply	  writing	  this	  income	  off	  as	  a	  transfer	  of	  wealth	  would	  have,	  it	  has	  the	  advantage	  (for	  proponents	  of	  the	  financial	  services	  sector)	  that	  it	  greatly	  increases	  the	  share	  of	  the	  GDP	  for	  which	  financial	  services	  are	  responsible	  (2011,	  133).	  This	  contestation	  is	  worth	  noting	  for	  our	  purposes	  insofar	  as	  it	  demonstrates	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy	  that	  at	  first	  seem	  merely	  technical	  may	  be	  shown	  to	  include	  a	  political	  dimension	  as	  well.	  Indeed,	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  make	  a	  meaningful	  distinction	  between	  the	  “merely	  technical”	  and	  the	  “political”	  because	  technical	  decisions	  of	  this	  sort	  always	  have	  political	  implications.	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   In	  contrast	  to	  the	  tortured	  history	  of	  the	  calculation	  of	  the	  GDP,	  Smith’s	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  material	  nature	  of	  the	  wealth	  is	  even	  more	  pronounced.	  His	  focus	  on	  wealth	  created	  by	  productive	  labor	  suggests	  that	  he	  understands	  the	  general	  stock	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  literal	  material	  stockpile	  that	  exists	  separate	  from	  the	  individuals	  who	  use	  it.	  	  Because	  of	  this	  literal	  materiality,	  the	  general	  stock	  behaves	  very	  differently	  than	  the	  economy,	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  crisis.	  In	  fact,	  were	  Smith	  truly	  a	  theorist	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  modern	  sense,	  it	  would	  be	  quite	  startling	  that	  the	  word	  “crisis”	  does	  not	  appear	  even	  once	  in	  The	  Wealth	  of	  Nations	  (Glahe,	  1993).	  	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  following	  passage	  from	  the	  New	  York	  Times:	  “Banks’	  profits	  have	  plunged,	  and	  the	  government	  is	  spending	  hundreds	  of	  billions	  of	  dollars	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  industry	  and	  prevent	  its	  problems	  from	  dragging	  down	  the	  economy”	  (White,	  2008).	  The	  sentiment	  is	  so	  commonplace	  as	  to	  appear	  banal,	  and	  yet	  the	  basic	  analysis	  necessary	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  apparently	  simple	  statement	  would	  have	  been	  entirely	  alien	  to	  Smith.	  A	  decline	  in	  banking	  profits	  would,	  for	  Smith,	  be	  very	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  diminution	  of	  the	  quantity	  of	  money	  in	  circulation.	  However,	  as	  these	  bankers	  were	  not,	  to	  begin	  with,	  productive	  workers,	  it	  should	  have	  little	  effect	  on	  the	  general	  stock:	  When	  we	  compute	  the	  quantity	  of	  industry	  which	  the	  circulating	  capital	  of	  any	  society	  can	  employ,	  we	  must	  always	  have	  regard	  to	  those	  parts	  of	  it	  only,	  which	  consist	  in	  provisions,	  materials,	  and	  finished	  work:	  the	  other,	  which	  consists	  in	  money,	  and	  which	  serves	  only	  to	  circulate	  those	  three,	  must	  always	  be	  deducted.	  In	  order	  to	  put	  industry	  into	  motion,	  three	  things	  are	  requisite;	  materials	  to	  work	  upon,	  tools	  to	  work	  with,	  and	  the	  wages	  or	  recompence	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  which	  the	  work	  is	  done.	  Money	  is	  neither	  a	  material	  to	  work	  upon,	  nor	  a	  tool	  to	  work	  with;	  and	  though	  the	  wages	  of	  the	  workman	  are	  commonly	  paid	  to	  him	  in	  money,	  his	  real	  revenue,	  like	  that	  of	  all	  other	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men,	  consists,	  not	  in	  the	  money,	  but	  in	  the	  money’s	  worth;	  not	  in	  the	  metal	  pieces,	  but	  in	  what	  can	  be	  got	  for	  them.	  (1981,	  262)	  	  An	  event	  that	  affects	  the	  quantity	  of	  money	  would	  certainly	  affect	  the	  value	  of	  money,	  and	  would	  thus	  influence	  what	  could	  be	  bought	  for	  a	  given	  quantity	  of	  money,	  but	  it	  would	  not	  affect	  the	  actual	  material	  wealth	  that	  makes	  up	  the	  general	  stock.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  quantity	  of	  money,	  or	  the	  banking	  industry,	  is	  unimportant	  to	  the	  various	  processes	  of	  productive	  labor.	  As	  Smith	  puts	  it:	  That	  part	  of	  his	  capital	  which	  a	  dealer	  is	  obliged	  to	  keep	  by	  him	  unemployed,	  and	  in	  ready	  money	  for	  answering	  occasional	  demands,	  is	  so	  much	  dead	  stock,	  which,	  so	  long	  as	  it	  remains	  in	  this	  situation,	  produces	  nothing	  either	  to	  him	  or	  to	  his	  country.	  The	  judicious	  operations	  of	  banking	  enable	  him	  to	  convert	  this	  dead	  stock	  into	  active	  and	  productive	  stock;	  into	  materials	  to	  work	  upon,	  into	  tools	  to	  work	  with,	  and	  into	  provisions	  and	  subsistence	  to	  work	  for;	  into	  stock	  which	  produces	  something	  both	  to	  himself	  and	  to	  his	  country.	  	  (1981,	  280)	  	  The	  banking	  industry	  can	  help	  those	  who	  are	  engaged	  in	  productive	  labor	  to	  produce	  more,	  for	  Smith,	  but	  a	  crisis	  in	  the	  banking	  industry	  could	  not	  diminish	  the	  general	  stock	  itself;	  it	  could	  only	  inconvenience	  those	  engaged	  in	  that	  productive	  labor,	  requiring	  those	  dealers	  to	  maintain	  more	  of	  their	  capital	  in	  liquid	  form	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  “occasional	  demands.”	  	  Unlike	  contemporary	  accounts,	  in	  which	  a	  banking	  crisis	  is	  understood	  to	  affect	  everyone,	  and	  in	  which	  we	  expect	  it	  to	  impact	  the	  poor	  and	  the	  working	  class	  as	  much	  as	  or	  more	  than	  the	  wealthy	  because	  of	  the	  perceived	  relationship	  between	  banks	  and	  the	  economy,	  Smith	  would	  expect	  a	  banking	  crisis	  primarily	  to	  affect	  merchants	  and	  direct	  producers.	  A	  banking	  crisis	  could	  not,	  in	  Smith’s	  understanding,	  have	  the	  result	  of	  reducing	  the	  actual	  amount	  of	  wealth	  in	  a	  given	  nation	  (as	  we	  tend	  to	  understand	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis	  to	  have	  done),	  nor	  of	  reducing	  effective	  demand	  for	  goods	  and	  services.	  Unlike	  Smith’s	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general	  stock,	  the	  economy	  allows	  the	  cost	  of	  failures	  incurred	  by	  financial	  elites	  to	  be	  passed	  onto	  the	  poor	  and	  the	  general	  public.	  	   	  The	  flipside	  of	  this	  coin	  is	  that	  activity	  that	  leads	  to	  substantial	  profits	  for	  the	  financial	  industries,	  as	  noted	  above,	  does	  nothing	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  general	  stock,	  except	  insofar	  as	  it	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  productive	  laborers	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  credit.	  One	  might,	  then,	  imagine	  a	  country	  with	  a	  very	  large	  GDP,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  not	  all	  that	  “wealthy”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Smith	  would	  understand.	  Another	  real	  world	  example	  might	  be	  instructive	  here:	  In	  2007,	  according	  to	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  World	  Development	  Indicators,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  a	  GDP	  of	  $13.742	  trillion,	  while	  China	  had	  a	  GDP	  of	  $3.382	  trillion,	  making	  the	  U.S.	  GDP	  over	  four	  times	  larger	  than	  China’s.	  However,	  also	  according	  the	  World	  Bank,	  in	  that	  year	  services	  (or	  unproductive	  labor)	  accounted	  for	  77.3	  percent	  of	  U.S.	  GDP,	  but	  only	  41.9	  percent	  of	  China’s.	  So,	  if	  we	  remove	  these	  service	  sectors	  from	  our	  calculation,	  the	  U.S.	  is	  left	  with	  a	  productive	  GDP	  of	  $3.119	  trillion,	  while	  China	  is	  left	  with	  $2.303.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  material	  wealth	  (in	  terms	  of	  production)	  of	  the	  United	  States	  only	  exceeds	  China’s	  by	  a	  factor	  1.35,	  instead	  of	  the	  factor	  of	  four	  noted	  above.	  Even	  this	  conception,	  it	  should	  be	  noted,	  wouldn’t	  be	  quite	  right	  by	  Smith’s	  account,	  as	  the	  general	  stock	  is	  properly	  understood	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  these	  dollars,	  but	  rather	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  goods	  they	  represent.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  contemporary	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy,	  despite	  its	  appearance	  of	  naturalness	  and	  ethical	  neutrality,	  allows	  for	  the	  validation	  of	  the	  work	  of	  some	  (those	  in	  the	  financial	  services)	  who	  do	  not,	  in	  Smith’s	  understanding,	  produce	  anything	  at	  all.	  Moreover,	  because	  the	  sums	  with	  which	  they	  work	  are	  so	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large,	  these	  same	  workers	  come	  to	  appear	  to	  contribute	  more	  than	  those	  who	  Smith	  would	  understand	  as	  productive.	  By	  reading	  the	  economy	  back	  onto	  Smith,	  we	  come	  to	  the	  erroneous	  conclusion	  that	  he	  would	  have	  been	  likely	  to	  understand	  Wall	  Street	  as	  a	  triumph	  of	  capitalism,	  when	  instead	  he	  might	  well	  have	  understood	  it	  as	  a	  massive	  sink	  of	  resources	  into	  unproductive	  labor.	  Moreover,	  by	  applying	  this	  erroneous	  understanding	  of	  Smith’s	  view	  of	  productivity	  to	  the	  equally	  erroneous	  idea	  that	  he	  shared	  an	  object	  with	  contemporary	  economists,	  we	  get	  the	  picture	  that	  the	  history	  of	  economic	  thought	  over	  the	  last	  250	  years	  has	  been	  the	  story	  of	  a	  steady	  rise	  toward	  the	  pinnacle	  that	  is	  the	  modern	  American	  financial	  sector.	  	  	  	  
D.	  Smith	  and	  the	  Six	  Criteria	  of	  the	  Contemporary	  Economy	  We	  might	  at	  this	  point	  return	  to	  the	  six	  criteria	  I	  have	  advanced	  for	  the	  modern	  economy,	  and	  compare	  them	  to	  Smith’s	  conception	  of	  the	  general	  stock,	  or	  the	  gross	  revenue,	  or	  of	  political	  œconomy	  in	  general.	  First,	  for	  Smith,	  none	  of	  these	  terms	  describes	  a	  distinct	  realm	  of	  existence;	  the	  general	  stock	  is	  a	  literal	  material	  stockpile,	  while	  the	  gross	  revenue	  is	  a	  direct	  outcome	  of	  human	  activity,	  intimately	  related	  both	  to	  social	  and	  political	  life,	  and	  political	  œconomy	  (unlike	  the	  modern	  economy)	  describes	  not	  a	  space	  or	  realm	  of	  activity,	  but	  instead	  a	  way	  of	  doing	  things	  or	  a	  type	  of	  activity.	  There	  is	  no	  independent,	  unique	  realm	  of	  economy	  in	  Smith’s	  writings.	  	   It	  is	  tempting	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  some	  aspects	  of	  Smith’s	  writings	  may	  satisfy	  the	  second	  criterion	  of	  the	  economy	  –	  that	  of	  providing	  an	  impersonal	  realm	  of	  activity	  that	  is	  free	  from	  the	  moral	  code	  governing	  other	  social	  interactions.	  Certainly	  this	  famous	  passage	  seems	  to	  support	  that	  position:	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It	  is	  not	  from	  the	  benevolence	  of	  the	  butcher,	  the	  brewer,	  or	  the	  baker,	  that	  we	  expect	  our	  dinner,	  but	  from	  their	  regard	  to	  their	  own	  interest.	  We	  address	  ourselves,	  not	  to	  their	  humanity	  but	  to	  their	  self–love,	  and	  never	  talk	  to	  them	  of	  our	  own	  necessities	  but	  of	  their	  advantages.	  (1981,	  72)	  	  This	  doesn’t	  actually,	  however,	  suggest	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  moral	  code	  in	  this	  transaction;	  instead,	  it	  simply	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  no	  moral	  reason	  for	  which	  the	  butcher	  is	  obligated	  to	  give	  us	  meat.	  This	  becomes	  clear	  when	  we	  add	  the	  following	  passage	  from	  the	  Theory	  of	  Moral	  Sentiments39:	  There	  can	  be	  no	  proper	  motive	  for	  hurting	  our	  neighbour,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  incitement	  to	  do	  evil	  to	  another,	  which	  mankind	  will	  go	  along	  with,	  except	  just	  indignation	  for	  evil	  which	  that	  other	  has	  done	  to	  us…	  	  In	  the	  race	  for	  wealth,	  and	  honours,	  and	  preferments,	  he	  may	  run	  as	  hard	  as	  he	  can,	  and	  strain	  every	  nerve	  and	  every	  muscle,	  in	  order	  to	  outstrip	  all	  his	  competitors.	  But	  if	  he	  should	  justle,	  or	  throw	  down	  any	  of	  them,	  the	  indulgence	  of	  the	  spectators	  is	  entirely	  at	  an	  end.	  It	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  fair	  play,	  which	  they	  cannot	  admit	  of.	  This	  man	  is	  to	  them,	  in	  every	  respect,	  as	  good	  as	  he:	  they	  do	  not	  enter	  into	  that	  self–love	  by	  which	  he	  prefers	  himself	  so	  much	  to	  this	  other,	  and	  cannot	  go	  along	  with	  the	  motive	  from	  which	  he	  hurt	  him.	  (Smith,	  1982,	  82)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Many	  readers	  may	  be	  aware	  that	  one	  area	  of	  Smith	  scholarship	  focuses	  on	  what	  has	  become	  known	  as	  the	  “Adam	  Smith	  problem,”	  or	  the	  “question	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  intensely	  moral	  focus	  of..	  the	  Theory	  of	  Moral	  Sentiments	  and	  the	  moral	  indifference	  of	  the	  Wealth	  of	  Nations”	  (Heilbroner,	  1982	  [quoted	  in	  Shapiro,	  1993]).	  For	  two	  reasons,	  I	  do	  not	  directly	  address	  this	  “problem.”	  First,	  I	  am	  not	  at	  all	  convinced	  it	  is	  a	  real	  problem.	  See	  the	  discussion	  on	  wages	  below,	  for	  example,	  for	  evidence	  that	  the	  Smith	  of	  the	  Wealth	  of	  Nations	  is	  not	  entirely	  morally	  indifferent.	  Second,	  I	  am	  convinced	  by	  Michael	  Shapiro’s	  argument	  that	  for	  analyses	  that	  are	  concerened	  not	  with	  “isolat[ing]	  the	  ‘real’	  Adam	  Smith,”	  but	  instead	  focusing	  on	  the	  kinds	  of	  problems	  and	  solutions	  Smith	  proposes,	  such	  a	  reconciliation	  is	  not	  necessary.	  Instead,	  using	  Shapiro’s	  idea	  of	  the	  “Smith	  Effect,”	  one	  may	  take	  any	  apparent	  contradictions	  in	  stride	  because	  “Adam	  Smith	  is	  important	  to	  traditionalists	  because	  he	  helped	  to	  shape	  the	  modern	  political	  condition	  (as	  if	  that	  ‘condition’	  were	  quescent,	  consistent,	  and	  unambiguous)	  (1993,	  xxvii).”	  Because	  I	  am	  attempting	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Smith’s	  ideas	  may	  be	  differentiated	  from	  the	  contemporary	  concept	  of	  the	  economy,	  unless	  I	  accept	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “true”	  Adam	  Smith	  to	  be	  found	  underneath	  and	  through	  his	  writing	  (which	  I	  do	  not),	  contradictions	  and	  inconsistencies	  in	  his	  work	  are	  not	  a	  problem.	  Instead,	  they	  are	  evidence	  that	  Smith’s	  own	  views	  were	  themselves	  ambiguous.	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  Smith	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  whatever	  happens	  in	  the	  race	  for	  wealth	  is	  “just	  business,”	  immune	  from	  all	  other	  considerations.	  Instead,	  he	  suggests	  that	  we	  should	  not	  expect	  the	  butcher	  or	  the	  baker	  to	  give	  us	  anything	  solely	  out	  of	  the	  goodness	  of	  their	  own	  hearts,	  but	  that	  we	  should	  expect	  them	  to	  deal	  with	  us	  fairly	  and	  honestly.	  Their	  action	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  self-­‐love	  is	  mitigated	  by	  their	  allegiance	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  fair	  play.	  Smith	  would	  likely	  find	  more	  resonance	  in	  Google’s	  “Don’t	  be	  evil,”	  than	  in	  Gordon	  Gecko’s	  “Greed	  is	  good.”	  Finally,	  it’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  these	  transactions	  all	  occur,	  for	  Smith,	  on	  a	  very	  personal	  level	  –	  we	  appeal	  directly	  to	  the	  butcher	  or	  the	  baker,	  and	  he	  or	  she	  acts	  on	  the	  basis	  on	  self-­‐love	  and	  a	  desire	  for	  esteem.	  There	  is	  no	  impersonal	  realm	  of	  economy	  in	  Smith’s	  writings.	  	   The	  third	  criterion	  I	  identify	  for	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  is	  that	  it	  functions	  as	  a	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality,	  serving	  to	  naturalize	  real	  inequalities	  that	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  issues	  generally	  understood	  as	  political	  or	  social.	  The	  economy	  serves	  to	  separate	  these	  inequalities	  from	  the	  functioning	  of	  our	  political	  and	  social	  institutions,	  allowing	  the	  illusion	  of	  formal	  equality	  to	  be	  maintained.	  A	  comparison	  between	  Smith’s	  discussion	  of	  rising	  wages	  for	  the	  working	  poor	  and	  Thomas	  Friedman’s	  discussion	  of	  low	  wages	  at	  Wal-­‐Mart	  may	  serve	  to	  illuminate	  this	  discussion:	  So	  the	  Wal-­‐Mart	  shareholder	  and	  shopper	  in	  us	  wants	  Wal-­‐Mart	  to	  be	  relentless	  about	  removing	  the	  fat	  and	  friction	  in	  its	  supply	  chain	  and	  in	  its	  employee	  benefits	  packages	  in	  order	  to	  fatten	  the	  companies	  profits	  –	  and	  to	  keep	  its	  prices	  low.	  But	  the	  Wal-­‐Mart	  worker	  in	  us	  hates	  the	  limited	  benefits	  and	  low	  pay	  packages	  that	  Wal-­‐Mart	  offers	  its	  starting	  employees.	  And	  the	  Wal-­‐Mart	  citizen	  in	  us	  knows	  that	  because	  Wal-­‐Mart,	  the	  biggest	  company	  in	  America,	  doesn’t	  cover	  all	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its	  employees	  with	  health	  care,	  some	  of	  them	  will	  just	  to	  go	  the	  emergency	  ward	  of	  the	  local	  hospital	  and	  the	  taxpayers	  will	  end	  up	  picking	  up	  the	  tab.	  (2004,	  251)	  	  For	  Friedman,	  we	  must	  begin	  by	  examining	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  our	  fragmented	  identities,	  each	  of	  which	  occupies	  a	  different	  position,	  feel	  about	  Wal-­‐Mart’s	  wages.	  There	  is	  no	  undifferentiated	  society	  as	  it	  appears	  in	  Smith’s	  writing.	  Instead,	  we	  first	  experience	  Wal-­‐Mart’s	  wage	  policy	  from	  our	  position	  as	  shareholders	  and	  shoppers.	  From	  these	  positions,	  located	  firmly	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  economy,	  Wal-­‐Mart’s	  low	  wages	  look	  great,	  as	  they	  lead	  directly	  to	  high	  profits	  and	  low	  prices,	  maximizing	  our	  own	  economy	  benefit.	  Moreover,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  citizens	  (leaving	  aside	  the	  terrifying	  concept	  of	  the	  “Wal-­‐Mart	  citizen”)	  what	  we	  see	  are	  not	  the	  potential	  political	  and	  social	  inequalities	  that	  may	  be	  created	  by	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  poverty-­‐level	  low	  wage	  work	  force	  with	  limited	  access	  to	  health	  care,	  but	  instead	  the	  potential	  taxpayer	  costs	  of	  the	  inevitable	  need	  of	  at	  least	  some	  of	  this	  underclass	  to	  access	  health	  care.	  It	  is	  only	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  workers	  themselves,	  for	  Friedman,	  that	  these	  low	  wages	  seem	  problematic	  in	  and	  of	  themselves.	  	   In	  contrast,	  Smith	  offers	  a	  view	  of	  the	  question	  of	  rising	  wages	  that	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  his	  view	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  than	  Friedman’s:	  Is	  this	  improvement	  in	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  lower	  ranks	  of	  the	  people	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  advantage	  or	  as	  an	  inconveniency	  to	  the	  society?	  The	  answer	  seems	  at	  first	  sight	  abundantly	  plain.	  Servants,	  labourers	  and	  workmen	  of	  different	  kinds,	  make	  up	  the	  far	  greater	  part	  of	  every	  great	  political	  society.	  But	  what	  improves	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  greater	  part	  can	  never	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  inconveniency	  to	  the	  whole.	  No	  society	  can	  surely	  be	  flourishing	  and	  happy,	  of	  which	  the	  far	  greater	  part	  of	  the	  members	  are	  poor	  and	  miserable.	  It	  is	  but	  equity,	  besides,	  that	  they	  who	  feed,	  cloath	  and	  lodge	  the	  whole	  body	  of	  the	  people,	  should	  have	  such	  a	  share	  of	  the	  produce	  of	  their	  own	  labour	  as	  to	  be	  themselves	  tolerably	  well	  fed,	  cloathed	  and	  lodged.	  (1981,	  117)	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  Smith	  suggests	  that	  the	  rising	  wages	  of	  the	  poor	  should	  be	  considered	  not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  utility	  to	  some	  impersonal	  concept	  of	  economy,	  but	  rather	  on	  whether	  they	  are	  an	  “advantage”	  or	  an	  “inconveniency”	  to	  society.	  In	  addition,	  he	  determines	  that,	  despite	  their	  inevitable	  role	  in	  raising	  the	  cost	  of	  goods,	  they	  must	  overall	  be	  an	  advantage	  because	  “No	  society	  can…	  be	  flourishing	  and	  happy,	  of	  which	  the	  far	  greater	  part…	  are	  poor	  and	  miserable.”	  Moreover,	  he	  tells	  us,	  this	  is	  an	  issue	  not	  simply	  of	  efficiency,	  but	  also	  of	  equity.	  In	  all,	  the	  question	  of	  rising	  wages	  is,	  for	  Smith,	  entirely	  a	  question	  of	  the	  overall	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  individuals	  who	  make	  up	  society	  as	  people,	  and	  this	  calculus	  involves	  no	  distinction	  between	  people	  as	  social	  and	  political	  units	  and	  people	  as	  economic	  units.	  If	  Smith	  can	  serve	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  he	  shouldn’t	  also	  be	  able	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  economy	  that	  suggests	  that	  such	  a	  realm	  does	  not	  exist.	  That	  is,	  because	  Smith	  has	  been	  erroneously	  deployed	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  (and	  implicitly,	  should	  be)	  such	  a	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality,	  a	  demonstration	  that	  he	  did	  not,	  in	  fact,	  hold	  such	  a	  view	  can	  call	  the	  sanctity	  of	  the	  idea	  into	  question	  and	  remove	  some	  of	  its	  perceived	  ideological	  and	  historical	  support.	  Moreover,	  an	  effort	  to	  reimagine	  the	  economy	  that	  uses	  Smith’s	  support	  for	  equity	  as	  one	  of	  its	  own	  historical	  foundations	  might	  be	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  some	  of	  the	  prior	  work	  that	  has	  been	  done	  in	  establishing	  Smith	  as	  a	  historical	  authority	  regarding	  the	  economy.	  There	  is	  no	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality	  in	  Smith’s	  writings.	  	   My	  fourth	  claim	  regarding	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  is	  that	  it	  functions	  as	  a	  potentially	  infinite	  realm	  of	  growth,	  serving	  to	  release	  some	  of	  the	  tension	  that	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might	  otherwise	  emerge	  as	  a	  result	  of	  capitalism’s	  endless	  requirement	  of	  expansion.	  As	  Mitchell	  puts	  it,	  the	  economy	  can	  “be	  imagined	  to	  grow	  –	  without	  altering	  its	  physical	  limits”	  (Mitchell,	  1998,	  90).	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  Smith	  believes	  that	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  the	  increase	  of	  wealth	  in	  individual	  nations,	  and	  that	  these	  limits	  are	  based	  upon	  the	  physical	  characteristics	  of	  these	  nations’	  territory	  (Smith,	  1981).	  This	  highlights	  a	  substantial	  distinction	  between	  Smith’s	  understanding	  of	  wealth	  and	  the	  contemporary	  concept	  of	  the	  economy;	  for	  Smith,	  wealth	  is	  material.	  The	  only	  way	  in	  which	  a	  nation	  can	  increase	  its	  wealth	  beyond	  the	  limits	  set	  by	  the	  characteristics	  of	  its	  territory	  is	  to	  gain	  new	  territory.	  While	  this	  physical	  territory	  may,	  in	  the	  late	  18th	  century,	  give	  the	  general	  appearance	  of	  being	  effectively	  limitless,	  it	  does	  not	  fulfill	  the	  same	  metaphysical	  role	  that	  a	  conceptually	  limitless,	  non-­‐physical	  economy	  fulfills.	  One	  might	  imagine	  a	  limit	  to	  geographic	  expansion	  –	  indeed,	  any	  scholar	  in	  the	  18th	  century	  would	  have	  conceded	  that,	  while	  there	  might	  have	  been	  enough	  land	  to	  make	  territory	  effectively	  limitless,	  there	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  territory	  in	  the	  world.	  In	  contrast,	  few	  economists	  today	  would	  agree	  that	  there	  is	  a	  hard	  and	  fast	  limit	  to	  economic	  growth.	  Instead,	  we	  tend	  to	  understand	  limits	  to	  the	  rate	  of	  growth,	  with	  the	  implicit	  understanding	  that	  growth	  itself	  is	  the	  only	  real	  constant.	  There	  is	  no	  potentially	  infinite	  realm	  of	  economy	  in	  Smith’s	  writings.	  	   My	  fifth	  criterion	  for	  the	  economy	  is	  that	  it	  is	  natural	  and	  inevitable	  –	  its	  laws	  are	  presented	  as	  so	  inexorable,	  its	  imperatives	  so	  inescapable,	  that	  its	  demands	  override	  mere	  human	  concerns.	  We	  are	  powerless	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  economy;	  we	  must	  do	  as	  it	  dictates.	  Given	  the	  four	  foregoing	  points,	  it	  seems	  that	  while	  one	  might	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make	  the	  case	  that	  Smith	  found	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  “tendency	  to	  truck	  and	  barter”	  to	  be	  inevitable,	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  this	  translates	  to	  an	  inevitable	  realm	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  tend	  to	  talk	  about	  it	  today.	  If	  we	  are	  powerless	  in	  the	  face	  of	  anything,	  according	  to	  Smith,	  it	  is	  the	  individual	  tendency	  to	  attempt	  to	  make	  a	  profit.	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  laws	  prohibiting	  the	  export	  of	  gold	  and	  silver,	  Smith	  notes	  that	  while	  the	  arguments	  made	  against	  such	  laws	  were	  “partly	  solid	  and	  partly	  sophistical,”	  they	  were	  solid	  insofar	  as	  they	  asserted	  that	  “no	  prohibition	  could	  prevent	  their	  exportation,	  when	  private	  people	  found	  any	  advantage	  in	  exporting	  them”	  (1981,	  350).	  People	  cannot	  be	  stopped	  from	  attempting	  to	  profit;	  however,	  because	  they	  are	  also	  subject	  to	  other	  motivations,	  they	  may	  be	  influenced	  in	  their	  activities.	  They	  may	  be	  stopped	  from	  a	  particular	  path	  that	  leads	  to	  profit,	  for	  example,	  if	  it	  contravenes	  the	  rules	  of	  “fair	  play”	  as	  enumerated	  above	  in	  the	  Theory	  of	  Moral	  Sentiments.	  Smith’s	  inevitability	  lies	  on	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  motivations,	  rather	  than	  large-­‐scale	  societal	  forces;	  there	  is	  no	  separate,	  inevitable	  realm	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  Smith’s	  work.	  	   Sixth,	  and	  finally,	  there	  is	  no	  agential	  economy	  present	  in	  Smith’s	  writing.	  Insofar	  as	  we	  focus	  on	  his	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “economy”	  itself,	  we	  see	  that	  it	  only	  describes	  other	  things,	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  aspire	  to	  agency.	  If,	  instead,	  we	  focus	  on	  Smith’s	  general	  stock,	  we	  find	  ourselves	  looking	  at	  a	  pile	  of	  material	  goods,	  which	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  important,	  but	  which	  cannot	  be	  thought	  to	  have	  agency.	  	  
E.	  Conclusion	  	   	  	  So,	  if	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  (or	  the	  “economy	  effect,”	  as	  we	  have	  been	  
	  159	  
referring	  to	  it	  is	  different	  in	  dramatic	  ways	  from	  the	  object	  of	  Smith’s	  inquiry,	  and	  if	  despite	  this	  difference	  we	  tend	  to	  write	  and	  talk	  about	  Smith’s	  work	  as	  thought	  its	  object	  was	  the	  contemporary	  economy,	  what	  importance	  might	  we	  find	  in	  this	  fact	  for	  our	  examination	  of	  the	  economy	  effect	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  the	  possibilities	  for	  political	  action?	  	  	   One	  important	  point,	  as	  noted	  above,	  is	  that	  the	  reading	  back	  of	  the	  economy	  onto	  thinkers	  like	  Smith	  contributes	  to	  its	  appearance	  of	  naturalness	  and	  inevitability.	  If	  the	  economy	  is	  understood	  not	  as	  a	  relatively	  new	  product	  of	  efforts	  to	  solve	  particular	  political	  and	  intellectual	  problems,	  but	  instead	  as	  an	  always-­‐already	  existing	  sphere	  of	  human	  activity	  to	  be	  uncovered,	  discovered,	  examined,	  and	  analyzed,	  then	  the	  results	  of	  these	  analyses	  and	  examinations	  take	  on	  a	  sense	  of	  authority	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  oppose.	  In	  its	  simplest	  form,	  the	  argument	  here	  is	  that	  the	  economy	  effect,	  by	  encouraging	  us	  to	  read	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  human	  activity	  onto	  a	  past	  that	  did	  not	  perceive	  it,	  constrains	  our	  capacity	  to	  understand	  economic	  activity	  as	  mutable	  and	  susceptible	  to	  intentional	  political	  and	  conceptual	  intervention.	  	  	   This	  dynamic	  has	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  substantial	  impact	  on	  the	  possibilities	  for	  political	  action	  in	  the	  present.	  If,	  by	  contributing	  to	  such	  a	  sense	  of	  naturalness	  and	  inevitability,	  the	  reading	  back	  of	  the	  economy	  onto	  Smith	  and	  his	  contemporaries	  helps	  to	  make	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  economy	  appear	  as	  immutable	  discoveries	  of	  science	  (like	  gravity	  or	  relativity)	  rather	  than	  contingent,	  normative	  statements	  made	  by	  individuals	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  a	  particular	  outcome,	  then	  it	  will	  also	  tend	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  mobilizing	  any	  kind	  of	  significant	  political	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activity	  which	  appears	  to	  oppose	  these	  immutable	  rules.	  After	  all,	  who	  would	  waste	  their	  time	  engaging	  in	  politics	  the	  goal	  of	  which	  was	  to	  encourage	  action	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  some	  alternate	  understanding	  of	  gravity?	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  resistance	  to	  such	  a	  sense	  of	  inevitability	  (through	  the	  construction	  of	  alternative	  narratives	  of	  the	  economy)	  might	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  loosen	  some	  of	  these	  constraints,	  making	  it	  less	  difficult	  to	  engage	  in	  political	  projects	  that	  are	  aimed	  at	  diminishing,	  or	  mitigating	  the	  effects	  of,	  material	  inequality.	  	  	   This	  story	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  one	  of	  unidirectional	  cause	  and	  effect,	  though.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  reading	  back	  of	  the	  economy	  effect	  onto	  thinkers	  like	  Smith	  contributes	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  naturalness	  and	  inevitability	  that	  we	  attribute	  to	  the	  economy,	  the	  reverse	  is	  also	  taking	  place.	  That	  is,	  the	  sense	  of	  naturalness	  and	  inevitability	  that	  comes	  with	  the	  economy	  effect	  directly	  contributes	  to	  our	  tendency	  to	  read	  it	  back	  onto	  thinkers	  whose	  work	  precedes	  it.	  If	  the	  economy	  really	  is	  natural	  and	  inevitable,	  we	  might	  think,	  then	  Smith	  must	  have	  been	  talking	  about	  it,	  even	  if	  he	  did	  not	  yet	  have	  the	  language	  to	  do	  so	  using	  the	  same	  words	  we	  do.	  	   When	  we	  think	  about	  this	  direction	  in	  the	  intercausal	  relationship	  we’re	  describing,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  economy	  effect	  functions	  not	  only	  to	  constrain	  our	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  politically	  possible	  in	  the	  present,	  but	  also	  our	  construction	  of	  narratives	  of	  the	  past.	  We	  are,	  for	  example,	  constrained	  in	  our	  reading	  of	  Smith	  by	  our	  underlying	  belief	  in	  the	  givenness	  of	  the	  economy	  effect,	  such	  that	  we	  contort	  our	  readings	  of	  his	  work	  in	  order	  to	  fit	  it	  to	  what	  we	  understand	  to	  be	  true	  about	  the	  economy.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  we	  construct	  a	  narrative	  of	  the	  history	  of	  ideas	  about	  
	  161	  
economic	  activity	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  these	  ideas	  seems	  to	  lead	  inevitably	  to	  the	  discovery	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  	   Recognition	  of	  this	  intercausality	  suggests	  that	  one	  may	  loosen	  this	  knot	  from	  either	  end.	  That	  is,	  as	  noted	  above,	  combatting	  the	  tendency	  to	  read	  the	  economy	  back	  on	  thinkers	  like	  Smith	  helps	  to	  weaken	  the	  sense	  of	  inevitability	  and	  naturalness	  that	  inheres	  in	  the	  economy,	  but	  resistance	  to	  this	  sense	  of	  inevitability	  and	  naturalness	  itself	  also	  helps	  to	  remove	  some	  of	  the	  constraints	  on	  our	  readings	  of	  historical	  theorists.	  If	  the	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  approaches	  is	  difficult	  to	  parse,	  it	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  is	  always	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  between	  our	  understanding	  of	  a	  particular	  element	  of	  history	  and	  our	  implicit	  beliefs	  regarding	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  human	  condition	  that	  are	  immutable	  and	  transhistorical.	  This	  may	  be	  part	  of	  why	  it	  so	  hard	  to	  “get	  out	  of	  the	  box”	  that	  is	  formed	  by	  the	  economy	  effect;	  it	  forms	  such	  a	  part	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  tend	  to	  understand	  the	  world	  as	  given	  that	  it	  is	  easy	  not	  to	  notice	  when	  we	  project	  it	  onto	  historical	  objects	  (or	  future	  imaginaries).	  The	  result	  is	  that	  our	  own	  conceptions	  and	  imaginations	  of	  the	  past	  and	  future	  support	  the	  claim	  of	  the	  economy’s	  naturalness	  and	  inevitability.	  	  	   If	  we	  attempt	  to	  work	  through	  this	  difficulty,	  however,	  we	  might	  begin	  to	  see	  that	  by	  giving	  up	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  necessary	  and	  natural	  distinction	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  everything	  else,	  we	  render	  it	  possible	  to	  view	  Smith	  not	  as	  an	  early	  discoverer	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  economy,	  but	  instead	  (for	  example)	  as	  a	  theorist	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  mechanism	  of	  the	  market	  can	  aid	  human	  efforts	  to	  cooperate	  and	  undertake	  large	  scale	  projects.	  In	  such	  a	  reading,	  we	  would	  direct	  our	  primary	  attention	  not	  to	  those	  portions	  of	  Smith’s	  work	  that	  seem	  amenable	  to	  the	  picture	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we	  already	  have	  in	  our	  minds	  of	  what	  the	  economy	  looks	  like,	  but	  instead	  to	  the	  types	  of	  government	  controls	  that	  Smith	  actually	  advocates	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  markets	  function	  in	  the	  way	  he	  suggests	  they	  might.	  	  	   With	  such	  a	  goal	  in	  mind,	  we	  might	  look	  at	  Smith’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  company,	  which	  highlights	  these	  less-­‐examined	  aspects	  of	  Smith’s	  thought.	  Such	  a	  company,	  Smith	  suggests,	  differs	  in	  “several”	  ways	  from	  the	  other	  types	  of	  business	  units	  he	  identifies	  (regulated	  companies	  and	  private	  copartneries).	  First,	  it	  differs	  in	  that,	  unlike	  a	  private	  copartnery,	  owners	  of	  stock	  in	  joint-­‐stock	  companies	  are	  free	  to	  transfer	  their	  stock	  to	  whomever	  they	  may	  choose	  at	  any	  time,	  but	  are	  not	  entitled	  to	  demand	  that	  the	  other	  owners	  of	  stock	  buy	  out	  their	  share	  if	  they	  want	  to	  get	  out	  of	  the	  venture.	  Second,	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  limits	  the	  liability	  of	  shareholders	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  holdings	  in	  the	  company	  (Smith,	  1904,	  V.1.104-­‐106).	  In	  both	  these	  respects,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  respect	  that	  such	  a	  structure	  can	  only	  be	  instigated	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  state	  (which	  is	  itself	  also	  an	  effect),	  Smith’s	  joint-­‐stock	  company	  closely	  resembles	  the	  contemporary	  public	  corporation.	  As	  such,	  the	  following	  assertion	  has	  some	  interesting	  implications:	  To	  establish	  a	  joint-­‐stock	  company,	  however,	  for	  any	  undertaking,	  merely	  because	  such	  a	  company	  might	  be	  capable	  of	  managing	  it	  successfully;	  or	  to	  exempt	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  dealers	  from	  some	  of	  the	  general	  laws	  which	  take	  place	  with	  regard	  to	  all	  their	  neighbours,	  merely	  because	  the	  might	  be	  capable	  of	  thriving	  if	  they	  had	  such	  an	  exemption,	  would	  certainly	  not	  be	  reasonable.	  To	  render	  such	  an	  establishment	  perfectly	  reasonable,	  with	  the	  curcumstance	  of	  being	  reducible	  to	  strict	  rule	  and	  method,	  two	  other	  curcumstances	  ought	  to	  concur.	  First,	  it	  ought	  to	  appear	  with	  	  the	  clearest	  evidence	  that	  the	  undertaking	  is	  of	  greater	  and	  more	  general	  utility	  that	  the	  greater	  part	  of	  common	  trades;	  and	  secondly,	  that	  it	  requires	  a	  greater	  capital	  than	  can	  easily	  be	  be	  collected	  into	  a	  private	  copartnery.	  (1904,	  V.1.125)	  	  First,	  this	  passage	  suggests	  that	  Smith	  doesn’t	  believe	  that	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  company	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should	  be	  nearly	  as	  common	  as	  it	  has	  become	  today,	  which	  casts	  some	  doubt	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  system	  Smith	  was	  advocating	  had	  much	  to	  do	  with	  the	  contemporary	  economy.	  Second,	  and	  far	  more	  important	  for	  our	  purposes,	  it	  suggests	  that	  despite	  the	  first	  point,	  he	  did	  believe	  that	  the	  form	  was	  appropriate	  for	  undertakings	  that	  had	  great	  general	  utility	  and	  required	  exceptional	  treatment	  in	  order	  to	  come	  to	  fruition.	  In	  short,	  this	  is	  an	  assertion	  that	  the	  mechanism	  of	  the	  market	  should	  be	  manipulated	  by	  the	  state	  (through	  the	  granting	  of	  the	  priveleges	  inhering	  in	  the	  joint-­‐stock	  company)	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  promoting	  the	  general	  welfare.	  	  	   Like	  many	  other	  passages	  in	  Smith’s	  work,	  if	  we	  work	  to	  think	  through	  this	  passage	  without	  assuming	  the	  economy	  effect,	  we	  can	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  his	  overall	  theory	  not	  as	  one	  of	  how	  the	  economy	  works,	  but	  instead	  of	  how	  the	  market	  (or	  markets,	  as	  for	  Smith	  these	  were	  almost	  always	  literal	  locations	  in	  which	  trading	  took	  place)	  might	  be	  constructed	  and	  manipulated	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  statecraft.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  market	  is	  not	  necessarily	  different	  from	  the	  family	  or	  the	  school;	  it	  is	  simply	  one	  of	  many	  institutions	  available	  to	  the	  state	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  undertaking	  activity	  that	  is	  generally	  beneficial	  to	  the	  populace.	  	  	  	   By	  working	  to	  understand	  the	  history	  of	  the	  economy	  effect	  not	  simply	  as	  a	  set	  of	  facts	  regarding	  the	  discovery	  of	  specific	  aspects	  or	  truths	  about	  this	  realm	  of	  human	  activity,	  but	  also	  (or	  perhaps,	  even	  moreso)	  as	  a	  narrative	  about	  that	  process	  that	  imposes	  its	  own	  suppositions	  and	  inflections,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  construction	  of	  alternative	  narratives	  of	  the	  past,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  hinted	  at	  above,	  might	  have	  the	  power	  literally	  to	  change	  history.	  If	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  present	  is	  based	  on	  a	  conception	  of	  path-­‐dependency,	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CHAPTER	  4	  
CONCEPTUAL	  INNOVATION	  AND	  THE	  GREEN	  ECONOMY	  
A.	  Introduction	  	   In	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  we	  examined	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  effect	  has	  been	  produced	  and	  maintained	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  six	  criteria	  I	  have	  laid	  out	  (see	  Chapter	  1),	  and	  also	  how	  it	  both	  constrains	  and	  is	  constrained	  by	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  economy.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  will	  take	  a	  look	  at	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  alternatives	  to	  “the	  economy”	  are	  constructed,	  with	  special	  attention	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  effect	  serves	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  efforts	  to	  reconfigure	  our	  patterns	  of	  production,	  consumption,	  and	  distribution,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  overwhelming	  political	  and	  practical	  forces	  calling	  for	  such	  a	  reconfiguration.	  We	  will	  focus	  in	  particular	  on	  the	  green	  economy.40	  	  “Alternative	  economies”	  are	  interesting	  for	  our	  purpose	  because,	  like	  many	  other	  claims	  regarding	  reconfigured	  patterns	  of	  economic	  activity,	  they	  start	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  we	  already	  know	  what	  the	  unmodified	  economy	  is.	  Such	  assumptions	  form	  a	  fascinating	  starting	  point	  for	  an	  inquiry	  into	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  think	  about	  the	  economy	  in	  general,	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  proposed	  conceptual	  innovations	  like	  “sharing.”	  While	  we	  tend	  to	  treat	  the	  economy	  as	  though	  it	  were	  axiomatic,	  an	  inevitable,	  always	  pre-­‐given,	  and	  always	  already	  understood	  phenomenon,	  it	  proves	  to	  be	  much	  more	  slippery	  than	  this	  when	  we	  attempt	  to	  look	  directly	  at	  it,	  rather	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  We’ll	  examine	  the	  sharing	  economy	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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than	  at	  its	  effects.	  For	  example,	  the	  best	  definition	  of	  the	  economy	  the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  can	  provide	  is	  “The	  organization	  or	  condition	  of	  a	  community	  or	  nation	  with	  respect	  to	  economic	  factors,	  esp.	  the	  production	  and	  consumption	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  and	  the	  supply	  of	  money	  (now	  freq.	  with	  the);	  (also)	  a	  particular	  economic	  system.”	  (OED)	  This	  definition	  can	  hardly	  account	  for	  uses	  such	  as	  “The	  economy	  added	  fifty	  thousand	  jobs	  last	  month”	  or	  “We	  won’t	  be	  able	  to	  fund	  healthcare	  in	  this	  bad	  economy.”	  We	  discuss	  it	  constantly,	  but	  define	  it	  only	  rarely	  and	  vaguely,	  in	  part	  because	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  a	  definition	  that	  could	  cover	  all	  of	  the	  myriad	  uses	  to	  which	  the	  economy	  can	  be	  put.	  There	  is	  widespread	  agreement	  that	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  determinants	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  of	  (at	  the	  very	  least)	  most	  citizens	  of	  liberal	  (or	  neoliberal)	  democracies,	  but	  what	  little	  consensus	  there	  is	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  its	  function	  and	  mechanics	  and	  the	  policies	  directed	  toward	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  derived	  from	  faith	  rather	  than	  evidence.	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  important	  to	  political	  outcomes	  is,	  at	  this	  point,	  so	  obvious	  as	  to	  appear	  banal,	  and	  yet	  the	  economy	  is	  in	  many	  respects	  treated	  as	  external	  to	  politics,	  acting	  upon	  them,	  and	  reacting	  to	  them,	  but	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  whims	  of	  political	  decision-­‐making.	  	  We	  might,	  in	  this	  respect,	  think	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  being	  something	  like	  a	  particularly	  difficult	  international	  ally.	  Obviously,	  our	  relationship	  with	  this	  ally	  is	  important	  to	  political	  outcomes,	  and	  we	  expect	  our	  representatives	  to	  do	  as	  good	  a	  job	  as	  possible	  of	  moving	  toward	  our	  goals	  in	  their	  interactions	  with	  this	  ally,	  but	  we	  do	  not	  expect	  them	  to	  have	  complete	  control	  over	  these	  interactions,	  and	  we	  recognize	  that	  the	  parameters	  for	  possible	  action	  are	  always	  already	  set	  by	  the	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inherent	  characteristics	  of	  the	  ally	  in	  question.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  we	  don’t	  (as	  noted	  above)	  understand	  there	  to	  be	  some	  relationship	  between	  policy	  and	  economic	  outcomes,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  perceived	  inevitability	  and	  naturalness	  of	  the	  economy	  heavily	  constrains	  the	  political	  choices	  that	  are	  available	  to	  any	  candidate	  for	  public	  office	  who	  wishes	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously,	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  it	  constrains	  negotiations	  in	  the	  workplace.	  There	  may	  be	  differences	  in	  the	  economic	  policy	  of	  various	  candidates,	  but	  this	  difference	  is	  not,	  by	  and	  large,	  a	  difference	  that	  makes	  a	  difference	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  economy.	  Instead,	  we	  speak	  as	  if	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  fixed	  object	  (the	  exact	  workings	  of	  which	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  debate)	  and	  the	  goal	  of	  policy	  is	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  correct	  view	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  constantly	  changing	  object	  in	  order	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  constraints	  it	  imposes.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  the	  following	  statement	  from	  an	  article	  in	  the	  New	  Republic	  is	  intelligible:	  “To	  judge	  Obama’s	  economic	  policies	  based	  on	  the	  economy’s	  actual	  performance	  ignores	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  presidency”	  (Vinik,	  2014).	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  difficulties	  the	  economy	  presents	  for	  political	  thinkers	  interested	  in	  subverting	  the	  assumption	  that	  we	  must	  tailor	  our	  political	  decision	  making	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  this	  amorphous	  object	  is	  that	  its	  everyday	  use	  involves	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  slippage,	  which	  provides	  evidence	  of	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  unspoken	  (and	  perhaps	  unconscious)	  assumptions	  about	  its	  nature.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  the	  OED	  definition	  described	  above	  is	  so	  profoundly	  unsatisfying;	  we	  know	  from	  our	  own	  experience	  that	  the	  economy,	  in	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  speech,	  is	  more	  than	  this.	  We	  know	  that	  a	  straightforward	  definition	  like	  the	  OED’s	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  we	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can	  intelligibly	  say	  both	  that	  “Traditionally,	  the	  economy	  demands	  people	  in	  a	  ratio	  of	  1	  to	  2	  to	  7…[o]ne	  person	  with	  a	  doctorate,	  two	  college	  graduates	  and	  seven	  tradespeople”	  (Piersol,	  2015)	  and	  that	  “Global	  energy	  emissions	  stayed	  stable	  last	  year	  even	  though	  the	  economy	  grew…”	  (AP,	  2015).	  	  An	  “organization	  or	  condition”	  can	  neither	  demand	  nor	  grow.	  Moreover,	  when	  we	  examine	  the	  evidence	  that	  “the	  economy	  grew”	  last	  year,	  we	  see	  that	  we’re	  talking	  about	  GDP	  (see	  our	  discussion	  in	  Chapter	  3).	  As	  we	  know,	  this	  is	  only	  one	  of	  the	  senses	  in	  which	  “the	  economy”	  can	  be	  used,	  and	  it’s	  difficult	  to	  reconcile	  this	  sense,	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  sum	  total	  of	  goods	  and	  services,	  with	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  might	  be	  an	  actor	  capable	  of	  making	  demands.	  	  Thus,	  while	  in	  the	  context	  of	  careful	  and	  critical	  thought	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  economy	  we	  might	  attempt	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  its	  nature	  is	  difficult	  to	  pin	  down,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  day	  to	  day	  conversations	  about	  politics	  we	  can	  neither	  be	  sure	  that	  people	  are	  talking	  about	  the	  same	  thing	  when	  they	  talk	  about	  the	  economy,	  nor	  that	  they	  are	  making	  conscious	  decisions	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  talk	  about	  it.	  	  However,	  by	  examining	  the	  discourses	  surrounding	  alternatives	  posed	  to	  the	  mainstream	  economy,	  such	  as	  the	  sharing	  or	  green	  economies,	  we	  might	  both	  gain	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  “the	  economy”	  and	  begin	  to	  develop	  the	  conceptual	  resources	  necessary	  to	  imagine	  concrete	  alternatives.	  These	  discourses	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  this	  way	  because,	  in	  order	  to	  pose	  an	  alternative	  to	  something	  like	  the	  economy,	  we	  must	  have	  in	  mind	  some	  idea	  of	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  original	  concept	  itself.	  That	  is,	  if	  I	  want	  to	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  green	  economy	  is	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  mainstream	  economy,	  this	  claim	  requires	  some	  conception	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(conscious	  or	  otherwise)	  of	  the	  point	  at	  which	  a	  given	  set	  of	  practices	  and	  relationships	  ceases	  to	  qualify	  as	  part	  of	  the	  mainstream	  economy.	  In	  order	  to	  name	  something	  as	  an	  alternative,	  I	  require	  some	  concept	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  differs	  from	  the	  original	  object.	  Through	  careful	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  discourses	  of	  “alternative”	  economies	  describe	  them	  as	  alternatives	  to	  the	  mainstream	  economy,	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  identify	  some	  of	  the	  borders	  we	  draw	  around	  the	  mainstream	  economy,	  outside	  of	  which	  we	  no	  longer	  recognize	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  or	  relationships	  as	  part	  of	  the	  economy	  (at	  least	  without	  a	  modifier).	  In	  addition,	  by	  looking	  not	  only	  at	  what	  aspects	  of	  the	  discourse	  change	  when	  we	  go	  from	  economy	  to	  alternative	  economy,	  but	  also	  at	  what	  aspects	  of	  the	  discourse	  seem	  to	  be	  fixed	  (or	  at	  least	  consistent)	  we	  can	  hope	  to	  determine	  what	  features	  are	  necessary	  in	  order	  for	  a	  given	  set	  of	  practices	  or	  relationships	  to	  be	  intelligible	  as	  part	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  economy	  (alternative	  or	  otherwise),	  rather	  than	  simply	  as	  non-­‐economic.	  	  
B.	  Conceptual	  Innovation	  Suppose	  we	  were	  trying	  to	  figure	  out	  what	  people	  mean	  when	  they	  talk	  about	  bicycles.	  Were	  we	  simply	  to	  ask	  people	  what	  a	  bicycle	  was,	  after	  they	  got	  done	  laughing	  at	  us	  for	  asking	  such	  an	  obvious	  question,	  they	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  tell	  us	  something	  like	  “It	  is	  a	  vehicle	  with	  two	  wheels	  that	  is	  powered	  by	  pedaling.”	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  set	  of	  characteristics	  that	  is	  common	  to	  most	  of	  the	  vehicles	  that	  we	  call	  bicycles,	  but	  it	  also	  not	  exhaustive.	  For	  instance,	  if	  we	  asked	  someone	  to	  describe	  a	  tricycle,	  they	  might	  reasonably	  tell	  us	  that	  it	  is	  a	  bicycle	  with	  three	  wheels.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  while	  the	  two	  wheels	  are	  something	  we	  expect	  of	  a	  bicycle,	  the	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concept	  of	  the	  bicycle	  does	  not	  require	  two	  wheels	  in	  order	  to	  be	  sensible.	  The	  tricycle	  is	  an	  alternative	  type	  of	  bicycle,	  in	  that	  it	  differs	  from	  what	  we	  expect	  to	  find	  in	  a	  bicycle,	  but	  is	  not	  so	  different	  that	  is	  not	  recognizable	  as	  part	  of	  the	  broader	  category.	  We	  might	  have	  similar	  conversations	  with	  regard	  to	  electric	  bicycles,	  recumbent	  bicycles,	  or	  tandem	  bicycles.	  However,	  at	  some	  point	  (perhaps	  the	  moped	  or	  the	  motorcycle)	  we	  would	  reach	  an	  item	  that,	  despite	  sharing	  many	  traits	  in	  common	  with	  bicycles	  and	  the	  various	  types	  of	  alternative	  bicycles	  we’ve	  identified,	  would	  not	  be	  identified	  by	  most	  respondents	  as	  a	  type	  of	  bicycle,	  but	  instead	  as	  something	  other	  than	  a	  bicycle.	  In	  this	  example,	  what	  we	  might	  discover	  is	  that	  while	  many	  kinds	  of	  deviations	  from	  the	  common	  ideal	  of	  the	  bicycle	  (number	  of	  wheels,	  angle	  of	  seating,	  number	  of	  riders)	  will	  not	  keep	  an	  object	  from	  being	  intelligible	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  bicycle,	  other	  types	  of	  deviations	  (like	  the	  inclusion	  of	  an	  internal	  combustion	  engine	  or	  an	  enclosed	  passenger	  cabin)	  are	  absolutely	  beyond	  the	  pale	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  original	  object	  in	  question.	  Once	  the	  vehicle	  has	  an	  engine,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  bicycle.41	  Such	  a	  determination	  would	  have	  a	  couple	  of	  interesting	  implications,	  not	  only	  for	  the	  study	  of	  bicycles,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  study	  of	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  transportation.	  That	  is,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  knowing	  that	  if	  the	  vehicle	  has	  an	  engine	  and/or	  an	  enclosed	  passenger	  cabin	  people	  will	  not	  tend	  to	  recognize	  it	  as	  any	  kind	  of	  bicycle	  allows	  us	  to	  refine	  our	  understanding	  of	  what	  people	  mean	  when	  they	  talk	  about	  bicycles.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  suppose	  that	  our	  goal	  in	  such	  an	  undertaking	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  category	  “bicycle,”	  but	  instead	  some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  For	  foundational	  discussions	  of	  “the	  contestability	  of	  social	  concepts”,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  language	  and	  politics,	  see	  MacIntyre	  1973	  and	  Taylor	  1985.	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concrete	  intervention	  in	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  people	  move	  from	  place	  to	  place,	  such	  as	  the	  reduction	  of	  car	  traffic.	  It	  is	  the	  case	  that	  there	  are	  active	  movements	  to	  reduce	  car	  traffic	  based	  around	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  do	  so	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  people	  who	  travel	  by	  bicycle.	  	  When	  we	  look	  at	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  such	  movements,	  we	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  find	  that	  the	  goals	  have	  to	  do	  with	  two	  main	  factors:	  the	  amount	  of	  space	  required	  by	  cars	  (both	  to	  drive	  and	  to	  park)	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  fossil	  fuel	  consumed	  by	  cars	  (relative	  to	  the	  number	  of	  people	  they	  move).	  Moreover,	  we	  might	  also	  find	  that	  these	  movements	  are	  not	  as	  successful	  as	  they	  might	  hope	  to	  be,	  in	  part	  because	  people	  don’t	  view	  a	  transition	  to	  travel	  by	  bicycle	  as	  realistic	  for	  them,	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  engine	  and	  a	  closed	  cabin,	  or	  the	  distance	  they	  must	  travel	  and	  the	  dangerous	  roads.	  The	  point	  of	  this	  somewhat	  tortured	  metaphor,	  as	  I	  think	  should	  now	  be	  clear,	  is	  that	  one	  way	  to	  make	  an	  intervention	  in	  such	  a	  case	  would	  be	  through	  an	  attempt	  at	  innovation	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  bicycle.	  If,	  either	  by	  revising	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  bicycle,	  or	  by	  replacing	  it	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  debates	  over	  traffic	  patterns	  with	  something	  like	  “small,	  efficient	  vehicles”	  we	  could	  arrive	  at	  a	  solution	  that	  centered	  on	  the	  use	  of	  small,	  enclosed,	  fuel-­‐efficient	  vehicles,	  we	  would	  be	  looking	  at	  a	  solution	  made	  possible	  by	  conceptual	  innovation.	  Moreover,	  the	  way	  for	  such	  conceptual	  innovation	  would	  have	  been	  paved	  by	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  category	  “bicycle”	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  movements	  to	  alter	  traffic	  patterns.	  	  We	  can	  see	  an	  example	  of	  such	  a	  conceptual	  innovation	  in	  the	  Renault	  Twizy	  45	  (Figure	  4	  below).	  The	  Twizy	  45	  is	  an	  electric	  vehicle	  that	  Renault	  describes	  as	  a	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“quadricycle”	  (McGlaun,	  2015).	  It	  is	  not,	  according	  to	  most	  of	  the	  criteria	  established	  above,	  a	  bicycle	  of	  any	  kind,	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  a	  small,	  efficient	  vehicle	  that	  takes	  up	  much	  less	  space	  on	  the	  road	  than	  a	  car,	  is	  much	  safer	  than	  a	  bicycle,	  and	  consumes	  very	  little	  energy	  (on	  par	  with	  an	  electric	  bicycle	  or	  scooter).	  Moreover,	  the	  Twizy	  has	  taken	  advantage	  of	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law	  in	  France	  (which	  dictates	  that	  vehicles	  with	  engines	  making	  less	  than	  4kW	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  many	  of	  the	  regulations	  to	  which	  cars	  are	  subject)	  to	  create	  a	  vehicle	  that	  requires	  a	  revision	  of	  our	  conceptual	  categories.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  car,	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  not	  powerful	  enough	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  regulations	  that	  govern	  cars42;	  but	  neither	  is	  it	  a	  bicycle,	  insofar	  as	  it	  provides	  four	  wheels,	  an	  enclosed	  space	  for	  passengers	  or	  cargo,	  and	  safety	  features	  like	  airbags	  and	  anti-­‐lock	  brakes.	  There	  is	  very	  little	  technological	  innovation	  in	  the	  Twizy;	  instead,	  it	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  new	  combinations	  or	  arrangements	  of	  existing	  components	  can	  demand	  revision	  of	  our	  concepts.	  It	  is	  able	  to	  do	  this	  because,	  while	  different	  from	  each,	  it	  is	  not	  so	  far	  from	  either	  a	  car	  or	  a	  bicycle	  that	  it	  loses	  intelligibility	  as	  a	  member	  of	  either	  category.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  For	  example,	  14	  year	  olds	  can	  legally	  drive	  one	  on	  the	  roads.	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  Figure	  4:	  Renault	  Twizy	  	  This	  example,	  of	  course,	  deals	  with	  a	  set	  of	  concepts	  that	  are,	  on	  many	  levels,	  much	  simpler	  to	  manipulate	  and	  discuss	  than	  the	  concepts	  involved	  in	  questions	  of	  the	  economy,	  but	  I	  think	  the	  general	  dynamic	  is	  similar.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  allow	  the	  economy	  to	  perform	  functions	  that	  it	  does	  not	  currently	  perform,	  or	  to	  perform	  the	  functions	  it	  currently	  performs	  differently,	  or	  even	  to	  cease	  to	  exist	  entirely,	  or	  to	  stand	  in	  some	  different	  relation	  to	  politics,	  we	  must	  first	  get	  some	  idea	  of	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  object	  in	  question,	  and	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  might	  be	  modified	  while	  still	  appearing	  to	  maintain	  its	  essential	  characteristics.	  	  Such	  an	  undertaking	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  our	  object,	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  it	  might	  also	  allow	  us	  to	  find	  solutions	  or	  tactics	  for	  achieving	  our	  concrete	  goals	  that	  would	  not	  otherwise	  be	  immediately	  apparent.	  Perhaps,	  that	  is,	  some	  of	  our	  answers	  might	  lie	  in	  practices,	  relationships,	  and	  institutions	  that	  are	  not	  immediately	  recognizable	  as	  part	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  some	  conceptual	  innovation.	  	  	  	   Alternative	  economies,	  like	  the	  “green	  economy”	  or	  the	  “sharing	  economy”,	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offer	  an	  interesting	  site	  to	  search	  for	  practices	  with	  this	  kind	  of	  potential	  for	  innovation.	  However,	  we	  must	  have	  a	  clearer	  idea	  of	  what	  it	  is	  that	  we	  mean	  by	  conceptual	  innovation	  before	  we	  can	  begin	  such	  a	  search.	  The	  first	  step	  in	  such	  a	  clarification	  requires	  that	  we	  pay	  particular	  attention	  to	  an	  important	  distinction	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  adjectival	  modifiers	  (like	  “green”	  or	  “sharing”)	  may	  be	  applied.	  These	  modifiers	  can	  operate	  in	  at	  least	  two	  different	  ways	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  noun	  they	  modify	  (in	  this	  case,	  “economy”).	  One	  of	  these	  ways	  is	  to	  specify	  something	  that	  is	  like	  the	  unmodified	  form	  of	  the	  noun,	  but	  different	  in	  some	  crucial	  respect,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  vampire	  bunny.	  We	  do	  not	  expect	  the	  bunny	  to	  be	  a	  vampire,	  but	  we	  do	  expect	  it	  to	  be	  a	  fluffy,	  hopping,	  floppy	  eared	  creature	  with	  big	  front	  teeth	  and	  a	  twitchy	  nose.	  If	  we	  encounter	  a	  creature	  with	  all	  of	  these	  characteristics	  that	  is	  also	  a	  vampire,	  we	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  call	  it	  a	  vampire	  bunny	  (before	  we	  ran	  away	  screaming),	  and	  the	  modifier	  “vampire”	  would	  serve	  to	  describe	  the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  creature	  is	  different	  from	  an	  unmodified	  bunny.	  	  	   This	  is	  not,	  however,	  the	  only	  way	  an	  adjectival	  modifier	  can	  work.	  These	  words	  can	  also	  serve	  to	  specify	  a	  particular	  sub-­‐group	  of	  the	  noun	  in	  question	  that	  doesn’t	  require	  us	  to	  alter	  our	  understanding	  at	  all.	  For	  example,	  I	  might	  describe	  my	  neighbor’s	  pet	  as	  a	  long-­‐haired	  bunny.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  modifier	  “long-­‐haired”	  doesn’t	  serve	  to	  distinguish	  the	  bunny	  from	  normal	  bunnies,	  but	  instead	  to	  identify	  it	  as	  part	  of	  the	  sub-­‐group	  of	  long-­‐haired	  (as	  opposed	  to	  short-­‐haired)	  bunnies.	  	  	   This	  distinction	  is	  important	  because,	  over	  time,	  modifications	  of	  the	  first	  sort	  might	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  lead	  to	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  noun	  in	  question,	  while	  modifications	  of	  the	  second	  sort	  lack	  such	  potential.	  To	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continue	  our	  admittedly	  silly	  example,	  were	  the	  trait	  of	  vampirism	  to	  spread	  among	  an	  increasingly	  large	  proportion	  of	  all	  bunnies,	  we	  might	  eventually	  cease	  to	  use	  the	  modifier	  at	  all,	  and	  instead	  begin	  to	  understand	  bunnies	  in	  general	  as	  fluffy,	  hopping,	  floppy	  eared	  creatures	  with	  big	  front	  teeth	  and	  twitchy	  noses	  that	  live	  on	  the	  blood	  of	  others,	  can’t	  go	  outside	  during	  the	  day,	  and	  can	  only	  be	  killed	  by	  a	  stake	  through	  the	  heart.	  Moreover,	  were	  this	  expansion	  of	  vampirism	  to	  go	  along	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  all	  their	  fur,	  we	  might	  begin	  understand	  bunnies	  as	  hairless,	  hopping,	  floppy	  eared	  creatures	  with	  big	  front	  teeth	  and	  twitchy	  noses	  that	  live	  on	  the	  blood	  of	  others,	  can’t	  go	  outside	  during	  the	  day,	  and	  can	  only	  be	  killed	  by	  a	  stake	  through	  the	  heart.	  The	  result	  would	  be	  a	  modification	  of	  our	  concept	  “bunny”	  to	  include	  the	  traits	  represented	  by	  the	  dropped	  modifier	  and	  exclude	  the	  traits	  that	  no	  longer	  apply.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see,	  I	  think,	  why	  long-­‐haired	  bunny	  does	  not	  carry	  the	  same	  potential.	  	   Vampirism,	  of	  course,	  is	  a	  biological(?)	  rather	  than	  a	  constructed	  trait,	  and	  as	  such	  it’s	  hard	  to	  justify	  talking	  about	  the	  resulting	  change	  in	  the	  concept	  represented	  by	  the	  term	  “bunny”	  as	  conceptual	  innovation	  (which	  carries	  a	  connotation	  of	  intentional	  activity).	  However,	  as	  described	  above,	  the	  practices	  related	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  economy	  are	  each	  the	  result	  of	  a	  particular	  choice	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  given	  individual	  or	  group	  of	  individuals	  (though,	  of	  course,	  these	  choices	  are	  made	  within	  a	  pre-­‐given	  set	  of	  constraints).	  As	  such,	  a	  similar	  change	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  economy	  could	  be	  construed	  as	  conceptual	  innovation.	  	   The	  process,	  even	  so	  described,	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  one.	  Reinhart	  Koselleck	  (2002,	  30)	  suggests	  that	  Saussure’s	  concepts	  of	  synchrony	  and	  diachrony	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  us	  here.	  In	  conceiving	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  might	  think	  about	  linguistic	  analysis,	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Saussure	  asks	  us	  to	  imagine	  a	  sort	  of	  cross	  shape	  (1966,	  80):	  
	  Figure	  5:	  Axes	  of	  Simultaneities	  and	  Successions	  	  This	  diagram	  represents	  two	  axes	  on	  which	  Saussure	  suggests	  we	  might	  think	  about	  language,	  and	  in	  particular	  about	  the	  relationships	  between	  linguistic	  concepts.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  such	  analyses	  we	  can	  distinguish	  between:	  	  (1)	  the	  axis	  of	  simultaneities	  (AB),	  which	  stands	  for	  the	  relations	  of	  coexisting	  things	  and	  from	  which	  the	  intervention	  of	  time	  is	  excluded;	  and	  (2)	  the	  axis	  of	  successions	  (CD),	  on	  which	  only	  one	  thing	  can	  be	  considered	  at	  a	  time	  but	  upon	  which	  are	  located	  all	  the	  things	  on	  the	  first	  axis	  together	  with	  their	  changes.	  (80)	  	  The	  AB	  axis,	  and	  the	  simultaneous	  interactions	  of	  coexisting	  terms	  that	  it	  represents,	  constitute	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  what	  Saussure	  refers	  to	  as	  synchronic	  linguistics.	  Similarly,	  the	  CD	  axis,	  along	  with	  the	  temporal	  changes	  within	  a	  given	  term	  that	  it	  represents,	  constitute	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  diachronic	  linguistics.	  “Everything	  that	  relates	  to	  the	  static	  side	  of	  our	  science	  is	  synchronic;	  everything	  that	  has	  to	  do	  with	  evolution	  is	  diachronic”	  (81).	  	   In	  order	  to	  get	  at	  Koselleck’s	  argument43	  about	  the	  usefulness	  of	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Despite	  the	  assertions	  of	  some	  scholars	  that,	  in	  thinking	  about	  conceptual	  history,	  one	  must	  choose	  or	  take	  a	  position	  between	  the	  methods	  of	  Skinner	  and	  Koselleck	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Palonen	  1999	  or	  the	  initial	  claims	  referenced	  in	  Valkhoff	  2006),	  I	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categories	  for	  thinking	  about	  conceptual	  innovation,	  I	  must	  quote	  at	  length:	  It	  is	  the	  link	  between	  synchronic	  events	  and	  diachronic	  structures	  that	  can	  be	  investigated	  historically.	  An	  analogous	  connection	  exists	  between	  spoken	  speech,	  synchronically,	  and	  the	  diachronically	  pregiven	  language	  that	  always	  takes	  effect	  in	  a	  conceptual-­‐historical	  way.	  What	  happens	  is	  always	  unique	  and	  new,	  but	  never	  so	  new	  that	  social	  conditions,	  which	  are	  pregiven	  over	  the	  long	  term,	  will	  not	  have	  made	  possible	  each	  unique	  event.	  A	  new	  concept	  may	  be	  coined	  to	  articulate	  experiences	  or	  expectations	  that	  never	  existed	  before.	  But	  it	  can	  never	  be	  too	  new	  not	  to	  have	  existed	  virtually	  as	  a	  seed	  in	  the	  pregiven	  language	  and	  not	  to	  have	  received	  meaning	  from	  its	  inherited	  linguistic	  context.	  (2002,	  30-­‐31)	  	  In	  order	  to	  explain	  further,	  he	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  historian	  might	  examine	  marriage.	  Someone	  who	  was	  interested	  in	  the	  conceptual	  history	  of	  marriage,	  he	  suggests,	  would	  be	  best	  served	  by	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  “kinds	  of	  texts,	  of	  various	  social	  classifications,	  in	  which	  particular	  marriages	  have	  been	  conceptualized”	  (34).	  Such	  texts	  would	  be	  interesting	  and	  useful	  to	  a	  historian	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  marriage	  because	  “In	  all	  cases,	  language-­‐bound	  traditions	  diachronically	  establish	  the	  life-­‐sphere	  of	  a	  possible	  marriage.	  And	  when	  changes	  become	  apparent,	  they	  do	  so	  only	  when	  the	  notion	  of	  marriage	  has	  been	  conceptualized	  anew”	  (34).	  	  Using	  such	  a	  method,	  he	  suggests,	  we	  would	  find	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  marriage	  underwent	  a	  transformation	  in	  two	  stages	  between	  the	  early	  18th	  century	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  prefer	  the	  position	  that	  the	  two	  have	  complimentary,	  though	  admittedly	  distinct,	  focuses.	  As	  Skinner	  himself	  puts	  it,	  “Koselleck	  is	  interested	  in	  nothing	  less	  than	  the	  entire	  process	  of	  conceptual	  change;	  I	  am	  chiefly	  interested	  in	  one	  of	  the	  means	  by	  which	  it	  takes	  place.	  But	  the	  two	  programmes	  do	  not	  strike	  me	  as	  necessarily	  incompatible,	  and	  I	  hope	  that	  both	  of	  them	  will	  continue	  to	  flourish	  as	  they	  deserve”	  (Skinner,	  1999).	  As	  such,	  I	  intend	  the	  discussion	  of	  Koselleck	  here	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  consistent	  with	  the	  discussion	  of	  Skinner	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  Skinner’s	  approach.	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beginning	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  Starting	  out	  as	  an	  “indissoluble	  institution	  ordained	  by	  God,”	  marriage	  first	  transformed	  into	  an	  institution	  based	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  common	  law	  and	  contracts,	  and	  then	  finally	  in	  the	  early	  19th	  century	  “Theological	  justification	  is	  replaced	  by	  anthropological	  self-­‐justification;	  the	  institution	  of	  marriage	  is	  divested	  of	  its	  legal	  framework	  so	  as	  to	  give	  space	  to	  the	  moral	  self-­‐realization	  of	  loving	  people”	  (35).	  While	  one	  might	  very	  reasonably	  quibble	  with	  Koselleck’s	  contention	  that	  marriage	  has	  been	  divested	  of	  its	  contractual	  character,	  the	  underlying	  point	  remains	  that,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  three	  conceptual	  stages	  he	  identifies:	  …each	  has	  structured	  the	  inherited	  normative	  economy	  of	  argumentation	  in	  different	  ways	  and	  innovatively	  altered	  its	  decisive	  points.	  Seen	  in	  terms	  of	  linguistic	  history,	  common	  law	  and	  romantic-­‐liberal	  conceptual	  formations	  both	  had	  the	  character	  of	  an	  event.	  They	  affected	  the	  entire	  linguistic	  structure	  on	  whose	  basis	  marriages	  could	  be	  conceived.	  It	  was	  not	  that	  diachronically	  pregiven	  language	  as	  a	  whole	  had	  changed,	  but	  its	  semantics	  and	  a	  new	  linguistic	  pragmatics	  had	  been	  set	  free.	  (35)	  	  Conceptual	  innovation,	  in	  this	  framework,	  serves	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  bridge	  between	  novel	  experience	  and	  the	  diachronic	  weight	  of	  conceptual	  history.	  It	  is	  limited,	  however,	  insofar	  as	  the	  revised	  concept	  cannot	  differ	  so	  greatly	  from	  the	  original	  concept	  that	  it	  ceases	  to	  function	  within	  the	  diachronically	  pregiven	  language.	  	  	   It’s	  worth	  noting	  an	  important	  consonance	  here	  between	  Koselleck’s	  argument	  about	  conceptual	  history	  and	  Butler’s	  argument	  about	  identity	  and	  signification	  (discussed	  in	  Chapter	  1).	  For	  Butler,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  features	  of	  signification	  is	  repetition,	  and	  her	  strategy	  for	  subversion	  of	  identities	  constructed	  through	  processes	  of	  signification	  is	  to	  find	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  repeated	  practices	  can	  be	  varied	  such	  that	  they	  at	  once	  remain	  intelligible	  as	  practices	  of	  signification	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related	  to	  a	  particular	  identity	  and	  simultaneously	  challenge	  the	  rules	  by	  which	  such	  an	  identity	  is	  presumed	  to	  operate.	  For	  Koselleck:	  What,	  in	  each	  case,	  takes	  place	  as	  unique	  in	  history	  as	  it	  occurs	  is	  possible	  only	  because	  presupposed	  conditions	  repeat	  themselves	  with	  a	  longer-­‐term	  regularity…	  When	  a	  concept,	  for	  instance	  that	  of	  “marriage,”	  is	  used,	  experiences	  of	  marriage,	  which	  have	  a	  long-­‐term	  effect	  and	  which	  have	  entered	  into	  the	  concept	  at	  and	  as	  its	  foundation,	  are	  linguistically	  stored	  in	  it…	  With	  any	  topical	  use	  of	  the	  word	  marriage,	  the	  linguistically	  determined	  pregiven	  data	  that	  structure	  its	  sense	  and	  its	  understanding	  repeat	  themselves.	  Here	  too,	  linguistic	  structures	  of	  repetition	  are	  set	  free,	  yet	  also	  delimit	  the	  scope	  of	  speech.	  And	  any	  conceptual	  change	  that	  becomes	  a	  linguistic	  event	  occurs	  in	  the	  act	  of	  semantic	  and	  pragmatic	  innovation,	  which	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  comprehend	  what	  is	  old	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  and	  to	  comprehend	  in	  any	  way	  what	  is	  new.	  (36-­‐37)	  	  One	  gets	  the	  sense,	  reading	  each	  of	  these	  discussions	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  repetition	  and	  change,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  rhythmic	  element	  to	  conceptual	  change.	  To	  engage	  in	  the	  practices	  that	  contribute	  to	  conceptual	  change,	  it	  seems,	  is	  to	  learn	  the	  steps	  of	  a	  dance,	  to	  insert	  oneself	  into	  the	  rhythm,	  and	  then	  to	  seek	  to	  change	  those	  steps,	  little	  by	  little,	  until	  by	  almost	  imperceptible	  stages	  the	  first	  dance	  has	  been	  transformed	  into	  a	  new	  set	  of	  steps	  	   James	  Farr	  takes	  up	  many	  of	  the	  ideas	  proposed	  by	  both	  Koselleck	  and	  Skinner	  in	  his	  description	  of	  the	  particular	  nature	  of	  conceptual	  change	  in	  politics.	  “Conceptual	  change,”	  he	  suggests,	  “might	  be	  understood	  as	  one	  rather	  strikingly	  imaginative	  outcome	  of	  the	  process	  of	  political	  actors	  attempting	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  they	  encounter	  as	  they	  try	  to	  understand	  and	  change	  the	  world	  around	  them”	  (1989,	  33).	  Moreover,	  in	  constructing	  a	  political	  theory	  of	  conceptual	  change,	  we	  must:	  …acknowledge	  that	  in	  acting	  politically	  actors	  do	  things	  for	  strategic	  and	  partisan	  purposes	  in	  and	  through	  language;	  and	  that	  they	  can	  do	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such	  things	  because	  the	  concepts	  in	  language	  partly	  constitute	  political	  beliefs,	  actions,	  and	  practices.	  Consequently,	  political	  change	  and	  conceptual	  change	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  one	  complex	  and	  interrelated	  process.	  (32)	  	  This	  is	  important	  for	  Farr	  because	  it	  suggests	  both	  that	  conceptual	  changes	  can	  be	  identified	  through	  changes	  in	  the	  use	  of	  language,	  and	  that	  these	  changes	  can	  be	  deemed	  at	  least	  partly	  successful	  when	  proposed	  changes	  in	  language	  are	  taken	  up	  by	  “a	  community	  of	  speakers	  and	  theorists,	  however	  grand	  or	  humble”	  (34).	  Additionally,	  his	  formulation	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  that,	  because	  conceptual	  innovation	  represents	  actors’	  efforts	  to	  solve	  their	  problems,	  and	  because	  these	  problems	  themselves	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  as	  problems	  through	  the	  use	  of	  concepts	  represented	  by	  language,	  the	  problems	  themselves	  are	  susceptible	  to	  conceptual	  change.	  That	  is,	  conceptual	  innovations	  intended	  to	  solve	  concrete	  political	  problems	  are	  likely	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  new	  political	  problems	  requiring	  new	  conceptual	  innovations,	  and	  so	  on	  ad	  infinitum;	  for	  Farr,	  conceptual	  innovation	  is	  a	  dialectical	  process.	  	  	   Such	  an	  insight	  is	  useful	  to	  our	  inquiry	  because	  it	  helps	  to	  highlight	  one	  aspect	  of	  dialectical	  thought	  that	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  conceptual	  innovation:	  the	  contradiction.	  As	  Farr	  points	  out,	  there	  are	  many	  types	  of	  problems,	  but	  contradictions	  are	  particularly	  acute	  problems	  for	  conceptual	  apparatuses,	  and	  are	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  ignore.	  Concepts	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  a	  vacuum;	  instead,	  they	  must	  function	  in	  a	  universe,	  or	  system,	  of	  other	  concepts.	  When	  changes	  in	  other	  concepts	  result	  in	  changes	  to	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  that	  bring	  a	  given	  concept	  into	  contradiction	  with	  the	  system,	  conceptual	  innovation	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  remedy	  this	  contradiction.	  For	  examp	  le,	  as	  we’ll	  discuss	  below,	  when	  the	  concept	  of	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the	  economy	  as	  capable	  of	  infinite	  growth	  begins	  to	  contradict	  our	  evolving	  concept	  of	  the	  environment	  as	  finite	  and	  threatened,	  one	  possible	  avenue	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  is	  the	  “green	  economy,”	  though	  such	  an	  innovation,	  as	  we’ll	  see,	  is	  by	  no	  means	  guaranteed,	  or	  without	  pitfalls	  of	  its	  own.	  	  	   This	  perspective	  allows	  us	  to	  distinguish	  between	  conceptual	  innovation	  and	  mere	  argumentation	  or	  political	  theorizing.	  While	  the	  act	  of	  engaging	  in	  political	  critique	  is	  not	  identical	  with	  conceptual	  innovation,	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  conceptual	  innovation.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  both	  that	  contradictions	  in	  conceptual	  systems	  are	  seldom	  immediately	  obvious	  and	  that	  we	  do	  not	  respond	  to	  all	  contradictions	  with	  conceptual	  innovation.	  Critique	  thus	  has	  two	  essential	  roles	  in	  conceptual	  innovation:	  first,	  it	  is	  through	  critique	  that	  we	  identify	  contradictions	  as	  contradictions;	  second,	  it	  is	  through	  critique	  that	  we	  contend	  that	  a	  given	  contradiction	  is	  sufficiently	  important	  to	  warrant	  the	  labor	  of	  conceptual	  innovation.	  When	  I	  make	  the	  claim,	  then,	  that	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  the	  contradiction	  between	  our	  contemporary	  concept	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  concept,	  for	  instance,	  of	  democratic	  self-­‐determination,	  I	  am	  really	  making	  two	  claims,	  neither	  of	  which	  is	  itself	  an	  example	  of	  the	  conceptual	  innovation	  for	  which	  I	  am	  calling.	  First,	  I	  am	  making	  the	  claim	  that	  these	  two	  concepts	  are,	  in	  fact,	  in	  contradiction	  with	  one	  another,	  and	  second,	  I	  am	  making	  the	  claim	  that	  this	  contradiction	  is	  not	  one	  with	  which	  we	  should	  or	  can	  live.	  Such	  a	  critique	  can	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  conceptual	  innovation,	  but	  the	  innovation	  itself	  must	  involve	  a	  transformation	  of	  one	  or	  both	  of	  the	  concepts	  in	  question	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	  the	  contradiction,	  and	  such	  a	  transformation	  can	  be	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identified	  through	  changes	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  words	  attached	  to	  the	  concepts	  are	  used,	  not	  only	  by	  me,	  but	  by	  a	  “community	  of	  speakers	  and	  theorists,	  however	  grand	  or	  humble.”44	  	   It	  is	  with	  these	  ideas	  in	  mind	  that	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  green	  economy.	  Does	  this	  alternative	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  stretch	  or	  alter	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy	  or	  any	  of	  its	  underlying	  concepts?	  Does	  it	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  challenges	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  rules	  that	  govern	  the	  economy’s	  operation?	  Does	  it	  allow	  us,	  as	  Koselleck	  puts	  it,	  to	  “comprehend	  what	  is	  old	  in	  a	  different	  way”	  or	  to	  “comprehend	  in	  any	  way	  what	  is	  new”?	  Does	  it	  highlight	  a	  contradiction	  that	  might	  be	  resolved	  through	  such	  an	  innovation?	  
C.	  The	  Green	  Economy	  Prior	  to	  1980,	  there	  were	  few	  or	  no	  uses	  of	  the	  term	  “green	  economy”	  in	  the	  works	  indexed	  by	  Google’s	  N-­‐gram	  viewer.	  While	  it	  is	  clearly	  a	  fairly	  blunt	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  It	  is	  worth	  noting,	  I	  think	  that	  there	  is	  an	  important	  strain	  of	  contemporary	  thought	  regarding	  conceptual	  innovation	  that	  I	  have	  not	  directly	  addressed	  in	  the	  passage	  above.	  Collier	  and	  Levitsky	  (1997)	  claim	  that,	  in	  thinking	  about	  conceptual	  innovation,	  we	  should	  focus	  on	  the	  particular	  linguistic	  or	  logical	  “moves”	  that	  such	  innovation	  involve.	  Such	  moves	  (or,	  as	  they	  call	  them,	  “strategies”),	  they	  suggest,	  come	  in	  relatively	  few	  varieties.	  The	  first	  type,	  “differentiation,”	  involves	  a	  move	  up	  or	  down	  Sartori’s	  ladder	  of	  generalization.	  In	  addition	  to	  differentiation,	  Collier	  and	  Levitsky	  suggest	  that	  strategies	  of	  developing	  “diminished	  subtypes”	  and	  of	  “precising	  definition”	  are	  also	  often	  used	  in	  contemporary	  work	  on	  democracy.	  While	  the	  strategies	  that	  Collier	  and	  Levitsky	  identify	  are	  not	  necessarily	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  discussion	  of	  conceptual	  innovation	  above,	  their	  work	  is	  less	  useful	  to	  the	  project	  at	  hand	  then	  that	  of	  others	  because	  they	  seem	  to	  assume	  that	  conceptual	  innovation	  is	  largely	  a	  question	  of	  how	  we	  think	  about	  (rather	  than	  how	  we	  practice)	  politics,	  and	  because	  (perhaps	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  first	  point)	  such	  innovation	  takes	  place	  in	  a	  relatively	  static	  world	  in	  which	  the	  change	  is	  the	  result	  merely	  of	  an	  effort	  to	  put	  a	  given	  concept	  to	  work	  in	  a	  particular	  scholarly	  program	  or	  argument.	  Thus,	  while	  Collier	  and	  Levitsky’s	  argument	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  those	  who	  are	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  how	  terms	  are	  used	  in	  the	  study	  of	  a	  concept,	  it	  does	  not	  add	  much	  to	  our	  inquiry.	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instrument,	  the	  N-­‐gram	  viewer	  is	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  track	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  use	  of	  a	  term	  like	  “green	  economy”	  over	  time.	  The	  viewer	  works	  by	  analyzing	  the	  text	  of	  over	  5	  million	  books	  published	  between	  1500	  and	  the	  present	  and	  digitized	  by	  the	  Google	  Books	  project.	  This	  set	  of	  texts	  is	  broken	  down	  into	  individual	  words	  (or	  grams);	  the	  entire	  corpus	  contains	  over	  500	  billion	  grams,	  of	  which	  361	  billion	  are	  in	  English.	  The	  data	  set	  is	  most	  meaningful	  for	  books	  published	  since	  1800.	  The	  N-­‐gram	  viewer	  maps	  the	  frequency	  of	  any	  particular	  gram,	  or	  group	  of	  grams,	  as	  compared	  to	  all	  other	  grams	  for	  any	  given	  year	  (Michel,	  et	  al	  2011).	  In	  1980,	  the	  term	  appeared	  with	  a	  frequency	  of	  only	  .0000000055%	  in	  the	  indexed	  texts.	  By	  1985,	  the	  term’s	  usage	  frequency	  had	  increased	  to	  .0000000819%;	  in	  other	  words,	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  had	  become	  nearly	  15	  times	  as	  common.	  By	  1990,	  the	  term	  was	  nearly	  63	  times	  as	  common	  as	  it	  had	  been	  in	  1980,	  and	  by	  2000	  “green	  economy”	  was	  being	  used	  more	  than	  188	  times	  as	  often	  as	  it	  had	  been	  in	  1980.45	  Clearly,	  the	  modifier	  “green”	  gained	  substantial	  salience	  in	  relation	  to	  “economy”	  in	  English	  language	  texts	  over	  this	  20-­‐year	  period.	  	  We	  can	  also	  identify	  some	  other	  terms	  in	  relation	  to	  which	  green	  has	  become	  an	  increasingly	  common	  modifier.	  The	  most	  striking	  of	  these	  is	  “energy,”	  which	  experienced	  an	  interesting	  pattern	  of	  usage	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century.46	  The	  two-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  While	  these	  numbers	  seem	  (and	  in	  many	  respects	  are)	  vanishingly	  small,	  it’s	  worth	  remembering	  that	  we’re	  talking	  about	  only	  one	  term	  out	  of	  all	  of	  the	  words	  and	  phrases	  that	  one	  might	  use	  to	  talk	  about	  anything	  at	  all	  in	  a	  published	  text.	  In	  1979,	  no	  one	  was	  talking	  about	  “green	  economy”	  at	  all,	  but	  in	  1980,	  if	  you	  were	  to	  select	  a	  two-­‐word	  phrase	  (“gram”)	  at	  random	  from	  all	  published	  sources,	  you	  would	  have	  roughly	  a	  one	  in	  20	  billion	  chance	  of	  selecting	  “green	  economy.”	  By	  2000,	  these	  odds	  would	  have	  increased	  to	  about	  one	  in	  100	  milion.	  46	  Other	  such	  terms	  include	  “green	  jobs”	  and	  “green	  housing”	  but	  they	  both	  experienced	  much	  more	  minor	  growth	  during	  the	  period	  in	  question,	  and	  their	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word	  gram	  “green	  energy”	  was	  more	  or	  less	  non-­‐existent	  in	  English	  language	  publications	  until	  1928,	  when	  it’s	  frequency	  in	  indexed	  texts	  increased	  from	  0	  (at	  10	  decimal	  places)	  to	  0.0000000805%.	  The	  term	  experienced	  a	  brief	  spike	  in	  frequency	  of	  use,	  rising	  as	  high	  as	  0.0000001783%	  of	  all	  two-­‐word	  grams	  in	  indexed	  texts	  in	  1934	  before	  dropping	  back	  off	  to	  an	  effective	  frequency	  of	  0	  from	  1944-­‐1947.	  Beginning	  in	  1948,	  “green	  energy”	  then	  experienced	  a	  steady	  increase	  in	  frequency	  that	  put	  it	  at	  0.0000000561%	  in	  1960,	  0.0000000607%	  in	  1970,	  0.0000003016%	  in	  1980,	  .0000004410%	  in	  1990,	  and	  0.0000011285%	  by	  2000.	  	  Leaving	  aside,	  for	  the	  moment,	  the	  brief	  spike	  in	  the	  1930s,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  by	  2000	  “green	  energy”	  had	  become	  20	  times	  more	  common	  that	  it	  was	  in	  1960,	  and	  132	  times	  more	  common	  than	  it	  was	  in	  1948.	  	  In	  absolute	  terms,	  “green	  energy”	  was	  used	  much	  more	  frequently	  than	  “green	  economy”	  throughout	  the	  60s,	  the	  70s,	  and	  most	  of	  the	  80s.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  “green	  economy”	  was	  virtually	  non-­‐existent	  until	  1980,	  and	  even	  as	  late	  as	  1988	  “green	  energy”	  was	  used	  nearly	  three	  times	  as	  often	  as	  “green	  economy.”	  By	  1992,	  though,	  the	  two	  grams	  had	  achieved	  virtual	  parity	  in	  usage,	  and	  maintained	  this	  parity	  (with	  small	  fluctuations)	  until	  2000.	  	  It	  is	  clear,	  I	  think,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  link	  between	  green	  energy	  and	  green	  economy.	  There	  is,	  in	  fact,	  a	  whole	  literature	  in	  the	  study	  of	  economics	  dedicated	  to	  examining	  and	  modeling	  the	  link	  between	  the	  production	  and	  sourcing	  of	  energy	  and	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  economy	  (e.g.	  Jacobsen	  2000	  or	  Rivers	  and	  Jaccard	  2005).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  dynamics	  of	  growth	  match	  up	  quite	  well	  with	  those	  of	  “green	  economy.”	  This	  suggests,	  I	  think,	  that	  they	  are	  derivative	  of	  the	  general	  trend	  I’ve	  already	  described	  with	  respect	  to	  “green	  economy.”	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For	  our	  purposes,	  however,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  green	  economy	  is	  a	  more	  interesting	  focus	  than	  green	  energy,	  and	  that	  in	  fact	  green	  energy	  should	  lead	  us	  to	  be	  cautious	  in	  our	  optimism	  about	  green	  economy’s	  potential	  to	  contribute	  to	  conceptual	  innovation.	  The	  problem	  with	  green	  energy,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  project,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  an	  adjectival	  modifier	  that	  functions	  similarly	  to	  the	  modifier	  “long-­‐haired”	  in	  the	  phrase	  long-­‐haired	  bunny.	  The	  green	  in	  green	  energy	  does	  not	  stretch	  or	  alter	  our	  conception	  of	  what	  we	  might	  be	  referring	  to	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  energy;	  it	  simply	  serves	  to	  designate	  a	  particular	  subset	  of	  the	  larger	  set	  of	  things	  to	  which	  we	  might	  be	  referring.	  Its	  use	  does	  nothing	  to	  challenge	  or	  complicate	  the	  concept	  of	  energy.	  If,	  as	  the	  n-­‐gram	  data	  seem	  to	  suggest	  might	  the	  case,	  the	  rise	  in	  the	  usage	  of	  green	  economy	  is	  related	  to	  the	  rise	  in	  the	  usage	  of	  green	  energy,	  then	  we	  should	  be	  cautious	  about	  assuming	  that	  green	  economy	  differs	  from	  green	  energy	  in	  this	  respect.	  	  	   What	  are	  we	  doing,	  we	  must	  ask,	  when	  we	  apply	  the	  modifier	  “green”	  to	  “economy,”	  and	  how	  might	  such	  an	  economy	  be	  differentiated	  from	  “the	  economy”	  writ	  large?	  Does	  the	  modifier	  “green”	  serve	  to	  stretch	  or	  alter	  our	  understanding	  of	  those	  practices	  that	  might	  be	  intelligible	  as	  part	  of	  the	  economy,	  or	  does	  it	  simply	  serve	  to	  designate	  a	  particular	  subset	  of	  practices	  among	  those	  that	  are	  already	  intelligible	  in	  this	  way?	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  multiple	  answers	  available	  to	  such	  a	  question,	  and	  it	  is	  in	  the	  competition,	  collision,	  and	  interaction	  of	  the	  multiple	  resulting	  discourses	  that	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  find	  a	  shape	  to	  the	  “green	  economy.”	  Each	  of	  these	  discourses	  will	  also	  necessarily	  make	  reference	  to	  the	  economy	  against	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which	  their	  own	  conception	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  different	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  green-­‐ness,	  and	  by	  paying	  careful	  attention	  to	  these	  distinction	  we	  can	  investigate	  the	  particular	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  adjectival	  modifier	  “green”	  may	  or	  may	  not	  serve	  to	  contribute	  to	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy.	  	  	   One	  way	  in	  which	  “green	  economy”	  can	  be	  conceived	  is	  as	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  economy	  to	  include	  additional	  cost	  variables	  for	  which	  it	  has	  not	  traditionally	  accounted.	  A	  prime	  example	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  is	  the	  Stern	  Review	  on	  the	  Economics	  of	  Climate	  Change,	  produced	  and	  published	  by	  economist	  Nicholas	  Stern	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  British	  government	  in	  2006,	  and	  cited	  more	  than	  5000	  times	  since	  its	  release.	  In	  this	  review,	  Stern	  takes	  the	  approach	  of	  using	  economic	  forecasting	  models	  to	  predict	  the	  cost	  of	  failing	  to	  change	  our	  behavior	  to	  account	  for	  human-­‐caused	  climate	  change,	  and	  comparing	  this	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  action	  designed	  to	  limit	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change.	  If	  we	  did	  nothing,	  the	  cost	  to	  the	  global	  economy	  would	  be	  somewhere	  between	  5%	  and	  11%	  (compared	  to	  potential	  output	  without	  climate	  change)	  were	  we	  to	  allow	  global	  temperatures	  to	  rise	  by	  2°C.47	  Importantly,	  Stern	  notes	  that	  such	  a	  projection	  requires	  one	  to	  include	  “direct	  impacts	  on	  the	  environment	  and	  human	  health,”	  and	  that	  such	  inclusion	  involves	  “difficult	  analytical	  and	  ethical	  issues	  of	  measurement”	  (Stern,	  x).	  	  	  	   On	  one	  level,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  such	  “costs”	  is	  clear	  evidence	  of	  resistance	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  “green	  economy”	  to	  the	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  (diachronic)	  uses	  of	  “economy”.	  By	  introducing	  factors	  of	  which	  existing	  economic	  measurements	  do	  not	  take	  account,	  Stern	  is	  able	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  “real”	  costs	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  He	  refers	  to	  scenarios	  in	  which	  no	  action	  is	  taken	  to	  mitigate	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  as	  “business-­‐as-­‐usual”	  or	  BAU.	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BAU	  are	  in	  fact	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  0%-­‐3%	  reductions	  in	  global	  economic	  output	  predicted	  by	  more	  traditional	  models	  examining	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  similar	  global	  temperature	  increase.	  	  This	  claim	  to	  greater	  access	  to	  the	  real	  costs	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  move	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  concept	  of	  the	  economy.	  Because	  this	  move	  leaves	  intact	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  naturally	  occurring	  object,	  rather	  than	  a	  made	  thing,	  it	  is	  able	  to	  function	  as	  a	  suggestion	  that	  the	  prior	  accounting	  is	  incomplete	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  failure	  to	  take	  account	  of	  factors	  that	  have,	  of	  course,	  always	  been	  real.	  In	  this	  respect,	  Stern’s	  resistance	  to	  the	  diachronic	  constraints	  of	  the	  economy	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  claim	  to	  have	  uncovered	  previously	  ignored	  or	  undiscovered	  aspects	  of	  the	  object,	  and	  to	  have	  arrived	  at	  a	  truer	  picture	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	  as	  a	  result.	  	  While	  such	  a	  move	  may	  have	  the	  potential	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  specific	  aspects	  of	  human	  existence	  that	  are	  encompassed	  in	  the	  economy,	  it	  does	  not	  at	  first	  appear	  to	  require	  any	  fundamental	  reshaping	  of	  the	  materialization	  of	  the	  economy	  itself.	  By	  framing	  the	  inclusion	  of	  “direct	  impacts	  on	  the	  environment	  and	  human	  health”	  as	  an	  expansion	  of	  that	  set	  of	  factors	  for	  which	  we	  already	  know	  how	  to	  account	  when	  we	  do	  economic	  projections,	  Stern	  is	  implicitly	  endorsing	  the	  existing	  conceptual	  apparatus	  of	  “the	  economy.”	  In	  this	  sense,	  “green	  economy”	  is	  not	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  economy,	  but	  instead	  the	  same	  economy	  that	  we	  have	  already	  been	  measuring	  and	  describing,	  but	  with	  a	  few	  additional	  factors	  uncovered	  and	  incorporated.48	  Thus,	  Stern	  is	  able	  to	  arrive	  at	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Importantly,	  this	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  these	  revisions	  won’t	  have	  significant	  effects	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  individuals	  or	  groups.	  If	  we	  are	  able	  to	  operationalize	  negative	  effects	  on	  lives	  or	  shared	  resources	  and	  incorporate	  these	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conclusion	  that	  “The	  policy	  tools	  exist	  to	  create	  the	  incentives	  required	  to	  change	  investment	  patterns	  and	  move	  the	  global	  economy	  onto	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  path”	  (Stern,	  xxvii).	  	  	   The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “path”	  is	  potentially	  interesting	  because	  it	  suggests	  a	  set	  of	  assumptions	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  grows	  and	  changes	  over	  time.	  In	  order	  for	  the	  economy	  to	  be	  amenable	  to	  being	  moved	  onto	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  path,	  two	  things	  must	  be	  true.	  First,	  the	  economy	  as	  it	  currently	  stands	  must	  be	  on	  some	  path	  other	  than	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  one;	  second,	  the	  economy	  must	  be	  in	  large	  part	  subject	  to	  its	  own	  laws	  of	  motion,	  but	  in	  some	  ways	  simultaneously	  susceptible	  to	  human	  action	  (government).	  BAU	  Functions,	  in	  Stern’s	  argument,	  as	  a	  stand-­‐in	  for	  the	  status	  quo	  path	  on	  which	  the	  economy	  is	  set.	  This	  path,	  we	  may	  infer	  from	  his	  argument,	  leads	  toward	  increased	  carbon	  consumption,	  with	  the	  accompanying	  deleterious	  effects	  to	  the	  global	  climate.	  However,	  this	  path	  is	  the	  result	  not	  of	  some	  conscious	  goal	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  economy,	  but	  rather	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  its	  inexorable	  calculative	  laws	  within	  a	  particular	  climate.	  We	  might,	  Stern	  suggests,	  alter	  this	  climate	  by	  intentionally	  incentivizing	  some	  behaviors	  and	  disincentivizing	  others,	  such	  that	  the	  economy	  would	  move	  onto	  a	  different	  path.	  	  In	  this	  construction,	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  the	  number	  of	  possible	  paths	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  finite,	  and	  the	  tools	  we	  have	  with	  which	  to	  influence	  the	  path	  the	  economy	  takes	  equally	  limited;	  hence,	  the	  need	  for	  the	  suggestion	  that	  in	  this	  case	  we	  do	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  into	  models	  for	  economic	  projections,	  we	  might	  reach	  very	  different	  conclusions	  about	  how	  we	  should	  act	  and	  what	  is	  or	  is	  not	  a	  worthwhile	  investment.	  	  However,	  the	  basic	  logic	  informing	  our	  decision	  making	  process	  will	  have	  remained	  the	  same,	  as	  it	  continues	  to	  depend	  upon	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  produced	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  economy,	  properly	  understood,	  are	  discernible,	  regular,	  and	  inevitable.	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the	  tools	  required	  to	  set	  the	  economy	  on	  a	  particular	  path.	  One	  is	  given	  to	  imagine	  a	  sort	  of	  mechanical	  juggernaut	  too	  large	  to	  pick	  up	  and	  move	  outright,	  lacking	  any	  direct	  steering	  mechanism,	  and	  moving	  forward	  (and	  sometimes	  backward)	  at	  varying	  and	  to	  some	  degree	  unpredictable	  speeds.	  In	  such	  a	  metaphor,	  public	  policy	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  economy	  might	  be	  imagined	  as	  the	  efforts	  of	  thousands	  of	  workers,	  tiny	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  juggernaut,	  to	  shape	  the	  landscape	  ahead	  of	  it	  such	  that	  the	  slopes	  and	  valleys	  will	  encourage	  it	  to	  travel	  in	  a	  particular	  direction.	  Not	  all	  directions	  will	  be	  possible	  because	  the	  landscape	  already	  has	  some	  features	  (many	  of	  which	  are	  not	  apparent	  until	  they	  are	  reached,	  or	  are	  in	  a	  constant	  process	  of	  shifting	  on	  their	  own)	  and	  because	  the	  size	  and	  type	  of	  change	  that	  the	  workers	  can	  make	  in	  the	  landscape	  is	  limited.	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  these	  limitations,	  however,	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  shape	  a	  path	  that	  meets	  at	  least	  some	  of	  our	  goals.	  	  Thus,	  according	  to	  the	  model	  we	  find	  in	  the	  Stern	  Review,	  a	  move	  toward	  a	  green	  economy	  would	  mean	  two	  things.	  First,	  we	  would	  incorporate	  impacts	  on	  “the	  environment	  and	  human	  health”	  in	  the	  cost	  benefit	  analyses	  on	  which	  the	  current	  economy	  runs.	  Stern	  admits	  that	  there	  is	  some	  difficulty	  inherent	  in	  such	  an	  addition,	  as	  these	  “costs”	  do	  not	  easily	  translate	  into	  money	  quantities,	  which	  are	  the	  basis	  of	  decision	  making	  in	  cost-­‐benefit	  analyses.	  However,	  he	  suggests	  that	  government	  might	  help	  to	  translate	  them	  into	  money	  quantities	  by	  introducing	  taxes	  and	  fees	  for	  actions	  that	  incur	  high	  levels	  of	  environmental	  or	  health	  costs.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  connection	  to	  the	  second	  aspect	  of	  a	  move	  to	  a	  green	  economy;	  the	  state	  (and	  other	  governmental	  entities)	  would	  adopt	  a	  policy	  of	  attempting	  to	  direct	  economic	  activity	  toward	  those	  possible	  paths	  that	  do	  the	  least	  harm	  to	  the	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environment	  and	  human	  health,	  presumably	  by	  making	  other	  paths	  relatively	  more	  expensive.	  The	  justification	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  such	  externalities,	  which	  conventional	  economics	  tells	  us	  should	  result	  in	  an	  overall	  reduction	  of	  total	  output,	  is	  that	  the	  resulting	  reduction	  in	  output	  would	  not	  be	  as	  great	  as	  it	  would	  be	  under	  BAU,	  given	  the	  rise	  in	  temperature	  that	  would	  accompany	  a	  failure	  to	  engage	  in	  concerted	  activity	  to	  direct	  the	  economy.	  	  	   It	  is	  this	  assumption,	  that	  a	  failure	  to	  engage	  in	  concerted	  activity	  to	  direct	  the	  economy	  toward	  a	  “low-­‐carbon	  path”	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  decreased	  output	  relative	  to	  a	  successful	  direction	  onto	  such	  a	  path	  by	  means	  of	  intentionally	  constructed	  externalities,	  which	  carries	  the	  greatest	  potential	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy	  in	  Stern’s	  model.	  In	  order	  to	  bear	  this	  assumption,	  one	  must	  conceive	  of	  the	  economy	  not	  merely	  as	  a	  realm	  of	  human	  activity	  subject	  to	  its	  own	  laws,	  but	  amenable	  to	  some	  limited	  direction	  by	  state	  policy,	  but	  instead	  as	  an	  entity	  (or	  realm	  of	  activity)	  that	  is	  not	  only	  incapable	  of	  self-­‐direction,	  but	  also	  subject	  to	  changing	  rules	  as	  a	  result	  of	  changes	  to	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  it	  operates.	  A	  “green	  economy,”	  in	  this	  context,	  becomes	  an	  economy	  managed	  by	  people	  who	  recognize	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  market	  to	  compensate	  for	  future	  costs	  resulting	  from	  environmental	  degradation,	  and	  thus	  depend	  upon	  direction	  by	  scientists	  and	  policy	  makers	  who	  can	  predict	  such	  costs	  outside	  of	  the	  market	  context.	  A	  shift	  of	  this	  kind	  could	  meet	  the	  definition	  of	  conceptual	  innovation	  outlined	  above.	  By	  maintaining	  much	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  prior	  conceptualizations	  of	  the	  economy,	  this	  shift	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  bridge	  between	  older	  understandings	  and	  the	  new	  one	  Stern	  implicitly	  proposes.	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Additionally,	  it	  does	  seem	  to	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  expand	  or	  alter,	  rather	  than	  simply	  specifying	  a	  subset	  of,	  these	  pre-­‐existing	  diachronic	  structures.	  It	  is,	  in	  these	  respects,	  a	  variation	  in	  the	  repeated	  practices	  of	  signification	  that	  produce	  and	  maintain	  the	  economy	  effect,	  and	  it	  poses	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  rules	  by	  which	  the	  materialization	  that	  results	  from	  this	  effect	  had	  been	  assumed	  to	  operate.	  	  Specifically,	  Stern’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  economy	  may	  require	  management	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  externalities	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  greatest	  possible	  rate	  of	  growth	  poses	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  economy	  can	  “be	  imagined	  to	  grow	  –	  without	  altering	  its	  physical	  limits”	  (Mitchell,	  1998,	  90).	  Instead,	  under	  this	  conception,	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  economy	  must	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  the	  physical	  limits	  of	  the	  world	  within	  which	  it	  exists.	  If	  allowed	  to	  grow	  unchecked,	  Stern	  suggests,	  the	  result	  will	  be	  a	  degradation	  of	  this	  physical	  world	  that	  will	  result	  in	  reduced,	  or	  even	  negative,	  growth	  in	  the	  economy.49	  The	  problem	  that	  Stern’s	  analysis	  implies	  is	  that	  the	  economy	  has	  difficulty	  incorporating	  the	  costs	  of	  this	  degradation	  of	  the	  physical	  world	  into	  its	  (market)	  mechanisms	  of	  decision	  making	  (perhaps	  because	  of	  this	  assumption	  that	  its	  growth	  is	  not	  directly	  coupled	  to	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  physical	  world).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  solution	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  of	  course,	  that	  the	  “green	  economy”	  is	  generally	  construed	  as	  incompatible	  with	  growth	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Pollin	  2008,	  for	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  green	  economy	  could	  be	  an	  engine	  for	  growth).	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  however,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  green	  economy	  is	  compatible	  with	  growth	  (as,	  indeed,	  Stern	  does),	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  articulate	  the	  need	  for	  the	  imposition	  of	  legal	  externalities.	  Pollin	  suggests,	  along	  these	  lines,	  that	  we	  should	  “combine	  government-­‐mandated	  increases	  in	  oil,	  gas,	  and	  coal	  prices	  with	  aggressive	  public	  support	  for	  renewable	  energy	  and	  conservation”	  (99).	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  degradation	  of	  natural	  resources	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  with	  which	  “the	  economy”	  is	  construed	  as	  being	  able	  to	  deal	  on	  its	  own,	  absent	  the	  introduction	  of	  such	  externalities.	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introduction	  of	  externalities	  that	  require	  for	  their	  intelligibility	  as	  practices	  related	  to	  the	  economy	  a	  reconceptualization	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  physical	  world.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  a	  brief	  diversion	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  words	  and	  practices	  may	  be	  useful,	  as	  I	  am	  asserting	  that	  the	  language	  and	  arguments	  used	  by	  Stern	  may	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  practices	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  economy	  effect.	  This	  assertion	  begins	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  “speech	  act,”	  as	  described	  by	  J.L.	  Austin,	  who	  points	  out	  that	  there	  exist:	  some	  utterances	  which	  can	  fall	  into	  no	  hitherto	  recognized	  grammatical	  category	  save	  that	  of	  'statement',	  which	  are	  not	  nonsense,	  and	  which	  contain	  none	  of	  those	  verbal	  danger	  signals	  which	  philosophers	  have	  by	  now	  detected	  or	  think	  they	  have	  detected	  (curious	  words	  like	  'good'	  or	  'all',	  suspect	  auxiliaries	  like	  'ought'	  or	  'can',	  and	  dubious	  constructions	  like	  the	  hypothetical):	  all	  will	  have,	  as	  it	  happens,	  humdrum	  verbs	  in	  the	  first	  person	  singular	  present	  indicative	  active.	  Utterances	  can	  be	  found,	  satIsfying	  these	  conditions,	  yet	  such	  that	  A.	  they	  do	  not	  'describe'	  or	  'report'	  or	  constate	  anything	  at	  all,	  are	  not	  'true	  or	  false';	  and	  B.	  the	  uttering	  of	  the	  sentence	  is,	  or	  is	  a	  part	  of,	  the	  doing	  of	  an	  action,	  which	  again	  would	  not	  normally	  be	  described	  as,	  or	  as	  'just',	  saying	  something.	  (1975,	  4-­‐5)	  	  As	  examples	  of	  such	  utterances,	  Austin	  suggests	  “I	  do”	  (in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  marriage),	  or	  “I	  name	  this	  ship	  the	  Queen	  Elizabeth,”	  or	  “I	  bet	  you	  sixpence	  it	  will	  rain	  tomorrow”	  (5).	  Each	  of	  these	  statements	  has	  the	  effect,	  as	  Austin	  points	  out,	  not	  of	  describing	  any	  already	  existing	  state	  of	  affairs,	  but	  instead	  of	  taking	  some	  action	  (like	  becoming	  married,	  or	  providing	  a	  ship	  with	  a	  name,	  or	  arranging	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  bet).	  	  	   Austin’s	  examples	  of	  speech	  acts	  are,	  one	  might	  note,	  fairly	  limited.	  They	  hinge	  on	  the	  use	  of	  verbs	  in	  the	  first	  person	  singular	  present	  active	  tense	  (Pitkin,	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1972,	  39).	  However,	  as	  Hannah	  Pitkin	  points	  out:	  ...the	  existence	  of	  these	  verbs	  is	  relatively	  uninteresting	  compared	  to	  the	  far	  greater	  discovery	  implicit	  in	  Austin	  but	  made	  explicit	  by	  Wittgenstein:	  that	  much	  or	  perhaps	  all	  of	  language	  is	  performative	  in	  a	  looser	  sense,	  is	  what	  we	  might	  call	  qausi-­‐performative.	  Though	  speaking	  may	  not	  always	  be	  performing	  the	  action	  named	  in	  the	  speech,	  it	  is	  always	  performing	  an	  action,	  for	  whose	  consequences	  the	  speaker	  is	  responsible.	  (39)	  	  If	  speaking	  is	  always	  performing	  an	  action,	  then	  patterns	  of	  speech	  may	  reasonably	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  practices,	  and	  these	  practices	  may	  well	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  dynamics	  of	  repetition	  and	  subversion	  as	  any	  of	  the	  other	  types	  of	  practices	  we	  have	  discussed.	  Moreover,	  Pitkin	  remarks	  that:	  It	  is	  a	  fact	  of	  the	  utmost	  importance	  that	  we	  do	  not	  constantly	  say	  all	  that	  could	  be	  said.	  We	  do	  not	  talk	  all	  the	  time,	  do	  not	  utter	  everything	  that	  happens	  to	  be	  true,	  or	  everything	  we	  know,	  or	  everything	  we	  think.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  when	  we	  do	  speak,	  that	  action	  itself	  has	  significance;	  the	  context	  in	  which	  we	  speak	  and	  our	  act	  of	  speaking	  have	  implications	  for	  meaning	  and	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  said.	  Saying	  something	  is	  an	  action	  with	  implications	  going	  beyond	  the	  implications	  of	  what	  is	  literally	  said,	  of	  the	  abstract	  meaning	  the	  utterance	  would	  have	  if	  no	  one	  said	  it.	  (83)	  	  In	  this	  light,	  Stern’s	  speech	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  environment	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  carry	  at	  least	  the	  potential	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy	  not	  merely	  because	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  report,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  this	  report,	  and	  not	  some	  other,	  was	  commissioned.	  By	  suggesting	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  planning	  for	  the	  long	  term	  consequences	  of	  environmental	  degradation,	  Stern	  is	  not	  saying	  that	  the	  concept	  in	  question	  is	  in	  need	  of	  revision	  with	  respect	  to	  any	  of	  its	  other	  characteristics,	  but	  only	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  think	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  natural	  world.	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  context	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of	  a	  report	  commissioned	  by,	  and	  issued	  in	  the	  name	  of,	  a	  neoliberal	  government	  such	  as	  the	  Blair	  administration	  in	  power	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  2006,	  any	  claim	  for	  the	  need	  for	  state	  intervention	  in	  the	  economy	  stands	  out	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  claims	  that	  such	  intervention	  should	  be	  avoided	  where	  possible	  and	  minimized	  everywhere	  else.	  	  	   The	  argument	  that	  a	  change	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  talk	  and	  write	  about	  a	  given	  object	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  change	  in	  the	  practices	  that	  relate	  to	  that	  object	  is	  particularly	  strong	  with	  respect	  to	  an	  object	  that,	  like	  the	  economy,	  is	  a	  materialization.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  if	  we	  understand	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  materialization	  (by	  which	  we	  mean	  the	  object	  given	  appearance	  by	  the	  structural	  effect	  to	  which	  we	  have	  referred	  as	  the	  “economy	  effect”),	  then	  we	  must	  understand	  it	  as	  having	  its	  basis	  in	  “the	  powerful,	  metaphysical	  effect	  of	  practices	  that	  make	  such	  structures	  appear	  to	  exist”	  (Mitchell	  1991,	  94).	  It	  is	  difficult	  imagine	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  a	  materialization	  such	  as	  the	  economy	  could	  be	  made	  to	  appear	  to	  exist	  without	  the	  use	  of	  speech	  acts	  to	  describe	  and	  invoke	  it.	  	  	  	  	  	   It’s	  certainly	  worth	  noting	  that	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  appropriate	  externalities	  such	  as	  the	  one	  discussed	  above	  would	  not	  be	  in	  any	  way	  unprecedented.	  In	  fact,	  one	  might	  understand	  the	  history	  of	  “the	  economy”	  in	  part	  as	  a	  story	  of	  the	  addition	  of	  logics	  justifying	  new	  externalities.	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  the	  National	  Labor	  Relations	  Board:	  	  Congress	  enacted	  the	  National	  Labor	  Relations	  Act	  ("NLRA")	  in	  1935	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  employees	  and	  employers,	  to	  encourage	  collective	  bargaining,	  and	  to	  curtail	  certain	  private	  sector	  labor	  and	  management	  practices,	  which	  can	  harm	  the	  general	  welfare	  of	  workers,	  businesses	  and	  the	  U.S.	  economy.	  (National	  Labor	  Relations	  Board)	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  The	  history	  of	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  NLRA	  is,	  of	  course,	  much	  more	  complex	  than	  this	  blurb	  would	  suggest.	  It’s	  certainly	  not	  the	  case	  that	  Congress	  came	  into	  session	  in	  1935,	  looked	  across	  the	  land	  and	  saw	  an	  imbalance	  of	  power	  between	  workers	  and	  owners	  threatening	  the	  economy,	  and	  decided	  boldly	  to	  take	  action	  to	  protect	  the	  economy.	  In	  fact,	  one	  might	  even	  note	  that	  while	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  Act	  does	  follow	  a	  logic	  similar	  to	  the	  blurb	  above,	  it	  does	  not	  make	  reference	  to	  “the	  economy”	  at	  all.	  Instead,	  it	  makes	  repeated	  reference	  to	  “the	  flow	  of	  commerce,”	  suggesting	  for	  example	  that:	  	  The	  inequality	  of	  bargaining	  power	  between	  employees	  who	  do	  not	  possess	  full	  freedom	  of	  association	  or	  actual	  liberty	  of	  contract	  and	  employers	  who	  are	  organized	  in	  the	  corporate	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  ownership	  association	  substantially	  burdens	  and	  affects	  the	  flow	  of	  commerce,	  and	  tends	  to	  aggravate	  recurrent	  business	  depressions,	  by	  depressing	  wage	  rates	  and	  the	  purchasing	  power	  of	  wage	  earners	  in	  industry	  and	  by	  preventing	  the	  stabilization	  of	  competitive	  wage	  rates	  and	  working	  conditions	  within	  and	  between	  industries.	  (NLRA,	  Sec.	  1).	  	  	  While	  the	  “flow	  of	  commerce”	  is	  probably	  not	  identical	  to	  “the	  economy,”	  insofar	  as	  the	  flow	  of	  commerce	  more	  clearly	  refers	  to	  a	  set	  of	  dynamics	  subject	  to	  human	  control,	  for	  our	  purposes	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  note	  that	  both	  sets	  of	  language	  assume	  a	  relationship	  between	  economic	  and	  state	  activity	  that	  bears	  a	  strong	  resemblance	  to	  that	  suggested	  by	  Stern.	  If	  BAU	  were	  allowed	  to	  continue,	  we	  may	  infer	  from	  either	  of	  the	  passages	  above	  regarding	  the	  NLRA,	  the	  result	  would	  have	  been	  decreased	  economic	  output,	  even	  though	  presumably	  all	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  question	  (owners	  seeking	  to	  maximize	  profit	  by	  reducing	  labor	  costs	  and	  workers	  seeking	  to	  maximize	  personal	  gain	  and	  fight	  off	  reductions	  by	  use	  of	  the	  strike	  weapon)	  were	  acting	  according	  to	  the	  inexorable	  laws	  of	  the	  economy.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  such	  a	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reduction	  in	  output,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  introduce	  additional	  externalities	  (in	  this	  case,	  laws	  formalizing	  the	  rights	  of	  workers	  to	  join	  unions	  and	  prohibiting	  certain	  acts	  on	  the	  part	  of	  employers).	  The	  presumption	  was,	  just	  as	  in	  Stern’s	  argument	  regarding	  the	  green	  economy,	  that	  the	  additional	  cost	  of	  such	  externalities	  would	  be	  outweighed	  by	  the	  avoidance	  of	  larger	  reductions	  in	  output	  in	  the	  future.	  	  One	  of	  the	  fascinating	  things	  about	  looking	  at	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  economy	  from	  this	  perspective	  is	  that	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  observe	  the	  fact	  that,	  while	  many	  such	  externalities	  become	  naturalized	  as	  simply	  part	  of	  the	  economy	  over	  time,	  things	  very	  rarely	  move	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  If	  we	  return	  to	  the	  language	  from	  the	  preamble	  of	  the	  Act,	  for	  example,	  we	  see	  that	  Wagner	  (the	  Act’s	  author)	  contrasted	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  employees,	  “who	  do	  not	  possess	  full	  freedom	  of	  association	  or	  actual	  liberty	  of	  contract”	  with	  that	  of	  employers,	  “who	  are	  organized	  in	  the	  corporate	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  ownership	  association.”	  At	  no	  point,	  however,	  did	  Wagner	  or	  any	  of	  the	  other	  supporters	  of	  the	  Act	  suggest	  that	  the	  answer	  might	  be	  to	  eliminate	  the	  corporate	  form,	  thereby	  leveling	  the	  playing	  field	  between	  workers	  and	  employers.	  Instead,	  the	  justification	  for	  the	  Act	  seems	  to	  start	  from	  the	  position	  that	  “corporate	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  ownership	  association”	  are	  natural	  to	  the	  flow	  of	  commerce,	  and	  that	  the	  only	  option	  is	  thus	  to	  use	  state	  power	  to	  influence	  the	  formation	  of	  corresponding	  combinations	  of	  worker	  power.	  In	  addition,	  we	  can	  see	  evidence	  in	  the	  language	  of	  a	  more	  recent	  change	  to	  US	  labor	  law	  that	  the	  addition	  of	  these	  new	  externalities	  can	  have	  the	  result,	  over	  even	  a	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  of	  naturalizing	  the	  resulting	  changes	  in	  economic	  activity.	  In	  1947,	  12	  years	  after	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  National	  Labor	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Relations	  Act,	  Congress	  passed	  the	  Taft-­‐Hartley	  Act,	  which	  significantly	  amended	  the	  NLRA.	  According	  to	  Section	  1(b)	  of	  Taft-­‐Hartley:	  It	  is	  the	  purpose	  and	  policy	  of	  this	  Act	  [chapter],	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  the	  full	  flow	  of	  commerce,	  to	  prescribe	  the	  legitimate	  rights	  of	  both	  employees	  and	  employers	  in	  their	  relations	  affecting	  commerce,	  to	  provide	  orderly	  and	  peaceful	  procedures	  for	  preventing	  the	  interference	  by	  either	  with	  the	  legitimate	  rights	  of	  the	  other,	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  individual	  employees	  in	  their	  relations	  with	  labor	  organizations	  whose	  activities	  affect	  commerce,	  to	  define	  and	  proscribe	  practices	  on	  the	  part	  of	  labor	  and	  management	  which	  affect	  commerce	  and	  are	  inimical	  to	  the	  general	  welfare,	  and	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  public	  in	  connection	  with	  labor	  disputes	  affecting	  commerce.	  	  As	  one	  contemporary	  observer	  noted,	  “the	  crux	  of	  the	  new	  Act	  is	  announced	  by	  statement	  of	  a	  new	  policy	  which	  sets	  forth	  the	  need	  for	  restricting	  the	  powers	  of	  labor”	  (Wohlmuth	  and	  Krupka,	  1948,	  1-­‐2).	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  only	  12	  years	  had	  passed	  since	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  NLRA,	  it	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  appear	  to	  Congress	  or	  its	  observers	  that	  an	  appropriate	  response	  to	  the	  perceived	  problem	  of	  excessive	  power	  on	  the	  part	  of	  organized	  labor	  was	  to	  withdraw	  some	  of	  the	  protections	  granted	  in	  the	  NLRA.	  Instead,	  Taft-­‐Hartley	  introduces	  yet	  another	  set	  of	  externalities	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  unfair	  labor	  practices	  on	  the	  part	  of	  labor	  unions)	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  re-­‐level	  the	  playing	  field.50	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  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  “the	  economy”	  is	  not	  mentioned	  in	  either	  of	  the	  laws	  quoted	  above,	  there	  is	  strong	  evidence	  that	  the	  “flow	  of	  commerce”	  to	  which	  both	  laws	  refer	  had	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  production	  of	  the	  economy	  effect.	  The	  idea	  that	  labor	  relations	  form	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  economy	  is	  certainly	  commonplace	  today,	  and	  we	  might	  understand	  the	  “flow	  of	  commerce”	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  bridge	  term	  between	  a	  conception	  of	  labor	  as	  simply	  a	  private,	  contractual	  arrangement	  affecting	  only	  those	  who	  are	  party	  to	  the	  contract	  (that,	  as	  simply	  part	  of	  commerce),	  and	  a	  conception	  of	  labor	  as	  part	  of	  some	  larger,	  universally	  relevant	  phenomenon	  (the	  economy).	  The	  concept	  of	  commerce	  as	  a	  flow	  is	  one	  that	  would	  be	  intelligible	  from	  both	  perspectives,	  and	  might	  itself	  be	  an	  example	  of	  conceptual	  innovation.	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   Conceptions	  of	  the	  green	  economy,	  however,	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  models	  that	  assume	  that	  we	  must	  find	  ways	  to	  make	  growth	  compatible	  with	  a	  finite	  natural	  world.	  In	  fact,	  some	  advocates	  of	  steady-­‐state	  economics	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  flaw	  in	  the	  argument	  put	  forward	  by	  those	  who	  favor	  a	  policy	  based	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  externalities	  designed	  to	  manage	  growth.	  The	  problem,	  they	  suggest,	  is	  that	  such	  a	  policy	  fails	  to	  take	  account	  of	  the	  source	  of	  the	  money	  that	  would	  be	  used	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  rising	  cost	  of	  goods	  under	  such	  a	  regime.	  Money,	  suggests	  Brian	  Czech,	  is	  ultimately	  the	  product	  of	  surplus	  production	  (beyond	  the	  basic	  needs	  required	  for	  the	  sustenance	  of	  life).	  He	  grounds	  this	  argument	  in	  Adam	  Smith,	  noting	  that	  Smith	  believed	  that	  it	  was	  the	  division	  of	  labor,	  leading	  to	  a	  production	  of	  agricultural	  surplus,	  which	  allowed	  the	  development	  of	  a	  money	  economy	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  As	  such,	  the	  creation	  of	  money	  cannot	  occur	  through	  government	  fiat	  (by	  the	  introduction	  of	  externalities	  like	  a	  carbon	  market),	  but	  instead	  can	  happen	  only	  through	  increased	  exploitation	  and	  extraction	  of	  natural	  resources.	  If	  a	  carbon	  tax	  increases	  the	  cost	  of	  production,	  while	  the	  assumption	  that	  continuous	  growth	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  economy	  remains	  intact,	  producers	  will	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  increase	  the	  rate	  of	  such	  extraction	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  additional	  externalities.	  Czech	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  an	  effort	  in	  which	  he	  participated	  to	  rehabilitate	  and	  improve	  the	  habitat	  for	  elk	  on	  Apache	  tribal	  land.	  In	  order	  to	  finance	  this	  effort,	  the	  tribe	  allowed	  the	  rights	  to	  hunt	  a	  very	  limited	  number	  of	  elk	  (which	  was	  otherwise	  prohibited)	  to	  be	  sold	  to	  people	  outside	  the	  tribe.	  One	  year,	  Czech	  notes,	  three	  such	  tags	  were	  sold	  for	  $43,000	  each;	  two	  of	  them	  went	  to	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  large	  timber	  operation	  in	  the	  Northwest	  United	  States.	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The	  irony,	  he	  notes,	  is	  that	  this	  means	  that	  the	  money	  used	  to	  finance	  the	  habitat	  rehabilitation	  effort	  was	  produced	  by	  activities	  that	  degrade	  a	  similar	  habitat	  in	  another	  place	  (Czech,	  183).	  	  	   Gowdy	  and	  Erikson	  expand	  on	  this	  critique	  by	  suggesting	  that	  one	  of	  the	  major	  shortcomings	  of	  neoclassical	  economics	  is	  its	  dependence	  on	  “value	  monism,”	  or	  the	  implication	  that	  “all	  objects	  of	  utility	  have	  some	  common	  characteristic	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  be	  compared”	  (212).	  This	  value	  monism	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis,	  because	  once	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  values	  of	  all	  things	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  single,	  comparable	  characteristic,	  we	  are	  freed	  to	  compare	  anything	  we	  want,	  coming	  to	  a	  quantitative	  conclusion	  about	  the	  best	  course	  of	  action	  (within	  the	  limits,	  of	  course,	  set	  by	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  future).	  However,	  suggest	  Gowdy	  and	  Erikson,	  there	  is	  substantial	  evidence	  that	  such	  an	  understanding	  is	  fundamentally	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  people	  actually	  make	  choices.	  For	  example,	  they	  note	  a	  number	  of	  anomalies	  in	  consumer	  choice	  theory,	  including:	  [T]he	  existence	  of	  endowment	  effects	  (people	  place	  higher	  values	  on	  things	  they	  already	  possess),	  hyperbolic	  discounting	  (people	  discount	  the	  near	  future	  at	  a	  higher	  rate	  than	  the	  distant	  future),	  loss	  aversion	  (people	  are	  significantly	  more	  averse	  to	  taking	  a	  loss	  than	  failing	  to	  receive	  an	  equal	  gain),	  [and]	  the	  part–whole	  problem	  (people	  consistently	  place	  higher	  values	  on	  the	  sum	  of	  individual	  components	  of	  an	  object	  of	  utility	  than	  on	  the	  whole	  thing	  itself).	  (212)	  	  The	  upshot	  of	  these	  shortcomings	  is	  that	  we	  cannot	  assume	  an	  unbroken	  chain	  between	  preferences	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  market	  prices	  and	  actual	  preferences	  held	  by	  people.	  	  	  	   Without	  such	  a	  chain,	  the	  logic	  by	  which	  we	  can	  hope	  to	  incentivize	  “green”	  economic	  activity	  through	  the	  intentional	  erection	  of	  externalities	  without	  any	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substantive	  or	  structural	  change	  to	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  we	  produce	  and	  distribute	  goods	  begins	  to	  erode.	  If	  we	  cannot	  rely	  on	  prices	  as	  an	  accurate	  representation	  of	  preferences,	  then	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  it	  is	  also	  dangerous	  to	  assume	  the	  inverse:	  that	  we	  can	  influence	  preferences	  by	  adjusting	  prices.	  It	  may	  be	  the	  case,	  for	  example,	  that	  endowment	  effects	  will	  make	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  influence	  people	  to	  give	  up	  existing	  (but	  environmentally	  damaging)	  technologies	  to	  which	  they	  have	  become	  accustomed	  than	  simple	  consumer	  choice	  theory	  would	  suggest,	  because	  is	  fact	  people	  will	  tend	  to	  value	  these	  existing	  technologies	  more	  highly	  than	  they	  value	  the	  prospective	  benefits	  of	  a	  change.	  	  This	  problem	  is	  compounded	  by	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  hyperbolic	  discounting:	  people	  tend	  to	  assign	  greater	  value	  to	  benefits	  accrued	  in	  the	  near	  term	  than	  they	  do	  to	  benefits	  accrued	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  As	  such,	  while	  the	  strategic	  deployment	  of	  externalities	  might	  hope	  to	  increase	  the	  short-­‐term	  cost	  of	  non-­‐green	  economic	  activity	  relative	  to	  green	  activity,	  it	  will	  have	  to	  do	  so	  at	  a	  rate	  that	  overcomes	  the	  tendency	  to	  devalue	  the	  long-­‐term	  economic	  benefits	  of	  green	  economic	  activity	  described	  by	  Stern,	  et	  al.	  	  	  	  One	  possible	  solution	  to	  such	  a	  problem,	  proposed	  by	  theorists	  like	  Czech	  and	  Gowdy	  and	  Erikson,	  is	  that	  our	  focus	  should	  cease	  to	  be	  on	  growth	  in	  the	  economy.	  That	  is	  not	  say	  that	  we	  would	  be	  forced	  simply	  to	  accept	  the	  current	  state	  of	  technology	  and	  standard	  of	  living	  as	  the	  zenith	  of	  what	  is	  possible,	  but	  rather	  that	  we	  should	  begin	  to	  ask	  whether	  we	  need	  to	  produce	  more	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  better.	  In	  fact,	  a	  persuasive	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  that	  the	  opposite	  should	  in	  fact	  be	  true.	  If	  we	  are	  careful	  in	  our	  applications	  of	  new	  technology,	  and	  focused	  not	  on	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growth	  but	  on	  improvement,	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  construct	  an	  economy	  that	  has	  as	  its	  main	  purpose	  not	  continual	  growth,	  but	  rather	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  steady	  state	  of	  sustainable	  production.	  	  Such	  an	  economy	  would	  engender	  a	  whole	  different	  set	  of	  questions,	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis,	  because	  in	  order	  for	  anything	  new	  to	  be	  produced,	  the	  production	  of	  something	  else	  would	  have	  to	  be	  reduced	  or	  discontinued.	  This	  sounds	  far-­‐fetched,	  and	  in	  many	  ways	  it	  is	  the	  stuff	  of	  science	  fiction.	  How,	  one	  might	  very	  reasonably	  ask,	  could	  we	  hope	  to	  control	  production	  to	  such	  a	  tight	  degree	  that	  we	  could	  ensure	  a	  steady-­‐state	  output	  without	  centralizing	  all	  production	  and	  instituting	  a	  massively	  inefficient	  bureaucracy?	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  already	  do	  a	  great	  many	  things	  as	  a	  society	  engaged	  in	  production	  that	  seem	  far-­‐fetched	  before	  they	  are	  implemented.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  get	  at	  the	  incredibly	  difficult	  job	  of	  imagination	  that	  is	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  Imagine,	  for	  example,	  a	  virtual	  space	  in	  which	  every	  variety	  of	  good	  or	  service	  is	  not	  only	  sold,	  but	  also	  in	  which	  the	  prices	  at	  which	  those	  goods	  and	  services	  will	  be	  sold	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  betting,	  the	  value	  of	  which	  vastly	  exceeds	  the	  value	  of	  the	  things	  that	  are	  being	  bought	  at	  sold.	  Imagine	  that	  this	  virtual	  marketplace	  operates	  at	  all	  times,	  in	  at	  least	  one	  or	  two	  places,	  and	  that	  vicissitudes	  of	  this	  virtual	  marketplace	  are,	  for	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes,	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  vicissitudes	  of	  the	  real	  wealth	  of	  people	  all	  over	  the	  globe.	  Imagine,	  even,	  that	  this	  connection	  goes	  so	  far	  and	  runs	  so	  deep	  that	  people	  who	  have	  never	  participated	  in	  the	  marketplace,	  and	  never	  will,	  cannot	  identify	  a	  factor	  that	  is	  more	  
	  202	  
important	  to	  the	  economic	  realities	  of	  their	  lives	  than	  what	  happens	  in	  this	  virtual	  space.	  As	  bizarre	  as	  such	  an	  imagined	  reality	  may	  be,	  it	  is	  also	  an	  accurate	  way	  of	  describing	  the	  stock	  market	  that	  has	  so	  much	  power	  over	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  present.	  	  In	  fact,	  when	  we	  get	  down	  to	  the	  meat	  of	  their	  critiques	  of	  the	  economy,	  there	  is	  not	  that	  much	  difference	  between	  the	  positions	  of	  steady-­‐state	  advocates	  and	  more	  moderate	  critics	  like	  Stern.	  In	  both	  cases,	  their	  critiques	  call	  into	  question	  (as	  noted	  above)	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  capable	  of	  infinite	  growth	  without	  regard	  for	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  physical	  world.	  Both	  call	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  externalities	  designed	  to	  curb	  the	  growth	  in	  practices	  that	  they	  believe	  will	  otherwise	  cause	  an	  irreparable	  degradation	  of	  this	  physical	  world	  that	  will	  inevitably	  harm	  the	  economy	  along	  with	  everything	  else.	  	  Both	  sets	  of	  critiques	  serve	  to	  highlight	  the	  uneasiness	  with	  which	  the	  idea	  of	  growth	  fits	  into	  our	  competing	  concepts	  of	  the	  economy.	  Much	  of	  the	  time	  and	  energy	  we	  expend	  in	  politics	  is	  spent	  worrying	  about	  making	  policies	  that	  will	  allow	  or	  encourage	  unending	  growth.	  We	  understand	  this	  growth	  the	  be	  so	  central	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  economy	  that	  we	  often	  use	  words	  like	  “healthy”	  or	  “strong”	  to	  describe	  an	  economy	  that	  demonstrates	  growth	  year	  after	  year,	  and	  their	  opposites	  (“weak”	  or	  “unhealthy”)	  to	  describe	  one	  that	  fails	  to	  do	  so.51	  The	  economy,	  in	  this	  formulation,	  exists	  simultaneously	  as	  a	  materialization	  that	  must	  grow,	  and	  also	  must	  be	  made	  to	  grow.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  steady-­‐state	  economic	  theories	  appear	  unrealistic	  to	  many	  because	  it	  seems	  self-­‐evident	  that	  the	  economy	  cannot	  be	  kept	  from	  growing.	  If	  we	  add	  in	  some	  of	  the	  perspective	  we	  get	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  E.g.	  Shultz	  and	  Hanushek,	  2012;	  Fitzgerald,	  2014;	  Marson	  2014;	  and	  Antos,	  2010,	  respectively.	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from	  the	  Stern	  report,	  we	  can	  also	  see	  that	  an	  intelligible	  argument	  may	  be	  made	  that	  the	  economy	  must	  be	  managed	  specifically	  because	  it	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  externalities	  of	  a	  changing	  environment	  in	  the	  future	  –	  that	  is,	  if	  we	  do	  nothing	  to	  change	  its	  “path”,	  the	  economy	  will	  grow	  less	  (or	  perhaps	  not	  at	  all)	  because	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  operates	  will	  change,	  and	  the	  inexorable	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  market	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  compensate	  for	  these	  changes.	  	  The	  consonance	  between	  these	  two	  lines	  of	  critique,	  then,	  might	  help	  to	  illustrate	  one	  potential	  avenue	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy.	  We	  have	  identified	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  that	  are	  at	  once	  intelligible	  as	  practices	  related	  to	  the	  economy	  (as	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  these	  lines	  of	  critique	  are	  about	  the	  economy,	  and	  carry	  with	  them	  implications	  for	  policies	  and	  behaviors	  that	  are	  also	  related	  to	  the	  economy),	  but	  are	  also	  irreconcilable	  with	  the	  rules	  by	  which	  the	  economy	  is	  understood	  to	  operate	  (insofar	  as	  we	  are	  convinced	  by	  Mitchell’s	  claim	  that	  one	  of	  the	  criteria	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  is	  that	  it	  provides	  space	  for	  infinite	  growth	  without	  regard	  to	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  physical	  world).	  Moreover,	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  be	  believe	  (based	  upon	  the	  brief	  examination	  of	  labor	  law	  above),	  that	  despite	  the	  apparent	  naturalness	  of	  the	  current	  materialization,	  additional	  externalities	  designed	  to	  curb	  growth	  that	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  physical	  world	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  be	  subsumed	  into	  this	  apparent	  naturalness	  relatively	  quickly.	  	  The	  key	  here,	  if	  we	  follow	  the	  theoretical	  lines	  laid	  out	  by	  Butler,	  Koselleck,	  Mitchell,	  and	  Farr,	  seems	  to	  be	  finding	  a	  way	  to	  incorporate	  this	  variation	  (the	  claim	  that	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  economy	  must	  be	  limited	  by	  externalities	  designed	  to	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compensate	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  market	  is	  incapable	  of	  planning	  for	  future	  degradation	  of	  the	  physical	  world)	  into	  the	  repetition	  of	  practices	  of	  signification	  by	  which	  the	  economy	  effect	  is	  produced	  and	  maintained.	  Moreover,	  it’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  this	  set	  of	  practices	  seems	  to	  carry	  the	  potential	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  will	  inevitably	  result	  in	  such	  innovation.	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  multiple	  competing	  sets	  of	  claims	  being	  made	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  physical	  world,	  and	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  foregone	  conclusion	  that	  this	  particular	  set	  of	  claims	  will	  win	  out	  (insofar	  as	  any	  set	  of	  claims	  ever	  really	  wins	  out).	  	  Attention	  must	  be	  paid	  as	  well	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  six	  criteria	  I’ve	  attributed	  to	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  isolation	  from	  one	  another.	  	  If,	  through	  critical	  practices	  arising	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  green	  economy,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  innovate	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  economy	  can	  be	  imagined	  to	  grow	  indefinitely	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  physical	  world,	  we	  must	  expect	  challenges	  to	  the	  other	  criteria	  to	  arise	  and/or	  intensify.	  In	  particular,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  altering	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  potentially	  infinite	  significantly	  weakens	  the	  appearance	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  natural	  and	  inevitable.	  If,	  that	  is,	  we	  can	  alter	  our	  practices	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy,	  and	  thereby	  construct	  the	  economy	  differently,	  such	  that	  it	  no	  longer	  appears	  to	  have	  the	  potential	  for	  infinite	  growth,	  we	  have	  mounted	  a	  significant	  challenge	  to	  the	  appearance	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  natural	  and	  inevitable,	  and	  we	  may	  have	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  criterion	  as	  well.	  	   It	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  all	  sunshine	  and	  roses	  in	  the	  land	  of	  conceptual	  innovation.	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Even	  if	  critical	  practices	  such	  as	  the	  ones	  described	  above	  do	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  conceptual	  innovation	  we’ve	  been	  discussing,	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  the	  innovations	  will	  be	  of	  the	  type	  environmental	  activists	  might	  prefer.	  As	  with	  any	  political	  issue,	  what	  I	  have	  described	  here	  is	  not	  a	  magical	  lever	  for	  social	  change,	  but	  rather	  a	  site	  for	  struggle,	  and	  hopefully	  a	  useful	  perspective	  from	  which	  to	  view	  the	  possibilities	  and	  pitfalls	  that	  might	  inhere	  in	  that	  struggle.	  	  	   Finally,	  it’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  I	  have	  in	  no	  way	  exhausted	  the	  potential	  discursive	  and	  critical	  practices	  falling	  under	  the	  label	  “green	  economy”	  that	  might	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  lead	  to	  conceptual	  innovation.	  I	  haven’t	  looked	  at	  all,	  for	  example,	  at	  critical	  practices	  advocating	  reduced	  consumption	  and	  seeking	  negative	  growth,	  or	  at	  movements	  centered	  around	  the	  idea	  no	  additional	  externalities	  are	  required	  if	  technological	  innovation	  is	  sufficient	  to	  allow	  the	  economy	  to	  continue	  to	  grow	  without	  degrading	  the	  physical	  world.	  Instead,	  I	  have	  illustrated	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  might	  evaluate	  such	  practices	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  potential	  for	  conceptual	  innovation,	  and	  pointed	  out	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  discourses	  of	  the	  green	  economy	  might	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  that	  could	  reduce	  some	  of	  the	  barriers	  imposed	  by	  the	  economy	  effect	  on	  actions	  aimed	  at	  decreasing	  material	  inequality	  and	  environmental	  damage.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  we’ll	  take	  a	  look	  at	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  discourses	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  may	  or	  may	  not	  provide	  a	  similar	  opportunity.	  We’ll	  pay	  particular	  attention	  in	  Chapter	  5	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  (or	  whether)	  conceptual	  innovation	  might	  be	  directed	  toward	  significant	  change	  in	  the	  economy	  effect,	  and	  to	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  such	  innovation	  is	  instead	  likely	  simply	  to	  be	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THE	  SHARING	  ECONOMY	  AND	  CONCEPTUAL	  INNOVATION	  AS	  A	  CHALLENGE	  TO	  
THE	  ECONOMY	  EFFECT	  
A.	  Introduction	  	  On	  a	  recent	  trip	  to	  two	  cities	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  I	  experimented	  with	  a	  number	  of	  businesses	  that	  are	  part	  of	  what	  is	  becoming	  known	  as	  the	  “sharing	  economy.”	  In	  Denver	  my	  partner	  and	  I,	  along	  with	  some	  friends,	  stayed	  in	  a	  farmhouse	  built	  in	  the	  1880’s,	  secured	  through	  a	  service	  known	  as	  Air	  BnB,	  which	  allows	  individuals	  to	  make	  their	  homes	  (or	  other	  residential	  properties)	  available	  for	  rent	  on	  a	  night-­‐by-­‐night	  basis.	  In	  Chicago,	  we	  ate	  at	  a	  restaurant	  where	  guests	  are	  encouraged	  to	  bring	  gifts	  to	  the	  chefs,	  and	  an	  attempt	  is	  made	  to	  create	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  convivial	  sharing	  rather	  than	  fee-­‐for-­‐service.	  When	  it	  was	  time	  to	  go	  back	  to	  the	  hotel	  after	  dinner,	  we	  ordered	  a	  car	  from	  Uber,	  a	  sort	  of	  Air	  Bnb	  for	  taxis,	  because	  no	  yellow	  cabs	  patrolled	  the	  area	  where	  the	  restaurant	  is	  located.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  scenarios,	  I	  was	  struck	  by	  the	  uneasy	  way	  in	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  sharing	  comes	  into	  contact	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  
B.	  The	  Sharing	  Economy	  	   I’m	  certainly	  not	  the	  only	  one	  interested	  in	  the	  possibilities	  raised	  by	  these	  new	  types	  of	  businesses.	  In	  March	  2013,	  The	  Economist	  ran	  a	  cover	  story	  on	  the	  sharing	  economy,	  which	  contained	  the	  following	  claim:	  	  	  	  The	  sharing	  economy	  is	  the	  latest	  example	  of	  the	  internet’s	  value	  to	  consumers...	  This	  emerging	  model	  is	  now	  big	  and	  disruptive	  enough	  for	  regulators	  and	  companies	  to	  have	  woken	  up	  to	  it.	  That	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  its	  immense	  potential.	  It	  is	  time	  to	  start	  caring	  about	  sharing.	  (3/9/2013)	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Along	  with	  mainstream	  media	  attention,	  the	  sharing	  economy	  has	  also	  given	  rise	  to	  a	  number	  of	  organizations	  and	  networks	  dedicated	  not	  to	  a	  single	  business	  (like	  lodging	  or	  transportation),	  but	  rather	  to	  promoting	  the	  model	  of	  “sharing.”	  At	  meshing.it,	  for	  example,	  one	  can	  find	  the	  Internet	  home	  of	  the	  Mesh,	  an	  organization	  that	  describes	  itself	  as	  “a	  world	  community	  and	  economy	  where	  access	  trumps	  ownership.”	  (Gansky,	  2013)	  Peers.org	  is	  the	  home	  of	  a	  similar	  organization	  that	  describes	  itself	  as	  a	  “a	  member-­‐driven	  organization	  that	  supports	  the	  sharing	  economy	  movement.”	  (Peers.org,	  2013)	  This	  group	  makes	  the	  similar	  claim	  that	  “we	  [the	  proponents	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy]	  access	  the	  things	  we	  need	  rather	  than	  buying	  them.”	  The	  sharing	  economy	  differs	  from	  the	  green	  economy	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  present	  an	  alternative	  primarily	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  we	  incentivize	  what	  we	  produce	  and	  consume,	  but	  rather	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  consume	  the	  things	  we	  produce.	  A	  typical	  description	  of	  an	  individual	  experience	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  looks	  something	  like	  this:	  
Joe	  starts	  the	  day	  by	  dropping	  his	  two	  kids	  off	  at	  the	  neighbors’	  place	  (where	  they	  
share	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  nanny),	  then	  biking	  from	  his	  Oakland	  apartment	  to	  his	  shared	  office	  
space	  in	  Berkeley.52	  When	  he	  arrives,	  he	  spends	  some	  time	  chatting	  with	  the	  other	  folks	  
who	  work	  there,	  then	  after	  responding	  to	  some	  emails,	  he	  checks	  his	  car	  sharing	  
service	  to	  find	  a	  vehicle	  he	  can	  use	  to	  get	  to	  an	  afternoon	  meeting	  in	  San	  Mateo.	  When	  
he	  returns	  early	  that	  evening,	  he	  picks	  his	  kids	  up	  and	  takes	  them	  home	  in	  time	  to	  meet	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  The	  San	  Francisco	  Bay	  area	  seems	  to	  be	  ground	  zero	  for	  the	  sharing	  economy,	  or	  at	  least	  for	  articles	  about	  this.	  This	  probably	  has	  something	  to	  do	  with	  the	  confluence	  of	  high	  population	  density,	  good	  public	  transportation,	  a	  very	  high	  cost	  of	  living,	  weather	  conducive	  to	  biking	  and	  walking	  most	  of	  the	  year,	  and	  a	  reputation	  as	  a	  progressive	  region,	  which	  is	  likely	  to	  attract	  people	  interested	  in	  alternatives	  to	  conventional	  economic	  relationships.	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up	  with	  friends	  who	  are	  there	  for	  a	  food	  swap	  –	  they’ve	  each	  cooked	  large	  portions	  of	  
one	  dish,	  and	  by	  sharing	  it	  around,	  they	  each	  end	  up	  with	  five	  meals	  for	  the	  week.	  After	  
everyone	  leaves,	  he	  and	  the	  kids	  sit	  down	  to	  watch	  a	  movie	  on	  Netflix	  over	  the	  wi-­‐fi	  
connection	  they	  share	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  building,	  and	  then	  to	  bed.	  	   The	  idea	  here	  is,	  clearly,	  that	  technology	  enables	  us	  to	  share	  in	  ways	  that	  were	  previously	  impractical	  or	  impossible,	  and	  that	  by	  leveraging	  these	  new	  sharing	  possibilities,	  we	  can	  simultaneously	  reduce	  our	  consumption	  and	  improve	  our	  standards	  of	  living.	  To	  continue	  in	  our	  analysis,	  the	  question	  here	  is,	  do	  the	  practices	  involved	  both	  in	  engaging	  in	  these	  new	  types	  of	  sharing,	  and	  in	  describing	  them	  to	  ourselves	  and	  others,	  carry	  the	  potential	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  as	  described	  in	  Chapter	  4?	  If	  so,	  in	  what	  way	  is	  such	  conceptual	  innovation	  likely	  to	  occur,	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  which	  of	  the	  criteria	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy?	  	  	   There	  are	  a	  couple	  of	  common	  threads	  in	  critical	  practices	  related	  to	  the	  sharing	  economy	  that	  may	  help	  us	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  these	  questions.	  The	  first,	  as	  noted	  above,	  is	  that	  when	  proponents	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  seek	  to	  describe	  it,	  their	  descriptions	  typically	  begin	  in	  a	  relatively	  affluent,	  residential	  neighborhood	  near	  or	  in	  a	  large	  city.	  The	  kinds	  of	  sharing	  in	  which	  individuals	  featured	  in	  these	  descriptions	  are	  engaging	  require	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  relatively	  high	  resource	  concentration	  to	  begin	  with,	  coupled	  with	  a	  relationship	  of	  trust	  that	  works	  better	  if	  it	  is	  based	  on	  ties	  to	  the	  community	  rather	  than	  between	  individuals.	  	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  think	  about	  the	  practices	  described	  as	  “sharing”	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  without	  also	  thinking	  about	  the	  actual	  goods	  and	  services	  that	  are	  being	  shared,	  and	  the	  consistency	  with	  which	  they	  appear	  from	  
	  210	  
description	  to	  description.	  For	  instance,	  one	  practice	  commonly	  referred	  to	  in	  such	  descriptions	  is	  “nanny	  sharing”.	  While	  it	  is	  unquestionable	  that	  many	  families	  could	  benefit	  from	  private,	  in-­‐home	  child	  care	  if	  only	  they	  could	  afford	  it,	  it	  is	  also	  the	  case	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  such	  families	  would	  remain	  unable	  to	  afford	  such	  childcare	  even	  if	  they	  were	  able	  to	  split	  the	  cost	  down	  the	  middle	  with	  another	  family.	  According	  to	  the	  ACS,	  in	  2011	  the	  median	  family	  income	  for	  all	  families	  with	  children	  was	  $63,701.	  However,	  the	  median	  income	  for	  a	  family	  with	  a	  female	  householder	  and	  children	  (nearly	  20%	  of	  all	  households	  in	  the	  US)	  was	  only	  $30,052,	  and	  single	  parent	  households	  headed	  by	  males	  (a	  smaller	  proportion	  at	  just	  over	  7%	  of	  all	  households)	  fared	  only	  slightly	  better,	  with	  a	  median	  income	  of	  $41,763	  (US	  Census	  Bureau).	  	  One	  article	  on	  the	  sharing	  economy	  details	  the	  savings	  from	  a	  shared	  nanny,	  noting	  that	  instead	  of	  paying	  $16/hour	  per	  child,	  by	  sharing	  a	  nanny	  with	  another	  family	  they	  are	  able	  to	  bring	  that	  cost	  down	  to	  $10/hour	  per	  child.	  This,	  the	  article	  suggests,	  translates	  to	  a	  savings	  of	  $10,800	  year	  for	  “Neal,”	  the	  sharer	  in	  question	  (Leonard	  and	  Chamberlain,	  2012).	  In	  order	  to	  save	  $10,800	  at	  a	  savings	  rate	  of	  $6/hour,	  Neal	  needs	  to	  purchase	  a	  total	  of	  1800	  hours	  of	  childcare.	  At	  $10/hour,	  these	  1800	  hours	  of	  child	  care	  still	  cost	  $18,000.	  So,	  on	  one	  level	  we’re	  looking	  at	  a	  $10,800	  cost	  savings	  per	  child,	  but	  on	  another	  level	  he	  has	  to	  be	  able	  to	  spend	  $18,000	  annually	  on	  child	  care	  in	  order	  to	  access	  these	  savings.	  The	  potential	  of	  these	  sharing	  practices	  to	  save	  money	  for	  affluent	  exemplars	  like	  Neal	  is	  compelling,	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  it’s	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  examples	  like	  this	  do	  little	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  those	  who	  are	  most	  in	  need	  of	  childcare.	  These	  reduced	  childcare	  costs	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would	  still	  be	  equal	  to	  nearly	  60%	  of	  the	  total	  income	  of	  the	  median-­‐earning	  female-­‐headed	  single	  parent	  household,	  leaving	  practices	  like	  nanny-­‐sharing	  firmly	  out	  of	  reach	  for	  many	  families.	  We	  must,	  then,	  as	  we	  continue	  to	  examine	  the	  sharing	  economy’s	  potential	  for	  conceptual	  innovation,	  remain	  alert	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  may	  also	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  bifurcated	  system	  in	  which	  only	  the	  affluent	  have	  access	  to	  its	  benefits.	  This	  would,	  of	  course,	  constitute	  a	  significant	  limit	  to	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  to	  assist	  political	  actors	  who	  are	  interested	  in	  mitigating	  or	  eliminating	  material	  inequality.	  	  	  The	  Sunset	  article	  highlights	  another	  potential	  shortcoming	  of	  the	  “sharing	  economy.”	  When	  Neal	  first	  got	  into	  sharing,	  we’re	  told,	  he	  tried	  sharing	  a	  car	  with	  a	  roommate.	  The	  roommate	  got	  the	  car	  towed,	  and	  it	  wasn’t	  clear	  whose	  responsibility	  that	  was,	  so	  Neal	  was	  forced	  to	  eat	  the	  cost	  of	  recovering	  the	  car.	  Luckily,	  he	  was	  able	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  now,	  the	  article	  notes,	  “agreements	  on	  paper…	  exist.”	  However,	  such	  an	  arrangement	  could	  have	  had	  much	  more	  severe	  consequences	  had	  Neal	  not	  been	  in	  a	  position	  to	  get	  the	  car	  out	  of	  impound.	  The	  sharing	  economy	  requires	  more	  than	  a	  high	  level	  of	  initial	  resource	  concentration	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  benefits;	  it	  also	  requires	  participants	  who	  are	  affluent	  enough	  to	  shrug	  off	  lapses	  in	  the	  trust	  relationships	  that	  make	  it	  possible	  and	  ideologically	  committed	  enough	  to	  continue	  sharing	  despite	  these	  setbacks.	  For	  many,	  a	  mistake	  that	  led	  to	  the	  impounding	  of	  a	  car,	  which	  might	  well	  be	  necessary	  transportation	  to	  work,	  would	  be	  not	  a	  minor	  setback	  but	  a	  major	  life-­‐problem.	  	  	  Despite	  these	  shortcomings,	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  allow	  us	  to	  get	  at	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  standard,	  or	  non-­‐sharing,	  economy	  that	  might	  otherwise	  
	  212	  
be	  difficult	  to	  access.	  In	  particular,	  the	  critical	  practices	  that	  seek	  to	  describe	  the	  sharing	  economy	  allow	  us	  to	  ask:	  to	  what,	  exactly,	  is	  it	  being	  contrasted?	  One	  of	  the	  other	  interesting	  common	  themes	  of	  articles	  about	  the	  sharing	  economy	  is	  that	  they	  often	  focus	  on	  people	  who	  have	  made	  a	  conscious	  choice	  to	  involve	  themselves	  in	  relationships	  based	  upon	  sharing	  due,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  to	  a	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  lives	  they	  led	  as	  privileged	  participants	  in	  more	  mainstream	  economic	  practices.	  The	  Sunset	  article	  cited	  above,	  for	  example,	  describes	  Neal,	  the	  sharer,	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  About	  seven	  years	  ago,	  Neal	  became	  so	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  meaninglessness	  of	  his	  job	  at	  a	  shipping	  company,	  he	  quit	  to	  be	  more	  connected	  to	  his	  community.	  After	  bouncing	  around	  Internet	  start-­‐ups	  that	  facilitated	  collaboration	  and	  sharing	  physical	  assets,	  he	  launched	  Shareable.	  (1)	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  meaninglessness	  of	  his	  job	  in	  shipping,	  Neal	  was	  able	  to	  find	  greater	  connection	  to	  his	  community	  through	  participating	  in	  activities	  that	  facilitate	  collaboration	  and	  the	  sharing	  of	  physical	  assets.	  	  	   The	  sharing	  economy,	  then,	  might	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  owning	  economy,	  or	  the	  taking-­‐and-­‐keeping	  economy.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  the	  private	  ownership	  of	  goods	  and	  real	  estate	  is,	  itself,	  an	  isolating	  force.	  This	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  a	  new	  idea.	  In	  the	  Manifesto,	  for	  example,	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  suggest	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie	  has:	  …	  left	  remaining	  no	  other	  nexus	  between	  man	  and	  man	  than	  naked	  self-­‐interest,	  than	  callous	  ‘cash	  payment.’	  It	  has	  drowned	  the	  most	  heavenly	  ecstasies	  of	  religious	  fervor,	  of	  chivalrous	  enthusiasm,	  of	  philistine	  sentimentalism,	  in	  the	  icy	  water	  of	  egoistical	  calculation.	  (Marx,	  475)	  	  In	  fact,	  we	  can	  go	  all	  the	  way	  back	  to	  Plato	  to	  find	  the	  assertion	  that:	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The	  city	  that	  is	  best	  governed	  [is]	  the	  one	  in	  which	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  people	  apply	  ‘mine’	  and	  ‘not	  mine’	  to	  the	  same	  things	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  same	  principle…(Republic,	  462c)	  	  However,	  both	  of	  these	  texts	  (and	  the	  related	  works	  by	  both	  authors)	  seem	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  best	  feasible	  alternative	  to	  private	  ownership	  is	  ownership	  in	  common	  by	  the	  entire	  political	  unit.	  That	  is,	  for	  both	  Marx	  and	  Plato,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  overcome	  the	  isolating	  influence	  of	  private	  ownership	  tend	  to	  center	  around	  the	  replacement	  of	  these	  private	  schemes	  with	  public	  ownership.	  For	  Marx,	  this	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  the	  collective	  appropriation	  and	  distribution	  of	  surplus	  value,	  while	  for	  Plato	  it	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  collective	  possession	  by	  men	  of	  the	  women,	  and	  collective	  responsibility	  taken	  by	  all	  for	  the	  children	  of	  Kallipolis.	  	   In	  contrast,	  advocates	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  private	  ownership	  could	  remain	  intact,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  things	  would	  not	  be	  held	  in	  common	  by	  all,	  but	  would	  instead	  be	  the	  property	  of	  specific	  individuals.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  scheme	  of	  private	  ownership	  could	  be	  altered	  substantially	  on	  the	  principle	  that	  what	  we	  really	  want	  out	  of	  ownership	  is	  not	  exclusive	  use	  of	  some	  good	  or	  service,	  but	  rather	  the	  right	  or	  capacity	  to	  use	  that	  good	  or	  service	  when	  we	  need	  or	  want	  it.	  Such	  an	  expansion	  is	  made	  possible	  through	  the	  use	  of	  technology,	  which	  allows	  for	  the	  real-­‐time	  identification	  and	  analysis	  of	  usage	  patterns,	  and	  may	  constitute	  a	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  “owning.”	  	  The	  primitive	  car-­‐sharing	  agreement	  in	  which	  Neal	  first	  participated,	  which	  could	  hardly	  be	  supposed	  to	  offer	  an	  alternative	  economy	  of	  any	  real	  import,	  is	  replaced	  with	  a	  system	  like	  Getaround.com,	  which	  allows	  you	  to	  rent	  a	  car	  from	  someone	  when	  they’re	  not	  using	  it,	  thus	  defraying	  their	  cost	  of	  ownership	  and	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giving	  you	  access	  to	  a	  vehicle	  when	  you	  need	  it.	  The	  system,	  in	  this	  case,	  undertakes	  the	  responsibility	  for	  ensuring	  that	  the	  drivers	  who	  rent	  your	  car	  are	  insured,	  that	  they	  are	  who	  they	  say	  they	  are,	  and	  that	  they	  will	  return	  your	  car	  on	  time.	  The	  company	  will	  even	  install	  a	  piece	  of	  hardware	  in	  your	  car	  that	  allows	  you	  to	  track	  its	  location	  in	  real-­‐time	  and	  to	  immobilize	  it	  if	  the	  driver	  tries	  to	  take	  it	  somewhere	  other	  than	  the	  agreed-­‐upon	  destination.	  	  In	  order	  to	  render	  coherent	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  which	  this	  kind	  of	  private,	  technology-­‐enabled	  sharing	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  overcome	  the	  isolating	  forces	  of	  the	  ownership	  economy,	  we	  will	  clearly	  need	  a	  different	  understanding	  of	  the	  source	  of	  this	  isolation	  then	  that	  provided	  by	  either	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  or	  Plato.	  Indeed,	  schemes	  like	  Getaround.com	  do	  nothing	  at	  all	  to	  overcome	  the	  replacement	  of	  human	  interactions	  by	  the	  “cash-­‐nexus.”	  This	  is	  sharing	  that	  doesn’t	  even	  require	  that	  you	  know	  or	  encounter	  the	  people	  with	  whom	  you	  share	  your	  automobile.	  Certainly,	  it	  doesn’t	  approach	  the	  level	  of	  unified	  “mine-­‐ness”	  that	  Plato	  envisions	  for	  Kallipolis.	  Perhaps,	  then,	  the	  implicit	  claim	  of	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  the	  sharing	  economy	  is	  in	  some	  way	  an	  antidote	  for	  alienation	  is	  that	  alienation	  is	  a	  product	  not	  of	  private	  as	  opposed	  to	  public	  ownership,	  but	  rather	  of	  individual	  rather	  than	  group	  ownership.	  Such	  an	  idea	  must	  rest	  on	  a	  conception	  of	  alienation	  that	  posits	  very	  different	  mechanisms	  than	  either	  Plato	  or	  Marx.	  	  For	  Plato,	  such	  mechanisms	  are	  fairly	  straightforward,	  resting	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  one	  perceives	  oneself	  as	  a	  whole	  distinct	  from	  others	  who	  are	  also	  wholes,	  or	  as	  a	  part	  among	  many	  parts	  of	  a	  single	  larger	  whole.	  See,	  for	  example,	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Socrates’	  practically	  rhetorical	  question	  to	  Glaucon	  at	  462b:	  “[D]oesn’t	  the	  privatization	  of	  these	  things	  [pleasure	  and	  pain]	  dissolve	  the	  city…?”	  Alienation	  (though,	  of	  course,	  Plato	  does	  not	  use	  this	  term)	  is,	  in	  this	  case,	  a	  product	  of	  feeling	  differently	  than	  ones	  neighbors	  due	  to	  a	  difference	  of	  circumstance.	  The	  solution,	  then	  is,	  to	  design	  a	  city	  such	  that	  “…whenever	  one	  of	  its	  citizens	  has	  an	  experience,	  whether	  good	  or	  bad…	  [the	  city	  will]	  say	  that	  the	  experience	  is	  its	  own,	  and	  all	  of	  it	  together	  will	  share	  his	  pleasure	  or	  pain”	  (462d-­‐e).	  	  As	  long	  as	  individuals	  experience	  things	  as	  individuals,	  rather	  than	  as	  part	  of	  a	  collective	  whole,	  they	  are	  doomed	  to	  be	  torn	  asunder	  from	  one	  another.	  For	  Marx,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  alienation	  is	  exploitation.	  In	  the	  process	  of	  being	  forced	  to	  sell	  his	  labor	  power	  in	  order	  to	  support	  himself,	  the	  worker	  is	  compelled	  to	  give	  up	  any	  right	  to	  the	  product	  of	  his	  labor.	  As	  such,	  Marx	  claims:	  …the	  worker	  always	  leaves	  the	  process	  in	  the	  same	  state	  as	  he	  entered	  it	  –	  a	  personal	  source	  of	  wealth,	  but	  deprived	  of	  any	  means	  of	  making	  that	  wealth	  a	  reality	  for	  himself.	  Since	  before	  he	  enters	  the	  process,	  his	  own	  labour	  has	  already	  been	  alienated	  from	  him,	  appropriated	  by	  the	  capitalist,	  and	  incorporated	  with	  capital,	  it	  now,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  process,	  constantly	  objectifies	  itself	  so	  that	  it	  becomes	  a	  product	  alien	  to	  him.	  (1990,	  716)	  	  	  As	  the	  world	  comes	  to	  be	  increasingly	  defined	  by	  the	  commodity	  form,	  those	  workers	  who	  produce	  but	  do	  not	  own	  these	  commodities	  will	  become	  increasingly	  alienated	  from	  the	  products	  of	  their	  labor,	  and	  by	  extension	  from	  themselves	  and	  from	  one	  another.	  	  	   The	  kind	  of	  group	  ownership	  conceived	  by	  proponents	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  clearly	  can	  do	  little	  to	  counter	  this	  sort	  of	  alienation,	  as	  the	  underlying	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conditions	  of	  exploitation	  continue	  to	  pertain.	  However,	  there	  may	  be	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  understand	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  alienation	  endemic	  to	  the	  ownership	  society.	  We	  might,	  for	  instance,	  conceive	  of	  the	  time	  and	  energy	  we	  are	  required	  to	  devote	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  things	  we	  own	  privately	  as	  one	  source	  of	  alienation.	  Some	  studies	  (e.g.	  Cairney	  and	  Boyle,	  2004)	  suggest	  that	  while	  ownership	  (in	  this	  case	  of	  one’s	  home)	  may	  carry	  some	  psychological	  benefit	  as	  a	  result	  of	  guaranteed	  access	  to	  important	  resources,	  it	  also	  induces	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  stress,	  particularly	  among	  those	  who	  do	  not	  have	  sufficient	  financial	  resources	  to	  make	  large	  purchases	  outright.	  	  	   It	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  to	  embark	  on	  an	  extended	  discussion	  of	  the	  psychological	  literature	  surrounding	  stress	  and	  ownership,	  but	  merely	  to	  point	  out	  that	  if	  we	  understand	  ownership	  not	  only	  as	  a	  source	  of	  security	  (which	  it	  clearly	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  be),	  but	  also	  as	  a	  potential	  source	  of	  stress	  with	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  psychological	  well-­‐being,	  then	  a	  whole	  avenue	  of	  possibilities	  for	  the	  improvement	  of	  human	  happiness	  becomes	  available	  to	  us.	  Moreover,	  if	  we	  take	  into	  account	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  psychological	  benefits	  of	  ownership	  accrue	  largely	  from	  a	  sense	  of	  security	  that	  our	  needs	  (and,	  no	  doubt,	  our	  desires)	  will	  be	  met,	  then	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  one	  such	  avenue	  might	  involve	  innovations	  in	  ownership	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  experience	  the	  security	  we	  associate	  with	  things	  like	  owning	  a	  home	  or	  a	  car,	  without	  requiring	  us	  also	  to	  take	  on	  the	  whole	  load	  of	  stress	  involved	  in	  such	  ownership.	  Perhaps,	  then,	  the	  promise	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  lies	  in	  its	  potential	  to	  socialize	  the	  negative	  aspects	  of	  ownership	  by	  leveraging	  the	  fact	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that	  most	  of	  us	  don’t	  need	  to	  use	  the	  things	  we	  own	  all	  the	  time;	  we	  just	  need	  to	  know	  that	  they’re	  available	  when	  we	  need	  them.	  	  	   Moreover,	  a	  shift	  toward	  shared	  ownership	  focused	  on	  access	  to	  resources	  rather	  than	  exclusive	  legal	  control	  of	  those	  resources	  may	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  challenge	  the	  appearance	  of	  naturalness	  with	  which	  private	  ownership	  has	  been	  imbued.	  One	  might	  imagine,	  for	  example,	  a	  project	  of	  exposition	  similar	  to	  J.K.	  Gibson-­‐Graham’s	  (2006)	  illustration	  that	  capitalism	  is	  not	  nearly	  as	  hegemonic	  as	  we	  often	  understand	  it	  to	  be.	  By	  demonstrating	  that	  there	  are	  many	  different	  sorts	  of	  class	  processes	  operating	  simultaneously,	  they	  are	  able	  to	  show	  that	  specifically	  capitalist	  class	  processes	  are	  neither	  natural	  nor	  inevitable.	  Were	  shared	  ownership	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  access	  to	  become	  widespread,	  it	  might	  have	  a	  similar	  potential	  with	  respect	  to	  private	  ownership	  and	  its	  central	  role	  in	  the	  economy.	  Such	  potential,	  however,	  would	  be	  meaningful	  for	  those	  seeking	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  decreasing	  material	  inequality	  only	  insofar	  as	  the	  kinds	  of	  practices	  made	  possible	  by	  these	  arrangements	  were	  simultaneously	  intelligible	  as	  relating	  to	  the	  economy	  and	  irreconcilable	  with	  the	  rules	  by	  which	  the	  economy	  is	  understood	  to	  operate.	  It	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  such	  a	  situation	  obtains.	  One	  particularly	  telling	  example	  of	  both	  the	  promise	  seen	  in	  the	  sharing	  economy	  and	  the	  limitations	  of	  its	  potential	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  current	  materialization	  of	  the	  economy	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  smartphone	  application	  LeftoverSwap.	  The	  authors	  of	  the	  program	  introduce	  the	  idea	  with	  the	  following	  passage:	  You're	  hungry.	  And	  cheap.	  We	  understand.	  You	  also	  care	  about	  reducing	  waste,	  eating	  locally,	  and	  want	  to	  build	  relationships	  within	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your	  community.	  We	  also	  understand	  those	  things.	  Simply	  fire	  up	  LeftoverSwap,	  view	  the	  available	  leftovers	  around	  you,	  make	  your	  selection,	  and	  arrange	  for	  pick-­‐up	  or	  delivery.	  Your	  cheap,	  local,	  and	  community-­‐oriented	  meal	  is	  waiting.	  (Leftoverswap.com,	  2013)	  	  This	  application,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  as	  much	  about	  who	  the	  consumer	  as	  it	  is	  about	  what	  the	  product	  is.	  This	  in	  itself	  is,	  of	  course,	  not	  new	  (see	  e.g.	  Frank,	  1997).	  However,	  the	  content	  of	  the	  message	  carried	  by	  this	  particular	  marketing	  campaign	  gives	  us	  an	  interesting	  insight	  into	  how	  at	  least	  one	  group	  of	  sharing	  economy	  proponents	  understand	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy.	  Here’s	  another	  snippet,	  this	  time	  aimed	  at	  those	  who	  might	  want	  to	  swap	  (sell)	  their	  leftovers:	  You're	  stuffed.	  You	  can't	  take	  another	  bite,	  but	  there's	  so	  much	  left	  on	  your	  plate.	  You	  hate	  the	  idea	  of	  throwing	  out	  food,	  but	  also	  don't	  want	  to	  be	  eating	  the	  same	  leftovers	  for	  the	  next	  few	  days.	  We	  understand.	  You	  want	  to	  reduce	  our	  dependence	  on	  fossil	  fuels	  and	  fertilizer	  as	  well.	  We	  also	  understand	  that.	  Snap	  a	  picture	  of	  what	  you	  can't	  eat,	  name	  it,	  and	  share	  the	  rest	  of	  your	  meal.	  Your	  neighbors	  are	  hungry.	  (ibid)	  	  The	  focus	  on	  sharing,	  on	  sustainability,	  and	  on	  a	  sort	  of	  communal	  responsibility	  (if	  tempered	  by	  the	  personal	  preference	  not	  to	  be	  eating	  the	  same	  leftovers	  for	  the	  next	  few	  days)	  is	  impossible	  to	  ignore	  in	  the	  copy.	  LeftoverSwap	  promises	  not	  only	  to	  allow	  each	  of	  us	  to	  increase	  the	  variety	  in	  our	  diets,	  but	  to	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  simultaneously	  reduces	  waste,	  support	  local	  commerce,	  and	  build	  relationships	  with	  others	  who	  share	  our	  communities.	  So,	  in	  addition	  to	  resolving	  some	  of	  the	  alienation	  that	  might	  result	  from	  a	  focus	  on	  private	  ownership	  of	  goods	  (as	  discussed	  above),	  LeftoverSwap	  adds	  another	  layer	  to	  the	  promise	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy:	  the	  reduction	  of	  waste.	  	  	   The	  focus	  on	  the	  language	  of	  swapping	  and	  sharing,	  however,	  almost	  completely	  obscures	  the	  fundamental	  use	  to	  which	  this	  application	  will	  actually	  be	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put	  –	  the	  buying	  and	  selling	  of	  previously	  non-­‐market	  goods.	  This	  program	  is,	  in	  short,	  an	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  new	  market,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  using	  language	  that	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  market.	  While	  the	  resulting	  set	  of	  practices	  and	  interactions	  could	  be	  described	  (as	  above)	  as	  an	  interposition	  of	  “sharing”	  into	  the	  usual	  logic	  of	  the	  economy,	  it	  could	  also	  be	  described	  simply	  as	  an	  adjustment	  of	  this	  logic,	  whereby	  the	  restaurants	  becomes	  wholesalers,	  and	  individual	  customers	  selling	  their	  leftovers	  become	  retailers,	  using	  LeftoverSwap	  as	  a	  marketing	  tool.	  	   This	  highlights	  a	  central	  problem	  with	  the	  sharing	  economy,	  at	  least	  insofar	  as	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  its	  capacity	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy:	  to	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	  is	  able	  to	  pose	  an	  effective	  challenge	  to	  current	  practices	  that	  produce	  and	  maintain	  the	  economy	  effect,	  this	  “sharing	  economy”	  is	  in	  fact	  not	  based	  on	  sharing	  at	  all.	  One	  might	  perhaps	  better	  term	  it	  the	  “micro-­‐transaction	  economy.”	  At	  root,	  each	  example	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  seems	  to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  use	  of	  technology	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  buy	  and	  sell	  things	  in	  smaller	  quantities,	  or	  shares,	  than	  was	  previously	  practical.	  While	  it	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  that	  such	  practices	  can	  help	  to	  reduce	  waste	  (at	  least	  in	  some	  senses	  of	  the	  term),	  and	  can	  in	  some	  circumstances	  have	  the	  virtue	  of	  encouraging	  human	  interaction,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  understand	  how	  such	  practices	  do	  anything	  but	  reinforce	  the	  idea	  that,	  in	  order	  for	  resources	  to	  be	  distributed	  efficiently,	  they	  must	  be	  bought	  and	  sold	  according	  to	  the	  “law”	  of	  supply	  and	  demand.	  	  Sharing	  thus	  ceases	  to	  be	  a	  term	  denoting	  a	  non-­‐market	  transaction	  based	  upon	  a	  mutual	  desire	  for	  both	  parties	  to	  have	  enough	  (as	  when	  I	  share	  my	  sandwich	  with	  a	  friend	  because	  he	  has	  no	  lunch),	  and	  becomes	  instead	  a	  term	  denoting	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  buying	  and	  selling	  in	  which	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the	  first	  purchaser	  uses	  some	  part	  of	  a	  purchased	  commodity	  and	  sells	  the	  rest.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  sharing	  economy	  is	  not	  an	  example	  of	  conceptual	  innovation.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  innovation	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  pose	  a	  serious	  challenge	  to	  the	  practices	  that	  produce	  and	  maintain	  the	  economy	  effect.	  For	  example,	  one	  site	  of	  potential	  conceptual	  innovation	  in	  the	  sharing	  economy	  can	  be	  found	  in	  its	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  waste.	  Returning	  to	  the	  language	  used	  by	  
LeftoverSwap,	  we	  see	  that	  both	  blurbs	  follow	  the	  same	  formula,	  which	  might	  be	  summarized	  as	  follows:	  You	  either	  have	  or	  want	  food.	  We	  understand.	  You	  also	  want	  
to	  reduce	  wastefulness.	  We	  also	  understand	  that.	  The	  important	  question	  here	  is,	  what	  do	  we	  do	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  our	  desire	  to	  reduce	  waste?	  What	  value	  do	  we	  claim,	  that	  is,	  inheres	  in	  not	  being	  wasteful?	  	  For	  economists,	  the	  concept	  of	  waste	  is	  inexorably	  tied	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  efficiency	  –	  a	  given	  arrangement	  is	  wasteful	  to	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	  is	  not	  efficient,	  where	  efficiency	  is	  defined	  as	  “obtaining	  the	  maximum	  output	  for	  given	  inputs”	  (Black,	  Hashimzade,	  and	  Myles,	  2009).	  In	  particular,	  efficiency	  in	  consumption	  (the	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy)	  may	  be	  described	  as	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  goods	  are	  allocated	  such	  that	  “it	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  by	  any	  reallocation	  to	  make	  some	  people	  better	  off	  without	  making	  anybody	  else	  worse	  off.”	  (ibid)	  Through	  even	  this	  simple	  description	  of	  the	  concept,	  one	  can	  instantly	  see	  that	  the	  sharing	  economy	  might	  also	  be	  described	  as	  an	  efficiency	  economy.	  One	  shortcoming	  of	  the	  retail	  system,	  or	  of	  the	  system	  of	  dedicated	  sellers	  of	  almost	  anything	  (with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  bulk	  goods)	  is	  that	  consumers	  must	  purchase	  things	  in	  predetermined	  quantities.	  LeftoverSwap	  highlights	  a	  particularly	  obvious	  example	  of	  this	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phenomenon.	  Who	  among	  us	  hasn’t,	  at	  one	  moment	  or	  another,	  bemoaned	  the	  seemingly	  ever-­‐increasing	  size	  of	  entrees	  at	  American	  restaurants.	  While	  these	  massive	  portions	  may	  be	  efficient	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  producer	  (insofar	  as	  decreasing	  portion	  size	  would	  not	  increase	  profits)	  they	  are	  clearly	  inefficient	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  individual	  diner	  (who	  could	  have	  less	  without	  being	  less	  well	  off,	  were	  there	  some	  effortless	  way	  to	  divert	  the	  rest	  of	  that	  food	  to	  someone	  else	  who	  wants	  or	  needs	  it	  and	  to	  recoup	  some	  of	  the	  initial	  cost	  of	  the	  meal).	  	  The	  same	  basic	  problem	  can	  be	  expanded	  to	  most	  (or	  perhaps	  all)	  of	  the	  spheres	  into	  which	  the	  sharing	  economy	  is	  said	  to	  extend.	  We	  must	  each	  buy	  a	  whole	  car,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  we	  will	  have	  access	  to	  it	  when	  we	  need	  it,	  but	  we	  won’t	  use	  it	  as	  much	  as	  it	  might	  be	  used.	  We	  have	  to	  pay	  rent	  (or	  service	  our	  mortgages)	  even	  when	  we	  are	  out	  of	  town	  and	  not	  using	  the	  space	  we	  are	  paying	  for.	  The	  list	  goes	  on.	  What	  the	  innovations	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy,	  like	  
LeftoverSwap	  or	  AirBnB	  or	  CarNextDoor	  make	  possible	  is	  the	  reallocation,	  through	  market	  mechanisms,	  of	  that	  portion	  of	  each	  of	  these	  goods	  without	  which	  the	  immediate	  consumer	  would	  not	  be	  less	  well	  off	  (for	  a	  fee,	  of	  course).	  	  	  One	  result	  of	  this	  rhetorical	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “waste”	  is	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  waste	  as	  the	  opposite	  of	  efficiency	  and	  waste	  as	  the	  opposite	  of	  careful	  stewardship	  is	  lost	  in	  the	  shuffle.	  Making	  my	  car	  available	  to	  be	  used	  by	  others	  for	  a	  fee	  when	  I’m	  not	  using	  it,	  for	  example,	  eliminates	  waste	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  all	  that	  time	  my	  car	  is	  spending	  idle	  while	  I’m	  at	  work	  can	  be	  turned	  into	  time	  during	  which	  others	  are	  using	  the	  car	  and	  defraying	  my	  costs.	  However,	  does	  this	  arrangement	  do	  anything	  to	  alleviate	  waste	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  exploitation	  of	  non-­‐renewable	  resources	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and	  increases	  in	  pollution?	  The	  answer	  depends	  upon	  what	  those	  who	  are	  using	  my	  car	  would	  have	  done	  were	  it	  not	  available.	  If	  they	  each	  use	  my	  car	  instead	  of	  owning	  their	  own	  cars,	  this	  may	  in	  fact	  result	  in	  a	  reduction	  of	  waste	  in	  this	  second	  sense.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  each	  of	  these	  “sharers”	  uses	  my	  car	  instead	  of	  riding	  the	  bus,	  then	  we	  have	  actually	  increased	  the	  waste	  in	  the	  second	  sense.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  the	  sharing	  economy	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  system	  allowing	  individuals	  to	  share	  those	  items	  they	  own	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense)	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  a	  stopgap	  or	  temporary	  condition	  leading	  to	  a	  change	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  things	  are	  bought	  and	  sold	  from	  businesses.	  As	  noted	  above,	  one	  of	  the	  claims	  that	  proponents	  make	  about	  the	  sharing	  economy	  is	  that	  “we	  access	  the	  things	  we	  need	  rather	  than	  buying	  them”	  (Peers.org,	  2013).	  If	  one	  follows	  this	  sentiment	  to	  its	  logical	  conclusion,	  it	  begins	  to	  become	  difficult	  to	  distinguish	  the	  possibilities	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  from	  other,	  already	  existing,	  licensing	  agreements.	  If	  it’s	  more	  efficient	  for	  me	  to	  rent	  my	  car	  out	  to	  others	  when	  I’m	  not	  using	  it,	  why	  isn’t	  it	  more	  efficient	  still	  for	  the	  car	  company	  simply	  to	  rent	  the	  car	  out	  on	  a	  per-­‐use	  basis?	  If	  the	  internet	  allows	  me	  efficiently	  to	  sell	  small	  quantities	  of	  food	  at	  low	  prices	  via	  an	  application	  like	  LeftoverSwap,	  how	  long	  will	  it	  be	  until	  some	  enterprising	  soul	  opens	  a	  restaurant	  dedicated	  exclusively	  to	  selling	  food	  this	  way,	  and	  undercutting	  the	  “sharing”	  market	  because	  profit	  on	  these	  micro-­‐meals	  needs	  only	  to	  be	  made	  once,	  rather	  than	  the	  double	  profit	  necessitated	  by	  a	  reselling	  scheme?	  At	  root,	  the	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  already	  an	  efficiency	  economy,	  and	  if	  by	  adding	  the	  modifier	  “sharing”	  what	  we	  really	  do	  is	  institute	  a	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new	  method	  for	  achieving	  economic	  efficiency,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  likely	  but	  inevitable	  that	  to	  the	  degree	  such	  a	  practice	  is	  effective,	  it	  will	  be	  subsumed	  by	  the	  very	  economy	  to	  which	  its	  supporters	  claim	  it	  poses	  a	  challenge.	  A	  key	  example	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  may	  be	  found	  in	  criticisms	  of	  the	  “ride-­‐sharing”	  company	  Uber.53	  As	  one	  column	  on	  the	  subject	  in	  The	  Nation	  puts	  it:	  	  Cutting	  through	  the	  marketing	  BS	  of	  Silicon	  Valley	  is	  a	  good	  goal	  for	  everyone,	  but	  the	  left	  in	  particular	  should	  debunk	  its	  definition	  of	  a	  “sharing	  economy.”	  Sharing,	  in	  this	  case,	  doesn’t	  mean	  “lending	  someone	  the	  use	  of	  something	  for	  free.”	  It	  also	  doesn’t	  match	  the	  Silicon	  Valley	  description	  of	  creating	  a	  large	  number	  of	  small-­‐scale	  entrepreneurs	  or	  independent	  business	  owners.	  Instead,	  what	  we	  see	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  low-­‐wage	  workforce	  under	  the	  ownership	  of	  tech	  companies.	  At	  Uber,	  this	  arrangement	  means	  that	  drivers	  have	  to	  pay	  for	  their	  own	  cars,	  maintenance	  and	  gas,	  while	  management	  sets	  the	  rates	  and	  terms	  of	  their	  labor,	  taking	  a	  hefty	  cut	  in	  the	  process.	  (Konczal	  and	  Covert,	  2014)	  	  	  The	  problem,	  as	  Konczal	  and	  Covert	  see	  it,	  is	  that	  despite	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  sharing,	  Uber	  doesn’t	  really	  involve	  any	  sharing	  at	  all.	  Instead,	  it	  uses	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  sharing	  as	  a	  way	  to	  offload	  much	  of	  the	  overhead	  that	  would	  fall	  on	  a	  company	  using	  a	  more	  typical	  business	  model	  onto	  those	  performing	  the	  labor.	  Far	  from	  a	  liberatory	  alternative	  to	  previous	  business	  models,	  they	  suggest,	  Uber	  represents	  an	  innovation	  in	  expanding	  and	  refining	  the	  forces	  of	  exploitation.	  	  	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  there	  is	  no	  way	  in	  which	  sharing	  could	  pose	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  conventional	  economy.	  As	  I	  argued	  above,	  following	  Mitchell,	  Butler,	  Koselleck,	  and	  Farr,	  in	  our	  search	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  we	  should	  look	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Uber’s	  business	  model	  is	  based	  around	  the	  idea	  that	  anyone	  who	  wants	  to	  (and	  has	  a	  car	  that	  meets	  the	  company’s	  requirement)	  can	  register	  as	  a	  driver.	  Users	  access	  the	  service	  through	  a	  smartphone	  application	  that	  tracks	  the	  location	  of	  drivers	  who	  are	  currently	  available.	  The	  software	  links	  users	  who	  need	  rides	  with	  drivers	  who	  are	  nearby	  and	  available,	  and	  handles	  billing	  and	  payment.	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for	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  repeated	  practices	  of	  signification	  through	  which	  the	  economy	  effect	  is	  produced	  and	  maintained	  may	  be	  varied	  such	  that	  they	  are	  simultaneously	  intelligible	  as	  practices	  related	  to	  the	  economy	  and	  also	  irreconcilable	  with	  the	  rules	  we	  understand	  to	  govern	  the	  economy.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  sharing	  economy,	  it	  may	  be	  valuable	  to	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  one	  of	  the	  features	  of	  Koselleck’s	  theory	  of	  conceptual	  innovation.	  As	  noted	  above,	  Koselleck	  claims	  that	  “any	  conceptual	  change	  that	  becomes	  a	  linguistic	  event	  occurs	  in	  the	  act	  of	  semantic	  and	  pragmatic	  innovation,	  which	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  comprehend	  what	  is	  old	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  and	  to	  comprehend	  in	  any	  way	  what	  is	  new”	  (2002,	  37).	  One	  thing	  that	  seems	  clear	  about	  the	  sharing	  economy	  is	  that,	  in	  all	  of	  its	  various	  forms,	  it	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  new	  types	  of	  information	  technology	  can	  be	  leveraged	  to	  make	  possible	  ownership	  and	  access	  models	  that	  were	  previous	  impractical	  or	  unachievable.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  think	  about	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  as	  a	  linguistic	  event	  that	  represents	  an	  attempt	  to	  make	  comprehensible	  a	  novel	  experience,	  or	  a	  set	  of	  novel	  experiences.	  	  In	  attempting	  to	  make	  comprehensible	  such	  a	  novel	  set	  of	  experiences,	  conceptual	  innovation	  of	  some	  sort	  is	  necessary;	  we	  must,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  form	  a	  bridge	  between	  the	  diachronic	  structure	  of	  language	  and	  synchronic	  experience	  of	  newness.	  In	  what	  category	  of	  thing,	  we	  must	  ask	  ourselves,	  should	  we	  include	  this	  new	  thing?	  Any	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  will	  constitute	  a	  conceptual	  innovation,	  as	  it	  will	  always	  involve	  either	  the	  expansion	  or	  alteration	  of	  the	  category	  in	  which	  the	  novel	  experience	  is	  included	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  its	  novelty,	  or	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  new	  category.	  The	  Renault	  Twizy	  quadricyle	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discussed	  above	  is	  an	  example	  of	  such	  an	  innovation;	  by	  suggesting	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  this	  thing	  that	  is	  neither	  a	  car	  nor	  a	  bicycle	  as	  part	  of	  the	  general	  category	  to	  which	  bicycles	  belong,	  Renault	  seeks	  to	  innovate	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  category	  “bicycle.”	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  it	  must	  bridge	  the	  diachronic	  structure	  of	  language	  (in	  the	  context	  of	  which	  we	  have	  always	  had	  to	  distinguish	  between	  bicycles	  and	  vehicles	  that	  provided	  closed	  cabins	  and	  used	  steering	  wheels	  and	  pedals)	  with	  the	  synchronic	  experience	  of	  newness	  (in	  this	  case,	  a	  vehicle	  that	  fits	  neatly	  into	  neither	  category).	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy,	  one	  question	  we	  might	  wish	  to	  ask	  is,	  how	  should	  we	  understand	  (and	  talk/write	  about)	  the	  novel	  experience	  of	  access	  to	  practical	  and	  easy	  to	  use	  tools	  that	  make	  large-­‐scale,	  relatively	  anonymous	  co-­‐ownership	  possible	  and	  practicable?	  One	  answer,	  as	  we	  can	  see	  through	  some	  of	  the	  examples	  above,	  is	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  it	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  expand	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  scales	  for	  the	  types	  of	  buying	  and	  selling	  to	  which	  we	  are	  accustomed.	  This	  is,	  in	  its	  own	  way,	  a	  type	  of	  conceptual	  innovation,	  especially	  insofar	  as	  it	  involves	  appropriation	  of	  the	  term	  “sharing”	  to	  describe	  these	  newly	  practical	  scales	  of	  commerce.	  This	  is	  not,	  however,	  the	  only	  type	  of	  conceptual	  innovation	  made	  possible	  by	  this	  set	  of	  novel	  experiences.	  	  For	  example,	  Konczal	  and	  Covert	  conclude	  their	  critique	  of	  Uber’s	  transformative	  potential	  with	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  problem	  lies	  not	  in	  the	  technological	  basis	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy,	  but	  instead	  with	  our	  efforts	  (conscious	  or	  otherwise)	  to	  make	  these	  new	  technological	  possibilities	  fit	  into	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  (diachronic)	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy.	  As	  they	  put	  it:	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Given	  that	  the	  workers	  already	  own	  all	  the	  capital	  in	  the	  form	  of	  their	  cars,	  why	  aren’t	  they	  collecting	  all	  the	  profits?	  Worker	  cooperatives	  are	  difficult	  to	  start	  when	  there’s	  massive	  capital	  needed	  up	  front,	  or	  when	  it’s	  necessary	  to	  coordinate	  a	  lot	  of	  different	  types	  of	  workers.	  But,	  as	  we’ve	  already	  shown,	  that’s	  not	  the	  case	  with	  Uber.	  In	  fact,	  if	  any	  set	  of	  companies	  deserves	  to	  have	  its	  rentiers	  euthanized,	  it’s	  those	  of	  the	  “sharing	  economy,”…	  	  	  Such	  a	  formulation	  suggests	  that	  the	  technological	  innovations	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy,	  which	  include	  the	  capacity	  to	  produce	  and	  operate	  smartphone	  applications	  that	  greatly	  simplify	  what	  might	  otherwise	  be	  insurmountable	  organizational	  obstacles,	  might	  have	  the	  potential	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  third	  criterion	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy:	  its	  status	  as	  a	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality.	  While	  I’m	  not	  as	  convinced	  as	  Konczal	  and	  Covert	  seem	  to	  be	  that	  the	  answer	  here	  is	  as	  simple	  as	  forming	  workers	  cooperatives	  to	  take	  the	  place	  of	  companies	  like	  Uber,	  their	  argument	  points	  us	  in	  an	  interesting	  direction.	  I	  do,	  however,	  have	  one	  significant	  quibble	  with	  their	  claims.	  In	  the	  closing	  paragraph	  of	  the	  article,	  they	  write	  “…a	  transition	  to	  workers’	  owning	  their	  firms	  is	  necessary,	  economically	  smart,	  and	  one	  way	  for	  workers	  to	  gain	  power	  in	  the	  digital	  age.	  Because	  you	  know	  what	  worker-­‐run	  firms	  do?	  Share.”	  This	  sentiment,	  while	  politically	  attractive	  on	  a	  number	  of	  levels,	  is	  still	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  basic	  criticism	  that	  they	  level	  at	  Uber	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  article:	  “Sharing,	  in	  this	  case,	  doesn’t	  mean	  ‘lending	  someone	  the	  use	  of	  something	  for	  free.’”	  Konczal	  and	  Covert	  remain	  trapped,	  on	  this	  level,	  in	  the	  same	  conceptual	  bind	  as	  Uber	  and	  the	  other	  sharing	  economy	  firms	  they	  call	  out.	  They	  cannot	  conceive	  of	  a	  way	  in	  which	  “sharing”	  could	  be	  used	  to	  modify	  the	  term	  “economy”	  without	  altering	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  sharing	  to	  incorporate	  a	  drive	  for	  profit	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  sharer.	  	  	  
	  227	  
C.	  Conceptual	  Innovation	  as	  a	  Challenge	  to	  the	  Economy	  Effect	  The	  discussion	  above	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  novel	  technologies	  (and	  the	  experiences	  that	  arise	  out	  of	  interacting	  with	  them)	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  possibilities	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  are	  incapable	  of	  operating	  without	  profit	  as	  the	  primary	  driving	  force.	  It	  is,	  instead,	  intended	  to	  suggest	  that,	  to	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  do,	  we	  would	  become	  less	  likely	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  resulting	  practices	  as	  forming	  part	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  “economy”	  at	  all.	  To	  put	  this	  problem	  in	  the	  language	  we’ve	  been	  using	  to	  talk	  about	  conceptual	  innovation,	  when	  we	  try	  to	  vary	  the	  practices	  of	  signification	  that	  produce	  and	  maintain	  the	  economy	  effect	  in	  a	  way	  that	  challenges	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  profit	  motive,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  resulting	  practices	  will	  be	  intelligible	  as	  practices	  related	  to	  the	  economy	  at	  all.	  For	  example,	  the	  kind	  of	  meal	  sharing	  arrangement	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  wherein	  a	  group	  of	  individuals	  or	  families	  each	  agree	  to	  cook	  a	  large	  quantity	  of	  a	  single	  dish	  and	  then	  share	  these	  out	  such	  that	  each	  can	  eat	  for	  a	  week	  with	  some	  variety	  could	  represent	  a	  real	  possibility	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  were	  the	  practice	  to	  become	  widespread	  and	  commonly	  understood	  as	  an	  economic	  practice.	  It	  does	  not	  take	  appreciably	  longer	  to	  cook	  a	  lot	  of	  something	  than	  to	  cook	  a	  little	  of	  it,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  way	  that	  a	  conventional	  business	  could	  take	  over	  such	  a	  niche,	  as	  there	  is	  no	  profit	  to	  be	  gained	  other	  than	  access	  to	  a	  diverse	  diet	  with	  minimal	  effort.	  This	  doesn’t	  tend	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  an	  innovation	  in	  economics	  by	  most	  of	  us,	  though,	  because	  we	  have	  become	  so	  used	  to	  the	  “economy”	  conforming	  to	  the	  six	  traits	  enumerated	  earlier.	  Instead,	  meal	  sharing	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  tends	  to	  take	  the	  (by	  now	  predictable)	  form	  of	  services	  designed	  to	  unite	  (for	  a	  small	  service	  fee)	  people	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who	  are	  cooking	  with	  people	  who	  would	  like	  purchase	  a	  home	  cooked	  meal	  (e.g.	  
Feastly,	  EatWith,	  and	  Kitchen.ly).	  	  Moreover,	  because	  we	  tend	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  economy	  must	  conform	  to	  each	  of	  these	  six	  traits,	  when	  we	  examine	  the	  process	  by	  which	  alternative	  economies	  are	  subsumed	  by	  the	  mainstream	  economy,	  we	  tend	  to	  find	  a	  similar	  process	  whereby	  the	  term	  denoting	  the	  alternative	  (green,	  sharing,	  etc)	  is	  put	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  term	  “economy.”	  This	  tension	  revolves	  around	  the	  twin	  concepts	  of	  waste	  and	  efficiency,	  both	  of	  which	  only	  have	  meaning	  with	  respect	  to	  some	  particular	  (and	  usually	  implicit)	  goal.	  Nothing	  is	  ever	  either	  wasteful	  or	  efficient	  in	  the	  abstract.	  However,	  typically	  the	  concepts	  used	  to	  modify	  economy	  (green,	  sharing,	  etc.)	  carry	  a	  different	  implicit	  goal	  than	  the	  economy	  itself.	  	  In	  order	  to	  resolve	  this	  tension,	  there	  must	  be	  slippage	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  one	  or	  both	  of	  the	  terms.	  For	  example,	  the	  green	  in	  “green	  economy”	  denotes	  a	  concern	  with	  the	  physical	  environment	  in	  which	  we	  live,	  and	  the	  effect	  that	  our	  practices	  of	  production	  and	  consumption	  have	  on	  this	  environment.	  However,	  when	  “green”	  runs	  up	  against	  “economy,”	  the	  universe	  of	  possible	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  might	  alter	  our	  behavior	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  our	  physical	  environment	  is	  severely	  limited	  by	  the	  demand	  that	  such	  changes	  be	  efficient	  in	  the	  economic	  sense.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  possible	  but	  likely	  that	  in	  the	  process	  of	  working	  out	  this	  tension,	  courses	  of	  action	  that	  reduce	  waste	  in	  the	  environmental	  sense	  might	  be	  ignored	  or	  rejected	  because	  they	  increase	  waste	  in	  the	  economic	  sense	  (e.g.	  reusable	  vs.	  disposable	  packaging).	  	  We	  expect	  the	  economy	  to	  run	  according	  to	  internal	  rules	  of	  its	  own,	  and	  so	  we	  are	  not	  only	  unsurprised,	  but	  also	  accommodating	  when	  we	  are	  asked	  to	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change	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  terms	  that	  define	  our	  political	  priorities	  as	  they	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  economy.	  This	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  to	  say	  that	  such	  expectations	  are	  uncontested,	  or	  that	  there	  are	  no	  competing	  understandings	  of	  the	  world	  that	  seek	  to	  call	  into	  question	  the	  primacy	  of	  profit	  and	  efficiency.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  to	  say	  that	  when	  one	  makes	  such	  an	  argument,	  there	  exists	  a	  very	  real	  risk	  that	  the	  argument	  will	  be	  treated	  as	  an	  appeal	  to	  extra-­‐economic	  factors,	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  engage	  in	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy	  itself.	  	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  are	  projects	  like	  the	  sharing	  economy	  doomed	  to	  fail	  as	  attempts	  to	  engage	  in	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  appearance	  that	  profit	  and	  efficiency	  are	  the	  natural	  drivers	  of	  practices	  that	  might	  be	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  economy?	  One	  way	  out	  of	  this	  problem	  may	  be	  to	  think	  of	  the	  primacy	  of	  profit	  and	  efficiency	  in	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  particular	  technologies	  of	  power	  in	  the	  Foucaultian	  sense.	  In	  “The	  Subject	  and	  Power”	  Foucault	  suggests	  the	  following	  distinction	  between	  violence	  and	  power:	  A	  relationship	  of	  violence	  acts	  upon	  a	  body	  or	  upon	  things;	  it	  forces,	  it	  bends,	  it	  breaks,	  it	  destroys,	  or	  it	  closes	  off	  all	  possibilities.	  Its	  opposite	  pole	  can	  only	  be	  passivity,	  and	  if	  it	  comes	  up	  against	  any	  resistance	  it	  has	  no	  other	  option	  but	  to	  try	  to	  break	  it	  down.	  A	  power	  relationship,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  only	  be	  articulated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  two	  elements	  that	  are	  indispensable	  if	  it	  is	  really	  to	  be	  a	  power	  relationship:	  that	  “the	  other”	  (the	  one	  over	  whom	  power	  is	  exercised)	  is	  recognized	  and	  maintained	  to	  the	  very	  end	  as	  a	  subject	  who	  acts;	  and	  that,	  faced	  with	  a	  relationship	  of	  power,	  a	  whole	  field	  of	  responses,	  reactions,	  results,	  and	  possible	  inventions	  may	  open	  up.	  (137-­‐138)	  	  If	  we	  understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  primacy	  of	  profit	  not	  as	  a	  necessary	  connection,	  constructed	  or	  otherwise,	  but	  instead	  as	  one	  result	  of	  an	  agglomeration	  of	  particular	  deployments	  of	  particular	  technologies	  of	  power	  in	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the	  quest	  to	  solve	  the	  specific	  political	  problems	  of	  particular	  individuals,	  then	  we	  might	  also	  see	  where	  the	  possibilities	  for	  resistance	  to	  such	  technologies	  come	  into	  play.	  	   Foucault	  stresses	  that,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  may	  well	  be	  disparities	  of	  influence	  between	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  power	  relationship,	  what	  characterizes	  it	  as	  a	  relation	  of	  power	  rather	  than	  one	  of	  domination	  or	  violence	  is	  the	  presence	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  “the	  one	  over	  whom	  power	  is	  exercised”)	  of	  a	  subject	  who	  acts,	  and	  for	  whom	  such	  action	  takes	  place	  in	  “a	  whole	  field	  of	  responses,	  reactions,	  results,	  and	  possible	  inventions”	  that	  opens	  up	  when	  the	  subject	  if	  faced	  with	  the	  relationship	  of	  power.	  If	  we	  choose	  to	  understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  effect	  and	  the	  primacy	  of	  profit	  as	  the	  result	  of	  an	  agglomeration	  of	  technologies	  of	  power,	  then	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  ask	  ourselves	  what	  types	  of	  actions	  are	  available	  to	  us	  at	  the	  nexus	  of	  these	  particular	  power	  relationships,	  and	  whether	  any	  of	  these	  actions	  might	  carry	  the	  potential	  to	  destabilize	  or	  alter	  these	  relationships	  in	  ways	  that	  could	  help	  us	  to	  solve	  our	  particular	  political	  problems.	  When	  we	  examine	  the	  problem	  from	  this	  perspective,	  we	  can	  identify	  a	  number	  of	  discreet	  technologies	  of	  power	  in	  the	  sets	  of	  relationships	  that	  seem	  to	  require	  that	  some	  practices	  (such	  as	  “sharing”	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense)	  be	  omitted	  from	  business	  practices	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  maintaining	  the	  link	  between	  the	  “economy”	  and	  the	  primacy	  of	  profit	  and	  efficiency.	  The	  system	  of	  equity	  investment	  (ironically	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  “the	  process	  of	  going	  public”),	  for	  example,	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  “fiduciary	  responsibility”	  that	  comes	  along	  with	  it,	  seems	  to	  require	  the	  operator(s)	  of	  a	  business	  enterprise	  to	  take	  actions	  that	  will	  maximize	  profits.	  Of	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course,	  if	  it	  really	  required	  such	  actions,	  they	  would	  not	  take	  place	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  whole	  field	  of	  responses,	  reactions,	  results,	  and	  possible	  inventions,	  and	  the	  stock	  market	  would	  characterize	  a	  force	  relationship	  rather	  than	  a	  power	  relationship.	  In	  fact,	  there	  are	  business	  owners	  and	  managers	  all	  around	  us	  who	  make	  take	  actions	  directed	  at	  some	  goal	  other	  than	  that	  of	  maximizing	  profit,	  though	  most	  don’t	  expand	  to	  the	  scale	  that	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  participate	  in	  equity	  markets.	  The	  coffee	  shop	  owner	  with	  no	  aspiration	  to	  franchises	  or	  chains,	  the	  graphic	  designer	  who	  works	  enough	  to	  support	  her	  interest	  in	  other	  activities,	  and	  the	  small	  local	  farmer	  are	  all	  examples	  of	  such	  businesses.	  	  	   However,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  businesses	  that	  have	  achieved	  the	  scale	  necessary	  to	  participate	  in	  equity	  markets,	  we	  change	  our	  assumptions	  about	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  profit	  maximization	  constitutes	  only	  one	  course	  of	  action	  in	  a	  field	  of	  possible	  actions.	  Instead	  of	  understanding	  growth	  and	  profit	  maximization	  as	  choices	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  operators	  of	  a	  given	  enterprise	  market	  that	  enterprise	  to	  investors,	  we	  posit	  the	  principle	  of	  “fiduciary	  responsibility.”	  This	  responsibility	  was	  first	  laid	  out	  by	  the	  Michigan	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  1919:	  A	  business	  corporation	  is	  organized	  and	  carried	  on	  primarily	  for	  the	  	  profit	  of	  the	  stockholders.	  The	  powers	  of	  the	  directors	  are	  to	  be	  	  employed	  for	  that	  end.	  The	  discretion	  of	  directors	  is	  to	  be	  exercised	  	  in	  the	  choice	  of	  means	  to	  attain	  that	  end,	  and	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  a	  	  change	  in	  the	  end	  itself,	  to	  the	  reduction	  of	  profits,	  or	  to	  the	  nondistribution	  of	  profits	  among	  stockholders	  in	  order	  to	  devote	  them	  to	  other	  purposes.	  (Dodge	  v.	  Ford	  Motor	  Company)	  	  Such	  a	  formulation	  by	  the	  Court	  would	  seem	  to	  transform	  the	  power	  relationship	  in	  question	  into	  a	  force	  relationship,	  as	  it	  appears	  to	  leave	  only	  a	  single	  course	  of	  action,	  rather	  than	  a	  field	  of	  possible	  actions	  available	  to	  the	  subject.	  However,	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despite	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  passage	  is	  commonly	  cited	  as	  a	  support	  for	  the	  legal	  idea	  of	  fiduciary	  responsibility,	  later	  Court	  decisions	  show	  a	  remarkable	  unwillingness	  to	  exercise	  force	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  principle	  it	  articulates.	  In	  later	  cases,	  including	  
Shlensky	  v.	  Wrigley	  (1968)	  and	  Revlon,	  Inc.	  v.	  MacAndrews	  &	  Forbes	  Holdings,	  Inc.	  (1986),	  the	  courts	  shy	  away	  from	  imposing	  their	  views	  on	  the	  operators	  of	  the	  firms,	  instead	  deferring	  to	  their	  positions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  “business	  judgment	  rule,”	  which	  holds	  that	  the	  presumption	  should	  be	  that	  the	  operators	  are	  acting	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  shareholders,	  even	  in	  situations	  in	  which	  their	  actions	  appear	  to	  be	  altruistic,	  as	  long	  as	  some	  connection	  to	  some	  potential	  (economic)	  benefit	  for	  the	  shareholders	  can	  be	  identified.	  	  	   In	  Schlensky,	  for	  example,	  a	  minority	  stakeholder	  in	  the	  Chicago	  Cubs	  brings	  suit	  against	  Wrigley	  (the	  majority	  stakeholder)	  for	  refusing	  to	  install	  lights	  at	  Wrigley	  Field,	  thereby	  making	  night	  games	  impossible.	  The	  suit	  alleges	  that	  this	  results	  in	  decreased	  home	  game	  attendance,	  and	  as	  such	  a	  reduction	  in	  revenue	  as	  compared	  to	  what	  would	  be	  possible	  with	  lights.	  The	  court,	  however,	  declines	  to	  intervene.	  The	  part	  of	  the	  case	  that	  is	  most	  interesting	  for	  our	  discussion	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  reasoning	  attributed	  to	  Wrigley’s	  decision	  making.	  Schlensky	  claims	  that	  Wrigley	  refuses	  to	  install	  lights	  “not	  because	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  corporation	  but	  because	  of	  his	  personal	  opinions	  ‘that	  baseball	  is	  a	  `daytime	  sport'	  and	  that	  the	  installation	  of	  lights	  and	  night	  baseball	  games	  will	  have	  a	  deteriorating	  effect	  upon	  the	  surrounding	  neighborhood.’”	  (176)	  That	  is,	  according	  to	  Schlensky,	  Wrigley	  (who	  owns	  80%	  of	  the	  enterprise	  in	  question)	  is	  violating	  his	  fiduciary	  responsibility	  by	  prioritizing	  his	  preferences	  for	  daytime	  baseball	  over	  potential	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profits.	  The	  court,	  however,	  is	  unwilling	  to	  accept	  this	  argument:	  …[W]e	  are	  not	  satisfied	  that	  the	  motives	  assigned	  to	  Philip	  K.	  Wrigley,	  and	  through	  him	  to	  the	  other	  directors,	  are	  contrary	  to	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  corporation	  and	  the	  stockholders.	  For	  example,	  it	  appears	  to	  us	  that	  the	  effect	  on	  the	  surrounding	  neighborhood	  might	  well	  be	  considered	  by	  a	  director	  who	  was	  considering	  the	  patrons	  who	  would	  or	  would	  not	  attend	  the	  games	  if	  the	  park	  were	  in	  a	  poor	  neighborhood.	  Furthermore,	  the	  long	  run	  interest	  of	  the	  corporation	  in	  its	  property	  value	  at	  Wrigley	  Field	  might	  demand	  all	  efforts	  to	  keep	  the	  neighborhood	  from	  deteriorating.	  (180-­‐181)	  	  The	  court	  is	  not	  willing	  to	  restrict	  Wrigley’s	  actions	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  fiduciary	  responsibility,	  but	  neither	  is	  it	  willing	  to	  say	  that	  Wrigley,	  as	  majority	  stakeholder,	  has	  the	  right	  to	  prioritize	  his	  preferences	  about	  when	  baseball	  should	  be	  played	  over	  the	  profits	  of	  the	  corporation.	  Instead,	  Justice	  Sullivan	  finds	  a	  middle	  ground,	  arguing	  that	  it	  might	  actually	  be	  in	  the	  corporation’s	  long-­‐term	  (profit)	  interest	  to	  refuse	  to	  install	  lights,	  and	  that	  the	  court	  should	  not	  substitute	  its	  business	  judgment	  for	  Wrigley’s	  given	  this	  possibility.	  As	  such,	  the	  principle	  established	  in	  
Ford	  is	  maintained,	  but	  an	  available	  field	  of	  actions	  is	  also	  described.	  Directors	  of	  corporations	  have	  freedom	  of	  action,	  as	  long	  as	  that	  action	  can	  be	  construed	  as	  part	  of	  a	  strategy	  that	  might	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  the	  maximization	  of	  profits.	  In	  this	  very	  brief	  history	  of	  legal	  precedent	  surrounding	  fiduciary	  responsibility,	  we	  can	  see	  a	  sketch	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  “whole	  field	  of	  responses,	  reactions,	  results,	  and	  possible	  inventions”	  to	  which	  Foucault	  refers	  can	  come	  to	  be	  opened	  up	  in	  the	  framing	  of	  a	  power	  relationship.	  Directors	  of	  corporations	  may	  deviate	  from	  the	  path	  that	  seems	  to	  lead	  most	  directly	  to	  the	  financial	  advantage	  of	  the	  shareholders,	  and	  in	  this	  respect	  they	  are	  acting	  subjects	  with	  choices	  to	  make,	  but	  they	  make	  these	  choices	  in	  full	  cognizance	  of	  the	  potential	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penalties	  which	  may	  imposed	  should	  they	  choose	  courses	  of	  action	  that	  fall	  outside	  of	  what	  the	  court	  might	  be	  willing	  to	  understand	  as	  “business	  judgment.”	  	   When	  the	  relationship	  is	  understood	  in	  this	  way,	  two	  related	  aspects	  (or	  perhaps	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  aspect)	  become	  apparent.	  First,	  regardless	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  reasoning	  surrounding	  courses	  of	  action	  that	  deviate	  from	  direct	  profit	  maximization,	  the	  fundamental	  relationship	  itself	  will	  not	  be	  threatened	  by	  any	  choice	  that	  accepts	  profit	  maximization	  as	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  corporate	  activity.	  Likewise,	  choices	  that	  do	  call	  the	  priority	  of	  profit	  maximization	  into	  question	  will	  threaten	  to	  reconfigure	  the	  power	  relationship	  herein	  described.	  That	  is,	  to	  return	  to	  our	  examples	  of	  green	  economic	  practices,	  or	  of	  sharing-­‐based	  practices,	  the	  institution	  of	  such	  practices	  doesn’t	  threaten	  the	  technology	  of	  fiduciary	  responsibility	  unless	  it	  is	  held	  to	  be	  an	  end	  in	  itself,	  rather	  than	  a	  possibly	  circuitous	  route	  to	  profit	  maximization.	  	  
D.	  Conceptual	  Innovation	  in	  the	  Corporate	  Structure	  Once	  we	  arrive	  at	  such	  an	  understanding,	  a	  curious	  aspect	  of	  the	  legal-­‐economic	  framework	  of	  the	  United	  States	  becomes	  apparent.	  There	  is	  a	  finite	  variety	  of	  legal	  forms	  available	  to	  those	  who	  with	  to	  operate	  firms	  of	  a	  relatively	  large	  scale	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  IRS	  lists	  five	  possible	  business	  structures:	  sole	  proprietorship,	  partnership,	  S	  corporation,	  corporation,	  and	  limited	  liability	  company	  (Irs.gov,	  2013).	  Sole	  proprietorships,	  partnerships,	  and	  S	  corporations,	  however,	  all	  require	  significant	  financial	  and	  planning	  interaction	  between	  the	  owners	  and	  the	  operators	  of	  the	  firm,	  and	  as	  such	  are	  not	  useful	  structures	  for	  firms	  that	  exceed	  the	  size	  at	  which	  such	  interactions	  are	  realistic.	  Moreover,	  the	  limited	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liability	  company	  is	  really	  a	  subset	  of	  firms	  in	  each	  of	  the	  other	  four	  categories	  that	  have	  chosen	  to	  manage	  their	  financial	  and	  legal	  risk	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  The	  result	  is	  that,	  if	  you	  wish	  to	  operate	  a	  firm	  of	  a	  relatively	  large	  size	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  there	  is	  really	  only	  one	  structure	  available	  to	  you:	  the	  corporation,	  which	  the	  IRS	  describes	  as	  a	  firm	  in	  which	  “prospective	  shareholders	  exchange	  money,	  property,	  or	  both,	  for	  the	  corporation's	  capital	  stock”	  (ibid).	  In	  short,	  the	  only	  form	  available	  to	  you	  is	  the	  form	  in	  which	  the	  operator	  of	  the	  firm	  is	  subject	  to	  fiduciary	  responsibility	  toward	  the	  shareholders,	  as	  described	  above.	  	  If	  you	  wish	  to	  get	  out	  of	  this	  paradigm,	  the	  tax	  code	  seems	  to	  offer	  only	  one	  real	  alternative:	  the	  non-­‐profit	  corporation.	  While	  the	  code	  enumerates	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  corporation	  may	  operate	  as	  a	  non-­‐profit,	  each	  of	  these	  designations	  shares	  the	  common	  characteristic	  that	  “no	  part	  of	  the	  net	  earnings	  of	  such	  entity	  inures	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  any	  private	  shareholder	  or	  individual”	  (Internal	  Revenue	  Code,	  2013).	  Thus,	  curiously,	  the	  legal-­‐economic	  structure	  of	  the	  United	  States	  seems	  to	  offer	  only	  two	  real	  alternatives	  for	  firms;	  either	  you	  prioritize	  profits	  as	  your	  exclusive	  raison	  d’etre	  or	  you	  eschew	  them	  all	  together.	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  literally	  no	  legal	  space	  available	  to	  the	  firm	  that	  wishes	  to	  pursue	  profit	  along	  with	  some	  other	  goal.	  Such	  a	  legal	  structure	  serves	  to	  reify	  the	  binary	  described	  above,	  in	  which	  a	  firm	  is	  either	  an	  economic	  entity	  in	  which	  the	  terms	  that	  modify	  economy	  will	  necessarily	  give	  way	  to	  economic	  imperatives	  when	  push	  comes	  to	  shove,	  or	  a	  firm	  is	  a	  non-­‐economic	  entity	  that	  pursues	  some	  extra-­‐economic	  goal	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  profit	  motive.	  The	  permissible	  structures	  of	  non-­‐profit	  entities	  are	  governed	  by	  section	  
	  236	  
501(c)	  of	  the	  Internal	  Revenue	  Code.	  The	  IRS,	  in	  its	  explanation	  of	  this	  portion	  of	  the	  code,	  identifies	  eleven	  types	  of	  organizations	  that	  might	  qualify	  for	  non-­‐profit	  status:	  charitable	  organizations,	  churches	  and	  religious	  organizations,	  (some)	  political	  organizations,	  private	  foundations,	  business	  leagues,	  employee	  benefit	  associations	  or	  funds,	  fraternal	  societies,	  labor	  and	  agricultural	  organizations,	  social	  clubs,	  social	  welfare	  organizations,	  and	  veterans	  organizations.	  Each	  of	  these	  types	  of	  organizations,	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  as	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization,	  must	  fall	  under	  one	  of	  the	  subsections	  of	  section	  501(c).	  The	  most	  commonly	  used	  subsection	  is	  501(c)(3),	  which	  requires	  that:	  no	  part	  of	  the	  net	  earnings	  of	  which	  inures	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  any	  private	  shareholder	  or	  individual,	  no	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  which	  is	  carrying	  on	  propaganda,	  or	  otherwise	  attempting,	  to	  influence	  legislation	  (except	  as	  otherwise	  provided	  in	  subsection	  (h)),	  and	  which	  does	  not	  participate	  in,	  or	  intervene	  in	  (including	  the	  publishing	  or	  distributing	  of	  statements),	  any	  political	  campaign	  on	  behalf	  of	  (or	  in	  opposition	  to)	  any	  candidate	  for	  public	  office.	  	  This	  is	  not,	  however,	  the	  only	  option.	  An	  organization	  may	  also	  qualify	  under	  subsection	  501(c)(4),	  which	  covers:	  
(A) Civic	  leagues	  or	  organizations	  not	  organized	  for	  profit	  but	  operated	  exclusively	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  social	  welfare,	  or	  local	  associations	  of	  employees,	  the	  membership	  of	  which	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  employees	  of	  a	  designated	  person	  or	  persons	  in	  a	  particular	  municipality,	  and	  the	  net	  earnings	  of	  which	  are	  devoted	  exclusively	  to	  charitable,	  educational,	  or	  recreational	  purposes.	  	  This	  subsection	  goes	  on	  to	  require	  that	  “Subparagraph	  (A)	  shall	  not	  apply	  to	  an	  entity	  unless	  no	  part	  of	  the	  net	  earnings	  of	  such	  entity	  inures	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  any	  private	  shareholder	  or	  individual.”	  The	  501(c)(4)	  designation	  is	  often	  used	  by	  political	  groups	  engaged	  in	  advocacy,	  and	  it	  has	  proven	  useful	  to	  those	  who	  have	  money	  that	  wish	  to	  funnel	  toward	  political	  causes,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  available	  to	  those	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who	  with	  to	  earn	  a	  profit	  from	  their	  enterprise.	  	  	   The	  code	  goes	  on	  to	  list	  22	  more	  variations,	  but	  they	  each	  amount	  simply	  to	  a	  description	  of	  another	  type	  of	  organization	  subject	  to	  the	  requirement	  that	  “no	  part	  of	  the	  net	  earnings	  of	  such	  entity	  inures	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  any	  private	  shareholder	  or	  individual.”	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  more	  permutations	  within	  these	  categories,	  such	  as	  private	  vs.	  public	  non-­‐profits	  (both	  of	  which	  tend	  to	  be	  501(c)(3)	  organization,	  and	  are	  differentiated	  by	  their	  sources	  of	  funding)	  and	  political	  “527”	  organizations,	  which	  are	  covered	  under	  section	  527	  of	  the	  code	  and	  engage	  in	  the	  collection	  and	  distribution	  of	  political	  contributions.	  While	  there	  is	  a	  huge	  variety	  of	  available	  forms	  for	  firms	  that	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  seek	  profit,	  none	  of	  these	  forms	  allow	  space	  for	  firms	  that	  wish	  to	  seek	  profit,	  but	  not	  as	  their	  primary	  purpose.	  	  This	  strange	  space	  in	  the	  US	  legal	  structure	  might	  suggest	  a	  possible	  avenue	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy.	  That	  is,	  if	  we	  refuse	  to	  understand	  the	  choices	  presented	  to	  us	  by	  a	  concept	  like	  the	  “sharing	  economy”	  as	  consisting	  of	  a	  binary	  between	  primarily	  profit-­‐driven	  behavior	  with	  a	  sharing	  flavor	  or	  entirely	  altruistic	  behavior	  focused	  on	  sharing	  without	  profit,	  we	  might	  begin	  to	  open	  up	  new	  possibilities	  for	  challenges	  to	  the	  criteria	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  subject	  to	  its	  own	  distinct	  (or	  absent)	  moral	  code.	  	  One	  example	  of	  an	  effort	  to	  do	  just	  that	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  struggle	  of	  so-­‐called	  “social	  entrepreneurs”	  to	  find	  or	  develop	  business	  forms	  that	  are	  appropriate	  for	  their	  goals	  of	  developing	  “an	  organization	  or	  venture	  that	  achieves	  its	  primary	  social	  or	  environmental	  mission	  using	  business	  methods,	  typically	  by	  operating	  a	  revenue-­‐generating	  business”	  (Katz	  and	  Page	  2010,	  2).	  	  This	  struggle	  raises	  some	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serious	  questions	  for	  social	  entrepreneurs:	  A	  recent	  survey	  showed	  that	  71%	  of	  social	  entrepreneurs	  believed	  that	  the	  choice	  of	  legal	  structure	  was	  the	  single	  greatest	  challenge	  for	  their	  ventures.	  Legal	  practitioners	  and	  academics	  in	  increasing	  numbers	  have	  begun	  struggling	  with	  the	  issue.	  Although	  the	  nonprofit	  form	  is	  inherently	  conducive	  to	  socially-­‐beneficial	  undertakings,	  it	  nonetheless	  also	  has	  drawbacks.	  Additionally,	  some	  social	  entrepreneurs	  and	  proponents	  perceive	  problems	  with	  conventional	  for-­‐profit	  forms,	  such	  as	  legal	  and	  structural	  limits	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  pursue	  social	  aims	  at	  shareholders'	  expenses	  or	  to	  entrench	  the	  entity's	  long-­‐term	  pursuit	  of	  ends.	  (13-­‐14,	  notes	  from	  original	  omitted.)	  	  Non-­‐profits,	  Katz	  and	  Page	  suggest,	  can	  be	  great	  in	  the	  right	  situation,	  but	  because	  they	  have	  no	  owners	  and	  their	  “controllers	  can	  earn	  no	  more	  than	  ‘reasonable’	  compensation,”	  (2)	  they	  have	  limited	  upside	  and	  don’t	  make	  sense	  in	  situations	  in	  which	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  proposed	  undertaking	  requires	  significant	  shareholder	  buy-­‐in.	  For-­‐profit	  corporations,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  have	  the	  problem	  discussed	  above,	  that	  their	  controllers	  are	  legally	  obligated	  to	  privilege	  profitability	  for	  shareholders	  where	  that	  goal	  conflicts	  with	  the	  social	  goals	  of	  the	  enterprise:	  To	  formally	  distinguish	  a	  for-­‐profit	  social	  enterprise	  from	  an	  ordinary	  business,	  its	  controllers	  must	  have	  lawful	  discretion	  to	  transparently	  reduce	  shareholder	  wealth	  in	  order	  to	  make	  presumably	  larger	  improvements	  in	  social	  welfare.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  firm	  may	  sometimes	  make	  trade-­‐offs	  between	  social	  and	  financial	  performance	  that	  preference	  social	  performance	  over	  profit.	  This	  commitment,	  although	  difficult	  to	  legally	  enforce,	  goes	  beyond	  the	  promise	  of	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  to	  make	  decisions	  that,	  all	  things	  being	  equal	  (i.e.,	  where	  wealth-­‐maximizing	  shareholders	  ought	  to	  be	  indifferent),	  will	  confer	  more	  benefits	  on	  society	  rather	  than	  less.	  (14,	  notes	  from	  original	  omitted.)	  	  	  Fiduciary	  responsibility,	  in	  other	  words,	  must	  be	  reimagined	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  social	  enterprise	  in	  order	  to	  release	  the	  controllers	  of	  such	  firms	  from	  the	  obligation	  to	  maximize	  profit	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  social	  goals.	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   In	  response	  to	  these	  critiques,	  several	  states,	  including	  California,	  Hawaii,	  New	  Jersey,	  and	  Virginia	  have	  created	  a	  new	  corporate	  form	  known	  as	  a	  “benefit	  corporation”	  (Cummings	  2012,	  579).	  Referring	  to	  these	  benefit	  corporations	  as	  “double	  bottom	  line	  corporations”	  (because	  they	  seek	  to	  pursue	  both	  profit	  and	  social	  benefit),	  Cummings	  differentiates	  them	  from	  pre-­‐existing	  business	  structures	  	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  Unlike	  previous	  efforts	  to	  combine	  profit-­‐making	  with	  public	  problem	  solving,	  however,	  double	  bottom	  line	  corporations	  neither	  treat	  social	  responsibility	  as	  incidental	  to	  profit-­‐making	  (as	  do	  both	  corporate	  philanthropy	  and	  CSR	  [corporate	  social	  responsibility])	  nor	  see	  profit-­‐making	  as	  incidental	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  social	  welfare	  objectives	  (as	  does	  a	  nonprofit	  engaging	  in	  commercial	  activities).	  Instead	  they	  seek	  to	  serve	  two	  "co-­‐equal"	  masters	  (two	  bottom	  lines)	  at	  once	  -­‐	  to	  "expressly	  measure	  [their]	  success	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  [their]	  financial	  performance	  .	  .	  .	  and	  [their]	  success	  in	  advancing	  a	  social	  mission."	  (581-­‐582,	  notes	  from	  original	  omitted.)	  	  	  Such	  an	  innovation	  is	  potentially	  quite	  important	  to	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  make	  a	  profit	  without	  prioritizing	  that	  profit	  over	  social	  responsibility	  because	  of	  what	  one	  author	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  “Ben	  and	  Jerry	  dilemma”:	  …the	  owners	  of	  Ben	  &	  Jerry’s	  ice	  cream	  company	  felt	  compelled	  to	  sell	  their	  company	  to	  the	  highest	  bidder	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  to	  compromise	  their	  own	  social	  and	  environmental	  values	  ...	  The	  owners	  had	  been	  advised	  by	  their	  lawyers	  that	  if	  they	  did	  not	  sell	  to	  the	  highest	  bidder,	  they	  would	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  shareholder	  lawsuits	  that	  would	  challenge	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  their	  social	  and	  environmental	  goals,	  thereby	  forcing	  them	  to	  ignore	  these	  goals	  in	  favor	  of	  enhancing	  shareholder	  returns…	  In	  sum,	  among	  other	  goals,	  the	  benefit	  corporation	  design	  attempts	  to	  protect	  management	  from	  lawsuits	  by	  legitimizing	  various	  social	  and	  environmental	  pursuits.	  (André	  2012,	  133-­‐134)	  	  While	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  benefit	  corporation	  carries	  with	  it	  some	  of	  its	  own	  problems	  (as	  evidenced,	  for	  example,	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  three	  articles	  quoted	  herein	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  idea	  are	  all	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  the	  question	  of	  how	  these	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corporations	  will	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  the	  performance	  of	  their	  publicly	  beneficial	  goals),	  its	  emergence,	  and	  particularly	  the	  consistent	  formulation	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  have	  lead	  to	  its	  emergence	  suggest	  that	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  legal	  space	  in	  which	  profit	  can	  be	  a	  goal	  without	  being	  the	  only	  goal	  has	  promise	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  criteria	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  subject	  to	  its	  own	  distinct	  (or	  absent)	  moral	  laws.	  The	  public	  benefit	  corporation	  is	  an	  explicit	  attempt	  to	  suggest	  that	  ethical	  behavior	  and	  economic	  behavior	  need	  not	  be	  counter-­‐posed	  to	  one	  another,	  with	  the	  added	  benefit	  that	  it	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  anyone	  who	  chooses	  the	  traditional	  corporate	  form	  over	  that	  of	  the	  benefit	  corporation	  has	  made	  an	  explicit	  choice	  to	  privilege	  the	  profit-­‐motive	  above	  all	  other	  motives.	  Moreover,	  by	  seeking	  to	  expand	  our	  collective	  understanding	  of	  available	  corporate	  forms	  while	  maintaining	  continuity	  with	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  diachronic	  structures	  through	  which	  we	  categorize	  economic	  entities,	  the	  public	  benefit	  corporation	  seems	  a	  prime	  site	  for	  potential	  conceptual	  innovation.	  	  
E.	  The	  Open	  Source	  Movement	  and	  Conceptual	  Innovation	  	  	   One	  area	  in	  which	  we	  can	  see	  a	  different	  relationship	  between	  the	  idea	  of	  sharing	  and	  the	  demands	  of	  “the	  economy”	  than	  the	  ones	  we’ve	  detailed	  thus	  far	  is	  the	  open	  source	  movement,	  which	  has	  emerged	  in	  large	  part	  as	  a	  response	  to	  novel	  experiences	  brought	  on	  by	  new	  technological	  capacity.	  While	  we	  typically	  think	  of	  open	  source	  in	  relation	  to	  software,	  many	  trace	  the	  roots	  of	  this	  movement	  to	  Detroit	  in	  1911,	  when	  Henry	  Ford	  won	  a	  challenge	  to	  a	  patent	  protecting	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  2-­‐cycle	  gasoline	  engine.	  Once	  the	  patent	  was	  defeated,	  a	  group	  formed	  which	  would	  become	  known	  as	  the	  Motor	  Vehicle	  Manufacturers	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Association;	  one	  of	  this	  group’s	  purposes	  was	  to	  facilitate	  the	  sharing	  of	  information	  regarding	  engine	  design	  through	  a	  cross-­‐licensing	  agreement.	  Under	  this	  agreement,	  individual	  manufacturers	  continued	  to	  do	  their	  own	  research	  and	  develop	  their	  own	  patents,	  but	  all	  members	  were	  able	  to	  use	  all	  of	  these	  patents	  without	  the	  payment	  of	  any	  fees	  (Flink,	  1990).	  This	  original	  connection	  to	  material	  manufacturing	  processes	  will	  be	  important	  later	  in	  our	  discussion	  of	  open	  source.	  As	  we	  can	  already	  see,	  this	  is	  a	  model	  that	  really	  does	  privilege	  access	  over	  ownership,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  ownership	  of	  any	  given	  patent	  is	  irrelevant	  as	  long	  as	  you	  are	  part	  of	  the	  group	  that	  can	  access	  all	  of	  them.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  sharing	  in	  this	  example	  is	  fundamentally	  limited,	  both	  in	  that	  the	  information	  is	  only	  shared	  with	  the	  members	  of	  a	  fairly	  select	  group	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  creating	  and	  maintaining	  a	  monopoly	  (or	  perhaps	  an	  oligopoly),	  and	  that	  the	  information	  being	  shared	  wouldn’t	  be	  useful	  to	  anyone	  who	  lacked	  the	  concentrated	  capital	  to	  engage	  in	  large-­‐scale	  manufacturing.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  the	  open	  source	  movement	  has	  developed	  such	  a	  strong	  relationship	  with	  software.	  Digital	  goods	  have	  the	  unique	  attribute	  that	  they	  can	  be	  shared	  without	  being	  lost	  or	  diminished,	  making	  them	  particularly	  well-­‐suited	  to	  present	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  the	  criterion	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  that	  it	  forms	  a	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  an	  absence	  of	  scarcity,	  it	  becomes	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  defend	  a	  situation	  of	  economy	  inequality.	  So,	  for	  example,	  a	  computer	  user	  who	  wishes	  to	  run	  the	  Linux	  operating	  system	  need	  only	  download	  a	  free	  copy	  and	  install	  it	  on	  his	  or	  her	  computer,	  as	  Linux	  is	  covered	  by	  the	  GNU	  general	  public	  license,	  which	  guarantees	  both	  that	  no	  payment	  is	  necessary	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to	  run	  the	  software	  and,	  crucially,	  that	  anyone	  is	  free	  to	  modify	  the	  software	  and	  to	  access	  the	  source	  code.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  the	  more	  users	  it	  has,	  the	  better	  Linux	  becomes,	  as	  these	  users	  also	  form	  a	  developer	  base	  that	  is	  constantly	  engaged	  in	  improving	  the	  software.	  Some	  people	  do	  make	  a	  living	  on	  Linux,	  either	  by	  providing	  services	  associated	  with	  the	  software,	  or	  by	  compiling	  bundles	  of	  open	  source	  software,	  modifying	  them	  to	  work	  together,	  and	  selling	  the	  bundle,	  but	  while	  the	  GNU	  license	  doesn’t	  prohibit	  this,	  neither	  does	  it	  make	  the	  preservation	  and	  expansion	  of	  these	  monetization	  strategies	  its	  primary	  objective.	  Instead,	  the	  open	  source	  software	  movement	  is	  primarily	  about	  sharing	  and	  cooperative	  development,	  but	  with	  room	  left	  for	  profit	  making	  when	  it	  doesn’t	  interfere	  with	  this	  primary	  objective.	  	  The	  obvious	  shortcoming	  of	  the	  open	  source	  movement	  as	  a	  potential	  site	  of	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  criterion	  that	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  is	  a	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality	  is	  that	  most	  of	  the	  things	  we	  buy,	  sell,	  trade,	  and	  consume	  are	  not	  digital	  goods.	  Open	  source	  is	  great	  for	  operating	  systems	  or	  computer	  programs,	  but	  what	  would	  it	  mean	  to	  have	  an	  open	  source	  car	  or	  an	  open	  source	  house?	  Material	  goods	  are	  scarce,	  and	  this	  scarcity	  presents	  a	  significant	  obstacle	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  open	  source	  model.	  However,	  this	  scarcity	  of	  material	  goods,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  requirement	  (as	  with	  the	  automobile	  manufacturers	  discussed	  above)	  that	  a	  large	  concentration	  of	  capital	  be	  deployed	  in	  order	  to	  build	  complex	  devices	  in	  large	  numbers,	  is	  in	  some	  important	  respects	  a	  technical	  problem	  rather	  than	  an	  insurmountable	  aspect	  of	  reality.	  What	  if	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  print	  complicated,	  three-­‐dimensional	  devices	  at	  home,	  as	  long	  as	  you	  had	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the	  plans?	  As	  one	  law	  review	  article	  on	  the	  subject	  puts	  it:	  In	  the	  late	  1970s	  3D	  printing	  started	  to	  become	  established	  as	  a	  manufacturing	  technology.	  Thirty	  years	  on	  the	  cost	  of	  3D	  printing	  machines	  is	  falling	  to	  the	  point	  where	  private	  individuals	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  may	  easily	  own	  them.	  They	  allow	  anyone	  to	  print	  complicated	  engineering	  parts	  entirely	  automatically	  from	  design	  files	  that	  it	  is	  straightforward	  to	  share	  over	  the	  Internet.	  However,	  although	  the	  widespread	  use	  of	  3D	  printers	  may	  well	  have	  both	  economic	  and	  environmental	  advantages	  over	  conventional	  methods	  of	  manufacturing	  and	  distributing	  goods,	  there	  may	  be	  concerns	  that	  such	  use	  could	  be	  constrained	  by	  the	  operation	  of	  intellectual	  property	  (IP)	  law.	  (Bradshaw,	  Bowyer,	  and	  Haufe,	  2010)	  	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  the	  authors	  of	  this	  review	  have	  the	  context	  right,	  but	  may	  be	  looking	  at	  the	  questions	  it	  raises	  from	  the	  wrong	  angle.	  That	  is,	  we	  should	  consider	  the	  rise	  of	  technologies	  like	  3D	  printing	  not	  as	  something	  to	  be	  constrained	  by	  existing	  IP	  laws,	  but	  precisely	  as	  technologies	  for	  the	  challenge	  and	  reconfiguration	  of	  these	  laws,	  and	  of	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  economy	  of	  which	  they	  form	  an	  integral	  part.	  That	  is,	  if	  we	  continue	  to	  understand	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  materialization	  resulting	  from	  a	  structural	  effect	  that	  is	  produced	  and	  maintained	  through	  repeated	  practices	  of	  signification,	  then	  we	  might	  understand	  the	  advent	  of	  technologies	  like	  3D	  printing	  as	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  whole	  new	  set	  of	  possible	  practices.	  The	  insertion	  of	  such	  practices	  as	  variations	  on	  the	  repetition	  of	  practices	  of	  signification	  has	  the	  potential	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy,	  and	  in	  this	  case,	  with	  respect	  in	  particular	  to	  its	  status	  as	  a	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality.	  	   In	  this	  context,	  we	  can	  answer	  a	  couple	  of	  the	  questions	  raised	  above.	  An	  open	  source	  car,	  for	  example,	  might	  be	  simply	  the	  instructions	  for	  the	  printing	  of	  such	  a	  car.	  An	  open	  source	  home	  could	  mean	  the	  same	  thing	  –	  imagine	  the	  possibilities	  for	  inexpensive,	  easy	  to	  construct,	  modern	  housing	  if	  you	  could	  simply	  
	  244	  
print	  panels	  complete	  with	  insulation,	  windows,	  plumbing,	  and	  wiring,	  then	  just	  snap	  them	  together.	  Putting	  aside	  the	  problem	  that	  these	  examples	  are	  well	  beyond	  the	  capabilities	  of	  actually	  existing	  3D	  printing	  technologies,	  it’s	  clear	  that	  such	  an	  innovation	  could	  not	  completely	  resolve	  the	  problem	  of	  material	  scarcity	  as	  some	  matter	  would	  be	  necessary	  from	  which	  to	  print	  things.	  There	  is	  also,	  of	  course,	  the	  question	  of	  access	  to	  the	  printers	  themselves;	  could	  they	  print	  themselves?	  However,	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  might	  imagine	  such	  an	  innovation	  to	  transform	  efforts	  to	  resist	  or	  alter	  the	  power	  relationship(s)	  embodied	  in	  the	  current	  materialization	  of	  the	  economy	  can	  illustrate	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  such	  efforts	  might	  be	  made	  more	  effective	  today,	  again	  keeping	  in	  mind	  the	  link	  that	  technological	  innovation	  makes	  possible	  new	  experiences	  and	  novel	  practices	  which	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  lead	  to	  conceptual	  innovation.	  	   For	  example,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  what	  might	  be	  left	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  we	  generally	  think	  about	  it	  if	  all	  (or	  even	  most)	  commercial	  manufacturing	  gave	  way	  to	  3D	  printing.	  Not	  only	  would	  such	  a	  change	  drive	  manufacturing	  itself	  out	  of	  the	  economy	  (as	  we	  tend	  to	  conceive	  of	  it,	  at	  least),	  but	  it	  would	  also	  have	  profound	  effects	  on	  the	  transportation	  and	  fuel	  industries,	  as	  it	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  necessary	  to	  ship	  manufactured	  goods	  from	  point	  to	  point	  (creating	  an	  interesting	  connection	  between	  this	  vision	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy	  and	  our	  earlier	  discussion	  of	  the	  green	  economy).	  Similarly,	  it	  would	  be	  come	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  “own”	  the	  design	  of	  a	  given	  product	  in	  any	  meaningful	  way;	  one	  might	  expect	  plans	  for	  iPods	  to	  be	  distributed	  as	  freely	  as	  MP3s.	  	  In	  the	  first	  case	  (the	  manufacturing	  industry	  itself),	  power	  relationships	  that	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we	  tend	  to	  think	  of	  as	  dictated	  by	  the	  “innate”	  characteristics	  of	  the	  economy	  would	  cease	  to	  obtain,	  much	  as	  they	  do	  in	  the	  open	  source	  software	  sector	  described	  above.	  Efforts	  by	  the	  film	  and	  music	  industries	  have	  made	  it	  quite	  clear	  that	  once	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  given	  commodity	  becomes	  the	  same	  as	  acquisition	  of	  information	  describing	  that	  commodity	  in	  sufficient	  detail,	  it	  is	  more	  or	  less	  impossible	  to	  stop	  the	  free	  spread	  of	  that	  information.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  business	  models	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Netflix,	  Spotify,	  iTunes,	  Kindle,	  etc)	  must	  be	  radically	  altered	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  new	  paradigm	  of	  sharing.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  each	  of	  these	  examples,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  enterprise	  lies	  not	  only	  in	  adequately	  delivering	  the	  commodities	  in	  question	  to	  consumer,	  but	  in	  doing	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  exceeds	  the	  convenience	  of	  true	  sharing.	  One	  effect	  that	  such	  a	  shift	  might	  have,	  were	  it	  to	  extend	  its	  reach	  into	  physical	  manufacturing,	  would	  be	  a	  radical	  restructuring	  of	  the	  power	  relationships	  surrounding	  the	  concept	  of	  employment.	  In	  late	  capitalism,	  several	  aspects	  of	  such	  power	  relationships	  appear	  as	  innate	  features	  of	  the	  economy.	  One	  prime	  example	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  what	  Marxists	  term	  a	  “crisis	  of	  overproduction.”	  Such	  a	  crisis	  may	  occur	  when,	  through	  the	  continual	  revolutionizing	  of	  the	  process	  of	  production,	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  process(es)	  is	  increased	  dramatically	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  amount	  of	  human	  labor	  required	  is	  decreased.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  situation	  wherein	  the	  amount	  produced	  cannot	  be	  consumed,	  not	  because	  there	  is	  insufficient	  demand	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  human	  desire	  for	  the	  product	  in	  question),	  but	  instead	  because	  there	  insufficient	  money	  available	  to	  purchase	  commodities	  produced.	  Such	  crises	  (whether	  understood	  in	  Marxist	  terms,	  or	  in	  the	  more	  banal	  liberal	  language	  of	  the	  “business	  cycle”)	  are	  common	  in	  contemporary	  experience,	  and	  we	  tend	  to	  accept	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without	  question	  the	  basic	  premise	  that	  individuals	  must	  be	  employed	  by	  capital	  in	  order	  to	  be	  eligible	  to	  consume	  its	  produce	  (see,	  e.g.	  Mandel	  1972	  or	  Harvey	  1991).	  The	  advent	  of	  3D	  printing	  as	  a	  legitimate	  replacement	  for	  manufacturing	  (particular	  if	  those	  3D	  printers	  could	  print	  copies	  of	  themselves)	  might	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  extreme	  case	  of	  a	  crisis	  of	  overproduction.	  That	  is,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  virtually	  anything	  that	  humans	  as	  a	  group	  know	  how	  to	  build	  could	  be	  built	  with	  virtually	  no	  labor	  at	  all.	  The	  result	  would	  be	  a	  decoupling	  of	  labor	  from	  consumption,	  which	  would	  necessarily	  result	  in	  a	  complete	  revaluation	  of	  labor.	  There	  would,	  of	  course,	  still	  be	  practices	  and	  services	  that	  required	  the	  labor	  of	  individuals	  with	  particular	  skills,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  entice	  these	  individuals	  to	  exercise	  these	  skills	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  material	  fulfillment	  were	  such	  fulfillment	  available	  to	  them	  regardless.	  One	  might	  imagine	  that	  people	  would	  eventually	  stop	  using	  money	  to	  facilitate	  material	  exchanges,	  limiting	  its	  use	  to	  the	  exchange	  of	  services.	  	  The	  value	  in	  this	  thought	  experiment	  for	  the	  project	  at	  hand	  lies	  in	  the	  following	  question:	  how	  would	  we	  describe	  the	  economy	  of	  this	  hypothetical	  society?	  Should	  we	  think	  of	  the	  activity	  involved	  in	  developing	  3D	  printing	  plans	  that	  may	  be	  shared	  freely	  without	  loss	  to	  the	  developer	  as	  economic	  activity?	  Would	  the	  economy	  be	  limited	  to	  those	  goods	  and	  services	  that	  could	  still	  be	  purchased	  with	  money?	  Would	  concepts	  like	  GDP	  or	  “growth”	  continue	  to	  be	  meaningful?	  These	  questions,	  or	  questions	  like	  them,	  are	  of	  course	  already	  on	  the	  table	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  music,	  video,	  and	  book	  industries.	  However,	  with	  respect	  to	  these	  industries,	  the	  questions	  tend	  to	  be	  posed	  in	  the	  form	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  industry	  in	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question	  can	  survive	  the	  challenge	  posed	  by	  innovative	  sharing	  technologies	  (e.g.	  Zentner,	  2006;	  Hennig-­‐Thurau,	  Henning,	  and	  Sattler	  2007;	  and	  Liebowitz	  2006).If	  we	  imagine	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  all	  major	  industries	  are	  subject	  to	  these	  novel	  dynamics,	  the	  questions	  must	  be	  framed	  differently,	  asking	  not	  whether	  the	  construction	  industry	  can	  survive	  the	  challenge	  (as	  there	  is	  no	  possibility	  that	  people	  will	  simply	  do	  without	  houses),	  but	  instead	  what	  form	  it	  must	  take	  in	  order	  to	  continue	  to	  produce	  necessary	  goods.	  While	  the	  answers	  to	  these	  questions	  might	  not	  be	  entirely	  clear	  (in	  fact,	  I	  will	  argue	  they	  cannot	  be),	  what	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  a	  significant	  reorganization	  would	  be	  required	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  think	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  “the	  economy”	  and	  the	  political	  and/or	  the	  social.	  The	  need	  for	  some	  system	  to	  determine	  the	  rules	  of	  access	  for	  scarce	  goods	  would	  not	  disappear,	  as	  goods	  such	  as	  land	  and	  human	  services	  would	  remain	  scarce,	  but	  such	  a	  system	  would	  have	  to	  be	  completely	  reimagined,	  and	  divorced	  from	  the	  allocation	  of	  manufactured	  goods.	  What	  would	  it	  mean	  to	  be	  wealthy	  in	  such	  a	  scenario?	  One	  might	  imagine,	  for	  instance,	  that	  wealth	  would	  be	  composed	  not	  of	  money	  or	  material	  goods,	  but	  instead	  of	  access	  to	  the	  information	  required	  to	  print	  the	  most	  desirable	  items.	  Of	  course,	  such	  information	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  keep	  contained	  forever,	  so	  one	  might	  expect	  a	  sort	  of	  cult	  of	  newness	  to	  arise,	  wherein	  people	  trade	  on	  the	  novelty	  of	  their	  particular	  possessions.	  It’s	  not	  at	  all	  clear,	  however,	  how	  such	  a	  system	  would	  relate	  to	  whatever	  system	  arose	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  allocation	  of	  truly	  scarce	  goods.	  One	  might	  even	  imagine	  the	  division	  of	  what	  we	  now	  think	  of	  as	  “the	  economy”	  into	  completely	  separate	  spheres,	  dealing	  respectively	  with	  those	  goods	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that	  are	  subject	  to	  evaluation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  novelty,	  and	  the	  other	  with	  those	  goods	  that	  remain	  subject	  to	  scarcity.	  The	  simple	  allocation	  of	  goods	  that	  function	  primarily	  as	  use	  values	  would	  recede	  out	  of	  the	  arena	  of	  either	  of	  these	  spheres,	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  we	  don’t	  tend	  to	  think	  about	  distribution	  of	  access	  to	  air	  as	  a	  significant	  function	  of	  the	  economy.	  This	  thought	  experiment	  suggests	  a	  couple	  of	  interesting	  features	  of	  an	  inquiry	  regarding	  the	  possibilities	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  economy,	  and	  particularly	  to	  the	  criterion	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality.	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  a	  single	  technological	  innovation	  that	  has	  the	  capacity	  entirely	  to	  reconfigure	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  “the	  economy.”	  Second,	  and	  equally	  important,	  without	  knowing	  the	  precise	  nature	  and	  workings	  of	  such	  a	  technological	  innovation,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  specify	  the	  precise	  nature	  of	  the	  accompanying	  conceptual	  innovation.	  This	  is	  because,	  per	  Koselleck,	  conceptual	  innovation	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  occur	  as	  a	  response	  to	  novel	  experience.	  One	  key	  source	  of	  novel	  experience	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy	  is	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  technological	  capabilities	  (as	  demonstrated	  above	  in	  the	  example	  of	  the	  sharing	  economy),	  but	  the	  advent	  of	  such	  novel	  experience	  neither	  guarantees	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  corresponding	  conceptual	  innovation,	  nor	  dictates	  the	  precise	  nature	  of	  any	  such	  innovation	  that	  might	  occur.	  	  Indeed,	  even	  were	  the	  precise	  nature	  of	  such	  a	  technological	  innovation	  (and	  the	  corresponding	  novel	  experience)	  known,	  it	  would	  simply	  form	  a	  field	  of	  possibility	  on	  which	  concrete	  political	  battles	  over	  the	  accompanying	  conceptual	  innovation	  would	  play	  out.	  Technological	  innovation	  makes	  possible	  new	  practices	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with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy,	  and	  these	  new	  practices	  form	  a	  potential	  site	  for	  conceptual	  innovation,	  but	  the	  process	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  Newton’s	  cradle	  wherein	  knowledge	  of	  the	  initial	  motion	  allows	  one	  to	  predict	  all	  subsequent	  motion.	  	  One	  might	  illustrate	  this	  point	  by	  looking	  backward	  rather	  than	  forward.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  most	  educated	  noble,	  peasant,	  or	  serf	  in	  14th	  century	  England,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  more	  or	  less	  impossible	  to	  predict	  the	  nature	  of	  industrial	  capitalism,	  with	  its	  accompanying	  conceptions	  of	  the	  economy,	  the	  political,	  and	  the	  social.	  Were	  one	  to	  apprise	  this	  hypothetical	  Englishman	  of	  the	  general	  nature	  of	  industrial	  manufacture	  and	  the	  division	  of	  labor,	  he	  might	  have	  been	  able	  to	  begin	  to	  imagine	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  capitalism	  might	  function,	  but	  he	  certainly	  wouldn’t	  be	  able	  to	  predict	  its	  structure	  wholesale,	  because	  this	  structure	  is	  instead	  the	  product	  of	  concrete	  political	  battles	  played	  out	  on	  a	  field	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  technological	  innovations	  in	  question,	  resulting	  in	  the	  specific	  practices	  (and	  their	  repetition)	  that	  produce	  and	  maintain	  the	  economy	  effect	  and	  its	  resultant	  materialization.	  It’s	  difficult	  to	  argue	  that	  industrial	  capitalism	  doesn’t	  represent	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  conceptual	  innovation	  in	  ownership,	  individual	  rights,	  and	  social	  responsibility,	  but	  it’s	  equally	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  that	  any	  of	  these	  specific	  innovations	  could	  have	  been	  predicted	  prior	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  their	  conditions	  of	  possibility.	  	   So,	  if	  we	  are	  on	  the	  watch	  for	  possible	  openings	  for	  conceptual	  innovation,	  new	  concrete	  economic	  practices	  that	  leverage	  new	  technological	  abilities	  are	  undoubtedly	  one	  important	  place	  to	  look	  because	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  novel	  experience	  and	  conceptual	  innovation,	  but	  we	  should	  be	  wary	  of	  any	  such	  practices	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that	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  opening	  of	  new	  markets	  for	  the	  sale	  of	  commodities	  in	  old	  ways.	  In	  fact,	  we	  might	  want	  to	  be	  cautious	  in	  our	  enthusiasm	  for	  any	  activity	  that	  we	  can	  easily	  and	  readily	  understand	  as	  economic	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Instead,	  we	  might	  be	  better	  advised	  to	  look	  for	  those	  practices	  in	  which	  goods	  and	  services	  are	  distributed	  in	  ways	  that	  seem	  to	  be	  extra-­‐economic,	  like	  IP	  piracy	  and	  the	  open	  source	  movement	  detailed	  above,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  the	  institution	  of	  these	  types	  of	  practices	  in	  place	  of	  those	  that	  we	  commonly	  think	  of	  as	  economic	  that	  we	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  find	  real	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  criteria	  by	  which	  the	  economy	  is	  currently	  identified.	  	  
F.	  Conclusion	  If	  we	  wish	  to	  combine	  the	  lessons	  we	  have	  gleaned	  from	  these	  examinations	  of	  the	  green	  and	  sharing	  economies,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  the	  most	  promising	  avenues	  for	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  economy	  lie	  in	  the	  combination	  of	  novel	  experiences	  and	  the	  institution	  of	  practices	  (linguistic	  or	  otherwise)	  that	  highlight	  the	  irreconcilability	  of	  those	  experiences	  with	  the	  rules	  we	  understand	  to	  govern	  the	  economy.	  Such	  a	  statement,	  however,	  is	  at	  once	  both	  banal	  and	  uselessly	  vague.	  To	  be	  more	  specific,	  we	  might	  first	  narrow	  down	  the	  range	  of	  novel	  experiences.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  technologies	  like	  3D	  printing	  are	  one	  possible	  source	  of	  such	  novel	  experience,	  insofar	  as	  their	  widespread	  adoption	  would	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  continue	  economic	  BAU	  (to	  borrow	  Stern’s	  term).	  Other	  possibilities	  include	  science	  fiction	  technologies	  like	  teleportation	  (or	  some	  reasonable	  facsimile	  thereof)	  or	  space	  travel	  (eliminating	  the	  scarcity	  of	  land,	  and	  potentially	  introducing	  whole	  new	  kinds	  and	  sources	  of	  wealth),	  but	  also	  more	  mundane	  innovations	  like	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new	  techniques	  for	  producing	  energy	  or	  growing	  food	  that	  can	  serve	  to	  limit	  individuals’	  dependence	  on	  the	  large-­‐scale	  corporate	  form	  and	  the	  money	  economy,	  or	  even	  novel	  arrangements	  of	  relationships	  that	  supercede	  “economic”	  imperatives.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  Gibson-­‐Graham’s	  (2006)	  idea	  of	  looking	  for	  the	  non-­‐capitalist	  class	  practices	  inside	  the	  system	  we	  usually	  think	  of	  as	  capitalist	  is	  on	  the	  right	  path,	  but	  perhaps	  focuses	  insufficiently	  on	  the	  element	  of	  the	  novel	  experience	  (in	  part	  because	  they	  are	  concerned	  less	  with	  the	  economy	  and	  more	  with	  capitalism).	  We	  must	  look	  not	  only	  for	  these	  non-­‐capitalist	  practices,	  but	  for	  specific	  examples	  of	  these	  practices	  which	  leverage	  novel	  experiences	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  capitalist	  class	  processes	  (if	  our	  goal	  is	  to	  challenge	  capitalism),	  or	  with	  processes	  that	  perpetuate	  inequality	  (if	  our	  goal	  is	  to	  reduce	  the	  inequality	  of	  the	  capitalist	  system),	  or	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  separate	  sphere	  of	  human	  activity	  that	  meets	  our	  six	  criteria	  (if	  our	  goal	  is	  to	  destabilize	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole).	  Such	  examples	  are	  not	  so	  difficult	  to	  find,	  and	  have	  the	  advantage	  over	  many	  traditional	  methods	  of	  resistance	  on	  the	  left	  that	  they	  neither	  require	  individuals	  to	  decrease	  their	  consumption,	  nor	  do	  they	  make	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life	  harder	  in	  the	  service	  of	  some	  ideological	  goal.	  Instead,	  they	  present	  ways	  to	  make	  our	  lives	  easier,	  as	  long	  as	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  cast	  off	  the	  relations	  and	  reshape	  the	  materializations	  that	  inhibit	  or	  prohibit	  their	  use.	  	  If	  we	  combine	  this	  insight	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  are	  beginning	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  engine	  in	  need	  of	  constant	  direction	  and	  redirection	  as	  we	  better	  understand	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  future	  consequences	  of	  our	  actions	  (see	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Chapter	  4),	  the	  outlines	  of	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  that	  could	  nicely	  complement	  the	  focus	  on	  novel	  experiences	  begins	  to	  take	  form.	  Perhaps,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  many	  in	  the	  environmental	  movement	  are	  seeking	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  there	  are	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  live	  an	  environmentally	  responsible	  life	  without	  giving	  up	  major	  components	  of	  our	  current	  lifestyles	  through	  careful	  leveraging	  of	  new	  technologies	  (like	  alternative	  power	  sources	  and	  biodegradable	  materials),	  an	  anti-­‐economy	  movement	  could	  base	  its	  innovative	  practices	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  maintaining	  many	  of	  our	  desired	  patterns	  of	  consumption	  while	  throwing	  off	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  economy	  through	  a	  similar	  careful	  leveraging	  (as,	  for	  example,	  discussed	  above	  in	  relation	  to	  file	  sharing	  and	  3D	  printing).	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  green	  and	  sharing	  economies	  as	  we	  have,	  we	  can	  also	  see	  an	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  the	  dynamic	  by	  which	  the	  current	  materialization	  of	  the	  economy	  is	  renewed	  and	  reinvented	  while	  maintaining	  coherence.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  cases,	  we	  see	  examples	  of	  the	  gradual	  adaptation	  of	  the	  modifying	  terms	  (in	  these	  cases,	  “green”	  and	  “sharing”)	  to	  bring	  their	  meanings	  into	  line	  with	  the	  basic	  (diachronic)	  presuppositions	  of	  the	  economy.	  “Green”	  becomes	  a	  word	  that	  denotes	  the	  incorporation	  of	  environmental	  externalities	  into	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis,	  while	  “sharing”	  begins	  to	  mean	  the	  introduction	  of	  micro-­‐transactions	  to	  an	  already	  existing	  market	  mechanism.	  It	  is	  by	  no	  means	  an	  easy	  thing	  to	  pose	  a	  successful	  alternative	  to	  the	  economy,	  in	  large	  part	  because	  its	  appearance	  of	  naturalness	  and	  inevitability	  make	  us	  particularly	  willing	  to	  sacrifice	  or	  modify	  our	  “extra-­‐economic”	  goals	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  them	  in	  line	  with	  the	  perceived	  reality	  of	  the	  economy.	  In	  many	  cases,	  what	  starts	  out	  as	  an	  effort	  to	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CONCLUSION	  	  	   In	  the	  Introduction,	  I	  described	  how	  I	  began	  to	  form	  the	  questions	  that	  drove	  this	  dissertation	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  union	  negotiation	  over	  health	  insurance.	  The	  University	  had	  announced	  that	  significant	  changes	  to	  graduate	  employee	  health	  insurance	  were	  required	  because	  it	  was	  the	  only	  way	  in	  which	  a	  new	  student	  health	  center	  could	  be	  financed	  in	  “the	  economy”	  in	  which	  we	  found	  ourselves	  at	  the	  time.	  I	  was,	  at	  the	  time,	  struck	  by	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  such	  an	  assertion	  was	  effective	  at	  shutting	  down	  negotiations,	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  “the	  economy”	  served	  as	  a	  virtually	  incontestable	  constraint	  on	  the	  possible	  solutions	  or	  agreements	  at	  which	  we	  might	  arrive.	  My	  goal	  in	  this	  dissertation	  has	  been	  to	  suggest	  that,	  through	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  processes	  through	  which	  the	  economy	  effect	  has	  come	  to	  exist,	  and	  through	  which	  it	  continues	  to	  be	  produced	  and	  maintained,	  we	  might	  allow	  ourselves	  to	  contest	  the	  seemingly	  incontestable,	  to	  resist	  or	  alter	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  constraints.	  	   How,	  though,	  might	  such	  contestation	  actually	  be	  enacted?	  What,	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  can	  we	  do	  with	  the	  understanding	  to	  which	  this	  work	  has	  been	  devoted?	  A	  passage	  from	  a	  recent	  report	  by	  Joseph	  Stiglitz	  and	  the	  Roosevelt	  Institute	  might	  be	  useful	  in	  thinking	  about	  these	  questions:	  Inequality	  is	  not	  inevitable:	  it	  is	  a	  choice	  we	  make	  with	  the	  rules	  we	  create	  to	  structure	  our	  economy.	  Over	  the	  last	  35	  years,	  America’s	  policy	  choices	  have	  been	  grounded	  in	  false	  assumptions,	  and	  the	  result	  is	  a	  weakened	  economy	  in	  which	  most	  Americans	  struggle	  to	  achieve	  or	  maintain	  a	  middle-­‐class	  lifestyle	  while	  a	  small	  percentage	  enjoy	  an	  increasingly	  large	  share	  of	  the	  nation’s	  wealth…	  To	  fully	  understand	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  problem,	  we	  must	  also	  examine	  the	  array	  of	  laws	  and	  policies	  that	  lie	  beneath	  the	  surface	  –	  the	  rules	  that	  determine	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  public	  and	  private,	  employers	  and	  workers,	  innovation	  and	  shared	  growth,	  and	  all	  the	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interests	  that	  make	  up	  the	  modern	  economy.	  (Stiglitz,	  7)	  	  The	  title	  of	  the	  report	  (“Rewriting	  the	  Rules	  of	  the	  American	  Economy:	  An	  Agenda	  for	  Shared	  Prosperity”)	  seems	  at	  first	  to	  offer	  hope	  that	  Stiglitz’s	  agenda	  will	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  claim,	  advanced	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  that	  far	  from	  a	  pre-­‐given	  object	  with	  which	  we	  must	  cope,	  the	  economy	  is	  instead	  a	  structural	  effect	  which	  is	  produced	  and	  maintained	  through	  the	  concrete	  actions	  of	  individuals.	  It	  appears	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  made	  thing	  rather	  than	  a	  given,	  and	  that	  as	  a	  result	  it	  may	  be	  changed	  in	  order	  better	  to	  serve	  the	  needs	  and	  wants	  of	  individuals	  and	  groups.	  	  The	  beginning	  of	  the	  quotation	  above,	  which	  is	  the	  opening	  passage	  of	  the	  report’s	  executive	  summary,	  bolsters	  this	  expectation.	  The	  economy,	  it	  tells	  us,	  is	  structured	  by	  rules	  that	  we	  ourselves	  create.	  	  	   However,	  it	  proves	  difficult	  for	  Stiglitz	  to	  maintain	  this	  stance	  toward	  the	  economy	  even	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  entire	  opening	  passage.	  By	  the	  second	  sentence,	  in	  fact,	  the	  economy	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  product	  of	  self-­‐consciously	  created	  rules,	  but	  instead	  an	  external	  element	  that	  responds	  to	  our	  policy	  choices.	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  right	  and	  wrong	  policy	  choices	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy’s	  “strength”	  or	  lack	  thereof.	  Of	  course,	  a	  suggestion	  that	  given	  policy	  choices	  will	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  making	  the	  economy	  stronger	  or	  weaker	  suggests	  that	  the	  economy	  may	  meaningfully	  be	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  strength,	  without	  attention	  to	  the	  goals	  toward	  which	  that	  strength	  is	  oriented.	  Additionally,	  according	  to	  Stiglitz’s	  formulation,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  given	  policy	  choice	  strengthens	  or	  weakens	  the	  economy	  appears	  to	  be	  dependent	  upon	  the	  truth	  or	  falsity	  of	  the	  assumptions	  that	  inform	  that	  choice.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  (discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2	  above)	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that	  the	  economy	  is	  an	  object	  to	  be	  discovered	  or	  uncovered;	  to	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  we	  are	  able	  to	  uncover	  this	  object,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  make	  true	  assumptions	  about	  its	  workings,	  and	  thus	  about	  the	  kinds	  of	  policies	  that	  will	  strengthen	  it.	  	  	   Things	  get	  even	  muddier	  when	  we	  get	  to	  the	  third	  usage	  of	  the	  economy,	  in	  the	  final	  sentence	  of	  this	  passage.	  Here,	  the	  economy	  is	  neither	  a	  product	  of	  self-­‐consciously	  created	  rules,	  nor	  an	  external	  object	  subject	  to	  good	  or	  bad	  policy	  decisions;	  instead,	  it	  has	  become	  the	  aggregation	  of	  “public	  and	  private,	  employers	  and	  workers,	  innovation	  and	  shared	  growth,	  and	  all	  the	  other	  interests	  that	  make	  up	  the	  modern	  economy.”	  While	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  these	  entities	  is,	  in	  this	  formulation,	  determined	  by	  the	  rules	  to	  which	  Stiglitz	  referred	  in	  the	  opening	  sentence,	  the	  economy	  is	  not	  these	  rules,	  but	  instead	  an	  agglomeration	  of	  “interests.”	  Within	  the	  span	  of	  three	  sentences,	  Stiglitz	  moves	  through	  three	  different	  uses	  of	  “the	  economy,”	  only	  one	  of	  which	  is	  really	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  structural	  effect.	  While	  Stiglitz’s	  first	  usage	  (“Inequality	  is	  not	  inevitable:	  it	  is	  a	  choice	  we	  make	  with	  the	  rules	  we	  create	  to	  structure	  our	  economy”)	  seems	  to	  make	  room	  for	  such	  a	  perspective,	  his	  second	  usage	  (“Over	  the	  last	  35	  years,	  America’s	  policy	  choices	  have	  been	  grounded	  in	  false	  assumptions,	  and	  the	  result	  is	  a	  weakened	  economy…”)	  is	  much	  more	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  timeless	  and	  governed	  by	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  which	  exist	  prior	  to	  and	  separate	  from	  our	  social	  structures,	  and	  to	  which	  these	  structures	  must	  be	  adapted	  through	  access	  to	  correct	  knowledge	  of	  the	  object.	  As	  we	  discussed	  above,	  such	  a	  formulation	  is	  often	  found	  in	  historical	  narratives	  about	  thinkers	  like	  Adam	  Smith	  whose	  work	  predates	  the	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economy.	  By	  treating	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  pre-­‐given,	  naturally	  occurring	  object,	  such	  language	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  making	  it	  apparent	  that	  we	  must	  change	  those	  things	  over	  which	  we	  do	  have	  control	  (like	  laws	  governing	  social	  relations)	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  consistent	  with	  the	  (discovered	  and	  discoverable)	  demands	  of	  the	  economy.	  Far	  from	  promoting	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  rules	  may	  be	  re-­‐written	  to	  advance	  our	  political	  goals	  (which	  for	  Stiglitz	  seem	  clearly	  to	  include	  the	  elimination	  or	  mitigation	  of	  inequality),	  this	  sentence	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  we	  must	  alter	  our	  rules	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  consistent	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  a	  strong	  economy,	  and	  that	  one	  result	  of	  such	  an	  economy	  would	  be	  decreased	  inequality.	  	  Finally,	  in	  his	  third	  usage	  (“…public	  and	  private,	  employers	  and	  workers,	  innovation	  and	  shared	  growth,	  and	  all	  the	  interests	  that	  make	  up	  the	  modern	  economy”),	  by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  made	  up	  not	  simply	  of	  rules	  (either	  produced	  or	  uncovered),	  but	  instead	  of	  some	  (unspecified)	  combination	  or	  rules	  and	  “interests,”	  Stiglitz	  makes	  room	  for	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  agential.	  In	  short,	  despite	  the	  initial	  promise	  of	  Stiglitz’s	  formulation,	  when	  we	  attempt	  to	  synthesize	  these	  three	  senses	  in	  which	  he	  uses	  the	  term	  “economy,”	  the	  result	  is	  a	  confused	  object	  which,	  while	  making	  some	  room	  for	  change,	  is	  ultimately	  consistent	  with	  most	  of	  the	  six	  criteria	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  elaborated	  above.	  	  Stiglitz’s	  economy	  is	  (1)	  distinct	  from	  social	  and	  political	  life,	  and	  it	  functions	  according	  to	  laws	  of	  its	  own	  (else	  it	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  make	  “false	  assumptions”	  about	  its	  working	  in	  the	  way	  he	  suggests).	  While	  Stiglitz’s	  economy	  may	  not	  be	  (2)	  entirely	  impersonal	  or	  subject	  to	  its	  own	  moral	  laws,	  it	  does	  seem	  (3)	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  naturalization	  of	  many	  kinds	  of	  material	  inequality.	  This	  is	  true	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despite	  his	  overt	  anti-­‐inequality	  position,	  because	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  economy	  functions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  own	  rules	  without	  also	  accepting	  the	  position	  that	  these	  rules	  may	  require	  certain	  types	  or	  levels	  of	  inequality.	  That	  is,	  if	  there	  are	  “correct”	  assumptions	  about	  what	  kinds	  of	  rules	  will	  generate	  a	  “strong”	  economy,	  then	  we	  must	  be	  prepared	  to	  accept	  as	  natural	  whatever	  levels	  of	  inequality	  come	  along	  with	  such	  strength.54	  Moreover,	  Stiglitz’s	  formulation	  does	  nothing	  to	  challenge	  the	  perception	  (4)	  that	  the	  economy	  can	  serve	  to	  decouple	  the	  idea	  of	  growth	  from	  the	  limitations	  of	  physical	  space,	  and	  it	  is	  clearly	  consistent	  with	  the	  criteria	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  (5)	  natural	  and	  inevitable	  (insofar	  as	  it	  is	  governed	  by	  rules	  which	  exist	  prior	  to	  us	  and	  must	  be	  discovered),	  and	  (6)	  agential,	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  made	  up	  not	  only	  of	  rules	  but	  also	  of	  “interests.”	  	   One	  way,	  then,	  in	  which	  we	  might	  put	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  as	  a	  structural	  effect	  which	  fulfills	  these	  six	  criteria	  to	  work	  is	  to	  use	  it	  as	  a	  lens	  through	  which	  we	  can	  evaluate	  specific	  uses	  of	  “the	  economy”	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  potential	  for	  conceptual	  innovation.	  In	  order	  to	  carry	  such	  a	  potential,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  a	  given	  usage	  must	  at	  once	  be	  intelligible	  as	  related	  to	  the	  original	  concept	  (in	  this	  case,	  the	  contemporary	  economy)	  while	  simultaneously	  allowing	  us	  to	  “comprehend	  what	  is	  old	  in	  a	  different	  way”	  or	  to	  “comprehend	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Based	  upon	  the	  timeline	  I	  have	  suggested	  in	  chapters	  1	  and	  2,	  inequality	  vastly	  predates	  the	  production	  of	  the	  economy.	  As	  such,	  one	  might	  reasonably	  argue	  that	  to	  produce	  the	  economy	  differently,	  or	  not	  at	  all,	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  a	  step	  toward	  reducing	  or	  eliminating	  inequality.	  While	  this	  might	  be	  true,	  the	  contrapositive	  is	  less	  convincing.	  That	  is,	  I	  argue	  that	  while	  changing	  or	  eliminating	  the	  economy	  might	  not	  do	  anything	  to	  eliminate	  or	  mitigate	  inequality,	  maintaining	  the	  status	  quo	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  economy	  effect	  does	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  maintaining,	  protecting,	  and	  encouraging	  high	  levels	  of	  inequality,	  as	  outlined	  above.	  Some	  conceptual	  innovation	  in	  the	  economy	  is	  necessary,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  sufficient,	  for	  reducing	  material	  inequality.	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any	  way	  what	  is	  new.”	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  helpful	  if	  such	  a	  usage	  highlights	  a	  contradiction	  that	  might	  be	  resolved	  through	  the	  innovation	  in	  question.	  Had	  Stiglitz	  written	  the	  paragraph	  in	  question	  with	  such	  concerns	  in	  mind,	  it	  might	  have	  looked	  something	  like	  this:	  Inequality	  is	  not	  inevitable:	  it	  is	  a	  choice	  we	  make	  with	  the	  rules	  we	  create	  to	  structure	  our	  economy.	  Over	  the	  last	  35	  years,	  America’s	  policy	  choices	  have	  been	  grounded	  in	  the	  assumption	  that	  rules	  
that	  allow	  for	  easier	  concentration	  of	  capital	  will	  result	  in	  
increased	  investment	  and	  decreased	  unemployment,	  and	  the	  result	  is	  an	  economy	  that	  has	  been	  constructed	  in	  order	  to	  
concentrate	  capital,	  and	  in	  which	  most	  Americans	  struggle	  to	  achieve	  or	  maintain	  a	  middle-­‐class	  lifestyle	  while	  a	  small	  percentage	  enjoy	  an	  increasingly	  large	  share	  of	  the	  nation’s	  wealth…	  To	  fully	  understand	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  problem,	  we	  must	  also	  examine	  the	  array	  of	  laws	  and	  policies	  that	  lie	  beneath	  the	  surface	  –	  the	  rules	  that	  determine	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  public	  and	  private,	  employers	  and	  workers,	  innovation	  and	  shared	  growth,	  and	  all	  the	  interests	  that	  participate	  in	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  
the	  economy	  effect.55	  	  	  These	  changes	  might	  appear	  small,	  and	  in	  many	  respects	  they	  are,	  but	  they	  alter	  the	  passage	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  becomes	  clear,	  all	  the	  way	  through,	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  produced	  object	  (effect),	  and	  that	  as	  such	  it	  can	  be	  reconstructed	  differently	  through	  the	  act	  of	  “Rewriting	  the	  Rules	  of	  the	  American	  Economy.”	  Without	  this	  shift	  in	  language	  and	  understanding,	  the	  project	  outlined	  in	  the	  report	  appears	  to	  be	  one	  in	  which	  Stiglitz	  and	  others	  seek	  to	  understand	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  external	  object,	  the	  features	  of	  which	  must	  be	  determined,	  in	  order	  to	  arrive	  at	  “correct”	  policy	  positions	  that	  allow	  it	  to	  gain	  “strength,”	  albeit	  with	  the	  proviso	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  such	  strength	  should	  be	  as	  evenly	  distributed	  as	  possible.	  	  However,	  with	  the	  changes	  I’ve	  suggested,	  the	  passage	  instead	  describes	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  My	  changes	  in	  bold.	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project	  in	  which	  the	  rules	  themselves	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  economy	  effect,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  changes	  in	  these	  rules	  can	  serve	  to	  transform	  the	  economy	  itself.	  As	  such,	  while	  the	  formulation	  above	  is	  still	  intelligible	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  prevailing	  concept	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy,	  it	  also	  has	  the	  potential	  for	  conceptual	  innovation,	  insofar	  as	  it	  does	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  six	  criteria	  elaborated	  above.	  Such	  as	  a	  usage	  makes	  room	  for	  us	  comprehend	  what	  is	  old	  in	  a	  new	  way,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  has	  the	  self-­‐conscious	  purpose	  of	  innovating	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  The	  operative	  question	  then	  becomes	  not	  simply	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  economy,	  but	  also	  the	  goals	  and	  purposes	  with	  which	  it	  is	  imbued.	  If,	  in	  this	  formulation,	  the	  rules	  are	  to	  be	  changed	  so	  that	  easy	  concentration	  of	  capital	  is	  no	  longer	  privileged,	  such	  a	  change	  will	  not	  be	  made	  because	  it	  is	  the	  correct	  way	  to	  strengthen	  the	  economy	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  objective	  understanding	  of	  its	  mechanisms.	  Instead,	  the	  change	  will	  be	  made	  because	  we,	  as	  political	  actors,	  have	  decided	  that	  some	  other	  goal	  or	  purpose	  is	  more	  important	  to	  us	  than	  the	  easy	  concentration	  of	  capital	  	  	   I	  am	  not,	  of	  course,	  suggesting	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  structural	  effect	  is	  sufficient	  in	  itself	  for	  efforts	  to	  halt	  or	  reverse	  the	  slippage	  in	  modifying	  terms.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  unmasking	  a	  lie	  in	  order	  for	  the	  truth	  to	  shine	  through.	  Instead,	  the	  theoretical	  position	  outlined	  in	  this	  dissertation	  opens	  up	  new	  possibilities	  for	  concrete	  discursive	  actions	  that	  contest	  the	  given-­‐ness	  of	  the	  object,	  and	  provides	  a	  language	  through	  which	  to	  describe	  an	  alternative	  relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  its	  potential	  modifiers.	  For	  example,	  without	  the	  language	  of	  structural	  effects	  and	  materializations,	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  make	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the	  claim	  that,	  rather	  than	  modifying	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  “sharing”	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  compatible	  with	  the	  economy,	  we	  might	  instead	  seek	  to	  alter	  the	  rules	  and	  relationships	  that	  produce	  and	  maintain	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  structural	  effect	  in	  order	  to	  make	  it	  compatible	  with	  sharing.	  The	  theory	  allows	  us	  to	  develop	  new	  tactics	  like	  the	  one	  described	  above;	  while	  such	  tactics	  are	  not	  themselves	  a	  victory	  over	  the	  constraints	  on	  political	  possibility	  enforced	  by	  the	  economy	  effect,	  they	  are	  a	  necessary	  component	  of	  such	  a	  victory.	  	   With	  this	  idea	  in	  mind,	  I’d	  like	  to	  return	  to	  the	  example	  of	  negotiations	  over	  healthcare	  with	  which	  this	  dissertation	  began.	  The	  language	  of	  structural	  effects,	  and	  the	  ideas	  and	  critiques	  that	  go	  along	  with	  it,	  might	  have	  made	  possible	  the	  following	  line	  of	  resistance.	  First,	  when	  we	  were	  confronted	  at	  the	  negotiating	  table	  with	  the	  claim	  that,	  “in	  this	  economy”	  no	  one	  but	  the	  workers	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  finance	  a	  new	  student	  health	  center,	  we	  might	  have	  responded	  that	  we	  were	  not	  willing	  to	  go	  along	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  economy	  was	  fixed	  or	  given	  while	  our	  actions	  were	  flexible	  or	  malleable	  (much	  as	  negotiators	  often	  do	  when	  confronted	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  given	  demand	  is	  a	  political	  impossibility).	  Second,	  the	  bargaining	  team	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  respond	  to	  demands	  from	  members	  that	  we	  acquiesce	  to	  the	  inexorable	  requirements	  of	  the	  economy	  with	  a	  reasoned	  argument	  that	  these	  requirements	  were	  far	  from	  inexorable,	  and	  that	  in	  fact	  they	  could	  only	  be	  altered	  through	  a	  refusal	  to	  play	  by	  the	  rules	  that	  they	  sought	  to	  enforce.	  The	  team	  might	  even	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  many	  practices	  (including	  the	  strike	  weapon)	  toe	  the	  line	  between	  economic	  and	  political	  activity,	  and	  that	  through	  the	  judicious	  employment	  of	  such	  practices	  we	  as	  a	  union	  had	  the	  potential	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to	  resist	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  given.	  	  We	  could	  have	  made	  similar	  arguments	  to	  the	  media	  and	  to	  our	  various	  allies,	  allowing	  us	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  fight	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  resources	  would	  be	  drawn	  from	  our	  membership	  in	  order	  to	  finance	  the	  new	  student	  health	  center	  without	  focusing	  that	  battle	  on	  the	  technical56	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  economic	  conditions	  allowed	  for	  any	  other	  type	  of	  financing;	  instead,	  we	  could	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  financing	  the	  health	  center	  by	  reducing	  graduate	  employee	  health	  benefits	  would	  produce	  and	  maintain	  the	  kind	  of	  economy	  we	  want.	  Of	  course,	  none	  of	  these	  tactics	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  very	  effective	  in	  a	  vacuum;	  that	  is,	  were	  my	  union	  the	  only	  group	  making	  such	  claims,	  all	  the	  administration	  would	  have	  to	  do	  is	  disagree	  with	  our	  contention	  that	  the	  economy	  could	  be	  otherwise	  and	  continue	  to	  treat	  us	  as	  though	  our	  demands	  were	  unrealistic.	  Because	  meaning	  is	  socially	  constructed,	  conceptual	  change	  must	  always	  be	  a	  social	  process.	  As	  such,	  one	  goal	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  advance	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  economy	  may	  be	  usefully	  understood	  as	  an	  effect	  in	  order	  to	  make	  such	  an	  understanding	  part	  of	  the	  toolbox	  of	  others	  who	  wish	  to	  overcome	  the	  constraints	  it	  places	  on	  political	  action.	  	  Moreover,	  as	  we	  can	  see	  in	  the	  current	  debate	  over	  same	  sex	  marriage,	  or	  the	  relatively	  recent	  Lawrence	  v.	  Texas	  (2003)	  ruling,	  academic	  work	  demonstrating	  that	  objects	  like	  “the	  family”	  or	  practices	  like	  “sodomy”	  are	  not	  natural	  and	  inevitable,	  but	  instead	  constructed	  and	  contingent	  (and	  thus	  susceptible	  to	  elimination	  or	  alternative	  construction)	  can	  influence	  judges	  and	  policy	  makers.	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  The	  term	  “technical”	  deserves	  an	  analysis	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  performed	  for	  the	  “the	  economy”	  in	  this	  work;	  its	  meaning	  is	  far	  from	  clear-­‐cut	  or	  uncomplicated.	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Lawrence	  v.	  Texas,	  for	  example	  the	  arguments	  presented	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  -­‐	  and	  reiterated	  by	  the	  justices	  in	  their	  decision	  -­‐	  rested	  heavily	  on	  the	  scholarship	  of	  historians	  of	  sexuality.	  The	  historians'	  interpretation	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  particularly	  of	  the	  changing	  meaning	  of	  sodomy	  and	  sodomy	  laws,	  proved	  crucial	  to	  convincing	  the	  justices	  to	  go	  against	  their	  own	  precedent.	  (Hurewitz,	  2004)	  	  	  	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  imagine	  this	  dissertation	  forming	  part	  of	  a	  body	  of	  work	  that	  might	  have	  a	  similar	  role	  in	  a	  challenge	  to	  fiduciary	  responsibility,	  for	  example,	  or	  even	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  “the	  economy”	  is	  an	  acceptable	  justification	  for	  a	  refusal	  to	  bargain.	  A	  demonstration	  that	  a	  given	  object	  or	  practice	  is	  not	  natural	  or	  inevitable	  can	  form	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  constellation	  of	  practices	  that	  force	  political	  actors	  (be	  they	  judges,	  elected	  officials,	  or	  simply	  people	  living	  their	  everyday	  lives)	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  claim	  that,	  if	  they	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  contributes	  to	  the	  continued	  production	  or	  maintenance	  of	  	  a	  given	  structural	  effect	  (like	  “the	  economy”)	  they	  do	  so	  not	  because	  they	  must,	  but	  because	  they	  have	  chosen	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	   Much	  like	  the	  historians’	  brief	  in	  Lawrence	  v.	  Texas	  did	  for	  sodomy	  laws,	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  that,	  rather	  than	  existing	  as	  a	  stable	  object	  across	  history,	  the	  economy	  effect	  has	  taken	  a	  number	  of	  different	  forms,	  both	  changing	  over	  time,	  and	  subject	  to	  contestation	  and	  dispute	  within	  individual	  moments.	  I	  have	  employed	  my	  six	  criteria	  of	  the	  contemporary	  economy57	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  understandings	  of	  the	  economy	  over	  time	  have	  differed	  from	  and	  moved	  toward	  the	  contemporary	  view.	  	  The	  etymology	  in	  Chapter	  2	  provides	  evidence	  that	  the	  word	  “economy”	  has	  been	  used	  to	  mean	  many	  different	  things	  since	  at	  least	  the	  middle	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  As	  a	  reminder,	  according	  to	  these	  six	  criteria	  the	  contemporary	  economy	  is:	  1)	  independent	  and	  unique;	  2)	  impersonal;	  3)	  a	  protected	  realm	  of	  inequality;	  4)	  potentially	  infinite;	  5)	  natural	  and	  inevitable;	  and	  6)	  an	  agent.	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the	  seventeenth	  century,	  but	  that	  none	  of	  them	  fulfilled	  these	  six	  criteria	  until	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  and	  that	  such	  a	  usage	  did	  not	  become	  commonplace	  until	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  Moreover,	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3	  focus	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which,	  despite	  this	  etymological	  evidence,	  we	  read	  thinkers	  like	  Marx	  and	  Smith,	  whose	  work	  predates	  the	  contemporary	  economy,	  as	  though	  they	  were	  discussing	  an	  object	  that	  fulfills	  these	  criteria.	  	  One	  result	  of	  such	  a	  practice	  of	  “reading	  back”	  is	  that	  it	  both	  satisfies	  our	  expectation	  that	  the	  economy	  has	  always	  existed	  as	  an	  object	  that	  fulfills	  these	  criteria	  and	  strengthens	  our	  expectation	  that	  additional	  examples	  will	  also	  satisfy	  this	  expectation.	  This	  reading	  back	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  economy	  effect;	  by	  expecting	  the	  economy	  to	  exist	  as	  an	  object	  that	  fulfills	  these	  criteria,	  we	  condition	  ourselves	  to	  see	  it	  as	  such,	  and	  thus	  don’t	  tend	  to	  seek	  out	  evidence	  that	  it	  has	  not	  always	  done	  so.	  	  	   As	  I	  describe	  in	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5,	  this	  reading	  back	  of	  the	  economy,	  along	  with	  practices	  focused	  on	  the	  present	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  economy	  effect,	  creates	  significant	  difficulty	  for	  efforts	  to	  enace	  conceptual	  change	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy.	  When	  words	  such	  as	  “green”	  or	  “sharing”	  are	  brought	  into	  conversation	  with	  “the	  economy,”	  we	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  effect	  alterations	  in	  the	  meanings	  of	  these	  modifying	  terms	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  them	  into	  alignment	  with	  the	  perceived	  demands	  of	  the	  economy.	  In	  this	  way,	  “green”	  ceases	  to	  be	  a	  term	  that	  means	  acting	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  environment	  as	  our	  primary	  concern,	  and	  instead	  becomes	  a	  term	  that	  denotes	  particular	  kinds	  of	  commodities	  (green	  cleaning	  supplies,	  green	  energy,	  or	  even	  green	  homes)	  that	  are	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less	  bad	  for	  the	  environment	  than	  comparable,	  non-­‐green	  versions.	  Through	  this	  slippage,	  “green”	  comes	  to	  denote	  acting	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  as	  little	  damage	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  environment	  while	  maintaining	  the	  economy	  as	  our	  primary	  concern.	  This	  slippage	  does	  even	  more	  violence	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  sharing,	  which	  ceases	  to	  denote	  the	  act	  of	  giving	  some	  of	  one’s	  own	  possessions	  to	  another	  in	  order	  that	  you	  might	  both	  have	  some,	  and	  instead	  comes	  to	  mean	  a	  system	  of	  micro-­‐transactions	  facilitated	  by	  an	  information	  distribution	  service	  that	  takes	  a	  cut	  of	  the	  proceeds	  and	  carries	  no	  stock	  (and	  thus	  very	  little	  risk).	  	  	  	   However,	  this	  slippage	  in	  terms	  used	  to	  modify	  the	  economy	  depends	  upon	  our	  willingness	  to	  understand	  the	  economy	  itself	  not	  as	  a	  structural	  effect,	  but	  instead	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  discoverable	  or	  revealable	  object	  described	  by	  Stiglitz	  in	  his	  second	  usage	  above.	  That	  is,	  if	  we	  accept	  the	  idea	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  economy,	  terms	  such	  as	  “green”	  and	  “sharing”	  must	  be	  imbued	  with	  new	  meanings,	  we	  also	  implicitly	  accept	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  economy	  itself	  is	  an	  unalterable	  	  given.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  refuse	  to	  accept	  this	  proposition,	  demanding	  instead	  that	  the	  economy	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  structural	  effect,	  then	  we	  gain	  the	  ability	  to	  ask	  how	  the	  economy	  might	  be	  altered	  in	  order	  to	  become	  compatible	  with	  the	  values	  described	  by	  terms	  like	  “green”	  or	  “sharing”	  without	  altering	  the	  meaning	  of	  these	  modifying	  terms.	  Such	  a	  stance	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  safeguard	  against	  the	  tendency	  of	  efforts	  to	  resist	  or	  reshape	  the	  economy	  to	  instead	  be	  absorbed	  into	  its	  already	  existing	  logic.	  By	  keeping	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  a	  structural	  effect	  at	  the	  center	  of	  our	  efforts	  to	  describe,	  discuss,	  and	  alter	  it,	  we	  can	  act	  strategically	  in	  order	  to	  make	  such	  absorption	  less	  likely.	  	  
	  266	  
In	  many	  respects,	  it	  is	  this	  possibility	  that	  forms	  the	  central	  contribution	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  While	  others,	  including	  both	  Timothy	  Mitchell	  (1998;	  2014)	  and	  Michel	  Foucault	  (2007),	  have	  claimed	  that	  the	  economy	  is	  newer	  than	  we	  tend	  to	  think,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  at	  once	  produced	  and	  real,	  they	  have	  each	  done	  so	  with	  a	  focus	  that	  is	  complimentary	  to,	  but	  different	  than,	  my	  own.	  Mitchell	  focuses	  largely	  on	  the	  questions	  of	  how	  and	  when	  the	  economy	  was	  formed	  as	  a	  structural	  effect	  (though	  the	  attentive	  reader	  will	  not	  that	  he	  and	  I	  reach	  somewhat	  different	  conclusions	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  question),	  and	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  realities	  of	  life	  for	  much	  of	  the	  world’s	  population.	  Foucault,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  primarily	  interested	  in58	  demonstrating	  discontinuities	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  in	  examining	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  we	  have	  come	  to	  be	  governed	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  are.	  There	  is	  little	  focus,	  however,	  in	  Foucault’s	  work	  on	  the	  economy,	  on	  questions	  of	  how	  we	  might	  transform	  the	  economy	  effect	  to	  make	  it	  serve	  our	  own	  political	  goals.	  In	  fact,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  common	  response	  to	  Foucault	  that	  I’ve	  encountered	  among	  students	  is	  that	  his	  work	  is	  extraordinarily	  interesting,	  but	  leaves	  new	  readers	  feeling	  paralyzed.	  	  In	  contrast,	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  economy	  effect	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  political	  possibilities	  in	  the	  present,	  and	  as	  the	  constant	  locus	  of	  conceptual	  innovation,	  I	  hope	  to	  present	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  fruitful	  site	  for	  political	  action.	  By	  addressing	  the	  literature	  on	  conceptual	  change,	  and	  examining	  the	  efforts	  of	  activists	  seeking	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  It’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  any	  claim	  that	  follows	  this	  introductory	  phrase	  is	  a	  step	  into	  a	  proverbial	  minefield.	  Foucault	  himself	  made	  multiple	  contradictory	  statements	  about	  his	  “primary	  interest”	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  life.	  As	  such,	  any	  claim	  made	  be	  someone	  else	  who	  claims	  to	  know	  exactly	  what	  his	  primary	  interest	  was	  should	  be	  taken	  with	  a	  large	  grain	  of	  salt.	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form	  the	  “green”	  and	  “sharing”	  economies	  through	  this	  lens	  of	  this	  literature,	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  leave	  the	  reader	  with	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  economy	  effect	  is	  both	  made	  and	  real,	  but	  also	  that	  because	  of	  this	  fact	  it	  might	  be	  made	  differently,	  and	  that	  such	  change	  might	  be	  directed	  or	  influenced	  by	  actors	  who	  are	  attentive	  to	  the	  processes	  and	  dynamics	  of	  conceptual	  innovation.	  Specifically,	  as	  I	  suggest	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  we	  might	  usefully	  think	  of	  conceptual	  change	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  dance.	  We	  must	  first	  learn	  the	  steps	  and	  enter	  into	  the	  rhythm;	  once	  we	  have	  done	  so,	  we	  can,	  in	  slow	  stages,	  and	  with	  the	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  of	  others,	  slowly	  and	  in	  nearly	  imperceptible	  stages,	  alter	  the	  steps	  so	  that	  at	  some	  point,	  despite	  never	  having	  stopped	  dancing,	  the	  dance	  we	  are	  performing	  is	  a	  different	  one	  than	  the	  one	  we	  started.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  economy	  effect,	  this	  we	  can	  apply	  this	  insight	  by	  engaging	  in	  practices	  that	  are	  at	  once	  intelligible	  as	  related	  to	  the	  economy	  in	  its	  contemporary	  form,	  but	  that	  also	  challenge	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  conforming	  the	  six	  criteria	  elaborated	  above.	  	  While	  this	  work	  unquestionably	  builds	  upon	  the	  work	  of	  both	  Mitchell	  and	  Foucault,	  by	  incorporating	  the	  literature	  on	  conceptual	  change	  and	  focusing	  on	  the	  political	  possibilities	  of	  the	  present	  and	  the	  future	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  understand	  the	  past	  existence	  of	  the	  economy	  effect,	  I	  have	  brought	  something	  new	  to	  the	  conversation.	  	  	   Finally,	  it’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  I’ve	  not	  engaged	  in	  this	  project	  merely	  as	  an	  intellectual	  exercise;	  I	  include	  myself	  in	  the	  class	  of	  activists	  who	  wish	  to	  alter	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  economy	  effect.	  In	  particular,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  altering	  the	  perceived	  relationship	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  politics.	  While	  it	  is	  perhaps	  the	  case	  that	  each	  of	  these	  structural	  effects	  could	  be	  done	  away	  with	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completely,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  a	  much	  more	  humble	  goal	  to	  suggest	  that	  we	  could	  strive	  for	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  economy	  does	  not	  function	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  politics,	  but	  instead	  politics	  functions	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  the	  economy.	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  we	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  say	  that	  a	  given	  political	  goal	  is	  impossible	  because	  of	  the	  economy	  (though	  it	  might,	  of	  course,	  be	  impossible	  or	  impractical	  for	  a	  host	  of	  other	  readings,	  which	  might	  even	  include	  insufficient	  access	  to	  necessary	  resources),	  but	  we	  would	  be	  able	  to	  say	  that	  certain	  types	  of	  economic	  outcomes	  (such	  as	  growth	  in	  GDP	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  a	  decrease	  in	  median	  income)	  were	  impossible	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  support	  them.	  	  Such	  a	  change	  would,	  of	  course,	  have	  to	  come	  in	  steps,	  but	  it	  is	  my	  profound	  hope	  that	  this	  work	  can	  contribute	  to	  this	  process	  in	  at	  least	  two	  ways.	  First	  by	  undermining	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  an	  eternal,	  inevitable,	  and	  unchanging	  historical	  object,	  I	  hope	  to	  help	  transform	  decisions	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  completely	  constrained	  by	  the	  impositions	  of	  the	  economy	  into	  choices	  that	  must	  be	  recognized	  as	  having	  important	  ethical	  dimensions	  (much	  as	  the	  historians’	  brief	  helped	  to	  do	  for	  legal	  decisions	  about	  sodomy	  laws).	  Second,	  by	  highlighting	  the	  idea	  that,	  if	  the	  economy	  is	  not	  only	  changeable,	  but	  always	  changing,	  and	  not	  only	  not	  inevitable,	  but	  in	  fact	  highly	  contingent	  and	  thus	  in	  some	  ways	  extremely	  fragile,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy	  is	  not	  only	  possible	  but	  likely.	  If	  activists,	  political	  actors,	  and	  students	  enter	  the	  fray	  with	  this	  suggestion	  in	  mind,	  the	  relevant	  questions	  might	  shift	  from	  “Can	  anything	  be	  done	  to	  alter	  the	  economy?”	  to	  “How	  can	  I	  participate	  in	  the	  process	  of	  changing	  the	  economy	  in	  order	  make	  it	  conform	  to	  my	  political	  preferences?”	  While	  such	  a	  shift	  in	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questions	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  the	  kinds	  of	  changes	  I	  hope	  to	  see,	  it	  is,	  I	  think,	  a	  necessary	  precondition,	  as	  it	  opens	  to	  the	  door	  for	  concerted,	  self-­‐conscious	  efforts	  at	  directed	  conceptual	  innovation	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  economy.	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